CLAUSE 1.—(Liability to be called up for service.)
Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom
- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on May 7, 1947, during Committee debate on Clause 1 of the National Service Bill, attacking the Defence Minister for cutting national service from 18 to 12 months under backbench pressure.
- Main themes
- Reduction of national service from 18 to 12 months, Minister of Defence's reversal of his 20 March statement, Chiefs of Staff manpower estimates, government yielding to backbench rebels, political motives over expert advice, Burke quotation on improvised government, ministerial duty regarding expert advice, damage to confidence in the Administration, effect of shorter service on skilled naval apprentices, Air Force and Navy conscription needs
- Duration
- ~17 min
- Words
- 2,016
- Sentences
- 84
- Readability
- 60
- Grade
- 10.3
- Syntax
- 3.08
- Vocabulary
- 2.20
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other84 sentences in 22 paragraphs
I have been looking around for something upon which to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman. After some difficulty, I have found at least one point on which I can offer him my compliments, and that is the control of his facial expression, which enabled him to deliver the ridiculous and deplorable harangue to which we have listened, and yet keep an unsmiling face. Indeed, there were moments when I was not quite sure whether he was not taking his revenge on the forces which compelled him to his present course of action, by showing them how ridiculous their case was, and how absurd their position would be when it was presented to the House of Commons. I spoke yesterday of the care and thought given to the social and industrial side of the Bill as explained by the Minister of Labour, and I am willing to believe that equal attention was given to the military side. That is the foundation of the complaint which we make. Let me read what the right hon. Gentleman said, not in the autumn of last year, but on 20th March of this year of grace, 1947. I must read to the House what the right hon. Gentleman said, because I was naturally greatly impressed by it:
At the direction of the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staffs in the autumn prepared their considered appreciation of the defence requirements of this country. They put forward their detailed Estimates of the manpower requirements of the three Services as the minimum necessary to implement the defence commitments. The Chiefs of Staffs—I want to emphasise this point strongly—did not produce their considered p10posals without relation to considerations of the available manpower re-
454
sources of the country and of all the realities of the manpower situation. They presented to the Government a severely practical statement from their point of view of the manpower requirements of the Services, not based on the numbers ideally required to carry out those commitments satisfactorily, but upon an appreciably lower scale on which they thought they could manage … To put the matter in a sentence, I would say that the numbers required by the Armed Forces to carry out the defence commitments of this country have been very carefully screened by the Chiefs of Staffs in their report to the Government.
That is a curious phrase which has crept in. "Sifted" would have been a more natural word, and would avoid any ambiquity with the word "concealed." "Screened" is a modern vulgarism. I continue the quotation:
Those proposals were, in turn, considered in relation to the realities of the economic position. The report of the Chiefs of Staffs was scrutinised with extreme care and in great detail. So was the initial sketch estimates prepared by the Service Departments on the basis of that report, and of the production programmes put forward by the Joint War Production staff. The main burden of that examination fell on myself and my Service colleagues assisted on the production aspect by the Minister of Supply. Discussions subsequently took place in the defence committee and in the Cabinet. As a result very substantial reductions of the original proposals were achieved, with the full co-operation of the Service Ministers and of the Chiefs of Staffs. The Estimate, in its first form, as submitted to me, envisaged a total expenditure of £1,064,000,000 and that figure was eventually cut to £899,000,000, involving a reduction of £165,000,000, or more than 15 per cent. of the original p10posal. Substantial reductions were also achieved in the manpower figure for the Services themselves and for their production. In particular, the size of the Forces, already put by the Chiefs of Staffs below which they regarded as necessary for our commitments, was fixed at a still lower level."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th March, 1947: Vol. 435, c. 610–11.]
I think I am justified in saying that great and close attention was also given to the military side. This, I repeat, was said not in the autumn of last year, but on 20th March, 1947, and it was the right hon. Gentleman who was speaking. He will not deny that it was he who said that. I have HANSARD here—a real copy of the OFFICIAL REPORT. Only five or six weeks ago the right hon. Gentleman used those heavy, serious arguments, showing the care with which everything had been examined, and the refinements and judgments at each stage by the natural and normal processes of Parliamentary government, and showing at every point, how the Chiefs of Staffs had produced
455
what they thought necessary, until finally an agreement was reached on which all could in saying that it was the minimum. I do not think any one can fail to be impressed by the powerful character of the statement made to the House, and we on this side of the Committee were impressed by it. But now the right hon. Gentleman comes down and tells us in elegant language that what he said on 20th March was all "piffle and poppycock." I would not dream of using terms like that unless they were quoted on the high authority of a Minister of the Crown.
