Address, 17 December 1994

South Africa Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela · President of the African National Congress

17 December 1994 · 49th National Conference of the African National Congress · South Africa

Context
Mandela addressed delegates, NEC members and diplomats at the 49th National Conference of the African National Congress on December 17, 1994, reviewing the transition since 1991 and the challenges of governing.
Main themes
49th ANC National Conference, transition from apartheid to democracy, political violence and the state security network, international community's role in the transition, negotiations and mass mobilisation, relationship with the National Party and the Government of National Unity, Reconstruction and Development Programme, local government elections, extreme right-wing and IFP threats, role of traditional leaders, tribute to fallen leaders
Duration
~44 min
92nd percentile
Words
5,260
92nd percentile
Sentences
202
89th percentile
Readability
33
22nd percentile
Grade
15.1
77th percentile
Syntax
3.18
70th percentile
Vocabulary
2.35
84th percentile

Source: GitHub DRChivers/Nelson-Mandela-Speeches-Sentiment-and-Topic-Modelling-Analysis ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 34%34%
  • Geopolitical 33%32%
  • Social 18%17%
  • Ceremonial 13%13%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

202 sentences in 93 paragraphs

Comrade Chairperson;

Officials and members of the NEC;

Fellow delegates;

Members of the Diplomatic Corps;

Distinguished Guests:

"There is no doubt that the road to Union Buildings and Tuynhuis has become the shorter". With these words we concluded the 48th National Conference of the ANC in Durban barely over three years ago. It was the first constitutional National Conference of our organisation held within South Africa in over three decades.

Then, we were celebrating the unbanning of the African National Congress, and struggling to secure normal political activity, including the release of many political prisoners who remained behind bars.

And so we assemble today, at this the 49th National Conference of the African National Congress, converging from Union Buildings and Tuynhuis; from parliament and regional legislatures; from ministries and provincial governments - as the majority organisation in the first ever democratically-elected government of our country. We have converged from the shop-floor and informal settlements; from places of worship and learning; from urban and rural areas; as business-persons and professionals - African, Coloured, Indian and White - a microcosm of South African society.

For the first time in the history of our country, we have under one roof, sharing the same vision and planning as equals, delegates from every sector of South African society, including those who hold the highest offices in the land. This in itself vividly captures the qualitative change our country has undergone: a dream fulfilled and a pledge redeemed.

That pledge, made in this mother-city of the ANC 83 years ago by yet another representative gathering, was to transform South Africa into a non-racial and democratic society. As we meet in the environs where they planted the seed, we can proudly say to the founders: the country is in the hands of the people; the tree of liberty is firmly rooted in the soil of the motherland!

This Conference is the first such assembly after our momentous elections, the convention which signals the closing of a painful and yet glorious chapter in the history of our country and our organisation, and the opening of a new chapter of freedom, dignity and prosperity.

On behalf of the National Executive Committee, I welcome you all - delegates, observers from allied organisations and our friends representing governments across the globe. On your behalf, I wish to express our gratitude to the Free State Province of the ANC for the hospitality accorded us; and to the National Conference Preparatory Committee for the excellent organisation that should help make this Conference the success that it promises to be. We congratulate all the delegates and the Regions and branches for the seriousness with which they have prepared for this historic event.

Yesterday, December 16, was the anniversary of that bloody battle on the banks of the river Ncome, as warriors sought to stave off the persistent incursion into ancestral lands, into their freedom and their dignity. Many perished in honour, as have thousands before and after them. Even as we met in Durban in 1991, massacres underpinned by the same bent to impose white supremacy, were continuing.

A great many patriots, some of whom were with us at the last Conference have passed away. Oliver Tambo, former President of the ANC who steered our organisation during difficult moments; Chris Hani, the outstanding people's soldier who was gunned down in cold blood; Elias Motsoaledi and our former Treasurer-General Thomas Nkobi. We also fondly remember Reggie Radebe, Lambert Mbatha, Helen Joseph, Susan Keane, Firoza Adams, Elijah Barayi, Sam Ntambani, Oscar Mpetha and many more leaders and cadres who contributed in no small measure to the victory we celebrate today. In honour of these martyrs, I ask you to stand and observe a moment of silence.

