Address By Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister Of Singapore, Brussels, 1 December 1972
Lee Kuan Yew · Prime Minister of Singapore
- Context
- Lee addressed a conference dinner organised by an institute in Brussels on December 1, 1972, urging the enlarged European Economic Community to widen trade, investment and preferences towards Southeast Asia.
- Main themes
- European trade and investment ties with Southeast Asia, colonial history of European intrusion in Asia, decline of European economic dominance, rise of American and Japanese trade, five major power blocs, opening of China to trade and credit, European offshore manufacturing in Asia, American commitment abroad, E.E.C. Generalised System of Preferences quota, Third World development prospects
- Duration
- ~52 min
- Words
- 6,190
- Sentences
- 459
- Readability
- 51
- Grade
- 8.9
- Syntax
- 2.78
- Vocabulary
- 2.61
Source: National Archives of Singapore ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other459 sentences in 260 paragraphs
Mr. President, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
When I accepted the invitation to speak at this conference, I did not know that I was to speak at dinner. It would have been difficult enough to speak during the day to a knowledgeable and sophisticated audience. Any pleas for increased communion with the Third World, in particular, distant places like
Southeast Asia, might have invoked only polite applause. Worse, being asked to speak at the end of a long day, I would have to be informative and amusing, a formidable task for which I am poorly equipped.
I concluded, however, that the Director-General of the Institute wanted to be kind. He knew Europeans were disappointed with the Third World which they had set free. With Americans and, much later, the Japanese, they have had to give aid to their former colonies, but with meagre results, and little appreciation. Effective administration and honest governments are not universal features of new countries. But some Europeans and Americans still feel embarrassed over their imperial past. So it was best if a representative of the
Third World were to speak after the tranquilising effect of good cuisine and excellent wine.
The past is history. Nearly 500 years ago, the Europeans sailed into the
Indian and Pacific Oceans and opened up Asia.
The first Europeans to lead organised expeditions to the East were the
Portuguese. In 1486, Diaz discovered the Cape of Good Hope. Vasco da Gama followed. When he sailed into Calicut, India, in 1488, he said he sought
“Christians and spices”. But what brought him there by sea was the disruption of the trade routes between Europe and Asia through the Middle East. In the 14th and 15th centuries, the rising power of the Ottoman Turks had made the land route hazardous.
For nearly the whole of the 16th century, the Portuguese remained the dominant naval power. Lisbon replaced Venice as the emporium in Europe for spices and silks of the East.
In 1595, the Dutch despatched their first and successful expedition to the
East Indies. Within six years, 65 Dutch ships had gone out establishing factories all over Southeast Asia -- Patani, Grisek, Johore, Amboyna, Acheh, Ternate.
The Portuguese were largely displaced.
In 1600, the British East India Company was founded; in March 1602, the
Dutch East India Company; in 1664, the French East India Company.
The last of the colonialists in Southeast Asia were the Americans. After a battle in 1898, Spain, which had first colonised the Philippines in 1565, surrendered it to the Americans. But, having got to the East Indies, they all wanted to get to fabulous Cathay.
Against 4,000 years of continuous, and continuing civilisation in East Asia, and 3,000 years in South Asia, 450 years of European intrusion is but a brief interlude. But they have left behind an indelible mark on Asia and Asians. I do not know if memories of empire still haunt the minds of older Europeans. I do know that, in many parts of Asia, the older generation now believe that the colonial past was not so bad after all. The younger generation have little time for recrimination or regret. They are too busy trying to catch up with the developed world, and are finding the going tough.
A Western historian 1 has estimated that, before the Second World War,
Europe’s annual imports from the U.S. amounted to US$500 million more than her exports. The greater part of the funds to balance this account was provided by Southeast Asian trade.
In each case, the European metropolitan country vertically integrated the economies of its colonies with its own. Just before the Second World War, in the Netherlands East Indies, 75% of foreign capital was Dutch; 2 in Indo-China,
97% French; 3 in Malaya and Singapore, 70% British. 4
The Americans, as latecomers in the Philippines, had to be content with
52% of foreign investments. The Spaniards hung on to some 29%. 5 In
Thailand, Britain was the chief investor in business enterprises and the chief holder of her foreign debt, whilst providing Thailand with her greatest market. 6
But the metropolitan power brought in capital, new knowledge and new methods of organisation and commerce. Harbour, roads and railways were built.
The Europeans replaced forests with plantations to feed metropolitan Europe’s factories. They built up a small educated class. Whole populations had better public health and medical facilities.
The colonial phase came to an end in December 1941 when the Japanese attacked Southeast Asia. After Japan’s defeat, it was impossible to re-establish imperial authority.
With independence, trade and investment links changed. External trade and foreign investments of the countries of Southeast Asia became diversified.
