- Context
- Afwerki gave a wide-ranging interview to local Eritrean media in January 2026, analyzing global power shifts, US decline, and Trump's return to assess impacts on Africa and Eritrea.
- Main themes
- Global governance crisis, US decline and MAGA doctrine, unipolar world order collapse, Trump foreign policy, regional impact on Africa and Eritrea, Cold War legacy, US national debt and economic weakening, geopolitical uncertainty, US interventionism, NATO cohesion, Middle East implications
- Duration
- ~29 min
- Words
- 3,467
- Sentences
- 214
- Readability
- 35
- Grade
- 12.3
- Syntax
- 2.81
- Vocabulary
- 2.37
This is an interview, press conference or exchange with other speakers. It is split into sentences and counted in the corpus, but its sentences are not tagged on the twelve indices.
214 sentences in 30 paragraphs
Q.1 In your previous interview, you provided comprehensive and detailed explanations of the current global and regional situation. Building on that discussion, our questions today are brief and focused on recent developments. We will begin with global conditions, and then move on to our regional and internal affairs.
The conflicting events, uncertainties, shifting dynamics, and unclear direction unfolding at the global level highlight a crisis of the transitional framework of the global governance system. Although the full picture has yet to emerge, based on a general assessment, what impact might these developments have on Africa and our region?
PIA: To speak about the future at the global level, and even to accurately describe the present, we must begin by examining where we have come from. The world has passed through distinct phases of the Cold war, each with its own characteristics. That era formally concluded with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. In its aftermath, the notion of a unipolar world order emerged. Who initiated this project, and how it evolved, is a long historical process. What transpired during the last three decades is not necessarily congruent with what Fukuyama and Huntington envisaged.
Now, more than thirty years have passed. The ambition to create a unipolar world order; to bring the globe under comprehensive economic, technological, and military dominance, has run its course. What results has this philosophy actually produced? Has it delivered peace, stability, justice, or prosperity? Or has it instead generated disorder and uncertainty? The present global confusion invites these fundamental questions. The first and most evident illustration is the current condition of the United States.
It’s important to grasp that America’s internal and external circumstances have significant global repercussions. We must therefore ask: what do we observe in the United States today, and what can we anticipate in the coming years? With President Donald Trump returning to power, what defining features characterize his approach? If we evaluate America’s trajectory over the past three decades, we see a gradual decline in economic strength and pre-eminence, technological advantage, military dominance, and international influence. From the Clinton era onwards, this deteriorating trend has become manifest incrementally; step by step. One need only compare America’s position then and now; it’s economic capacity, global standing, and level of acceptance, to recognize this shift. The endeavor to establish a unipolar world order has not produced the intended result; instead, it has coincided with America’s eventual weakening.
Today, the United States carries a national debt exceeding 36 trillion dollars. Beyond the sheer scale of the debt, the more pressing question is whether America still possesses real productive economic power. By many indicators, its economic, military, and technological supremacy has diminished.
It is within this context that Trump’s “MAGA” doctrine (Make America Great Again) must be understood. Implicit in this slogan is an acknowledgement that America is no longer “great” in the sense it once claimed, and that a deliberate effort is required to restore that status. Trump recognizing this reality as positive. This outlook does not belong to one individual alone; it reflects the thinking of a significant segment of American society. This raises further questions: What can realistically occur within America? How might this doctrine shape its global conduct? What possible decisions can Trump make on the basis of this doctrine? What measures will be pursued in the name of restoring greatness, and will they succeed?
During Trump’s first term beginning in 2016, certain initiatives were launched but later reversed under the Biden administration. Now, with a Second Term underway, we must consider what policies may take shape over the next three years. One example is the recent measures toward Venezuela, justified under the pretext of combating narcotics trafficking. Following the reported abduction of President Maduro, the narcotics trafficking issue is fading. This is not an event isolated to Venezuela. Other countries – Greenland, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, and Panama – have already been signaled as part of a larger strategic outlook and assigned timelines. Measures linked to the Venezuelan situation are already affecting Cuba. Iran also features prominently in similar near-term calculations.
If America adopts military measures under the MAGA doctrine, what consequences will follow? What would be the impact of actions concerning Greenland on Denmark and Europe? How would NATO cohesion be affected? What would pressure on Mexico and Canada imply – can it actually be sustained? If Iran were attacked, what repercussions would occur in our own region? Military initiatives taken in the name of combating narcotics or restoring order carry unpredictable and far-reaching consequences.
