- Context
- John G. Tower delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference on 15 February 1970, addressing Cold War tensions and NATO's role in European security.
- Main themes
- Military superiority towards the Soviet Union, Vietnamization of the war, NATO force commitments, strategic arms limitation talks, European security conference, containment of communist expansion in Asia, multilateral defence cooperation
- Duration
- ~26 min
- Words
- 3,129
- Sentences
- 125
- Readability
- 37
- Grade
- 14.2
- Syntax
- 3.05
- Vocabulary
- 2.30
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other125 sentences in 46 paragraphs
United States Senator from Texas and Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee
John G. Tower addressed the 7th Wehrkunde Conference with a plea to maintain a military posture of “unquestioned superiority” towards the Soviet Union.
The present time has been described by President Nixon as one in which we are moving from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. He believes that we must realistically view our present world not as what we would like it to be, but as it actually is.
In my opinion, Mr. Nixon is a pragmatist who believes that any sign of weakness on our part, any attempt at appeasement, any diminution of our resolve will be viewed with contempt by the Soviets and will be exploited by them. In this context, it is essential that we maintain a military posture not of parity, but of unquestioned superiority. I am stating the obvious when I say the maintenance of such posture serves as a deterrent to Soviet aggression against the non-communist world and provides us the power base from which to negotiate. We have learned we cannot think and act solely in global and nuclear terms, just as we cannot do so only in regional and conventional terms.
We must maintain a spectrum of deterrents ranging from well-equipped foot soldiers to the ICBM. Further, we believe that the possession of superior force alone is not enough.
Our deterrent is not credible unless friend and foe alike are convinced of our willingness to use our force if necessary. Without that conviction, the Soviets and the Chinese might be tempted to risk dangerous adventures.
It is my belief that we delude ourselves that there can be a détente or a stable and secure world with the current polarization of power between a sphere dominated by the Soviets and a sphere dominated by the United States. Rather, to achieve a secure and progressive world (particularly in light of the fact that in fifty years this planet will not be able to produce the food and fiber necessary to sustain the projected population), there must be at least four spheres of influence.
In addition to a Soviet sphere and an American sphere, there must be a West European sphere dominated by the collective powers of Western Europe, and an Asian sphere dominated, in the near future, by Japan with China being unable to play that role by virtue of the fact that Mao-Tse-Tung has virtually collapsed the economy of that country and the current leadership thinks in irrational and introspective terms.
In this context, let us consider Vietnam and the American commitment there. There is no question that we made errors of judgment that led to our involvement there. It is moot to argue whether or not we should have been in Vietnam in the first place. The fact is that we are there and the security of the peripheral nations of Asia depends on the outcome. This has been a difficult war for the United States because we have not fought an extensive guerrilla war since the American revolution. We have had to learn new techniques and devise new weapons. It is a kind of war in which success is difficult to measure, but I can report to you in all candor that we have achieved measurable success.
Approximately 85 percent of the territory and over 90 percent of the citizenry are now under effective allied control. The Thieu government is showing increasing stability and responsiveness to the needs of the country. The ARVN has demonstrated increasing combat proficiency and “esprit de corps.” Pacification is proceeding at a satisfactory pace. On the other hand, the VC infrastructure is decimated, demoralized, and unable to recruit effectively.
The North Vietnamese probably reached their peak strength at the Tet offensive in 1968 — a brash gamble that failed. North Vietnamese manpower resources have steadily deteriorated since that time, both in terms of numbers and quality.
Under present circumstances, the enemy is convinced that he cannot win a military victory in South Vietnam. Conscious that the war against the French was won in Paris, Hanoi seeks to achieve its objectives by continuing the war to the extent that the American people weary of it and bring popular pressure to bear on the President for unilateral American withdrawal.
The Nixon Administration is determined to see the issue to a successful and honorable conclusion and is not prepared to accept a camouflaged surrender to the demands of Hanoi. The President is determined to follow his established policy of the Vietnamization of the war with the withdrawal of American troops contingent on the criteria of level of enemy activity and competence of the Vietnamese to take over the ground fighting.
There is no doubt but that a substantial residual American force will have to be maintained there for some time. Even after maneuver battalions and their support elements have been withdrawn, we will have to continue to provide logistical, air, and naval support to the South Vietnamese.
It is my belief that we must look also to the sanitization of Laos and Cambodia, in light of the fact that there is a considerable communist infrastructure in Thailand, a SEATO ally of the United States, which is slated to be the next target for a so-called war of national liberation.
The current make-up of that infrastructure in Thailand is largely ethnic Chinese and ethnic Vietnamese and minority tribesmen. Laos serves as a base of operations against Thailand. It is our hope that we can ultimately contain communist expansion in Asia by surrounding China with a number of politically, economically, and socially progressive Asian nations. Because of its great economic potential, Vietnam fits into this picture.