Leaving aside the war-torn countries of Indo-China, with the exception of the Philippines, (A) the former metropolitan powers have lost their economic dominance.
In post-Sukarno Indonesia, (B) E.E.C. Nine investments accounted for only
7.5% as against the U.S.’s 32.5% and Japan’s 17.2%. Holland accounted for only 2.3%.
In Singapore, (C) E.E.C.’s share of investments declined from 54.2% in
1965 to 38.9% in 1972. U.K. investments declined by over a third. But
American investments more than doubled in the same period. In West Malaysia, (D) for recent years American and Japanese investments jointly exceed those of E.E.C. plus Britain, Ireland and Denmark. For Thailand, (E) Japanese and
American investments together were 3½ times E.E.C. investments.
As for trade, in 1938, US$546 million or nearly 30.2% of total Southeast
Asian trade was with the E.E.C. Nine, (F) over 22.0% with the Americans, (G) and about 7.4% with the Japanese. (H) By 1970, Southeast Asian trade with the
E.E.C. Nine had been reduced by nearly one-half in percentage terms to 15.9%
(US$2,412 million), (F) whilst the Japanese had increased their share of Southeast (H) Asian trade by over 3½ times to 25.5%. American trade went down marginally, by one-quarter from 22.0% to 17.0%. (G) (See diagrams I and II.)
In each former colony, the metropolitan power was the biggest loser against intrusions of, first, the Americans, and, then, the ubiquitous Japanese.
Even Germany and Italy, which had no colonies in the area, increased their trade with Southeast Asia. 7
What is pertinent is how small this trade was to total E.E.C. trade. Over
187 million people in the E.E.C. (in 1.2 million sq. kilometres) of the Six in 1970 had a total trade of US$1.6 billion with over 257 million people of Southeast
Asia (I) (in 3.4 million sq. kilometres). It was only 0.9% of E.E.C. total external trade of US$177.5 billion. But it was more than one-tenth (10.7%) of Southeast
Asian total trade. (F)
Similarly, trade between the E.E.C. Six and Yaounde Convention countries. (J) The total, US$3.1 billion, was 1.8% of E.E.C. total trade, but nearly
67% of total trade of Yaounde Convention States. 8 So too trade between the
E.E.C. Six and the Arusha Agreement states was US$246 million, 0.1% of
E.E.C. trade, but 16.5% of Arusha trade.(K)
Meanwhile, intra-E.E.C. trade has gone up by over 500% from 1958 to
1970.
The E.E.C. is a powerful economic bloc and will become more so with
Britain’s entry. But, in military terms, this is still a bi-polar world, unless Britain and France are prepared to pool their nuclear technology and transfer huge funds from social and economic to nuclear purposes. Perhaps, within 20 years, when
China has developed a credible second strike capability, even without a first strike capability, it will become a tri-polar world. Meanwhile, in economic and political terms, there are in fact five major power blocs -- America, Russia and
Comecon, the Europe of the Nine, Japan and China. (I)
In a world made ever smaller by Western inventions in communications and transportation, issues of peace and war, and of trade and finance, are indivisible. The first gesture of the new friendship between America and China was the lifting of the trade embargo on a whole series of items. In November, the ban on American ships and chartered aircraft going to China has been lifted.
With the SALT agreements, greater direct trade on enlarged credit terms between
America and Russia is one of the important collateral results. Europe is keen on trade with China, and trade with, especially exports to, Japan. Can it be unprofitable to trade with, and even manufacture in Southeast Asia which lies directly on the sea lanes to East Asia?
Tonight, I shall allow myself the luxury of speculating on the future.
My first assumption is that there is no nuclear conflict between the super powers, no pre-emption by Russia on China. Then nuclear rationally will prevail in China, as it has done in America and Russia. Any other supposition leads to such pessimistic conclusions that it is not worth speculating
Then, it is in the interests of all the five economic power-groups to maintain peace, order and stability in the world. If there are no major wars between the major powers, then, is self-sufficiency in economic “blocs” the most fruitful system for all?
Is it in the interests of the non-Communist world that it should be compartmentalised in self-sufficient economic blocs? Can Europe of the Nine afford to have close links only with the rest of Western Europe, with the
Mediterranean Basin and Africa in a special relationship: wealthy, self-sufficient and self-satisfied?
What of Japan? Is it possible for Japan to achieve self-sufficiency without changing her boundaries -- a proposition dangerous for the peace of the world?
Even an attempt at a Japanese economic bloc could turn Southeast Asia into a dangerous area of conflict. Can Japan survive as a powerful economic super- state without an American nuclear umbrella? Or, if this nuclear umbrella is not credible, will not Japan go for a second strike capability and make this a more dangerous world?
