Burma Independence Bill

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

5 November 1947 · House of Commons debate on the Burma Independence Bill · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons debate on the Burma Independence Bill in London on November 5, 1947, attacking the Government for granting Burma full independence without a Dominion status stage.
Main themes
Burma Independence Bill, criticism of immediate full independence for Burma, omission of the Dominion status stage, White Paper of May 1945, protection of the frontier tribes and Shan States, U Aung San's wartime record, U Saw's wartime record, murder of the Burmese Cabinet, British troops in Palestine, decline of the British Empire, loss of India, unrest and violence in Burma
Duration
~17 min
56th percentile
Words
1,983
56th percentile
Sentences
75
49th percentile
Readability
48
58th percentile
Grade
13.1
58th percentile
Syntax
3.15
67th percentile
Vocabulary
2.26
64th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 82%65%
  • Institutional 13%11%
  • Economic 2%1%
  • Social 2%1%
  • Ceremonial 2%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 20%

75 sentences in 27 paragraphs

(Woodford)

I was rather surprised to see the benches opposite, particularly those below the Gangway, so thinly occupied upon an occasion which must, to hon. Members opposite, particularly in that quarter, be a joy-day—one of those moments in our history when they reach the satisfaction and fulfilment of long years of labour and endeavour. I remember reading the other day a speech by the Foreign Secretary in the country where he spoke of the announcements about India—the impressive scene, with the quiet little man and his quiet little voice sweeping away our position in India. I wondered, after this glowing description by a Member of the right hon. Gentleman's Government, that his followers have not hastened to be in their places in order to see the same performance repeated, if on an even smaller scale.

The position which was occupied by the National Government, of which I was the head, is set out in the White Paper of May, 1945, and the substance is contained in the first paragraph:

It is and has consistently been our aim to assist her political development till she can sustain the responsibilities of complete self-government within the British Commonwealth and consequently attain a status equal to that of the Dominions and of this country.

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That was conditional upon a three years' breathing space for rehabilitation, and also to give time for the wishes of the people to manifest themselves calmly and deliberately, and under conditions of peace and order. A return to the constitution of 1935 was the objective in the interval. The framing of a new constitution for full "self-government within the British Commonwealth" subject to special protection for the frontier tribes—and particularly mentioned in the White Paper are the Shan States—from all of whom we received much loyalty and aid in freeing the country from Japanese invasion.

There would have been no difficulty in carrying out this programme in an orderly and careful manner. Half, perhaps one-third, or one-quarter, of the British troops squandered in Palestine on a policy now abandoned, the fatuity of which is now recognised, would have sufficed to enable the transfer of power to a Burmese Government, on the basis of Dominion status, to be carried out by regular and measured steps, and with due consideration for all interests, opinions and feelings involved in that population of many various strains. Instead, the whole business has been conducted by the British Government from weakness and not from strength. The breathing space has been curtailed and we are now confronted, not with Dominion status, which, as in the case of India, we considered an indispensable stage in any policy to which we on this side of the House were committed but Burma has been plunged at once into full independence.

This Bill is to cut Burma out of the Empire altogether, and to make her a foreign Power. At the earliest moment when these intentions to hustle the whole process through were known—although at that time the right hon. Gentleman did not mention independence, and seemed to indicate that a decision in that sense was not probable—I protested. The right hon. Gentleman made a statement, and on 20th December, 1946, I made an immediate protest. I said:

It was said, in the days of the great Administration of Lord Chatham, that one had to get up very early in the morning in order not to miss some of the gains and accessions of territory which were then characteristic of our fortunes. The no less memorable Administration of the right hon. Gentleman opposite is distinguished for the opposite set

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of experiences. The British Empire seems to be running off almost as fast as the American Loan. The steady and remorseless process of divesting ourselves of what has been gained by so many generations of toil, administration and sacrifice continues. In the case of Burma, it is hardly a year since, by the superb exertions of the Fourteenth Army and enormous sacrifices in life and treasure—sacrifices in British blood and in Indian blood—the Japanese were forced to surrender, destroyed, or driven out, and the country was liberated. And yet, although barely a year has passed away, there is this extraordinary haste that we should take the necessary measures to get out of Burma finally and for ever. The same formula the right hon. Gentleman says will be used as was used in the case of India, with the same extensions he put on to that formula when the Indian Mission was sent out, eliminating the—"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th December, 1946; Vol. 431, c. 2343.]

At this moment, as there had been no Question before the House, you, 'Mr. Speaker, did me the honour to interrupt me, so that I was not able to conclude my sentence, which would have finished—"

eliminating the stage of Dominion status.

There is great importance in the stage of Dominion status, in that it does give a definite period in which, with all the advantages of Dominion Government and the full authority attaching thereto, all matters can be considered without heat or prejudice; in which those who feel that they would wish to adhere to and enjoy the great advantages and protection afforded by the British Commonwealth of Nations to all its members, would have an opportunity of making their weight felt, without any question intervening of direct interference by British administrators in their local affairs.

