MSC 1976 — J. William Middendorf II

United States J. William Middendorf II · United States Secretary of the Navy

15 February 1976 · Munich Security Conference · 1976 · Hotel Bayerischer Hof, Munich, Germany

Context
J. William Middendorf II delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference on 15 February 1976, addressing security concerns during the Cold War era.
Main themes
NATO alliance support, Soviet military capabilities, naval strategy and sea denial, standardisation and rationalisation in NATO, defence expenditure disparities, Mediterranean security, Soviet presence in Africa
Duration
~16 min
55th percentile
Words
1,928
55th percentile
Sentences
86
56th percentile
Readability
37
29th percentile
Grade
13.5
62nd percentile
Syntax
2.99
46th percentile
Vocabulary
2.30
73rd percentile

Munich Security Conference

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 58%35%
  • Economic 21%13%
  • Ceremonial 15%9%
  • Institutional 6%3%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 40%

86 sentences in 33 paragraphs

Secretary of the Navy of the United States of America

On the occasion of the 13th Wehrkunde Conference, J. William Middendorf II represented US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In his speech, he emphasized the need to match the increasing military capabilities of the Soviet Union.

It is an honor for me to be here today representing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the former Ambassador of the United States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was my pleasure, as US Ambassador to The Netherlands, to work with Secretary Rumsfeld in numerous matters relating to the NATO alliance. The defense and preservation of Europe as we know it has always been a matter of great concern to Americans. The actions of my Government have demonstrated that concern over and over again, and it is my intention today to stress that the United States continues its policy of support for Europe through a common defense.

While this is not a NATO conference, I feel compelled to point out that during the past twenty-seven years NATO has been eminently successful in accomplishing its designed task. The collective defense to deter aggression and preserve peace provided by NATO is more and more important to us today, for reasons which I shall describe in detail.

I strongly believe that NATO and its military capabilities are perhaps the single most important factor in deterrence of great disruption in Europe at a time when the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries continue to increase their capabilities; here are some of the facts about this increase in Soviet capabilities:

The key fact is that over the past dozen years, Soviet defense spending has increased by about 35 percent. In this period, the Soviet military establishment (not counting border guards and internal security forces) expanded from 3.4 to 4.4 million men. Intercontinental ballistic missiles increased from 224 to 1,600. Sea launched ballistic missiles went up from 29 to 730. Strategic warheads and bombs were up from 450 to 2,500.

And between 1964 and 1974 the Soviets produced 249 new major combatant ships, establishing themselves as a naval power and adding a new dimension to the problem of defending Europe — an oceanic dimension.

The Soviet strategic buildup unfortunately seems to be gaining momentum, with qualitative improvements such as the development of four new ICBM’s, two of which are currently being deployed with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV’s).

The production of a new generation of ballistic missile submarines one class of which has recently deployed with the 4,200 mile SS-N-8 missile.

Improvements which could give their ICBM’s significantly better accuracy. Large MIRV’s with high-yield warheads. Development of a mobile IRBM. The Soviet general purpose forces have not been without their expansion also: The number of divisions has increased from 141 to 168 with an increase in numbers of tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. An addition of nearly 2,000 tactical aircraft, combined with the introduction of more sophisticated fighter/attack aircraft.

As the Secretary of the Navy I have a particularly keen interest in the Soviet navy and its capabilities. Soviet naval presence in peacetime is becoming a very significant factor throughout the world. Nowhere have the new directions of the Soviet Navy been more apparent than in the Mediterranean — NATO’s southern flank. In 1964 this presence averaged five ships. The present Soviet average is between fifty and sixty. During the 1973 Middle East crisis the Soviet Mediterranean squadron reached some ninety-five units. The new Soviet Navy has one vertical and short takeoff and landing aircraft carrier undergoing sea trials, a second under construction and a third in the planning stages. Their sea denial ability has been enhanced through the addition of powerful new surface combatants, such as KARA-class cruisers.

The Soviet Navy has new ships, modern weapons systems, and access to facilities in the Black Sea and to a limited extent along the Mediterranean Coast, This increased Soviet strength has led some to question the capability of NATO and the US Sixth Fleet. At best we are maintaining adequacy. Even this could be in jeopardy as unsettled conditions in several countries threaten to increase our logistics problems. I feel that today the Allied NATO partners are still the dominant force in the Mediterranean as long as there are aircraft carriers capable of sustained actions, but we no longer have a monopoly. For this reason, I feel that it is imperative that the NATO nations be as supportive as possible to the new government in Spain. Spain has a valuable role to play in the European community and should not be prevented from doing so because of policies of a previous era.

What have we seen outside the Mediterranean? Recently Soviet units have made unprecedented deployments and conducted exercises indicating a change in the basic mission of defense of the homeland to one of sea denial. This change has serious meaning for Europe. The Soviets are now capable of significantly threatening vital overseas areas and the sea lanes. The NATO countries are dependent on the sea for overseas trade, just as is the United States. In fact, the very existence of Western Europe as we know it today depends on the unimpeded flow of oil and other strategic materials which can only be supplied in the proper quantities by ocean-going vessels.