And, can Europe survive as a powerful economic and political bloc if there is no NATO with a credible American commitment?
So, one must hope that, though the present economic blocs will remain, enlightened national and bloc interests will lead to ever freer trade, by lowering of tariffs, and removal of non-tariff barriers, and not only between America and
Western Europe. The Japanese are learning that they have to exercise their ingenuity in ways other than making it impossible for Europeans and Americans to sell to, or invest in Japan. Their new Prime Minister, Mr. Tanaka, has publicity displayed realisation of this, that trade and investments must be reciprocal. With the Japanese, however, old habits die hard, and from Prime
Ministerial recognition to bureaucratic change in policy, there may be quite an interval. Even so, the era is over, when trade for Japan meant the export of finished products, the result from the imports of technology from the developed
West, and raw materials from the under-developed South and Southeast Asia.
If transportation costs have not inhibited Japanese exports to Europe,
neither should they inhibit European exports to Southeast Asia, Japan and China.
For specific middle-technology products, with high labour and skill content,
Europeans can fight back by judicious selection of sites in East and Southeast
Asia for offshore manufacture. For there are several urban centres where there is political stability and the industrial climate is good, with labour skills as high as, and costs lower than, those in Japan. And when Suez is re-opened one day, it will stimulate trade between Europe and Asia as its first opening did in 1869.
The high growth rates in developed countries in the 1950’s and 1960’s, reflected also in their external trade, were partly due to the rehabilitation of
Western Europe and Japan. Fundamental technological innovations, like the jet engine, nuclear power, petrochemicals and electronics, were in large measure the spin-off from military research and development during and after the last war.
They stimulated consumer demanded and increased trade.
It has been suggested that one of the reasons for the slow-down in economic growth and in world trade, is that most of these new industries have reached maturity. As more countries produce goods which had been the preserve of one or two, exports are becoming a “zero sum” game. Instead of more exports stimulating more imports and expanding trade, an increase of the share of total exports by any major country diminishes the share of the rest. Hence the tendency to protectionism.
Research on rocket and space programmes has not led to a spin-off in civilian user, except for communications, earth and weather satellites, and the minaturisation of certain components. These innovations and inventions have not yet given a boost to world trade.
But, for the next two decades, a potential powerful stimulus to world trade can come from the opening of China to the world. She can become a vast new frontier for existing middle and higher technology, machinery and know-how.
This would generate growth both in the developed countries and in China itself, with spin-off benefits for Third World countries in aid and trade. With a population estimated at over 750 million, in early 10 million sq. kilometres,
China has an effective administration, and an adequate infrastructure of power, water, transportation, basic education and skills. Unlike most of the new countries, China has the capacity to absorb, and effectively use inputs of technology, both machinery and knowhow. But she has not got enough foreign exchange to pay for such massive purchases unless extensive credits are made available. China’s external trade in 1970 was estimated to be US$4.2 billion (I).
Hong Kong, with a population of 4 million, for the same year, had a trade figure of US$5.4 billion, (I) more than China’s by one-quarter. Indeed, trade between
China and Southeast Asia has grown marginally in actual terms, and dropped by almost half in percentage terms, of Southeast Asian trade. (L) But given the credits, China’s trade potential could be Hong Kong’s US$5.4 billion by a multiple of 200 for simply the size of population, ignoring the even greater multiple in land resources.
There are all the signs that China wants closer economic ties with the developed West. First, cultivation of West European governments by China even before President Nixon’s visit to Peking. Next, China’s symbolic purchase of these Concordes. China has publicly supported the expansion of the E.E.C.
Now Japan has severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and is to have direct diplomatic and trade relations with China. Some Japanese believe
America would have established close diplomatic and direct trade relations with
China soon enough to enable China’s leaders to be present in Washington to join in celebrations in the spirit of 1976. For her part, China will want to import technology on the most competitive terms, and on the best credits offered, from
Europe, Japan and America.
For most of the Third World, development will be uneven and patchy.
Trade concessions and UNCTAD resolutions are important in easing the painful and slow process of educating and disciplining agricultural communities and transforming them into industrial urban societies. But the decisive factors are a people’s ethnic and cultural characteristics, the cohesiveness of their social organisation, their administrative competence, plus their leadership to provide the will to a whole people to make strenuous and sustained efforts. But the flame of hope, however small and flickering, must be kept alive.
It is not a coincidence that those countries which the West found most difficult to subjugate like Vietnam, or to extract Treaty Ports and extra-territorial concessions from, like China, are also the ones which have demonstrated their capacity for effective administration and for economic progress, with the promise of high growth rates if capital, machinery and know-how were made available.
