- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on June 10, 1941, in a debate on the Battle of Crete, arguing against demands for public inquests on military setbacks and defending the allocation of guns and airfields.
- Main themes
- Parliamentary debate on the Battle of Crete, limits on public accounting for military operations, risk of revealing information to the enemy, Prime Minister's choice of when to make war statements, Crete airfields and anti-aircraft guns, competing claims on scarce resources, Battle of the Atlantic, sinking of the Hood and the Bismarck, Hitler and Mussolini compared with British accountability, Hore-Belisha and the state of the Army
- Duration
- ~16 min
- Words
- 1,868
- Sentences
- 48
- Readability
- 41
- Grade
- 17.4
- Syntax
- 3.73
- Vocabulary
- 2.17
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other48 sentences in 18 paragraphs
I do not think anyone, however Ministerially-minded, could possibly complain of the tone, temper and matter of this Debate. The kind of criticism we have had to-day, some of it very searching, is the kind of criticism that the Government not only accept but welcome. All the same, the House will, permit me perhaps to point out that the way in which this Debate came about was calculated to give one the feeling of a challenge to the security of the Administration, and, from the point of view of the advantage to the country, that raises serious considerations. There were all kinds of paragraphs and reports which appeared in the papers about the grave uneasiness and unrest, stating that a Debate on Crete must take place. The parties were demanding it, the Labour party, the Liberal party and members of the Conservative party were demanding it, and there must be a full accounting, an inquest held, and so forth. That being so, one is bound to take a serious view because of the interests which are confided into our care.
I think that it would be a mistake if the House got into the habit of calling for explanations on the varying episodes of this dangerous and widespread struggle and asking for an account to be given of why any action was lost or any part of the front was beaten in. In the first
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place, no full explanations can possibly be given without revealing valuable information to the enemy, information not only about a particular operation which is over, but about the general position and also of the processes of thought which are followed, such as they may be, by our war direction and our high command". There is always a danger that a Minister in my position, in seeking to vindicate the course we have pursued, should inadvertently say something which may supply the enemy with some essential, with some seemingly innocent fact, about which the enemy is in doubt, and thus enable the enemy to construct a comprehensive and accurate picture of our state of mind and the way in which we are looking at things. The heads of the Dictator Governments are not under any similar pressure to explain or excuse any ill-success that may befall them. Far be it from me to compare myself or the office I hold or the functions I discharge with those of these pretentious and formidable potentates. I am only the servant of the Crown and Parliament and am always at the disposal of the House of Commons, where I have lived my life.
Still the House, and I think I may say also the country, have placed very considerable responsibilities upon me, and I am sure they would not wish any servant they have entrusted with such duties to be at a disadvantage against our antagonists. I have not heard, for instance, that Herr Hitler had to attend the Reichstag and tell them why he sent the "Bismarck" on her disastrous cruise, when by waiting for a few weeks, and choosing his opportunity, when perhaps our capital ships were dispersed on convoy duty, she might have gone out accompanied by the "Tirpitz," another 45,000-ton ship, and offered a general sea battle. Neither have I heard any very convincing statement by Signor Mussolini of the reasons why the greater part of his African Empire has been conquered and more than 200,000 of his soldiers are prisoners in our hands.
I must say, quite frankly, to the House that I should feel myself under a needless disadvantage if it were understood that I should be obliged, in public Debate, to give an account, possibly a controversial account, of our operations irrespective of whether the times were suitable or not.
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It would, for instance, have been a nuisance if Parliament had demanded a Debate on the loss of the "Hood" before we had been in a position to explain what measures we had taken to secure the destruction of the "Bismarck." I always take—and I am sure that what I say will be accepted—very great pains to serve the House, and on all occasions to associate the House in the fullest possible manner with the conduct of the war, but I think it would be better, and I submit it to the House, if in the future I were permitted on behalf of His Majesty's Government to choose the occasions for making statements about the war, which I am most anxious to do
There is another general reason why I should have deprecated a Debate upon the Battle of Crete. It is only one part of the very important and complicated campaign which is being fought in the Middle East, and to select one particular sector of our widely extended front for Parliamentary Debate is a partial, lopsided and misleading method of examining the conduct of the war. A vast scene can only be surveyed as a whole, and it ought not to be exposed and debated piecemeal, especially at a time when operations which are all related to one another are wholly incomplete. Into the general survey of the war come all sorts of considerations about the gain and loss of time and its effect upon the future. There also comes into the picture the entire distribution of our available resources to meet the many calls that are made upon them. For instance, my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J: Wardlaw-Milne), who has just spoken, asked why it was that when we had Crete in our possession for more than six months we had wasted all that time for constructing numerous airfields and placing them in the highest state of defence, and he reminded us how very efficiently the Germans would have done a work like that if Crete had fallen into their hands. Everyone will, I dare say, admit that it would have been a mistake to make a great number of airfields in Crete unless we could find the anti-aircraft guns, both of high and low ceiling, and the aircraft to defend those airfields, for that would simply have facilitated the descent of the enemy's air-borne troops upon the island.