Indeed, as we get down to the business of Conference, we need always to remember that, the stroke of good fortune that has allowed us to be there and at the helm in the democratic transition, is at the same time a grave responsibility to ensure that the ideals for which these heroes perished and the cause which consumed their lives, finds concrete realisation in a better life for all our people.

For, proud as we should be of the achievements made, the reality is that democratic forces in our country have captured only elements of political power. South Africa is not yet out of the woods.

We have assembled at this Conference precisely to chart the way forward to a truly free and prosperous nation. The real measure of success or failure of this Conference will be whether we will emerge motivated and stronger than before, and whether the decisions we take bring practical relief to the millions who so graphically demonstrated their confidence in the ANC and in democracy last April.

Their eyes are trained at this Conference, and their ears strain to hear our decisions. They wait expectant that we will bring new hope and justify their trust.

Comrade Chairperson and Delegates:

As we met in July 1991, the apartheid regime was well-entrenched, relating to the liberation movement with arrogance, as if we were hapless petitioners.

The talks-about-talks aimed at freeing the political environment were grinding along at a slow pace; political violence against the people was on the increase; and many political prisoners were still behind bars. The rulers of our country were confident that they could drag out the process, undermine the ANC and impose a political settlement that would leave the essence of apartheid intact.

It was therefore natural that our debates had to focus on the advisability or otherwise of negotiations and the fate of the four pillars of our struggle in a changing South Africa and a changing world.

Our conclusion that the regime was in crisis and unable to rule in the old way; that it was forced to unban the ANC and yet sought to delay the transition; inspired us to pursue negotiations combined with mass action as well as strengthening our organisational and military capacity. This was reinforced by our assessment of the new international order characterised by the general pursuit of multi-party democracy and human rights and the collapse of the socialist world. We also had to adopt a new approach to our own relations with the international community, to ensure that the world supported change in a manner that strengthened the forces of democracy in our country.

The decisions of the 48th National Conference created the basis for the ANC to take the lead on all fronts. Yet, while we can confidently say that the transformation that has taken place vindicates this conclusion, we should also admit that, in the process we did also falter. What is crucial though is whether we were able to learn from our mistakes and to adapt our approach to a changing and dynamic situation.

Soon after National Conference, the National Executive Committee reviewed progress in the talks-about-talks and, as instructed by Conference, recommitted itself to the content of the OAU Harare Declaration. However, it was agreed that a review of our approach to the phases of the process was required. You will remember that we had then identified the achievement of free political activity, including release of all political prisoners and an end to the violence, as necessary conditions for substantive negotiations to start.

In our discussion, and in consultation with a number of leaders on the continent, we came to the conclusion that we needed to proceed apace to real negotiations. Given that the apartheid regime was inherently violent, and given that it sought to drag out the transition, we felt it necessary to deprive it of the initiative it was exercising over the process. While we continued to pursue the removal of all the identified obstacles, we then started to prepare for an all-party conference, the central aim being to curb the monopoly of power of the apartheid regime itself, the real obstacle to the democratic transition.

This tactical flexibility on our part, popularly known as the "strategic shift" laid the basis for the holding of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa I) in December 1991. The adoption, at that Convention, of the Declaration of Intent, committing virtually all political players to a democratic settlement based on internationally-accepted principles, was a historic landmark in the evolution of South Africa's entire political life.

By this time, too, we had started examining the actual meaning of the concept of interim government to supervise elections for a Constituent Assembly. This culminated much later in narrowing the mandate of such a transitional mechanism to areas specifically to do with normal political activity and the conduct of free and fair elections.

In the same period, a wide variety of forces had come to realise that violence posed a serious threat to the process and that joint efforts were needed to eradicate it. In particular, the religious community initiated a process which led to the National Peace Convention and the adoption of the National Peace Accord. Debate will continue on the actual impact these structures made to contain political violence, as well as the approach underpinning the regime's participation in them.

