Foreign Affairs.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

22 February 1938 · House of Commons debate on Foreign Affairs · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on February 22, 1938, in the Foreign Affairs debate following Eden's resignation, criticising Chamberlain's opening of talks with Italy and warning of the consequences for Austria and Britain's standing.
Main themes
Resignation of Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary, Chamberlain's talks with Italy, Mussolini's triumph over Eden, Nyon Conference and Mediterranean submarine attacks, non-intervention policy in Spain, Italy's economic strain, recognition of the conquest of Abyssinia, threat to Austria's independence, damage to British standing in the United States, Halifax mission to Germany, Rome-Berlin axis, appeasement of the dictator Powers
Duration
~30 min
82nd percentile
Words
3,575
82nd percentile
Sentences
152
81st percentile
Readability
54
75th percentile
Grade
11.5
39th percentile
Syntax
3.14
66th percentile
Vocabulary
2.13
33rd percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 68%61%
  • Institutional 15%14%
  • Ceremonial 13%11%
  • Social 4%3%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 11%

152 sentences in 36 paragraphs

It is with sorrow that I rise to-day to take part in this Debate. Since my right hon. Friend became Prime Minister, I have tried my best to give him disinterested and independent support. I know what his difficulties are, and we all know the dangers by which we are encompassed; yet I could not sit silent here this afternoon without expressing in good faith and in sincerity my disagreement with the course which he has taken, and my increasing concern for the consequences attendant upon it. There is one thing, however, that I will not do; I will not say one word willingly to exacerbate the differences which have arisen between the late Foreign Secretary and his former colleagues. No man, with the best will and sense of detachment in the world, can resign from a Government without wounds given and taken. My hope is that those wounds will not rankle

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or fester into personal differences, however serious the political issues upon which the men are divided.

We were all stirred yesterday by the speeches of the two retiring Ministers. I must express my keen personal sympathy with the late Foreign Secretary, whose policy I admired and whose friendship I enjoy. My right hon. Friend has had a long and laborious apprenticeship at the Foreign Office and upon the League of Nations, and he undoubtedly is in possession of a body of knowledge and experience abont Europe which no one else possesses outside the trained officials, and which no one else is likely rapidly to be able to acquire. I say that he is an irreparable loss to the Government, being one of the very few men on that bench whose name is widely known throughout this island, and I feel personally, as an older man, the poignancy of his loss all the more because he seems to be the one fresh figure of first magnitude arising out of the generation which was ravaged by the War. My right hon. Friend falls from power associated with the great principles and causes which he has faithfully sustained, and which, we may be sure, will protect him in his retirement.

I would also like to pay my tribute of respect to my Noble Friend the Under-Secretary, and to his chivalry and strong conviction. I was received with great kindness by his famous grandfather when I was a young lieutenant in the cavalry; I have known his father, as so many of us have, and worked with him for many years; and everyone, I am sure, will agree that on this occasion he has worthily sustained those high traditions of service to the greatness of Britain which have for centuries been associated with his name. I think that this is also a moment to celebrate the achievements of the late Foreign Secretary. They ought not to be overlooked at this time. They have been remarkable. For a year and a half we have followed his policy of non-intervention in Spain, and even those who have been most irritated by many of its aspects must have admired the extraordinary tenacity of purpose and steadiness of aim with which he has maintained a central course, without undue bias on either side. And at the end of all this, with all the shifting scenes of the Spanish War, we are found to be the country most trusted by both sides,

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and the only country, perhaps, which still possesses some eventual power of merciful mediation.