How can the right hon. Gentleman now bear, with composure, the fact that he used those words, which we thought were used in good faith, which we thought were based on a real solid decision, and conviction, and study of the question on its merits? How can the Prime Minister sit at his side, with all this great responsibility, and now pretend that, owing to a study of the economic position achieved in 48 hours—after 70 or 80 hon. Members below the Gangway had voted against him—the whole scene is transformed? One can only leave these matters to the broad judgment of the country as a whole, and I am quite sure that nothing could have more weakened confidence in the present Administration than the light-hearted way in which they immediately respond to the pressure of their tail below the Gangway. This is a scorpion organisation, with a sting in its tail. How can it be pretended that the new 12 months' system has been thought out carefully, in proportion to our needs? On 20th March the right hon. Gentleman was speaking in the words which I have read to the Committee. He then based himself on the elaborate schemes so carefully prepared in the autumn. Two days later than the Division, he has prepared an entirely different scheme, based on 12 months' service. He must have worked very hard during those 48 hours to make all the tremendous changes and recasting of the immediate and intricate Service problems, in all three Services—all in 48 hours. It is wonderful what great strides can be made when there is a resolute purpose behind them.
The right hon. Gentleman has not concealed the fact that he still thinks that the 18 months was most highly desirable and necessary, but in his statement he
456
made explaining this somersault, or tergiversation—however one likes to express it—he admitted, nakedly and squalidly, that the reason was political He said nothing about this wonderful revelation of economic difficulties in which our country stood, which came to him on the morrow of the Division in the House. What he said was in the light of the Debate in the House of Commons— Certainly, but one had hoped that the arguments he put before us for 18 months were based on a long and careful study. That they should have been cast aside and thrown overboard as a result of 70 or 80 Members voting against the Government is, if I may say so, a degradation and disreputability of government which has rarely been seen in this House.
I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman—I do him justice for this—did not pretend that the Chiefs of the Staff were in agreement with what had been done. He used the word "consulted." Well, one can always consult a man and ask him "Would you like to have your head cut off tomorrow?" and after he has said, "I would rather not," cut it off. "Consultation" is a vague and elastic term. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman made no pretence that he was acting on expert advice in this matter, or that he had behind him the authority of the Chiefs of Staff. It is not the business of the Chiefs of Staff to decide these matters. I am a Parliamentarian myself, I have always been one. I think that a Minister is entitled to disregard expert advice. What he is not entitled to do is to pretend he is acting upon it, when in fact he is acting contrary to it. I am not accusing the right hon. Gentleman of violating that canon. He has made it perfectly clear that this is a political manœuvre for a political purpose, and founded on political arguments and political arguments solely.
I must say I am very sorry for the Minister of Defence. His naked, squalid confession that all design, planning and expert advice were thrown aside, although he had received a 300 majority from the House, of which we contributed 132, lowers his position as Minister of Defence, and I am afraid that he will never be able to retrieve what he has lost. What confidence can we place in his future statements about the defence of the country when it is quite clear that if 70 or 80 pacifists or "cryptos," or that
457
breed of degenerate intellectuals who have done so much harm, vote against him he is prepared to run away, abandon all his prepared plans, worked out over months, and produce, in 48 hours, anything that can be rushed out to placate his critics?
I have here a quotation from Burke which he used about a Government in bygone days. It does not quite apply; I will show afterwards why it does not. It reads:
They never had any kind of system, right or wrong, hut only invented occasionally some miserable tale for the day in order meanly to sneak out of difficulties into which they had proudly strutted.
The reason why that quotation does not wholly apply is that, in this case, the Government did have a careful system and argument and scheme prepared, and they have cast it away in order to avoid their Parliamentary difficulties. At any rate, the right hon. Gentleman may be quite sure that people will no more, in the future, believe what he says about national defence than they believe what the Minister of Fuel and Power says about the state of our fuel stocks. It is quite certain that all the Army plans, based on 18 months' service, must be completely altered for 12 months' service. This would apply even more to the naval and Air Force plans.
4.45 p.m.
I am rather distressed by the problem which will now be put to many young men. Although a 12 months' period looks easier, there might be an advantage to be gained both by the State and the individual by having an 18 months' period, which will not be gained from the 12 months' period. There is the case of a young man I know, who was an apprentice electrical artificer, a clever lad, who was called up to the Navy the other day. I asked him how he felt about going. He was rather sorry to leave his job for 18 months but he was very ready to go. In 18 months he could have been bent into the electrical work of a ship of war, whereas to attempt to do that in 12 months would be a sheer loss and waste to the Service, without even getting to the point where he would be able to bring his specialised technical acquirements to the handling of the ever-increasing electrical complications of a warship. The effect of this upon the Navy and upon the Air Force, neither of which have stood in very great need of conscription—