Yet it can be said, without any shadow of doubt, that, to the extent that the NPC created a moral and structural basis for dealing with the violence; to the extent that it monitored incidents and identified the causes; and to the extent that its wealth of experience informed the electoral process as well as concrete proposals regarding the introduction of community policing, it was an important contribution to the transition, uniting a wide range of forces and expressing the sentiments of virtually all South Africans. In this context, it also became the forum through which the international community launched its observer missions.

On our part, we actively took part in these structures to help protect the people. We also saw it as our task to harness community efforts to defend themselves. This was not made easy by the fact that the same forces responsible for the violence were at the centre of maintaining apartheid legality. Yet, in the overall, while there were many weaknesses of organisation, discipline, infiltration by state agents as well as minimal capacity on the part of communities, we can say that community self- defence, with the participation of many cadres of Umkhonto we Sizwe, combined with local political initiatives, was the cutting edge in preventing worse disaster.

Both to strengthen forces of the oppressed and democratic forces, and to deny the regime fertile ground to pit these forces against one another, the ANC took the leading role in initiating the broad patriotic front. This reinforced earlier efforts to bring into the fold of democratic opposition the various Bantustan and tri-cameral parties and to reinforce co- operation with hundreds of civil society formations. The basic platform for this initiative was the central demand for a sovereign Constituent Assembly and the steps required to reach that goal.

The Broad Patriotic Front Conference in October 1991 as well as the strong working relations that developed both within and outside negotiations vindicated the correctness of this approach. Even in fora in which participants in apartheid structures constituted the majority, the regime and its allies found themselves isolated.

In the period leading up to the Broad Patriotic Conference and immediately thereafter, it became clear to us that the leadership of some so-called liberation movements had either not done sufficient work among their members or failed to appreciate the strategies required to bring fundamental change to our country. This lack of leadership, coupled with the tendency to pander to populism, undermined our efforts to ensure that these forces play a significant role with us in the transition.

The aim here is not to denigrate any self-professed patriotic organisation. Rather, it is to record the tragic fact that, as previous experience had shown, a blind pursuit of cheap popularity, has nothing to do with revolution. The April election results demonstrated in no uncertain terms that the masses themselves are able to distinguish between serious conduct of struggle and petty politicking.

The lesson needs to be kept in mind especially in the current period when we have to contend with serious difficulties of governance and delivery, that the solution lies in involving the people through all stages of the process and honestly explaining to them the difficulties we face and the reasons behind some unpopular decisions we may have to take. This is the best antidote to attempts by opportunists of all hues to gain popularity on the basis of radical-sounding but impractical propositions.

All these developments were taking place in a period in which the international community was redefining its own role with regard to our struggle. Proceeding from the decisions taken by Conference, the NEC consulted first and foremost the Front-line States and the OAU, to work out joint strategies aimed at ensuring a phased lifting of sanctions in accordance with progress in the negotiations process. As a result, at the Harare Commonwealth Summit of October 1991, and later at the United Nations and other fora, the ANC's perspective was adopted; thus undermining attempts by the regime to weaken international opposition to the system of apartheid.

Because of these initiatives and due to its own conduct, the ANC's standing improved in all capitals of the world. It became accepted among all forces, including political and business, not only as a major player to be reckoned with, but also as the custodian of the democratic transition.

It was in the context of this unfolding situation that the ANC and the democratic movement as a whole started to take both the strategic and tactical initiative. As recommended by Conference, the Negotiations Commission was constituted to plan and prepare for negotiations and conduct them in close consultation with the NEC, the Regions, branches and the broad patriotic forces.

Comprised of senior and capable leaders of our organisation, and constantly seeking the mandate of the broader movement, the negotiating team acquitted itself well. And we should congratulate them for a job well-done.

In time, the movement emerged as the driving force both of the content and form of negotiations.

This naturally frightened the regime and other counter-revolutionary forces. The process collapsed at Codesa II, because these forces feared the advent of democracy; they were worried about the pace of change; and for the ruling National Party in particular, misled by their seemingly universal popularity at the instance of the whites-only referendum in March 1992.

So confident were they of their fortunes that they calculated that they could delay the process that much longer, and in the intervening period, disorganise, weaken and discredit the ANC.