Despite our involvement in Southeast Asia, we Americans are much less preoccupied with Southeast Asia than we were a short time ago. And since the advent of the Nixon Administration, there has been a growing consciousness of our responsibilities elsewhere in the world. A question that seems to come first and foremost in international discussions today is the United States attitude towards Europe and the future of our force commitments in Europe.
It seems to me that the priority which the United States gives to Europe is evidenced by the fact that President Nixon’s first trip was to Europe where he made it abundantly clear that the need remained to maintain an adequate deterrent to aggression against Europe. The President also stressed that our Allies should concentrate upon the quality of their force and not increased quantities of men and that it would be helpful to the United States if our European Allies could do more multilaterally.
As recently as last December, Secretary Laird told the Ministers of the Defense Planning Committee that our strategic review has convinced us that the United States commitment must remain as firm as it has been in the past and that the security of the NATO Allies is indivisible from the security of the United States. He also noted that the critics of our present force posture base their criticism not on strategic or economic considerations, but on a feeling that the United States continues to bear a disproportionate share of NATO’s defense burden. I would agree with Secretary Laird’s comments and also agree with President Nixon’s statement that it would be helpful if our European Allies could do more multilaterally to demonstrate the solidarity of Western Europe’s defense commitments.
Many of you are wondering what decisions will be made on Senator Mansfield’s proposed Resolution regarding the level of forces permanently stationed in Europe. I do not intend to predict the outcome of deliberations in Congress on this subject but would like to stress one point: Senator Mansfield’s Resolution acknowledges that the security of the United States and its citizens remains as interwoven with the security of other nations signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty as it was when the Treaty was signed. It is the sense of his proposed Resolution that a substantial reduction of permanently stationed United States forces can be made because of our vast increase in capacity to move military forces and equipment by air. I am personally of the opinion that deterrence to aggression is best achieved by having sufficient forces on hand.
I further believe that NATO’s military planners’ views on what comprises sufficiency need careful consideration before they are altered for economic or political reasons. Moreover, we have, in the cases of world Wars I and II, found that intervention is far more costly in terms of lives, let alone funds, than deterrence. In evaluating the United States commitments to Europe’s defense, I often feel too much attention is paid to words and too little to deeds. For example, we have made no secret of the reductions in our defense budget expenditures or the actions which we have taken to change our force structure to achieve these budgetary savings.
As evidence of our commitment and awareness of our NATO obligations, you need only look around you to see that we have achieved our budgetary savings without affecting our combat forces in Europe. In fact, quite the contrary, we have made and are making significant qualitative improvements. Our Army improvements include introduction of more helicopters and mobile assault bridge and ferry units; the self-propelled HAWK, REDEYE, and CHAPARRAL-VULCAN units for air defense, and GENERAL SHERIDAN armored vehicles. Our PERSHING battalions are receiving modernized equipment and increased manning. Navy improvements include the introduction of more modern aircraft such as the A-6, A-7, and F4J for our carriers and P-3C aircraft for land-based anti-submarine warfare operations.
Our Air Forces in Europe are undergoing an intensive modernization program with the conversion of F-100 and F-102 Wings to the F-4E and F-111 aircraft. In addition, we have improved our air base posture and wartime aerial port facilities, munition storage, and are well into a program for providing aircraft shelters and air base defense. The Marine Corps has completed the equipping of both Marine expeditionary forces earmarked for assignment to NATO with a new generation of wheeled vehicles and has made qualitative improvements in communications, engineering equipment and aircraft.
To me these actions are firm evidence of our commitment and would seem to me to speak with more authority than any oral pledge of our interest in NATO defense. As you know, our engineering, construction and maintenance endeavors in Europe are largely performed by civilian personnel of the countries where our forces are based. All of these programs outlined above are common knowledge to local personnel working on our installations but perhaps have not received the public attention that they merit or it may be that the sum total has not been brought to your attention.
We have made certain reductions in support functions and in headquarters and other areas where we felt advanced technology permitted reductions. Since they affect the local labor force they too are apparent to you and have also been publicly announced. In some instances, local governments and townships have noted the economic problems this places on the local community due to a reduction in spending by our troops and the loss of revenue from salaries of personnel employed by these installations.
As a Senator, I can appreciate their concern. But here again, the sincerity of the United States commitment is evidenced by the magnitude of the cuts taken in our own labor forces and the number of defense installations we have closed in the United States in order to maintain our combat forces in Europe.
As to the future, I would be less than candid if I did not report that popular opinion in the United States expects our European Allies to do more and to accept a greater financial share of the defense burden. There are means to do this that would be of mutual benefit and we need to get on with them. We must find ways to fully offset the United States balance of payment deficits so that this is removed as an argument for additional dual basing of forces.