Then there was the Nyon Conference. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister gave an account yesterday of our differences with Italy in the Mediterranean during his tenure of office. I hope he will forgive me if I say that, although I have followed those events from day to day, I really hardly recognised them from what he said. But with respect to the Nyon Conference, certainly it is right to do justice to the great achievements of the late Foreign Secretary then. Here was the only occasion I know of where Britain and France together definitely stood up to the outrages that were being committed. The Prime Minister said that certain incidents had occurred in the Mediterranean. Those "certain incidents" were eight or nine submarines—and where, I should like to know, could they have come from?—sinking ships all over the Mediterranean and leaving the crews to drown. But when, at Nyon, England and France acted together, it was seen that there is a strength behind these two countries, and almost all the other countries in the Mediterranean resorted to them. On the very next day that odious form of warfare came to an end, and, with one exception, has never been resorted to since. I tell that story because it seems to me that we should not set ourselves unduly against the duty which sometimes falls upon nations and individuals of standing up boldly in defence of the right, even though that may not be unattended with risk. In the last place, no one at the Foreign Office has been more successful than, or so successful as, my right hon. Friend in establishing that good relationship, good will and sympathy with the United States which must for ever play a leading part in all our affairs.

I thought I might recite these incidents to the House because now that a great figure has left—and in view of all the criticism that attaches to men when they are Ministers—it is only right that we should recognise that his tenure of the Foreign Office has been not only distinguished, but memorable. We had yesterday the conventional and official account by both sides of the differences that led to this series of misfortunes. I think that, for the first time, we can form a clear picture of what happened. Evidently

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there were divergencies, marked no doubt by good will and all the courtesies of Cabinet association, between the Foreign Secretary and the new Prime Minister. These divergencies extended principally: first, to their conception of the present condition of the League of Nations and its Covenant; and, secondly, to the attitude which we should adopt towards the dictator Powers. I need scarcely say that these divergencies are divergencies of degree and, perhaps, of temperament, but it is clear that there were these divergencies—that they were honourable and well grounded on both sides, of course, goes without saying.

Coming to the merits of the actual dispute, it would seem to many people that this was an inopportune time for negotiations with Italy. In the first place, all these acts of bad faith which have been described to the House are fresh in everyone's mind. In the second place, the dictator Powers of Europe are striding on from strength to strength and from stroke to stroke, and the parliamentary democracies are retreating abashed and confused. On the other hand, behind this fine facade, there was every sign that the Italian dictator, at any rate, was in a very difficult position: the industrious, amiable Italian people long over-strained; everything in the country eaten up in order to augment the magnificence of the State; taxes enormous; finances broken; officials abounding; all kinds of indispensable raw materials practically unpurchasable across the exchange; Abyssinia a curse, a corpse bound on the back of the killer; Libya and Spain; perhaps 400,000 men overseas, all to be maintained by a continuous drain on the hard-driven, ground-down people of Italy. There was a picture. One would have thought that these corrective processes upon external arrogance and ambition might have been allowed to run their course for a while; or, otherwise, how are the healing processes of human society to come into play?

I believe myself that we might have left this scene alone for a time. I think the Italian dictator would soon have been compelled to bring many of his troops home from Libya, and some, at any rate, of his troops home from Spain, where they have given little satisfaction either to himself or to General Franco. We know that large numbers of disappointed people who have gone to Abyssinia in

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the hope of some Eldorado will be soon coming back to Italy, disillusioned. Many questionings were arising in Italian bosoms which were natural and legitimate and could not be suppressed or ignored. All this was in the interest of peace, and also, I might add, what is an even greater cause than peace, freedom. After all, it is sometimes wise to allow natural processes to work, and for crimes and follies to be paid in coin from their own mint. The internal condition of Italy is certainly causing their dictator grave anxiety. He stood in need of an external success. It is quite easy to understand how Signor Mussolini should have instructed Count Grandi, if he did so instruct him—I am not quite clear—to encourage talks with Great Britain. But it is less easy to understand, I venture to submit—and I am endeavouring to argue this in a manner not calculated to cause heat of any kind—why we should have had hurried so eagerly to the rescue. Here was a case where we ought to have allowed time to play its part.