Why then, first of all, I must ask, were enough guns not provided for the two
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serviceable airfields which existed in Crete? To answer that question one would have to consider how many guns we have and whether we could afford to spare them for that purpose. That leads us to a wider sphere. All this time, the Battle of the Atlantic has been going on, and a very great number of the guns which might have usefully been deployed in Crete have been, and are, being mounted in the merchant vessels to beat off the attacks of the Fokke Wulf and Heinkel aircraft, whose depredations have been notably lessened thereby.
Again, we must consider, on the subject of these guns, whether our airfields at home, our air factories or the ports and cities in our Islands, which are under heavy and dangerous attack, should have been further denuded or stinted of guns, in the last six or seven months, for the sake of the war in the Middle East. Further, it must be remembered—I did not notice that this was mentioned—that everything we send out to the Middle East is out of action for the best part of three months, as it has to go round the Cape. We have run very great risks and faced very serious maulings in this Island, in order to sustain the war in the Mediterranean, and no one, I venture to submit, can be a judge of whether we should have run more risks or exposed ourselves to heavier punishment at home, for the sake of fortifying and multiplying the Cretan airfields, without having full and intimate knowledge of all our resources and making a complete survey of the various claims upon them.
We did, however, from the moment that the Greek Government invited us into Crete, take steps to defend the anchorage of Suda Bay, as an important naval base, to develop the aerodrome nearby and to provide the base and the aerodrome with the largest quantity of high and low ceiling guns which we thought it fit to divert from other strategic points in the Mediterranean. We provided, in fact, a deterrent to the enemy attack sufficient to require a major effort on his part; but, of course, there are a great many islands and strategic points in the seas, and to attempt to be safe everywhere is to make sure of being strong nowhere.
Therefore, it may well be that if the House were able to go into detail into these matters, which I am afraid is not possible, hon. Members would feel that a
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reasonable and right disposition of our Forces was made; but without going into the facts and figures, which I am sure no one would wish me to do, even in Secret Session, let alone in Public Session, it is quite impossible for the House, or even for the newspapers, to arrive at a justly proportioned and level judgment on this affair. There is, however, this much that I should like to say: A man must be a perfect fool who thinks that we have large quantities of anti-aircraft guns and aircraft lying about unused at the present time. I will speak about aircraft in a moment, but, so far as anti-aircraft guns are concerned, large and expanding as is our present production, every single gun is in action at some necessary point or other, and all future production for many months ahead is eagerly competed for by rival claimants with, very often, massive cases behind each one of them.
This goes back a long way, but four years ago, in March, 1937, I mentioned to the House that the Germans had already got 1,500 mobile anti-aircraft guns—mobile and formed in batteries—in addition to the whole of their static artillery of anti-aircraft defence. Since then they have been making them at a great rate, and they have also conquered more than all they want from the many countries they have overthrown, so that our position is very different from that. The right hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) has made to-day a very cogent and moderate, well-informed and thoughtful contribution to the Debate, but he used a different mood and tone in a speech which he recently delivered in the country, and that at any rate makes it necessary for me to say that the state in which our Army was left when the right hon. Gentleman had ended his two years and seven months' tenure of the War Office, during the greater part of which he was also responsible for production and supply, was lamentable. We were short of every essential supply, but most particularly of those modern weapons, those special classes of weapons, the anti-aircraft gun, the anti-tank gun and the tank itself, which have proved themselves the vital necessities of modern war, a fact which he is now prepared to suggest we are so purblind and out-dated as not to be able to comprehend.
