Reflections of the Commander in Chief. THE WORLD TYRANNY

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

7 July 2007

Context
Castro reflected on assassination attempts, the Sierra Maestra campaign, and his 1959 meeting with Nixon, published as a written reflection on July 7, 2007.
Main themes
Cuban Revolution history, assassination plots against Castro, Cold War imperialism, Nixon-Castro meeting 1959, Sierra Maestra guerrilla campaign, US-Cuba relations, betrayal and infiltration, political ideology of Castro, world tyranny
Duration
~26 min
76th percentile
Words
3,070
76th percentile
Sentences
143
79th percentile
Readability
41
38th percentile
Grade
12.7
54th percentile
Syntax
3.08
57th percentile
Vocabulary
2.34
82nd percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 71%64%
  • Economic 12%11%
  • Institutional 10%9%
  • Ceremonial 5%4%
  • Social 2%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 10%

143 sentences in 61 paragraphs

At the end of the last offensive of tyranny against the Sierra Maestra, we also had to thwart the reckless schemes of Evaristo Venereo, an agent of the regime who, disguised as a revolutionary, attempted to infiltrate Mexico. He was the liaison agent of the secret police of that country, a very repressive body to which he served as an advisor during the blindfolded interrogation of Cándido González, a heroic activist who was assassinated after the landing. He was one of the few compañeros who drove the car in which I was traveling.

Evaristo Venereo then returned to Cuba. He had been assigned the mission to assassinate me when our forces were already advancing on Santiago de Cuba, Holguín, Las Villas, and the West. We later learned in detail when we seized the archives of the Military Intelligence Service. Everything is well documented there.

I survived numerous assassination plots. Only chance and the habit of carefully observing every detail allowed all those who later became known as the leaders of the victorious Revolution: Camilo, Che, Raúl, Almeida, Guillermo, to survive the traps set by Eutimio Guerra in the early, most dramatic days of the Sierra Maestra. We nearly faced extermination in a ridiculous manner when the enemy, guided by the traitor, managed to surround our camp, which was devoid of sentries. During the brief skirmish that ensued, we suffered a painful loss, that of a sugar worker, a Black man, a wonderful and active fighter, Julio Zenón Acosta, who was a few steps ahead of me and fell right next to me. Others survived this deadly danger and later died, like Ciro Frías, an excellent comrade and a promising leader, on the Second Front; Ciro Redondo, fighting bravely at Marverde within Che's column; and Julito Díaz who, without ceasing to operate his .30 caliber machine gun, died just a few steps from our P.C., during the attack on El Uvero.

We were ambushed in a well-chosen spot, waiting for the enemy because we had realized the movement they were going to make that day. Our attention had relaxed for barely a few minutes upon seeing two men from the group we had dispatched as scouts a few hours before making the decision to move, but who returned without the slightest news.

Eutimio Guerra was guiding the enemy, dressed in a white guayabera, the only thing visible in the forest of the Espinosa Heights where we were waiting for him. Batista had already concocted the news of the liquidation of our group and summoned the press. Victims of overconfidence, we had actually underestimated the enemy who took advantage of human weaknesses. We were then about twenty-two well-trained and handpicked men. Ramiro, wounded in the leg, was recovering far from us.

The column of more than three hundred men advancing in single file on that steep and wooded terrain escaped that day from a hard blow thanks to the movement we made at the last moment.

How did this machine operate against the Cuban Revolution?

I went to the United States, invited by the Washington Press Club, as early as April 1959. Nixon deigned to receive me in his private office. He later claimed that I was ignorant in economics.

I was so aware of this that I was preparing three university degrees at once in order to obtain a scholarship that would allow me to study economics at Harvard. I had already passed all the exams in law, diplomatic law, and social sciences, and I only had to take the exams in the history of social doctrines and the history of political doctrines. I had studied seriously—no other student had made this effort that year—and the path was clear. But events in Cuba accelerated, and I realized that it was no longer time to receive a scholarship and study economics.

I had gone to Harvard at the end of 1948. Upon returning to New York, I bought Capital in English to study Marx's masterwork and, incidentally, to better master the language. I was not a clandestine militant of the Communist Party, as Nixon thought, with his sly and prying gaze. What I can assure you—and I discovered this at university—is that I was first a utopian communist, and then a radical socialist, based on my analyses and studies, ready to fight according to an adequate strategy and tactics.

In front of Nixon, my only reluctance was having to frankly expose my thoughts to a vice president and probable future president of the United States, an expert in economic concepts and imperial government methods that I had long ceased to believe in.

What was the essence of this conversation that lasted for hours, according to what the author of the declassified memorandum recounts? I have only vague memories of it. I choose the paragraphs of this memorandum that best explain, in my opinion, Nixon's ideas.

Castro was particularly afraid of having irritated Senator Smathers with his comments about him. I reassured him at the beginning of the conversation by telling him that "Meet the Press" was one of the most difficult programs a public official could participate in and that he had done extremely well, especially since he had had the courage to speak English without going through an interpreter.