However, as I reconstruct the story, the Cabinet, from the usual vague, well-intentioned desire for peace and friendship, enjoined the Foreign Secretary to have these talks. It is quite clear that he was reluctant to do so, and, in my opinion, he was right. The talks proceeded very unenthusiastically for a number of days and no doubt Signor Grandi reported to Rome that the progress made was small. At any rate, at this point—on 11th February—the following statement is made in the Italian Press—an inspired statement on the authority of Signor Farinacci, which carries with it the decision and authority of the Italian Government:

Our opinion will not change until London's foreign policy ceases to be directed by Mr. Eden. In many speeches and on many occasions he has shown his poisonous attitude of mind towards Italy. …

And then there is a good deal of further abuse. This was a very serious article. No such expression of opinion could have appeared in that country unless it had been approved by the dictator. You might almost say that the dictator had dictated it himself. It amounted to this, that there was a demand that the Foreign Secretary should go, and that unless he went there could be no progress in these talks. I, therefore, read with very much

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concern in the London evening newspapers of the following Friday, 18th February, that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had taken the negotiations into his own hands, and had invited Count Grandi to conduct discussions with him and the Foreign Secretary, not at the Foreign Office but at No. 10 Downing Street.

I think that the House must say, looking at it from a purely outside point of view, that this was clearly a decisive episode in the story which we have before us: clearly the deciding episode, the episode which brought these divergencies which have not been concealed to a definite head. Here is the Foreign Secretary attacked by a foreign Government through their controlled Press, his own papers filled with rumours that he will resign, and the Prime Minister coming in in this peculiar and difficult situation and taking charge of the discussions himself. Of course, he has a perfect right to do so; and, if he feels the urge, he has an inevitable duty to do so. But what was the position of the Foreign Secretary in this situation? I am trying to apply my mind to that, with some experience of the ways of Cabinets and Ministers. What degree of authority, what sphere of usefulness, would be left to the Foreign Secretary in these Italian discussions after what had occurred? Clearly, he and they had been taken charge of by his superior, and taken charge of at a time when his dismissal was being loudly demanded in a foreign country with which this country was in negotiation. This is a bald statement of fact which everybody can get from the newspapers.

What is remarkable, I think, is that the Prime Minister should have been surprised on that second Friday when the Foreign Secretary began to talk about resignation and say he would not agree to this, that or the other. I think that that shows that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, acting entirely within his rights and from the best of motives, had taken a step the consequences of which he did not fully apprehend but which are now obvious to us all. Some people think the Foreign Secretary ought to have stayed on longer in a state of what can only be described as public chaperonage and ought to have waited for a longer period. It has been generally agreed that these are questions which a man can only judge

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for himself. Speaking about this memorable episode of his resignation, I am bound to say that in my view, as a Member of this House, I believe he acted absolutely rightly, and I think the responsibility for that event, for what has happened, or for what is going to happen, rests for good or ill upon the Prime Minister, who was also acting entirely within his rights. I think the Prime Minister yesterday, speaking of the future, said that we must look forward, and that we must not unduly look back. The Prime Minister has assumed the whole responsibility. He has taken control of foreign affairs, and of this decisive veer of those affairs, into his own hands. The House, by a large majority, is, I am convinced, ready that he should do so.

Whatever my views may be as to the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course, I am not going to fail to wish and hope that he may be rightly guided, and his efforts crowned with success. I will not attempt to predict the course of the negotiations with Italy to which we are now committed, but I must say that their initiation appears untimely and their outlook somewhat bleak. Anyone who was in the House when my hon. Friend the Member for West Leicester (Mr. Nicolson) gave us last night his brilliant and deeply informed analysis of the possibilities which are open in this field, must feel extremely anxious as to whether a satisfactory and successful conclusion will be reached. We shall certainly be asked to give a lot, and there is very little we can receive in return, except the cessation by Italy of wrong and unneighbourly action in which she has long indulged.

There is, however, one object which I fully admit would throw a different light on this scene. Even at the risk of being accused of some illogicality in my argument, I would say that if it were possible for Italy to discharge her duty in aiding Great Britain and France in defending the integrity and independence of Austria, for the sake of that I would go as far as any man in making concessions. It would not be possible without some new service rendered by Italy to the general cause of European peace and appeasement. But here, I was disappointed to read last week that my Noble Friend Lord Halifax in another place said, as far as I recollect, there can be no question of

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our trying to have the Rome-Berlin axis altered in any way. Then it does seem to me that this is very disconcerting. It is difficult to see what serious advantage can inure to Great Britain in the Mediterranean, except expressions of good will and temporary relief from wrongful annoyances to which we have been subjected. We must certainly hope that any negotiations upon which our country embarks will prosper and reach a conclusion acceptable to this House, and not incompatible with our interests, but the outlook is not too promising, and the Government's position in regard to these negotiations will not be particularly easy, because, obviously, they have a great step to take to bring about a satisfactory conclusion, and this must be perfectly well known to the other side.