By then, it had become clear to most South Africans that one of the regime's main weapons in this regard was Low Intensity Conflict against black people, particularly in Natal and the PWV. With the Boipatong massacre, the ANC felt obliged to call off negotiations and call for decisive steps to deal with the violence and to secure a commitment from the regime to real democracy, a sovereign Constituent Assembly and definite time frames.

With the advantage of hindsight, we can safely conclude that the regime's behaviour in the first half of 1992 constituted its most serious strategic miscalculation, the beginning of a process which saw it permanently lose the tactical initiative.

Comrade Chairperson and Delegates;

Perhaps we should pause here and reflect in depth on four particular issues which affected the entire transition and still contain strategic relevance in the current situation.

The first is the question of violence.

Between January and June 1992, political violence had so intensified that 1,806 were killed and 2,931 were injured.

The African National Congress had in 1990 already stated its view that this violence was organised and had deeper roots than the so-called "black-on-black" analysis churned out by the media and the regime's spokespersons. Incontrovertible information now available to the public shows that indeed there was a network of senior members of the security services responsible for this.

We are convinced that these actions had the backing of some leaders of the National Party; and that those who were not directly responsible, did, by omission, abet these crimes, hoping that this would weaken their main adversary, the ANC. In so far as Natal and the PWV are concerned, the earlier approach had been to bolster and build an alliance with the IFP against the ANC, and later, to blame both the ANC and the IFP and seek to make political capital out of it.

Yet built into this strategy were many inherent contradictions. For a start, it undermined the economy and therefore generated wider opposition than the regime expected. As time went by, the involvement of the state became more and more obvious, thus further undermining its legitimacy.

This Conference will need to reflect on this issue to the extent that it affects the security of democracy today. In some areas political violence still persists, though much reduced. This includes the ugly phenomenon of taxi violence which has also been linked to the counter-revolutionary strategy. It is no secret that much of the network responsible for this violence still exists, either burrowed in the nooks and crannies of the state apparatus or in private front companies.

We will also need to take into account the fact that the extreme right-wing, both black and white, sought to use certain issues to mobilise a social base around themselves. In this regard, we should examine the question whether there are such issues which can still be used for reactionary mobilisation, depending on how we handle them.

In Natal, particularly, a desperate struggle by elements within the IFP to maintain a power-base among traditional leaders as an extension of the party does pose a danger of an eruption. The challenge for us in this regard is to ensure that traditional leaders are themselves liberated to become non-partisan servants of the people. We should also, while meeting the commitment to international mediation, challenge the notion that any party anywhere in South Africa can arrogate to itself the status of being representative of any King or Kingdom.

Our political initiatives should be combined with clear measures to ensure the dismantling of the counter-revolutionary network and firm law-enforcement. We should be firm on violence wherever it comes from. It is our responsibility as ANC to ensure that the people of KwaZulu-Natal, like those in other parts of our country, do not continue to live under tyranny. We should, at this juncture, reiterate our recognition of, and respect for, the institution of traditional leaders in all parts of our country. We should also emphasise, as many of these leaders would agree, that restoring this institution to its respected role does not mean that the right of citizens to determine their destiny or for communities to exercise democracy, should be subverted, simply because they happen to live in rural areas.

The second major question pertains to the role of the international community.

We refer to the issue of international mediation conscious of the fact that the international community has always held the view that it is here, within South Africa, where the repository of potential solutions to our problems reside. This has been our approach as well.

It is in this context that, when negotiations broke down in 1992, we sought increased international involvement to help reinforce initiatives that South Africans themselves were engaged in. Assisted by the OAU, we managed to raise the profile of UN and other agencies within the country, particularly after the Security Council debate in July of that year.

We should take this opportunity to thank the international community for the magnificent role they played in helping steer our transition. Without their scrupulous mechanisms of monitoring and bold pronouncements; without their wise counsel away from the public eye and without their material support; our transition would have been that much more difficult and costly.

It was in recognition of the importance of their involvement, that Conference instructed us to organise a summit of anti-apartheid forces, which finally took place in February 1993. The decisions taken by representatives of the international community at that summit, pertaining to measures to help speed up the negotiations process, support for the election campaign and plans to assist the process of reconstruction and development contributed immensely to much of our current successes.