Regarding his visit to the United States, it is also evident that his main interest "was not to obtain a change in sugar quotas or a loan from the government, but to gain public support for his policy."

It is his almost blind submission to the prevailing opinion of the majority—the voice of the crowd—more than his naive attitude towards communism and his evident misunderstanding of the most basic economic principles that worried me the most when I had to assess what kind of leader he would be in the long run. That is why I spent most of my time insisting that he had great leadership gifts, but that the responsibility of a leader was not to always follow public opinion, but to help guide it on the right path, not to give people what they want at a moment of emotional tension, but to make them wish for what they should have.

I also tried to make him understand that, even though we believe in majority rule, it can be tyrannical and should never have the power to destroy certain individual rights.

Frankly, I do not think I made a strong impression on him, but he listened to me in any case and seemed receptive. I tried to present him with an essential idea: his place in history would be determined by the courage and statesmanship qualities he would demonstrate now. I insisted that the easiest thing would be to follow the crowd, but that doing the right things would ultimately be better for it and, of course, for him as well. As I have already said, he was incredibly naive about the communist threat and seemed absolutely unconcerned that communists could eventually seize power in Cuba.

In our discussions about communism, I again tried to argue in his best interests and point out that the revolution he had led could turn against him and the Cuban people if he did not maintain control of the situation and ensure that communists did not occupy positions of power and influence. On this point, I do not believe I achieved much.

I insisted as much as I could on the necessity for him to delegate responsibilities, but again I do not believe I was understood.

While showing a purely formal interest in institutions such as freedom of expression, press, and religion, it was evident that his fundamental concern was to develop economic progress programs. He kept repeating that a man who worked in the sugar cane fields for three months of the year and was hungry the rest of the time wanted work, food, housing, and clothing.

He stated that the United States was making a great mistake by supplying arms to Cuba or any other Caribbean country. He said: "Everyone knows that our countries will not be in a position to participate in the defense of this continent in the event of a world war. The arms that governments on this continent obtain only serve to repress the people, as Batista did to combat the Revolution. It would be much better if the money you give to Latin American countries for arms were directed towards capital investments." I must admit that on the substance of his arguments, I was far from disagreeing with him!

We discussed at length the means that Cuba could use to obtain the necessary investment capital for its economic development. He insisted that what Cuba essentially needed and what he wanted was not private capital, but public capital.

I was talking about capital from the Cuban government. Nixon himself acknowledges that I did not ask for resources from his government. He confuses things a bit and states:

"...that public capital was limited due to the many requests we were receiving and the budgetary problems we were encountering at the moment."

It is evident that I explained to him, since he immediately points out:

"...that the countries of America and the rest of the world were competing for capital and that this capital would not go to a country about which there were strong fears that it would adopt discriminatory policies against private enterprises."

Again, I doubt I achieved much.

I tried, with a lot of tact, to suggest to Castro that Muñoz Marín had done a remarkable job in Puerto Rico to attract private capital and to generally raise the standard of living of his people, and that he could very well send one of his main economic advisors to talk to him. This suggestion did not excite him much, and he pointed out that the Cuban people were "very nationalistic" and would view any program engaged with a country considered a "colony" of the United States unfavorably.

I am inclined to think that the real reason for his attitude is that he disagrees with Muñoz Marín, a staunch defender of private enterprise, and that he does not accept any advice that would divert him from his goal: to steer Cuba towards a more socialist economy.

"You should not talk so much to the United States about your fears of what the communists could do in Cuba or in other countries in Latin America, Asia, or Africa."

I tried to place our attitude towards communism in context, pointing out that communism was not just a simple idea, and that its agents were dangerously effective in the art of seizing power and establishing dictatorships.

It is also symptomatic that he did not ask any questions about sugar quotas nor even specifically mention economic aid.

My impression of him, as a person, is mixed. The only thing we can be sure of is that he possesses those indefinable qualities that make leaders. Whatever we may think of him, he will be an important factor in the development of Cuba and, very likely, in Latin American issues in general. He seems to be sincere, but he is either incredibly naive about communism or of communist allegiance.

But, given that he possesses this leadership ability I referred to, we have no other choice but to try to guide him at least on the right path.

This is how his confidential memorandum to the White House concludes.

When Nixon started to speak, there was no way to stop him. He was used to lecturing Latin American presidents. He did not bring notes of what he intended to say, nor did he take notes of what he said. He answered questions that were not asked of him. He introduced themes solely based on the preconceived opinions he had of his interlocutor. Even a primary school student would never have thought to receive so many lessons at once on democracy, anti-communism, and other matters of the art of governing. He was a fanatical supporter of developed capitalism and its natural right to dominate the world. He idealized the system. He conceived nothing else, and there was not the slightest possibility of communicating with him.

The slaughter began with the Eisenhower/Nixon administration. Otherwise, how can one explain that Kissinger exclaimed that "blood would flow if, for example, Robert Kennedy, Attorney General, had personally directed the assassination of Fidel Castro"? But blood had flowed before; the succeeding administrations merely followed the same policy, with a few exceptions.