The East Asians share a common intense culture. Their main characteristics are a high threshold for pain, a capacity for concentrated work over long periods, a willingness to postpone present consumption for greater capital formation. They are quick learners. Hence, they have been more successful in industrialisation, and they have had the fastest growth rates -- South
Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and, but for the war, Vietnam.
My second assumption for these projections is that the Americans would regain their self-confidence and poise and maintain their interests abroad in
NATO, the Middle East, East and Southeast Asia. Only then is Mr., Nixon’s generations of peace and prosperity without war, likely.
Japan and Europe can help to repair the terrible devastation in Indo-China and add to Mr. Nixon’s US$7 billion rehabilitation programme. And if the
Russians and the Chinese also pitch in, if only to help the Communist side, then, for once, all major power groups are on the same side doing the right thing for mankind.
But if, on the other hand, the Americans become self-centred, filled with self-pity, resentful that their generosity in restoring Europe and Japan to prosperity has gone unrequited, their efforts to keep out Communism and uphold the right of self-determination for South Vietnamese unappreciated, they may become interested only in themselves. This would make for a dangerous world.
Four years of a U.S. Presidency is a relatively short time in the history of nations. Perhaps, it is because the Americans are such a young nation that they are impatiently waiting to celebrate their 200th anniversary. They are generous and idealistic. But the onerous and tedious burdens of a super-power also demand patience, stamina and endurance. And it has taken the European in
Kissinger to get America to play a long game.
If we are to move towards a more peaceful and stable world, the major countries must move now towards a more multi-lateral sharing of world responsibilities in trade and finance. The Atlantic Institute has already got
Japanese corporations as active and contributing members, although it is the
Pacific, not the Atlantic, that washes Japanese shores. If Europeans take an interest beyond just the Mediterranean Basin and Africa, they will help make this a more prosperous and stable world. After all it was the Europeans who opened up East and Southeast Asia long before the Americans or Russians.
And it is significant that when Indonesia was sorely in need of rehabilitation after 20 prodigal years of Dr. Sukarno, the Americans insisted on the I.G.G.I. (Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia) formula: one-third
U.S.A., one-third Japan, one-third Western Europe.
For Southeast Asians, European multilateral sharing of responsibilities could be critical. 350 years of the Dutch in Indonesia, 150 years of the British in
Malaysia and Singapore, and about 100 years of the French in Indo-China, have left a profound imprint on their lives. Ties of language, culture and sentiment are not easily cut and forgotten. In part, it is nostalgia in the face of the more demanding super-powers. The donor-donee relationship with a super-power is not always an agreeable one.
Many in Southeast Asia have found the Russians 9 willing to give aid, but people who can be rough when baulked. The Americans can be generous. But they twist arms readily and brutally to get their way. And the Japanese bring up memories of the last war to the conscious surface every time a hard-headed and hard-hearted Japanese team negotiates a deal to extract timber, minerals or oil.
The Southeast Asians have re-discovered that the Europeans, especially their former imperial power, are perhaps amongst the more cultured of the developed peoples. Of course, Europeans put their national or company interests first, like all others. But they maintain the civilities and courtesies that make arm-twisting less of a painful business.
It was more than symbolic that the first European country Indonesia’s
President Suharto visited was Holland. And he sent a special message to the
European Heads of Government when they met in October. He followed this with a visit to Paris and Brussels.
It may not be possible immediately for the E.E.C. to let in agricultural products from Southeast Asia on the terms granted to the African states of the
Yaounde Convention, or even the East African states of the Arusha Agreement.
But Southeast Asia is watching what the 20 Caribbean and other sugar-producing countries may be getting. Some concessions to Southeast Asia, for psychological, as much as for economic reasons, are in everyone’s interests.
However, Southeast Asians are more likely to benefit from exports to the
E.E.C. of the Nine of manufactured middle technology products -- not textiles or transistors, over which there are many vexing problems for Europe as there are for America. If the Nine allow an annual increase of at least 15% of the GSP
(Generalised System of Preferences) quota, accompanied by liberalisation in the rules of origin of raw materials, Europe can contribute substantially towards a more stable, peaceful and prosperous world, where a freer exchange of goods and services diminishes reasons for conflicts.
-------------------
FOOTNOTES D G E Hall, History of Southeast Asia, (London: Macmillan), 1968, page 803.
H G Callis, Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia, (New York: International
Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1942, page 34.
Ibid., page 80 (investments in rubber, tea, coffee, coconuts, sugar cane, and cotton, plus mining in tin, zinc, tungsten and gold).
Hall, op. cit., page 802 callis, op. cit., page 17
Ibid., page 70
German trade from US$259 million (or 3.5%) in 1958 to US$726 million (or 4.8%) in 1970
Italian trade from US$93 million (or 1.3%) in 1958 to US$235 million (or 1.6%) in 1970
See Table VIII
18 countries, population 75 million, in 11 million sq. kilometres. See
Table IX.