Among other things, we also called for preparations to start for the post-sanctions era. In this regard, our experts also started to interact with relevant government departments on matters pertaining particularly to facilities offered by the IMF and negotiations for debt rescheduling.

The third major area is the issue of the relationship between negotiations and mass mobilisation as well as the capacity of both ourselves and the regime to qualitatively shift the balance of forces. This arose particularly after the Boipatong massacre, and in the context of the Campaign for Peace and Democracy.

Out of that campaign, we were not only able to secure our central demands as reflected in the Record of Understanding. We also managed to activate and thus strengthen our organisational structures, the Tri-partite alliance and relations with mass democratic structures. The supremacy of the ANC as the foremost political representative of the majority of South Africans was asserted beyond question. At the same time, we dare acknowledge that in these actions, we also learnt the need for tighter discipline and better assessment of situations to avoid errors of the Bisho type.

As we proceeded to break the logjam, we had to more earnestly address the questions: if mass action helps to shift the balance of forces, to what extent; would our objective be to so shift this balance that we exact a negotiated surrender on the part of the regime; at what cost would this be achieved; and were there any alternatives?

This inspired an open debate, continuing what had long been taking place within senior organs of the movement. Emerging from this was the Strategic Perspectives document on government of national unity, approach to the civil service and the issue of provinces in the transition. The ultimate product of this is Government as we have it today.

It might be a moot point to debate whether these conclusions and decisions were based on a correct assessment of the strategic balance; or whether we are today reaping the whirlwind of a terrible misjudgement. Yes, we did make compromises. But there can be no gain-saying that the approach to use the negotiations process to capture beach-heads within the power equation; and then proceed to strengthen our forces from a new vantage point, helped speed up the process to the great achievements we celebrate today. The challenge we face, which we will reflect on later, is whether we are utilising the new positions we occupy effectively to bring about fundamental transformation.

The fourth major area is the relationship between the ANC and the National Party. This arose particularly from the fact that we chose deliberately to resume negotiations with the NP government first, before multi-party discussions. Much speculation and accusations were also fuelled by the adoption of that Strategic Perspectives document.

Our decision to proceed in this manner was premised on the understanding that the ANC and the NP government were the major players in the transition. This was because, on the one hand, the ANC was the premier liberation movement; and on the other, the NP was the administration in power. The two parties differed fundamentally on the basic questions facing the country. Yet, they had to co-operate to ensure implementation of decisions the NP government was forced to agree to in negotiations.

The situation had to be handled in such a manner that we could tactfully persuade the leading forces within the NP that the transition was also in their interests; to assist them in appreciating the need to close a treacherous chapter in South Africa's history. Transition with the minimum of disruption required their co-operation. This did not mean a submerging of the fundamental contradictions; but it helped pave the way for the final settlement.

In broad terms, this principle helps to define the current relationship in the Government of National Unity. The situation has markedly changed, tempered by the electoral results, the fact that the ANC is the leading organisation in government and that we do not need a mediator to deal particularly with the various layers of the state machinery.

We have, as before, to skilfully broaden and deepen the areas of consensus, which today include essential elements of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, and ensure that all parties, especially those in government, co-operate in the realisation of this programme.

We should accept that it is the necessary thorny crown of leadership that, like a suitor, we have to patiently bring in line elements whose own sense of self-importance lies in making a relationship tempestuous. We have to understand the reasons behind this, at the same time as we challenge the false notion that the Government of National Unity arrangement is God-given, and therefore, that governance and investor confidence would collapse without the participation of forces other than the majority party.

Comrade Chairperson and Delegates:

When negotiations resumed in the multi-party negotiations forum, it was easier to streamline discussion and move with speed to the desired agreements. New forces had made their entry into the process, but they could not prevent speedy movement to the final objectives.

Our basic aim was to move quickly to transitional mechanisms that would deprive the NP of the monopoly of power and secure free and fair elections.

It was with this aim in mind that we approached the heinous murder of Chris Hani, outstanding leader of the ANC and General Secretary of the South African Communist Party. In channelling popular anger and managing what was a national crisis of great proportions, we sought to turn this tragic event into a platform to hasten movement to democracy. We hope that, by attaining an election date that became sacrosanct, we paid worthy tribute to this fallen hero.