Let us see what are the wider consequences of this resignation of the Foreign Secretary. They are grievous in the extreme. This last week has been a good week for dictators—one of the best they ever had. The German dictator has laid his heavy hand upon a small but historic country, and the Italian dictator has carried his vendetta to a victorious conclusion against my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden). The conflict between the Italian dictator and my right hon. Friend has been a long one. There can be no doubt whatever who has won. Signor Mussolini has won. All the might, majesty, power and dominion of the British Empire have not been able to secure the success of the causes which were entrusted to the late Foreign Secretary by the general will of Parliament and of the country. So that is the end of this part of the story, namely, the complete defeat and departure from power of the Englishman whom the British nation and the British Parliament, reinforced by the mandate of a General Election, entrusted with a certain task; and the complete triumph of the Italian dictator at a moment when success was desperately needed by him for domestic reasons.

What has happened since the resignation was announced? All over the world, in every land, under every sky and every system of government, wherever they may be, the friends of England are dismayed, and the foes of England are exultant. Can anybody who reads the reports which come in hour by hour deny that? We have a heavy price to pay for all this. No

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one can compute it. Small countries in Europe balancing which way to turn, to which system to adhere, liberal or authoritarian—those countries are more inclined to move to the side of power and resolution. We are told that Italian propaganda is already being toned down at the Bari broadcasting station. I am glad to hear that, because of the harm it was doing to our interests in the Middle East. No propaganda has ever been so harmful and effective as that. It will be universally believed that it is Signor Mussolini's superior power which has procured the overthrow of the British Foreign Secretary. I cannot myself contemplate the arrival of the British envoy at Rome to make a pact which, if it is successful, will involve the recognition of the conquest of Abyssinia. I cannot contemplate that, after all that has happened, and all that I have said in full accord with so many hon. Gentlemen here on both sides and with all with whom we have talked, our friends and constituents in the country. I cannot contemplate this event without a pang of bitter humiliation, which I am sure will be re-echoed in millions of cottage homes throughout this country.

But what has happened in the United States of America? There havoc has resulted from this event. I do not say that it cannot be repaired, but millions of people there who are our enemies have been armed with a means to mock the sincerity of British idealism, and they think that we are all Continental people tarred with the same brush. That is the propaganda which has been given an enormous impetous and assistance, while our friends, those who are steadily working for the closer co-operation of the two countries, of course, on parallel lines, are downcast, baffled and bewildered.

I must illustrate the danger of our present situation by another incident. There are a great number of worthy people who think that any negotiations must be good. They do not seem to see that ill-timed or unsuccessful negotiations debase the whole currency of international intercourse. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has referred to the Halifax Mission, or excursion, which took place. I was against it from the very beginning, because I think it was not a very good moment to communicate by that particular door. It certainly was not.

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But what happened? The powerful Press which supports the Government proclaimed that a great new basis had been found for the relations between Britain and Germany, that the question had been explored in an amicable manner, and that Britain and Germany had entered upon a new relationship. What has been the result? A most truculent speech. I am using the word "truculent" because I found it in the "Times"; I always read the "Times" though I do not always agree with it. I use this word because it is obviously a word which is justified, as those who used it were not seeking to use a needlessly provocative word. Then there has been this episode, this tragedy in Austria and the violent pressure placed upon the government of that country. How does this show improved relations? I was told by a friend who arrived from Vienna a few days ago one of the results of the Halifax Mission. One thing he said was that Lord Halifax had given him to believe that England would not object to German authority over Austria. No, no. There is not the slightest truth, I am certain, in that statement.