Russian trade with Southeast Asia has declined substantially since 1958 and amounts to only a small percentage (0.6%) of Soviet trade and 0.9%
of Southeast Asian trade. What may be interesting is the tremendous increase in Russian trade with India, especially since 1968 (from 2.1% to
5.9% of Soviet trade, and from 6.0% to 10.2% of Indian trade.) (See
Table V).
REFERENCES TO TABLES
(A) Table XIII - Philippines: Foreign Investments, 1970 (At end period)
(B) Table XI - Indonesia: Approved Investments, 1967 to March
1972
(C) Table X - Singapore: Foreign Investments in Manufacturing
Industry, 1965-1971
(D) Table XII - West Malaysia: Foreign Investments in Pioneer
Companies, 1969-1971 (At end period)
(E) Table XIV - Thailand: Foreign Investments December 1969
(F) Table I - E.E.C. Trade with Southeast Asia
(G) Table II - U.S.A. Trade with Southeast Asia
(H) Table III - Japan Trade with Southeast Asia
(I) Table IX - Population, Area, GNP and External Trade, 1970
(J) Table VI - E.E.C. Trade with Yaounde Convention States
(K) Table VII - E.E.C. Trade with Arusha Agreement States
(L) Table IV - People’s Republic of China Trade with Southeast
Asia.
TABLE I
E.E.C. TRADE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA(1)
E.E.C. SIX E.E.C. NINE Year US$ Million Percentage of Percentage of US$ Million Percentage of Percentage of E.E.C. Trade S.E.A. Trade E.E.C. Trade S.E.A. Trade 1938 365 3.7 20.2 546 3.1 30.2 1958 868 1.9 11.9 1,423 2.1 19.5
1970 1,625 0.9 10.7 2,412 1.1 15.9
(1) Includes ASEAN and Indochina.
Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade, Annual 1958-1962, 1966-1970 (Washington D.C.). Statistical Office of the United Nations: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1953 (New York). Registrar-General of Statistics, Singapore: The Foreign Trade of Malaya, 1939 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Malayan Statistics Imports & Exports, 1958 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Singapore External Trade Statistics, 1970 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaya: Federation of Malaya Imports & Exports, 1958 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: West Malaysia Annual Statistics of External Trade, 1970 Vol.1 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia: Sabah Statistics of External Trade, 1970 (Kota Kinabalu). Department of Statistics, Sarawak, Malaysia: Statistics of Sarawak External Trade, 1970 (Kuching).
TABLE II
U.S.A. TRADE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA(1)
Year US $ Million Percentage of Percentage of U.S.A. Trade S.E.A. Trade 1938 400 8.0 22.1
1958 1,156 3.7 15.9
1970 2,570 3.1 17.0
(1) Includes ASEAN and Indochina.
Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade, Annual 1958-1962, 1966-1970 (Washington D.C.). Statistical Office of the United Nations: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1953 (New York). Registrar-General of Statistics, Singapore: The Foreign Trade of Malaya, 1939 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Malayan Statistics Imports & Exports, 1958 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Singapore External Trade Statistics, 1970 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaya: Federation of Malaya Imports & Exports, 1958 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: West Malaysia Annual Statistics of External Trade, 1970 Vol.1 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia: Sabah Statistics of External Trade, 1970 (Kota Kinabalu). Department of Statistics, Sarawak, Malaysia: Statistics of Sarawak External Trade, 1970 (Kuching).
TABLE III
JAPAN TRADE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA(1)
Year US $ Million Percentage of Percentage of Japan Trade S.E.A. Trade 1938 133 8.7 7.4
1958 695 11.8 9.5
1970 3,859 10.1 25.5
(1) Includes ASEAN and Indochina.
Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade, Annual 1958-1962, 1966-1970 (Washington D.C.). Statistical Office of the United Nations: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1953 (New York). Registrar-General of Statistics, Singapore: The Foreign Trade of Malaya, 1939 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Malayan Statistics Imports & Exports, 1958 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Singapore External Trade Statistics, 1970 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaya: Federation of Malaya Imports & Exports, 1958 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: West Malaysia Annual Statistics of External Trade, 1970 Vol.1 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia: Sabah Statistics of External Trade, 1970 (Kota Kinabalu). Department of Statistics, Sarawak, Malaysia: Statistics of Sarawak External Trade, 1970 (Kuching).