The Prime Minister said that it was necessary for him to go back into the recent past history and to give us his version. I will follow him briefly over that course, but I think I must place a little different emphasis upon some of its episodes. Following on his announcement, and the comments which I have just read to the House, which I made then, a delegation of the most distinguished and leading representatives in Burma, or persons selected by the Government, was invited to London in January, and the British Government arranged with them for the acceleration of the whole process of getting rid of Burma. All the leading Burmese with which the Prime Minister negotiated, lunched and dined on that occasion have either been

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murdered, or are being tried for their lives for the mass murder of the Burmese Cabinet in July. The two outstanding figures of that delegation were U Aung San and U Saw. It is interesting to look at the respective parts which they played in the war.

U Aung San went over to the Japanese, and raised what we might call a Quisling army to come in at the tail of the Japanese and help conquer the country for Japan. Great cruelties were perpetrated by his army. They were not very effective in fighting, but in the infliction of vengeance upon the loyal Burmese—the Burmese who were patriotically fighting with British and Indian troops to defend the soil of Burma from Japanese conquerers—great cruelties were perpetrated on those men, because they had helped us to resist the Japanese.

After two or three years of desperately hard fighting, under climatic conditions and conditions of disease indescribably painful to British troops—two or three years of a struggle swinging to and fro, sometimes with most anxious crises, at length the balance turned in our favour. When it turned, U Aung San, as soon as he saw that Japan would be defeated—and it became quite evident that it was a matter of time only as to who was to win the great struggle—made overtures to Admiral Mountbatten, the Supreme Commander, that he was willing to come over to the winning side and bring his army with him, for what it was worth. I was, at that time, responsible, and upon the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, and with the approval of the Cabinet, we accepted those overtures.

I was in favour of that because of the general aim and importance of shortening the war, saving the unnecessary shedding of British blood, and bringing the whole of the Burma position forward into line with the American advance in the Pacific. Of course it is not a very agreeable transaction, when a traitor rebel leader, who has come in with foreign invaders, brings his army over to your side, when so many cruelties and outrages have been perpetrated—still, in war time, the great thing is to get to the end of the war as soon as possible in a victorious manner. I certainly did not expect to see U Aung San, whose hands were dyed with British blood and loyal Burmese blood, marching

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up the steps of Buckingham Palace as the plenipotentiary of the Burmese Government.

The case of U Saw is equally odd or even odder. In the autumn of 1941, this gentleman visited this country for consultations. He was the Prime Minister of the Burmese Government, which had been set up on the 1935 Constitution model. At the request of the India Office, I received him, and I also received from him strong assurances of loyalty and fidelity. He left to return to Burma by the Western route. He traversed the Atlantic, the broad expanses of the North American continent and embarked upon the Pacific, arriving at Hawaii on the night of 7th December, 1941, when the Japanese Pearl Harbour outrage had just been committed. The whole place was in confusion, a large portion of the United States fleet was sunk or burning and great numbers-of casualties had been inflicted. The scene was not at all well adapted to make a favourable impression upon the Oriental mind. It was evident that U Saw could not continue his journey by the westward route. He returned to Europe, and at the first moment when he could find a Japanese Consul, which was in Lisbon, he offered his allegiance to Japan. We are, of course, a very careless, happy-go-lucky people, but in wartime some pains are taken. We became aware of his message, overtook him in the air as he was flying across Palestine, and forced him to land. He was interned until the end of the war.

Such were the two figures whom the Government welcomed as the outstanding authorities with whom they were to confer and to whom they were to confide the future of Burma, where 15 million people had dwelt for more than 60 years in peace, justice and contentment under British rule. U Saw is now on trial for the murder of U Aung San and most of his Cabinet. I will make no further comment because the case is sub judice. But however the matter may be viewed, the Government can hardly be congratulated on the choice they made of the hands into which Burma, its fate and its future are to be delivered. I trust they will be found more fortunate in the new men with whom they have now to deal.

Today we are confronted with the result of complete independence and the cutting of Burma out of the British Empire and out of the protection of the

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British Empire. There is to be no interval stage of Dominion status where with calm and with deliberation all parties, all interests, all sections of the community and all creeds would see where their final fortunes would best lie. There are grave doubts that the assent of the frontier tribes has been honestly and genuinely given. I do not consider that we have any guarantee that there has been a fulfilment of our duties towards those who fought valiantly at our side. Indeed, I am told that through these mountainous regions, this half circle of mountains and hills about which the Prime Minister spoke, there is a condition of armed preparation and incipient revolt prevailing. About 12,000 murders and dacoities or armed robberies are reported to have taken place in the first seven months of this year and this is only a prelude—