- Context
- Frank C. Carlucci delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference on 15 February 1981, amid Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- Main themes
- NATO burden-sharing, Soviet military power, strategic nuclear forces, theatre nuclear force modernisation, Persian Gulf security, European security responsibilities, arms control cooperation
- Duration
- ~11 min
- Words
- 1,369
- Sentences
- 76
- Readability
- 41
- Grade
- 12.0
- Syntax
- 2.77
- Vocabulary
- 2.15
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other76 sentences in 30 paragraphs
Deputy Secretary of Defense of United States of America
Frank C. Carlucci used this speech to the 18th Wehrkunde Conference to call upon the European members of NATO to support the US in assuring common interests in the Persian Gulf.
I am honored and pleased to be here today. Honored to address so distinguished an assemblage. Pleased to return in an official capacity to Europe, where I spent some of the most interesting and satisfying years of my career in public service.
Europe holds a special place in the hearts of Americans. We draw from you much of our cultural heritage, our language, even our religious traditions. In this century, peace and security in Europe have become inseparable from peace and security for the United States. Three decades ago, we joined with our European friends in an unprecedented alliance of free people, an alliance whose raison d’être is as clear and persuasive today as it was when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.
Our common commitment to the goals of the Alliance is undiminished. As allies, we believe now, as we did then, that an attack against one of us is an attack against us all. We believe now, as we did then, that we must maintain and develop our individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Some of the challenges that confront us in the 1980s are those which forged our Alliance in the 1940s — the menacing and continuing growth of Soviet military power in Europe. Yet, in many ways, the context for even these familiar challenges has changed. The Soviet buildup in Europe clearly exceeds any rational requirement for defense. It bears all the marks of an offensive military capability, consistent with Soviet military doctrine. This steady and cumulative expansion of conventional, chemical, and theater nuclear forces has been accompanied by a long-term and major shift in the strategic nuclear balance, from one of unquestioned US superiority to essential equivalence, and the prospect, if appropriate steps are not taken, of possible inferiority. The twin results of this shift are that the United States no longer enjoys a strategic edge to compensate for other deficiencies and that Soviet ability to use the threat of conventional force for political purposes could be significantly enhanced. On all levels of military capability, the trends are ominous.
The United States must recognize its responsibilities in this mature alliance. All too often in the past we have talked of consultation and acted on our own. Too frequently we have urged the need for consistency yet presented our allies with what at times must have seemed like annual changes in priorities and programs. The new Administration is aware of these dangers. We are determined to avoid them.
Europe, too, should recognize its responsibilities. Like the East-West balance, the relationship between the United States and Western Europe also has shifted dramatically over 30 years. The United States no longer produces and consumes 50 percent of the world’s GNP. Europe is no longer shattered, impoverished and disunited. Indeed, Western Europe’s total GNP exceeds that of the United States. In this situation, the United States cannot be expected to improve and strengthen US forces in Europe, unless other Allies increase their own contribution to the combined defense effort. Nor can the United States, unaided, bear the burden of promoting Western interests beyond Europe.
There is, I might add, great concern in the US Congress over the issue of burden-sharing, a concern that was brought home quite clearly and explicitly to Secretary Weinberger and to me in our confirmation hearings. This concern is a political fact of life for us, and that should be understood by all concerned.
An integral element of this mature Alliance is an expanded concept of European security. Only by meeting and mastering Soviet challenges both inside Europe and in areas of critical interest beyond, can European security be maintained. Only then can the possibility of a more constructive East-West relationship in Europe be held open.
Let me suggest three areas for concentrated effort.
First, what the United States can do. Second, what we as Allies can do in Europe. Third, what the United States and Europe can do outside Europe.
What the United States can do: This Administration’s agenda is as clear as the results of last November’s election. We are unequivocally committed to a major and sustained increase in military capability and therefore in defense spending. We will use these resources to ensure the following objectives: We will increase confidence in our strategic nuclear forces. We will maintain momentum behind theater nuclear force modernization. We also need to continue the program we have made in rationalization, standardization and interoperability of weapons and munitions production. These programs have resulted in elimination of much duplication, reduction in costs, and increases in overall capability. As part of our family of weapons concept, we reached an agreement in August 1980 whereby the Europeans would produce a short-range air-to-air missile, and the United States would build a medium-range air-to-air missile. Dual production of weapons systems reduces duplication in research and development. We are currently producing the F-16 fighter, the ROLAND Air Defense System, as well as other important weapon systems.
Again, we want to work closely with Europe in developing common arms control positions in areas of special concern to you. As in other areas of common interest, we must not let the Soviets benefit from any appearance of disunity, or let them gain leverage as a result of European pressures on the United States to proceed before we are ready, to pursue unrealistic objectives, or to make unnecessary concessions.
What Europe and the United States can do outside Europe: Generally, we all understand well what needs to be done within Europe. The challenge there is to marshal the political will to generate the resources required to be on with the job. But it will require fresh vision, as well as renewed political will, to come to grips with the threats to European Security from outside this continent.
What is needed first is an expanded private and public dialogue on these issues. We have begun the process of consultations at senior levels of allied governments, and this will take on new intensity in coming weeks. I also hope that this conference and many other efforts in the months ahead can promote wider public awareness of the threats to European security in regions outside of Europe and will generate new understanding and new motivation to deal with these threats.
The threat to vital Western interests in key areas, such as the Persian Gulf, can be met only if all concerned share the burden and find new ways to make greater contributions in support of our common interests. Western Europe’s stake in the security and stability of the Persian Gulf is enormous and well-recognized. What is perhaps less well understood is the great contribution the Western European members of the Alliance could make to help protect the security of this region so vital to them. For obvious reasons, I am not speaking here of a formal role by NATO. I have in mind individual, but complementary efforts by the members of our Alliance.
Close political relations with nations throughout Southwest Asia can be activated to strengthen understanding of Western objectives in the region and of our common interest in resisting Soviet aggression.
Security arrangements between European Allies and countries in Southwest Asia can help our friends in that region to strengthen their capability for self-defense.
The hard truth is that none of us can have social welfare and economic prosperity unless our Alliance is strong enough to maintain the peace and to protect our access to vital energy sources and raw materials. And those of you here in this meeting know full well that the relative military strength of the Alliance has been declining for far too long.
Let us face the facts honestly and begin now to take the necessary action together.
Photo credit: SZ-Archiv
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