CLAUSE 1.—(Suspension of death penalty for murder.)
Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom
- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on July 15, 1948, opposing the Government's new Clause 1 on suspending the death penalty for murder and urging a return to the Bill's original form.
- Main themes
- Trial by jury in capital cases, suspension of the death penalty for murder, burden on ordinary jurors, Home Secretary's discretion, Government's new Clause 1, Court of Criminal Appeal, categories of murderers, House of Lords amendment, democratic liberties, Cabinet decision-making
- Duration
- ~6 min
- Words
- 755
- Sentences
- 30
- Readability
- 48
- Grade
- 13.2
- Syntax
- 3.35
- Vocabulary
- 2.23
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other30 sentences in 11 paragraphs
Ordinary jurymen and jurywomen who have never been called upon to split such hairs will now have to do it for the first time with a human life at stake. This Clause will in consequence give rise to endless legal arguments both before the judge and in the Court of Criminal Appeal. The result will be to make it more likely that certain categories of murderers will be hanged while other categories, equally heinous, cannot be. Secondly, it must tend in the long run to hamper the Home Secretary or some other Home Secretary in the exercise of his unlimited discretion which is by far, the most elastic, sympathetic and comprehending process that can possibly be used. But it is the ordeal to which juries will be subjected on which the main weight of the practical case rests.
We do not allow the decision of guilt or innocence to be decided in the first instance by trained legal minds or persons of exceptional education. The prime guarantee of British justice is the honest opinion of the ordinary man or woman. Very striking words are used in the jurymen's oath:
I swear that I will well and truly try the issue joined between our Sovereign Lord the King and the defendant"— or prisoner— and a true verdict give according to the evidence.
Some systems of society seek to substitute for this the decisions of State stipendiaries or officials acting under the influence of the Government of the day. We regard it as a fundamental safeguard of our democratic liberties and life and a principle which has been woven into the whole history of our judicial system that the supreme question. "Guilty or Not
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Guilty?" shall be decided by ordinary folk. At the present time this process of decision by a jury has the merit of simplicity. The jury are asked only one decisive question: "Have the facts given in evidence proved that the crime was committed?" There is the alternative of manslaughter which was mentioned, but in principle that is the issue required of the ordinary people on whom this stress is cast from time to time.
Even now there are disagreements on juries, in which case all the disadvantage of a second trial have to be faced, but by loading the issues to be decided by a jury with the almost metaphysical subtleties of this Clause, the Government will be placing on British juries a task which, however carefully it is defined by the judge, however keenly and lengthily it has been argued by counsel, will be beyond their compass to fulfil. This will greatly increase the probabilities of disagreement.
I say then, that this new Clause constitutes an assault, no doubt not intentional but none the less consequential, upon the system of trial by jury in capital cases and that as such it strikes at the democratic principle inherent in the life of our country that a man is entitled to the judgment of his equals. It seems almost incredible that such a rigmarole of wrong-thinking and right-thinking, of pandering to sectional sentiment and party currents, could have been produced by the collective ability of a British Cabinet. It makes one shudder to feel that this may be only a sample of the processes by which the most overwhelming decisions for this country and for the whole world are now being arrived at.
I would say without hesitation that if I had to choose myself between voting for the original Amendment inserted by the House two months ago, or for this new proposal which the Government now thrust before us, I would rather vote for the original proposal and see what happens. Fortunately we are not condemned to a bleak choice between two kinds of error. We are free at this moment, thanks to the moral courage of the Second Chamber, to pass the Bill in the form in which it was first introduced by His Majesty's Government and commended to us so strongly by the Home
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Secretary and by other leading Ministers. That would be by far the most sensible thing for us to do in the interests of the public, in the interest of this House of Commons, and even in the interests of the Government themselves, for they have no surer way of earning mockery and discredit than by persisting in their present course. I trust that, even now, good sense and reason will prevail. If not, our duty is clear, and we must not fail to discharge it.