Military action is not the only tool under this doctrine. From skyrocketing tariffs to economic coercion, withdrawal from multilateral forums, debt leverage, and the logic of intervention based on perceived persecution—”the Whites in South Africa” or “Christians in Nigeria”—are all featured in this strategic toolkit. We have identified about nine or ten such instruments. There is also a patterns of intervention under the cloak of peace facilitation, as seen in the cases of Ukraine, Congo, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the tensions between Thailand and Cambodia. Are these measures truly designed to make America “Great,” or do they instead deepen global instability? What ultimate objective underlies this strategy?
Inferring from the trajectory of the MAGA policy, the primary objective of these measures in recent years has been to control the extraction of natural resources. Venezuela’s wealth is not limited to oil; generally, Latin America’s mineral reserves are vast. The situation in Congo is similar. A central focus of MAGA-oriented policies is access to and control over these resources. Because America’s economic power has declined globally, it has increasingly sought measures to reassert strength by securing strategic resources. In the coming three years, similar measures can be anticipated. What will their consequences be – not only within the targeted countries, but also across entire regions and continents? These questions require serious and continuous analysis.
Ultimately, the principal strategic targets are China and Russia. Whether the focus appears to be Greenland, Venezuela, or other regions, the underlying objective remains the containment of Chine and Russia. Under this doctrine, American policymakers believe that restoring national “Greatness” requires first constraining these two powers. This does not mean that other States will be spared from pressure. In Asia, India, Pakistan, Japan, Korea, and Indonesia are also areas of strategic concern. Even NATO partners are subject to forms of control and leverage. In Europe, how are France, Germany, and England positioned under the MAGA doctrine? For MAGA to work, what alliances will be reshaped, and what counter-measures will emerge? Under this strategy, Europe itself becomes a target, a field of competition. Tariff and sanction policies serve broader objectives of influence and control. Even migration policies are framed as instruments for easing domestic pressures to strengthen America.
Whenever such measures are applied, reactions inevitably follow in each country. Many of the measures observed so far are inconsistent. Are they means of control or intimidation? Do they produce stability or instability? Have their consequences been carefully calculated? Will these tools prove sustainable, or are they temporary instruments of coercion? In this context, we can say there is no definitive answer. In our own vicinity, we observe developments involving Gaza, Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia. The Red Sea region, rich in energy resources and strategic maritime routes, is also implicated. To provide sound analysis, we must not only examine the actions of one power, but also take into account the probable responses of others within the context of the MAGA policy.
In the larger context of global governance, the world needs to be built on just, sustainable relationships, moving away from Cold War mentalities and unipolar ambitions. Eighty years after the Second World War, however, predicting the direction of international relations is still not difficult. It is not a new phenomenon. The universal aspiration of the peoples of the world is clear: to live in peace and dignity, to benefit fairly from their labor, and to support one another in solidarity. No society can live in harmony under domination, expansionism, or imposed control. Therefore, if a new world order is to emerge, it must be founded upon these principles. The desire of humanity is simple and does not require elaborate theorizing. But because such an environment does not yet exist, global instability persists.
How, then, might a peaceful world take shape? We are currently passing through a phase of transition and crisis. Will this phase lead toward constructive transformation, or will current measures intensify public resentment and accelerate the demand for a new international order by raising universal awareness? Beyond the United States, developments in other major centers of power will be decisive. What paths will China, Russia, India, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, Malesia and other Asian nations pursue?
Europe presents a particularly complicated and unsettling chapter. The war in Ukraine and NATO’s deep entanglement illustrate this complexity. NATO is facing a crisis and the European Union is likewise struggling to project unified influence. When we observe MAGA-driven policies in Venezuela, Africa (South Africa and Congo); Ukraine in Europe, or Palestine in the Middle East, we must ask: how will other powers respond? Thus far, responses have largely been limited to issuing statements rather than taking decisive action, a principle that stands in stark contrast to their international standing and power. The direction of these trends may become clearer over the next three years. For now, we remain in a period of transition.
This stage contains many unknown variables. It is not possible to speculate, at this stage, on every measure a Trump Administration might adopt. Any serious assessment we make must be grounded in verified realities on the ground, and not on mere conjecture. Objective analysis of the volatile global situation is essential for defining our own tasks, pursuing our goals, and identifying opportunities.