J. C. King, head of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, wrote verbatim in a memo dated December 11, 1959: "We must thoroughly consider the elimination of Fidel Castro. [...] Many well-informed people believe that Fidel's disappearance would greatly hasten the fall of the current government..."

As the CIA and the Church Senate Committee recognized in 1975, assassination plans began in 1960, when the objective of destroying the Cuban Revolution was included in the presidential program of March of that year. J. C. King had sent his memorandum to the CIA director, Allen Dulles, expressly asking him to approve his recommendations and others. All of them were accepted and considered with satisfaction, particularly the assassination proposal, as indicated by this annotation from Allen Dulles dated the following day, December 12, on the document: "The recommendation in paragraph 3 is approved."

In a draft book where he analyzes in detail the declassified documents, Pedro Alvarez Tabío, director of the Office of Historical Affairs of the State Council, writes: "Until 1993, the organs of the Cuban state security discovered and neutralized a total of six hundred twenty-seven plots against the life of Fidel Castro. This total includes both plans that entered a phase of concrete execution and those that were neutralized at the outset, as well as other attempts publicly revealed by the United States themselves for various means and reasons. It does not include a number of cases that could not be verified, because there was only the testimony of a few participants, nor, of course, the plans after 1993."

Colonel Jack Hawkins, head of CIA paramilitary operations during the preparations for the Bay of Pigs, writes in a previously declassified report:

"The paramilitary team studied the possibility of organizing a more considerable assault force than the small emergency force previously planned. It was envisaged that this force would land in Cuba after effective resistance, including active guerrillas, had been set in motion. It should be noted that the guerrillas operated successfully in the Escambray mountains throughout this period. It was anticipated that the landing of the assault force, after the establishment of widespread resistance, would precipitate a general uprising and numerous desertions in Castro's armed forces that would materially contribute to his overthrow.

"The concept of an amphibious and airborne assault force was discussed by the Special Group at its meetings in November and December 1960. The Group did not reach a definitive conclusion regarding the ultimate use of this force, but did not oppose its continued development for any eventuality. CIA representatives informed President Eisenhower of this concept at the end of November. The President expressed his desire that all concerned departments vigorously pursue all their ongoing activities.

What did Hawkins inform about the "results of the internal resistance program (September 1960-April 1961)"? Nothing less than the following:

"a) Infiltration of paramilitary agents. Seventy trained paramilitary agents, including nineteen radio operators, were infiltrated into the target country. Seventeen radio operators managed to establish communication circuits with CIA headquarters, although a number were later captured or lost their equipment.

"b) Aerial drop operations. These operations were unsuccessful. Of the 27 missions undertaken, only 4 achieved the expected results. Cuban pilots quickly proved that they did not possess the skills required for this type of operation. The Special Group refused to authorize the contractual engagement of U.S. pilots for these missions, while allowing the hiring of other pilots for potential purposes.

"c) Maritime delivery operations. These operations were very successful. Boats sailing between Miami and Cuba delivered more than forty tons of war weapons, explosives, and equipment, and infiltrated and exfiltrated a large number of people. Some of the supplied weapons partially equipped four hundred guerrillas who operated for a considerable period in the Escambray mountains in the province of Las Villas. Much of the sabotage carried out in Havana and elsewhere was conducted using materials provided in this way.

"d) Guerrilla development. The agents infiltrated in Cuba managed to develop a vast underground organization that extended from Havana to all provinces. Nevertheless, there were really effective guerrillas only in the Escambray mountains where poorly equipped guerrillas, estimated to be between six hundred and a thousand and organized into bands of fifty to two hundred members, operated successfully for more than six months. […] A CIA-trained coordinator intended for action in the Escambray entered Cuba clandestinely and was able to reach the guerrilla zone, but he was quickly captured and executed. Other small guerrillas sometimes acted in the provinces of Pinar del Río and Oriente, but without significant results. Agents reported in all provinces a large number of unarmed men willing to join the guerrilla if they had the means. […]

"e) Sabotage.

"1) The sabotage actions from October 1960 to April 15, 1961, were as follows:

"a) Approximately 300,000 tons of sugarcane destroyed in 800 separate fires.

"b) Approximately 150 other fires, including 42 tobacco dryers, 2 paper mills, a sugar refinery, 2 dairies, 4 stores, and 21 communist residences.

"c) Approximately 110 bombs, including at communist party offices, the Havana power plant, 2 stores, the train station, the bus station, militia barracks, and railways.

"d) Approximately 200 explosive charges in the province of Havana.

"e) Derailment of six trains, destruction of a station and microwave cables, and numerous transformers.

"f) A commando raid by sea against Santiago interrupted the refinery for a week."

This is what is known from Hawkins' report. Everyone understands that two hundred explosive charges in the main province of an underdeveloped country that relied on monoculture sugarcane, a semi-servile labor, and sugar quotas obtained because it had been a reliable supplier for two centuries, but whose most productive lands and sugar mills belonged to large U.S. companies, constitute an act of brutal tyranny against the Cuban people. Add to that the other actions carried out.

I will stop here. For today, that is quite enough.

Fidel Castro Ruz

July 7, 2007

3 PM