Speech By The Prime Minister At A Banquet In Honour Of Mr. Spiro T. Agnew, Vice-President Of The United States Of America, Held At The Singapore Conference Hall On 10Th January, 1970
Lee Kuan Yew · Prime Minister of Singapore
- Context
- Lee addressed a banquet honouring US Vice-President Spiro Agnew at the Singapore Conference Hall on January 10, 1970, cautioning against fixing timetables for American disengagement and political goals in Southeast Asia.
- Main themes
- American disengagement from Vietnam, Southeast Asia after Vietnam, American technology and target-setting, moon landing programme, limits of time-tabling political goals, climate of confidence and stability, regional security and co-operation, indigenous effort in economic development, different time scales of Southeast Asian peoples, welcome to Vice-President Agnew
- Duration
- ~6 min
- Words
- 709
- Sentences
- 35
- Readability
- 41
- Grade
- 12.5
- Syntax
- 2.90
- Vocabulary
- 2.29
Source: National Archives of Singapore ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other35 sentences in 13 paragraphs
Mr. Vice-President, Mrs. Agnew,
Your Excellencies, Ladies & Gentlemen,
My colleagues and I take pleasure in welcoming you both to Singapore.
For my part, I am priviledged to have had the opportunity to know you, and to learn of your views on the political mood in America, and its possible effects on shaping policies which may influence the course of events in Southeast Asia.
In recent months, many American visitors have asked me about the future of this region “after Vietnam”. I have been constrained to explain that what is likely to emerge “after Vietnam” depended to a large extent upon the manner in which American disengagement was accomplished. I had hoped that this disengagement from the military conflict would be ordered at a pace which could be seen to have given the South Vietnamese the opportunity to decide their future for themselves.
lky\1970\lky0110A.doc
Being Americans, my visitors were keenly interested in forecasting the future. They wanted to know what America could or should do to increase regional security, regional co-operation and regional economic progress. I have found it difficult to answer these enquiries. Much of it depends upon American assessment of their national interests. It depends also on an assessment of the worthwhileness of pursuing these interests when the costs necessary to achieve them may tax the patience of the American people, because results may not be visible within two or four years.
I confess to a great admiration of American technology, the programming and methodology in research and development. Targets are defined and a time-table for achieving them is set. In space technology, this has brought forth maximum effort and maximum results. So the journey to the moon and back was defined as the target, and programmed for achievement by 1970. And achieved it was, to the acclamation of the whole world. By naming a date, Americans spurred themselves on to win in the race, albeit at a higher price in lives and resources.
But for political goals in Southeast Asia where success or failure is related to qualitative and not quantitative factors, the fixing of dates for achieving lky\1970\lky0110A.doc intermediate targets may not be the best way to achieving final goals. What Southeast Asia needs is a climate of confidence, continuing security and stability in which constructive endeavour can become rewarding. It also needs to have the spirit of success. This spirit can be generated as enthusiaism spreads when their own efforts bring growth and progress. Time-tabling and fixing dates will negate both the climate of confidence and the spirit of success. The danger of forecasting the longer term political future is that people may begin to act as if the future is already now here.
So also, I doubt if we can fix a date by which conflicts within the region will have been lessened or muted and co-operation established between the countries in the region. These targets do not lend themselves to programming and computerisation. America, with other major powers, can help by providing the background of security and stability. America can even add a little stimulus for faster growth. But the transformation of conservative agricultural communities, working with old-fashioned tools, into thrusting mass-consumption industrial societies, depends finally upon indigenous efforts and perserverance.
May I hope that your stay here, brief though it is, may nevertheless give you an idea of the kind of place Singapore is, and the kind of society we are. I hope your journey will give you that local knowledge of our neighbours and lky\1970\lky0110A.doc ourselves so as to sustain your interest in Southeast Asia as it goes through a phase of rapid changes. Modern technology in which the United States have played so prominent a part has succeeded in physically creating one world.
Because it is now one world with swift transportation and instant communications, rapid change has become inevitable as under-developed communities adjust to make themselves relevant in the world of tomorrow.
If you can bring back to Washington an appreciation of the different time scales in which the peoples of this region live, work and fight, and of the fact that they are, for historical and cultural reasons, not yet amenable to programming and time-tabling, you would have done a service to the peoples of Southeast Asia.