The latest Soviet presence on the African continent in such places as Nigeria, Guinea and Angola could in the time of hostilities literally cripple Europe. Approximately 80% of the NATO alliance’s oil and 70% of the strategic materials move through the waters along the west coast of Africa, now vulnerable to the air and naval bases of Soviet supported governments.

During OKEAN 75, a Soviet naval exercise observed by NATO units, more than two hundred Soviet nuclear submarines and surface ships and 400 aircraft, in three oceans, were assembled and coordinated through a sophisticated worldwide communication network, including satellites, Soviet aircraft operated from bases not only in the Soviet Union, but also from air facilities made available to them in Cuba, Guinea and Berbera in the Somali Republic.

Putting this all together, it is apparent that the number of new ships and weapon systems which the Soviet Navy is acquiring and the experience it is gaining from its continuing high level of operations in distant areas, are giving the Soviet navy the level of capability, professionalism, and importantly, self-confidence to explore new Naval strategies which could be applied against NATO in various stages of hostilities ranging from an economic blockage to an all-out nuclear war.

OKEAN 75 saw Soviet naval units operating in more or less traditional areas such as the Norwegian Sea but also in areas such as the sea approaches to Europe, in the approaches to the Persian Gulf, off the west coast of Africa and off the coast of Japan. In much of the exercise activity, the Soviets displayed a remarkably sophisticated and well-integrated capability for surveillance of the oceans, making extensive use of sophisticated systems. Having located ships on the high seas with this system, Soviet surface, air and submarine forces exercised in convoy and anti-convoy operations, reconnaissance of vital sea lines of communication, and the control of key chokepoints throughout the world. These new departures were in addition to the normal exercising of Soviet navy anti-carrier and anti-submarine missions, as well as simulated strategic strikes at the culmination of the exercise.

You may ask “so what?”. Well, quite frankly it is a question of survival. Geographically, western Europe is a peninsula. But in reality, the NATO countries of Western Europe and Southern Europe are virtually an economic island. They maintain tremendous dependence on the sea. The food, raw materials and energy consumed and needed for their survival are in large part imported. Many important markets are overseas, whether in the United States or elsewhere.

The question today is whether the West is capable of recognizing the realities that confront it: a burgeoning Soviet military capability that includes a new element of sea denial, which has the potential to threaten a standard of living that is the envy of many; and a feeling of euphoria that comes with détente. To make détente work, we must have strength; and military and economic strength are the essence of détente.

In order to maintain détente and a credible NATO deterrence we must continue our joint operations, training, technology exchanges, logistics support, intelligence and mutual support. However, a major stumbling block which causes the alliance to waste money each year due to duplication of effort thereby sacrificing military effectiveness, is the lack of standardization and rationalization.

This should make it obvious that there is a need for standardization not only in weapon systems, but also in areas like training, communications doctrine and force structures, and the very important logistics field. Of late there has been an increased realization of this problem by senior officials and a genuine desire to correct it.

We also see a situation where defense expenditures as a percentage of the gross national product are not the same for all NATO partners. The United States percentage for last year, as estimated by NATO, was 6.7. That figure is down significantly from the 1971 US figure, which was 7.7 percent. Even so, it is well above that estimated for the average of European NATO countries, which was an estimated 4.3 percent of GNP as a defense expenditure in 1975. I realize of course that a good part of the “extra” American expenditure goes for US strategic forces.

During the past few years, as an ambassador and as a US Secretary of the Navy, I have personally visited key maritime officials and been aboard naval units of the navies of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain. From my firsthand observations, I can tell you that their professionalism is outstanding, and that they make a valuable contribution for security in Europe.

Today, no less than in the past, US military strategy, and hence the structure of our forces, must continue to support the NATO alliance. To do otherwise would be seen by friend and foe as a step toward withdrawal to that outmoded concept of isolation. It would undermine the very strength and confidence that we have in Western Europe, while encouraging the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies to exploit any weakness or division in Europe or in the world.

The United States will remain a friendly ally as long as leaders in America (like Senator John Tower of Texas who by his very presence at the Wehrkunde Conference this year and in the past years shows his dedication to the Atlantic Alliance) recognize the importance of mutual support. Few things could be more damaging to the future of Europe than any of us on their side of the Atlantic to lose sight of the continuing value of the Atlantic Alliance and the cooperation which underlies it. To do so would be an undercutting of those American leaders who support the Alliance, and encouragement of the emergence of other leaders — isolationists — with little understanding of the inter-relationships of the Alliance, and little concern for Europe. Therefore, our concern today should be maintaining a full partnership of strength that is perceived on both sides of the Atlantic to be essential to our very own survival.

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