Turning to Africa: despite possessing nearly sixty percent of the world’s natural resources, Africa remains a marginalized continent. Regional institutions such as the African Union, ECOWAS and IGAD remain weak, limiting Africa’s collective role in global power dynamics. Nevertheless, our sub-region – the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea corridor, the Arabian Gulf, and North and East Africa – holds immense geostrategic importance. It is highly sensitive to global shifts, but it also contains enduring opportunities.
In the coming three years, we must therefore give priority to our responsibilities: i.e. advancing development while safeguarding stability and peace. We must closely track how global developments specifically affect our region. We can set aside broader African variables for now, but in our vicinity, we must formulate and implement concrete regional policies that produce results. We should not get overly preoccupied with the unfolding policies of President Trump or be captivated by sensationalist media narratives. Instead, we must assess the actions of other global powers and regional actors with clarity.
Our diplomatic engagement with the United States should not preoccupy us needlessly or create confusion. We must take a calm, objective path, without dramatization. While larger global developments matter, our primary focus must remain our internal conditions and regional environment. This is where our true priority lies.
Q2- Your Excellency, in your previous interviews, you mentioned that in 2026, the Government of Eritrea will strengthen high-level engagement with the United States. In view of the new U.S. national security strategy, what can we expect in regard to Eritrea-U.S. diplomatic ties? Is there any possibility for change in the long-standing U.S. policies in the Horn of Africa?
The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the unipolar world order were concurrent with our achievement of national independence. And, since our independence, we have been monitoring closely the trajectory of US policies from the Clinton Administration onwards until the recent events. Our focus is not confined to the specific injustices meted out to Eritrea. We were acutely aware of the global damage that ensued from these misguided policies. The trends set in motion were not, indeed, sustainable and did not augur well for global governance. We did not succumb to the notion of a US-dominated, unipolar, global order that we had to accommodate whether we like it or not. Singular focus on the illicit sanctions and the wrongs imposed on us will not yield and give us any latitude in the rectification of global or regional realities. While not exaggerating our capacity, our perspectives and engagement policy must encompass a wider and strategic approach.
We recognized a potential opportunity in President Trump’s election to Office in 2016. Believing that the new Administration will have gleaned lessons from the mistakes of its predecessors, we took the initiative for active engagement and sent a message to President Trump. This positive step was taken on the firm conviction that rectification of the misguided policies was as much in the interest of the US as it was in our interest. Without delving into greater detail, President Trump’s response was positive. Our approach was prudent and comprehensive to include, with substantive details, the unwarranted policies pursued in the previous eighty years; their ramifications; as well as the rationale for correction. Unfortunately, the opportunity for meaningful interaction was not possible during the remaining years of President Trump’s first term due to various factors and the preoccupation of the Administration with other matters of paramount importance. The Biden Administration came to power subsequently. We were inclined to resume our initiative for constructive engagement with the new Administration, convinced as we were that this was not a matter of personalities. But the situation was not conducive and four years elapsed without any result. In total, nearly seven years were wasted without tangible outcome.
With Trump returning to the White House in 2025, we communicated our goodwill to continue the engagement that we had previously started. We underlined that after seven years of missed opportunity, this was indeed high time to resume the consultations that had begun in earnest. Here again, we have encountered some obstacles in the past year. Certain advisors in Washington seemed intent on blocking this engagement, deliberately or inadvertently, even creating obstacles to spoil the process. This may not be the time to dwell on this episode in greater detail. We know there are many “experts”, who actually lack the insight, but who nonetheless float certain recommendations. These trends are often intertwined with the lobbying process/norms in the US, and they are not confined to our case. These groups, fueled by their own fantasies and prejudices, usually seek to block positive engagements rather than enhancing them, essentially because they lack profound knowledge on the complex matters at hand. In our perspective, the judicious approach is for the parties to clearly stipulate the agenda and issues of discussion. This will allow both sides to do their homework and conduct the process of constructive engagement in a comprehensive manner to achieve the desired impact and outcome.