TABLE IV
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TRADE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA(1)
Year US $ Million Percentage of Percentage of China Trade S.E.A. Trade 1938 41 n.a. 2.3
1958 215 n.a. 3.0
1970 270 6.4 1.8 n.a. Not available. (1) Includes ASEAN and Indochina. Note: Data on China trade with South East Asia for 1970 were obtained from the People’s Republic of China: An Economic Assessment - A Compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States. Similar data for 1938 and 1958 are not available and have been derived from the trade of South East Asia Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade, Annual 1958-1962, 1966-1970 (Washington D.C.). Statistical Office of the United Nations: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1953 (New York). Registrar-General of Statistics, Singapore: The Foreign Trade of Malaya, 1939 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Malayan Statistics Imports & Exports, 1958 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Singapore External Trade Statistics, 1970 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaya: Federation of Malaya Imports & Exports, 1958 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: West Malaysia Annual Statistics of External Trade, 1970 Vol.1 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia: Sabah Statistics of External Trade, 1970 (Kota Kinabalu). Department of Statistics, Sarawak, Malaysia: Statistics of Sarawak External Trade, 1970 (Kuching). Joint Economic Committee, U.S.A.: People’s Republic of China: An Economic Assessment, 1972 (Washington D.C), pp. 350-351.
TABLE V
U.S.S.R. TRADE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA(1)AND INDIA
TRADE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA TRADE WITH INDIA Year US $ Million Percentage of Percentage of US $ Million Percentage of Percentage of U.S.S.R. Trade S.E.A. Trade U.S.S.R Trade India Trade 1938 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 0.6 0.3 1958 157 1.8 2.2 181 2.1 6.0 1970 141 0.6 0.9 420 5.9 10.2 n.a. Not available. (1) Includes ASEAN and Indochina.
Notes: Data on U.S.S.R. trade with Southeast Asia for 1958 were obtained from the Direction of Trade. Similar data for 1970 are not available and as such have been derived from the trade of Southeast Asia.
Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade, Annual 1958-1962, 1966-1970 (Washington D.C.). Statistical Office of the United Nations: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1953 1958 (New York). Registrar-General of Statistics, Singapore: The Foreign Trade of Malaya, 1939 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Malayan Statistics Imports & Exports, 1958 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Singapore External Trade Statistics, 1970 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaya: Federation of Malaya Imports & Exports, 1958 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: West Malaysia Annual Statistics of External Trade, 1970 Vol.1 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia: Sabah Statistics of External Trade, 1970 (Kota Kinabalu). Department of Statistics, Sarawak, Malaysia: Statistics of Sarawak External Trade, 1970 (Kuching).
TABLE VI
E.E.C. TRADE WITH YAOUNDE CONVENTION STATES(1)
E.E.C. SIX E.E.C. NINE Year US $ Million Percentage of Percentage of US $ Million Percentage of Percentage of E.E.C. Trade Y.C.S. Trade E.E.C. Trade Y.C.S. Trade 1938 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1958 803 1.8 30.8(2) 848 1.2 32.5(2)
1970 3,127 1.8 66.9 3,349 1.5 71.6 n.a. Not available. (1) Includes the following countries: - Burundi Dahomey Rwanda Cameroun Fed. Rep. Gabon Senegal Central African Rep. Madagascar Somalia Congo People’s Rep. Mali Chad Congo Democratic Rep. Mauritania Togo Ivory Coast Niger Upper Volta.
(2) Estimated based on the trade of major Yaounde Convention States.
Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade, Annual 1958-1962, 1966-1970 (Washington D.C.).
TABLE VII
E.E.C. TRADE WITH ARUSHA AGREEMENT STATES(1)
E.E.C. SIX E.E.C. NINE Year US $ Million Percentage of Percentage of US $ Million Percentage of Percentage of E.E.C. Trade A.A.S. Trade E.E.C. Trade A.A.S. Trade 1938 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1958 51 0.1 7.2 260 0.4 36.6
1970 246 0.1 16.5 626 0.3 42.0 n.a. Not available.
(1) Includes Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.
Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade, Annual 1958-1962, 1966-1970 (Washington D.C.).