If you agree that in place forces are a greater deterrence than dual-based forces, you should look to your own standards of readiness and seek improvements in existing active forces. In particular, improvements in manning levels and equipment of your active forces and in your mobilization systems, and an increase in the number of immediately available and ready combat reserve forces would be firm evidence of your interest. Some of you have indicated interest in the impact our Southeast Asia activities have had on our strategic reserve forces that are earmarked for Europe. I can tell you that they are fully manned and equipped and that a sizable proportion of their troops are now combat veterans who have completed their tour in Vietnam. Personnel rotations create problems in unit training programs but individual proficiency is high and combat experience is an offsetting factor.
We too have proponents of reduced terms of conscription, and it will be difficult for us to hold the line if the trend of reduced terms in Europe continues. In this connection, our minimum overseas tour in Europe is equal to the total conscription period of some of our Allies. In fact, our combat tour in Southeast Asia is twelve months. We cannot afford the increased costs and loss of efficiency resulting from more frequent rotation of personnel to Europe and urge consideration of these factors in your own defense planning.
It seems to me that all NATO nations might review costs or charges now borne by the United States to see if they are truly fitting or if they can be reduced. For example, airport taxes, leased telephone circuits for military facilities and air defense networks, and landing fees when it is necessary to utilize civilian airfields for military purposes. I am sure that your interest is in United States combat forces and equipment and I am equally sure that our continued presence can best be assured by reductions in our support costs to the point where it is no more or even less expensive to base them in Europe than in the United States.
I would like to make one last point before turning to other key issues. The future political and economic structure of Western Europe are issues for Europeans to decide. However, I am in full agreement that it would aid NATO’s supporters in the United States Congress if you would do more multilaterally in defense matters. Proposals for rationalization of forces and co-production of defense weapon systems make sense to me and would be concrete evidence of your interest in an integrated defense posture. Pursuing these proposals should be a matter for your urgent consideration. The subject other than forces that appears most on people’s minds today is East-West negotiations on arms limitations. The human race is a hopeful race, but we must deal with such issues as disarmament with realism and in the light of the cold, clear facts of history.
Regarding the preliminary round of talks on strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union (S.A.L.T. as we call them for short), we should not be too optimistic about early, favorable results. Our delegation was impressed with the serious, businesslike approach of the Soviets toward the negotiations, and we believe that the prospects are better than they have been in the past. On the other hand, we can be sure that the Soviets will make no agreements that are unfavorable to their national interests.
It should be noted that the Soviets agreed to the talks immediately after the United States announced its decision to go ahead with a limited ABM system. Although the Soviets may sincerely desire to reduce the threat of nuclear war and divert more resources to the civilian economy, they may see S.A.L.T. talks as a strategy for political gain. One objective might be to loosen the bond of mutual trust that binds America to the European members of the North Atlantic Alliance.
In keeping with our standard practice, we are coordinating our S.A.L.T. negotiations closely with the other members of NATO. Both prior to and after the first round of talks, our chief delegate consulted in detail with the North Atlantic Council. We plan to continue this close coordination, and I can assure you that our Administration will make no arrangements which lessen the security of its NATO Allies.
Another area we should approach with caution is the Warsaw Pact bid for an early European Security Conference. According to their Prague Declaration, the Communists would convene the Conference to discuss a renunciation of force and increased economic cooperation. However, these are being handled by bilateral talks. We should not rush to a conference that would serve no useful purpose for the West and might have the disadvantage of granting recognition to the East German regime and ratifying the present division of Europe.
If the Communist states show a willingness to discuss seriously substantive issues of European security, and I find it difficult to exclude in this context the problems of the German nation, then we should certainly agree to a meeting with the East European states and the Soviet Union. However, I must say that it is incongruous for regimes that have recently made a military invasion of a European state in order to force political changes on it to suddenly advocate a renunciation of the use or threat of force in Europe.
We should go to any conference that promises real improvements in European security. We should not, however, let propaganda moves by the Soviet Union divide our NATO Alliance or promote the permanent division of the German nation or of Europe. If the North Atlantic countries stand together, their security can be threatened by no one. In concluding, it seems to me that the European members of NATO need to be more forthcoming about their concepts of NATO’s defense policy. It would help if there were a consensus among you on other issues as strong as the existing consensus on United States force levels. Here too a multilateral approach would be desirable and enable us to make difficult defense decisions that are most likely to supplement your own defense efforts and to assure you of our continued commitment to NATO. Allies with bonds as strong as ours can have frank discussions over difficult and complex issues and emerge from them with even stronger bonds and greater understanding.
Photo credit: Dave Mathias/The Denver Post via Getty Images
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