Some of the topics raised do not even merit discussion. To provide a small example, while this engagement process is underway, the U.S. State Department issued a report alleging that “investment is not possible in Eritrea”. The agenda of constructive engagement will obviously include bilateral relations and future prospects; including economic cooperation. We have no qualms or reservations to discuss these matters with an open mind. In the event, how can the State Department under the watch of Marco Rubio, circulate such a document to the international public. To assert that investment is impossible in Eritrea constitutes a stance of defamation and demonization. How can one explain these contradictory messages: asserting, on the one hand, the political goodwill and readiness to undertake fruitful consultations on investment and economic cooperation while alleging in the same breadth, that investment is impossible in Eritrea? If the latter is the case, what will be the topics of discussion? Is the calumny intended to dictate the terms of investment in favor of the US; or is the objective to ultimately undermine the engagement process itself?
I can only designate these ploys as tactics of “ambush and hijacking.” Obstacles are placed on the path before the engagement process is launched in order to divert it into selected topics. This is not new to us; it is both a systemic habit and culture. The goal is to pressure, coerce, intimidate and demonize in order to achieve what one wants. I have dwelt on this episode only as an example. We are not otherwise unduly concerned, and the incident will not derail our initiative for engagement in any way.
Our engagement with the United States is not limited to bilateral matters; it is primarily focused on our wider neighborhood. The disconcerting situations in Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, as well as other various matters will remain central topics in our consultations. Because, we do not have exclusive objectives. We are cognizant of the fact that regional stability, security, and peace are fundamental to development. External policies, particularly of the US, can contribute positively towards the achievement of these objectives in our region. We intend to share, with full transparency and in good faith, our perspectives on current realities and trends in the Horn of Africa, particularly regarding Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia as well as the preoccupying developments we see in the Red Sea. Sharing information and perspectives in these areas is vital in order to eschew unhelpful positions in the initiatives they take to formulate new policies on the Horn of Africa and the wider region. By the same token, we can discuss our internal situation in greater detail. Because the constructive engagement can be successful only when our assessments are objective. It should not be predicated on emotional or subjective appraisals.
Let us take Sudan as an example. What is Washington’s actual perspectives regarding Sudan? What are their intended objectives? Full information on these matters is essential for sharing our views. The measures they have taken so far are neither in consonance with reality nor helpful in alleviating the current crisis. We seek to address this matter directly in the platform/initiative of constructive engagement. Indeed, consultations will lose relevance if undertaken belatedly, and after the situation spirals out of control, dialogue loses its significance. It is maintained, at times, that our priority should be the status of our bilateral ties. For us, the notion of “bilateral ties” falls in the third or fourth degree of priorities. Our bilateral ties will be reinforced only when the regional environment is stabilized and conducive.
It is essential to understand Washington’s policies in our region. And as mentioned earlier, we need to share our perspectives and appraisals of regional developments and trends with the US without reservations. It will then be up to them to take the decisions they deem appropriate. And of course, we are positively disposed should they decide on collaborative and coordinated stance as we have no inhibitions on constructive engagement. Should the US seek collaborative decision-making, we can work out on mutual consultation. We do not harbor hidden agendas; and we do not shift our positions for the sake of narrow interests. Nor are we concerned by the stance of certain pundits who employ tactics of “ambush and hijacking”; which is predicated on a narrow mindset. They talk about “give and take”. But what does “give and take” truly imply? Does it mean compromising our fundamental interests; does it mean auctioning our cause in the marketplace? This mentality is alien to our political culture. In the event, our position can be distilled into a more judicious approach of addressing regional matters first to later revert to bilateral issues. Because focus on bilateral issues without first ensuring the over-arching exigencies of regional stability, peace, cohesion and cooperation will not yield meaningful dividends.
In a nutshell, we should not be unduly hurried or perturbed in consummating the engagement process. We intend to sustain our engagement on the basis of patient appraisals and proper reading of the unfolding global realities over the next three years. This policy will not change. The ultimate dividend will depend on the goodwill of both parties. Nor can we put the onus on the US alone. Obviously, we harbor sincere aspirations that US position will be positive in view of its paramount influence in our region. And whatever policies they ultimately formulate, our task is to communicate to them, if given the opportunity, our positions and appraisals. More importantly, it is incumbent on us to address our own internal situation as a neighborhood before venturing into constructive engagement with extraneous powers. We cannot put the blame on them before we accomplish these tasks. We cannot always request their support, their intervention to resolve our problems before we do our homework and address our own problems. Such policies are doomed to failure. In general, constructive engagement must be predicated on the pillars that I have described briefly. We will monitor its developments in the coming three years.