TABLE VIII SOUTHEAST ASIA: TRADE WITH SELECTED TRADING PARTNERS
1938 1958 1970 1938 1958 1970 Country US $ Million Percentage Distribution Japan 126 739 3,928 7.0 10.1 26.0 U.S.A 392 1,184 2,828 21.7 16.3 18.7 Southeast Asia 384 2,104 2,266 21.2 28.9 15.0 China, People’s Rep. 41 215 245 2.3 2.9 1.6 U.S.S.R. n.a. 59 141 n.a. 0.8 0.9 E.E.C. Six 357 872 1,713 19.8 12.0 11.3 E.E.C. Nine 531 1,626 2,632 29.4 22.4 17.4 Belgium/Luxembourg 19 73 110 1.1 1.0 0.7 France 110 208 288 6.1 2.9 1.9 Italy 19 93 235 1.1 1.3 1.6 Germany, Fed. Rep. 62 259 726 3.4 3.5 4.8 Netherlands 147 239 354 8.1 3.3 2.3 United Kingdom 164 719 854 9.1 9.9 5.7 Eire n.a. - 6 n.a. - - Denmark 10 35 59 0.5 0.5 0.4 Others 333 1,351 3,083 18.4 18.6 20.4 Total 1,807 7,278 15,123 100.0 100.0 100.0 n.a. Not available. - Nil or negligible Notes: The percentages given in this table may not agree with those presented in Tables I - VII. In Tables I-VII, they were derived based on recorded trade statistics of the relevant countries whereas in this table they were based on trade statistics of Southeast Asia.
Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade, Annual 1958-1962, 1966-1970 (Washington D.C.). Statistical Office of the United Nations: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1953 (New York). Registrar-General of Statistics, Singapore: The Foreign Trade of Malaya, 1939 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Malayan Statistics Imports & Exports, 1958 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Singapore External Trade Statistics, 1970 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaya: Federation of Malaya Imports & Exports, 1958 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: West Malaysia Annual Statistics of External Trade, 1970 Vol.1 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia: Sabah Statistics of External Trade, 1970 (Kota Kinabalu). Department of Statistics, Sarawak, Malaysia: Statistics of Sarawak External Trade, 1970 (Kuching).
TABLE IX
POPULATION, AREA, GNP AND EXTERNAL TRADE, 1970
Country/Region Population Area GNP External Trade (Million) (’000 Sq Km) (US$ Million) (US$ Million) China, People’s Republic 759.6 9,597.0 93,500(1) 4,220 Hong Kong 4.1 1.0 2,542 5,424 Southeast Asia: 257.8 3,385.1 37,508(2) 15,123 ASEAN 208.4 2,637.9 30,200 14,114 Indochina 49.4 747.2 7,308 1,009 EEC Nine: 250.6 1,510.8 608,844 228,910 EEC Six 187.1 1,168.2 468,529 177,462 U.S.S.R. 242.8 22,400.0 270,111(3) 7,153 U.S.A. 205.4 9,363.2 974,100 83,191 Japan 103.5 369.7 197,180 38,199 Yaounde Convention States 75.0 11,052.5 n.a.(4) 4,706 Arusha Agreement States 34.0 1,761.2 3,901(5) 1,492
(1) Estimate relates to mean average of GNP given in “People’s Republic of China: An Economic Assessment” and “The Far East and Australasia, 1971.” (2) Data for Thailand and South Vietnam refer to 1969, for Cambodia to 1966. (3) Refers to 1968. (4) Either unavailable or available for earlier years only. (5) Data for Kenya refers to 1969. Source: Population: Statistical Office of the United Nations: Demographic Yearbook, 1970 (New York). Area: John Paxton: The Stateman’s Yearbook, 1972/1973 (London: MacMillan) GNP: International Monetary Fund: International Financial Statistics, Dec. issues, 1963-1971 and Sept. 1972 (Washington D.C.). Statistical Office of the United Nations: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Dec. issues 1968-1971 and Aug. 1972 (New York). Statistical Office of the United Nations: Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969 (New York). Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, Japan: Monthly Statistics of Japan, July 1972 (Tokyo). Bank Negara Malaysia, Malaysia: Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Vol.3 Dec. 1970 and Vol.5 June 1972 (Kuala Lumpur). Joint Economic Committee, Congress of U.S.A.: People’s Republic of China - An Economic Assessment, 1972 (Washington D.C.). Europa Publications Ltd: The Far East and Australasia, 1971 (London). Population Reference Bureau Inc., World Population Data Sheet 1970 (Washington, D.C.). External Trade: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade, Annual 1966-1970 (Washington D.C.). Department of Statistics, Singapore: Singapore External Trade Statistics, 1970 (Singapore). Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: West Malaysia Annual Statistics of External Trade, 1970 Vol.1 (Kuala Lumpur). Department of Statistics, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia: Sabah Statistics of External Trade, 1970 (Kota Kinabalu). Department of Statistics, Sarawak, Malaysia: Statistics of Sarawak External Trade, 1970 (Kuching). Joint Economic Committee, Congress of U.S.A.: People’s Republic of China: An Economic Assessment, 1972 (Washington D.C), pp. 350-351.