Within a few months, comprehensive agreements, including the interim constitution and structures to supervise elections, were reached. After years without legitimacy, the regime formally surrendered its legality as the tri-cameral parliament passed the transitional legislation and accepted the new centres of power in the Transitional Executive Council and related bodies.

However, lurking in the background were the extreme right-wingers whose politics of desperation centred around crude maintenance of the status quo, racism, tribal chauvinism and violence. Their alliance, though representing a small fraction of society was made the more dangerous because it included elements in the state apparatus, Bantustan power bases and, with some of them, potent issues to mobilise backward forces within society.

Our approach to engage these forces helped weaken their cohesion and resolve. In so far as the white right is concerned, we persisted with discussions which culminated in compromises offering them a feeling of security and a constitutional channel to address their apprehensions. The more far-sighted among them do realise that it was not all in vain, and they are co-operating with us in search of a stable and prosperous future for all our people.

We have already referred to the issue of international mediation as it affects the IFP. In so far as Ciskei and Bophuthatswana were concerned, the former could not sustain its resistance once the process gathered momentum; and the latter collapsed in shame at the instance of a popular uprising.

In engaging these forces, we had also noted that prominent forces within the regime's security establishment either hid behind the extreme right- wing or themselves engineered some of the disruptive actions. We can today reveal that, especially in the build-up to election day, we had to engage some of these elements and secure a commitment that they would act in defence of the process.

We did so to save lives and secure our people's right to a democratic election.

It is fitting at this juncture, to single out our Elections Commission and related structures at regional and branch level for the splendid and professional manner in which they led the ANC's campaign. When history is finally written, tribute will go to the unsung organiser who trudged the campaign trail to educate our people and prepare them for election day. Tribute will go above all to the people themselves who grasped the historic opportunity with both hands and braved the threats from all kinds of quarters. For, it is on those momentous days that the saying rung truer than ever before: that the people are their own liberators.

The content of the ANC's election campaign reflected our strategic objective of the political and social liberation of South African society. It set the tone for an inclusive approach to the task of nation-building and helped create the basis for the smooth post-elections transition. From the very beginning, we adopted an approach that underlined our serious intent and respect for the views of the mass of the people. We committed ourselves to concrete programmes, worked out professionally and based on the needs of the people. Thus we nipped in the bud any attempts by the parties of apartheid to fudge the issues.

We were fully aware that we had established a yardstick by which the people would judge our performance in government. And we wish to reiterate today, that we remain true to those commitments; and we shall assert our authority wherever we are, in order to realise the objectives we articulated in the election campaign. As we stated on countless occasions then, we are mindful of the fact that this will take time and much effort. We are also aware that it will require maximum co-operation among all sectors of society. For this to happen, the people should know and understand what government is doing. The ANC and its allies have a crucial role in this regard, as part of our task to ensure that the process of deepening democracy, including reconstruction and development, is people-driven and people-centred.

We have over the past months outlined in our discussion documents the initial assessment of the election results and their implications for nation-building and reconstruction. Suffice it to emphasise that our characterisation of ourselves as an organisation representing the oppressed people and other democrats was vindicated by the results.

At the same time, serious weaknesses in a number of areas were exposed. One of them, whose significance transcends narrow interests of the ANC, is the extent to which particularly poorer sections of the Coloured and Indian communities found solace in the racist mobilisation of the National Party, and voted in

This is even more crucial because many of the weaknesses in the implementation of our objectives arise from the absence of legitimate local government. We are the custodians of the RDP, and we have to ensure that those who know what the RDP is; why it is needed and how it should be implemented, are elected into local government. In this sense, the Local Government elections are a continuation of April 27, because there cannot be full democracy without democratic local government.

Chairperson and Delegates;

No doubt we shall be judged in these elections on the basis of how we perform now rather than simply on our message. It will therefore be crucial for Conference to apply its mind seriously to issues of governance, taking into account the background we have outlined in earlier parts of this report.

In this respect, we need to avoid two extremes.

The one is to conclude that we are merely in political office -