TABLE X
SINGAPORE: FOREIGN INVESTMENTS1/ IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1965-1971
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Country/Region U.S. $ Million Percentage Distribution U.S.A. 7.5 7.8 8.8 17.3 42.8 112.1 164.8 14.6 10.0 8.9 11.7 21.8 34.5 31.8 Japan 8.8 9.8 10.1 11.1 11.8 22.2 35.5 17.2 12.6 10.2 7.5 6.0 6.8 6.9 EEC 27.81 32.3 48.4 60.5 74.2 131.7 201.2 54.2 41.4 48.9 40.8 37.9 40.5 38.9 United Kingdom 4.7 17.3 27.8 33.7 39.9 65.0 96.7 28.7 22.2 28.1 22.7 20.4 20.0 18.7 Germany, Federal Republic n.a. n.a. 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 6.9 n.a. n.a. 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.3 Italy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.3 4.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.0 0.8 Netherlands 13.1 15.0 20.3 26.5 34.0 59.8 90.1 25.5 19.2 20.5 17.9 17.3 18.4 17.4 France n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.6 3.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.8 0.6 Others 7.2 28.1 31.7 59.4 67.2 59.1 116.1 14.0 36.0 32.0 40.1 34.3 18.2 22.4 Total 51.3 78.0 99.0 148.3 196.0 325.0 517.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1/ Data refers to value of gross fixed assets in the manufacturing industry. Source: Economic Development Board, Singapore, Report on the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Activity, 1971.
TABLE XI
INDONESIA: APPROVED FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, 1967 TO MARCH 1972
Country/Area US $ Million Percentage Number of Distribution Projects U.S.A. 554.0 32.5 77 Japan 291.9 17.2 84 EEC 127.7 7.5 115 Netherlands 38.5 2.3 28 United Kingdom 34.8 2.0 29 West Germany 22.0 1.3 30 France 15.9 0.9 8 Belgium 10.6 0.6 15 Denmark 5.0 0.3 4 Italy 1.0 0.0 1 Others 727.6 42.7 210 Total 1,701.2 100.0 486 Source: Foreign Investment Board, Statistical Data on Foreign Investment in Indonesia,
1972
TABLE XII WEST MALAYSIA: FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN PIONEER COMPANIES, 1969-1971 (At end period) 1969 1970 1971 1969 1970 1971 Country/Region U.S. $ Million Percentage Distribution U.S.A. 22.1 21.2 21.4 22.1 18.5 15.4 Japan 10.5 13.7 15.8 10.5 12.0 11.4 EEC 23.9 25.6 32.1 23.9 22.4 23.1 United Kingdom 22.7 24.1 29.8 22.7 21.1 21.4 Germany, Fed. Rep. 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 Netherlands 0.5 0.7 1.5 0.5 0.6 1.1 France 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 Belgium 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Denmark 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 Others 43.6 53.8 69.9 43.6 47.1 50.2 Total 100.1 114.3 139.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: 1969 : Asian Development Bank, Southeast Asia’s Economy in the 1970s, (London: Longman, 1971), p 387 1970,1971 Federal Industrial Development Authority of Malaysia, Malaysia Industrial Digest, Vol. 4 No. 1 and Vol. 5 No. 1 TABLE XIII
PHILIPPINES: FOREIGN INVESTMENT1/ 1970 (At end period)
Country/Area U.S. $ Million Percentage Distribution
U.S.A. 559.7 82.1
Spain 23.1 3.4
Japan 11.3 1.7
EEC 44.4 6.5
Netherlands 22.6 3.3
United Kingdom 20.3 3.0
Germany, Fed. Rep. 1.5 0.2
Others 43.6 6.4
Total 682.1 100.0
1/ Data cover corporations in manufacturing, public utility, commerce, mining, financial institutions, agriculture, services and construction.
Source: Board of Investments, Philippine Progress, Vol. V 4th Quarter 1971.
TABLE XIV
THAILAND: FOREIGN INVESTMENTS1/ DECEMBER 1969
Country/Area U.S. $ Million Percentage Distribution
Japan 31.3 31.8
U.S.A. 15.9 16.1
EEC 13.3 13.5
United Kingdom 5.1 5.2
Netherlands 4.1 4.1
Germany, Fed. Rep. 2.2 2.2
Denmark 1.3 1.3
Italy 0.6 0.6
Others 38.0 38.6
Total 98.5 100.0
1/ Registered capital of promoted industries
Source: Asian Development Bank, Southeast Asia’s Economy in the 1970s (London: Longman, 1971) p. 411.
DIAGRAM I
EXTERNAL TRADE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH E.E.C., U.S.A. AND JAPAN
U.S. $ Million
4000
E.E.C Six E.E.C Nine U.S.A. 3000 Japan
2000
1000
1938 1958 1970
DIAGRAM II
PERCENTAGE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA’S TRADE WITH E.E.C., U.S.A. AND JAPAN
35%
E.E.C Six E.E.C Nine 30%
U.S.A. Japan
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0% 1938 1958 1970