Foreign Affairs

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

23 October 1946 · House of Commons debate on foreign affairs · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on 23 October 1946, in a foreign affairs debate, responding to the Foreign Secretary on the veto, Germany, Palestine, Greece, Poland and Yugoslavia.
Main themes
Abuse of the Soviet veto at the United Nations, open discussions at the Paris conference, German self-government and disarmament, Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the Canal zone, future of the Sudan, Palestine Mandate and Jewish national home, Greek plebiscite and withdrawal of British troops, Soviet departure from Yalta undertakings on Poland, Trieste and Marshal Tito, Communist rule in Yugoslavia
Duration
~20 min
65th percentile
Words
2,376
65th percentile
Sentences
98
62nd percentile
Readability
52
68th percentile
Grade
11.7
42nd percentile
Syntax
3.13
65th percentile
Vocabulary
2.14
35th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 68%64%
  • Ceremonial 14%13%
  • Social 7%6%
  • Institutional 7%6%
  • Economic 4%4%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

98 sentences in 23 paragraphs

(Woodford)

The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary wished to open this Debate and I may say, merely to safeguard future practice, that it is not quite usual for a two days' Debate to be opened from the Government benches. However, I, naturally, willingly agreed to the right hon. Gentleman making his statement, and we all have been greatly interested in the speech which he has made. Indeed, I think there was a very general measure of agreement in the House with everything, or nearly everything, he said. Where there may be differences, they are not differences on what he said so much as on what, for no doubt very good reasons, the right hon. Gentleman left unsaid. As to the value of what are called the "open discussions" which have been proceeding in Paris, I can only comment that they seem to be bad diplomacy, but, none the less, valuable education. As to the veto, that is a very serious matter. It is well known that Soviet Russia would not have joined the original San Francisco Conference unless they had had what they regarded as the essential security of the veto. I quite agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it was never contemplated at any time that the veto should be used in the abrupt, arbitrary and almost continuous manner that we have seen it used, but that it should be reserved as a last assurance to a great Power that they would not be voted down on a matter about which they were prepared to fight. There is, certainly, a great departure from that tradition, and the Foreign Secretary will be supported on this side of the House in endeavouring to secure a modification in the uses of the veto, even if he is not at this time, able to secure a very considerable restriction of its employment.

We all wish the Foreign Secretary a successful mission to the United States. No one complains of his having to be

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out of the country. It is his duty to go over and, indeed, I, myself, believe very much that advantage comes from that. Even in the days of the National Coalition, Ministers sometimes left the country for considerable periods, and I, having left the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister to carry on affairs, allowed myself all the necessary latitude in these respects. We all, as I say, wish that the right hon. Gentleman may have a successful mission in the United States, and we are confident that, in many respects, he will be upholding, not party but national, and indeed not national, but world issues.

In the Debate yesterday the right hon. Gentleman made considerable references to Germany, and perhaps the most important part of his speech consisted of declarations of policy about Germany, and about the Anglo-American occupied zones in Germany. Agreement on this was expressed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. R. A. Butler). We are in full agreement with the modifications and the mitigations of the severity of German life under present conditions, so far as these are physically and economically possible. It is only common sense that the Germans should earn their own living, and I think it is only common sense that they should manage their own affairs, provided, and always provided, that effective disarmament is enforced and maintained over a prolonged period of years. We do not want to have the burden of teaching the Germans how to manage their own affairs, and we do not want to have the burden of earning their living for them. The remarks of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this subject might be held by captious critics to be a criticism of the policy so far pursued by His Majesty's Government.

However, there is just one point I should like to make on the subject of Germany managing her own affairs. The right hon. Gentleman announced—and I see that it gave great satisfaction at one of the watering places where festivities occasionally take place—that he was proceeding to nationalise the various great German industries and place them under the Commander-in-Chief. All I can tell the House is that experience and looking back on the past show that one may be quite sure that when the Germans have the power of managing their own affairs,

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they will not be attracted to a policy, whatever it may be, by the fact that it has been imposed upon them by foreigners. It was exactly what happened after the first world war when we imposed upon Germany, by force, all the blessings of a liberal constitution. All the blessings of freedom from the tyranny of conscription and many benefits fought for by generations of effort in this country were enforced by the victors upon the defeated Germans and were, for that very reason, odious in their eyes. But, as I say, it may be that it will work differently this time.

I must comment first this afternoon upon two or three special questions which are likely to cause trouble and are, indeed, already causes of disquiet. I have nothing to add today to the statements which I have made on previous occasions about Egypt and Palestine. No one can say that His Majesty's Government have not done their best to meet Egyptian wishes. Indeed, many of us thought that they had gone too far and had adopted the wrong methods in stating, at the outset of their negotiations, that they were willing to evacuate the Canal zone, which zone is secure to us for the next few critical years to come by the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. The result has been what was then predicted, namely, that their maximum offer was taken as the starting point for new discussions, and these discussions now even involve the whole sovereignty and future of the Sudan. I remind the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister of his statement on 7th May, when he said that, obviously, if negotiations break down the original treaty still stands. I hope that His Majesty's Government will act in this sense.

Before we separated for the Autumn Recess, I spoke about Palestine. I must refer to that subject, linked as it is with all other questions of the Middle East. If we are not able to fulfil our pledge to the Jews to create a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine—which is our undoubted pledge—we are entitled and, indeed, bound, in my view—I speak my personal view; there are differences on this subject in all quarters of the House—because it is our duty, and certainly we have a full right, to lay our Mandate at the feet of the United Nations organisation. The burden may yet be too heavy for one single country to bear.

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It is not right that the United States, who are so very keen on Jewish immigration into Palestine, should take no share in the task, and should reproach us for our obvious incapacity to cope with the difficulties of the problem.

At present, we have no policy, as far as I can make out, nor have we had one for more than a year. The amount of suffering which this indecision in regard to a question which, I admit, may well be called the "riddle of the Sphinx," and the amount of suffering which this hesitation is causing to all concerned, simply cannot be measured. From the moment when we declare that we will give up the Mandate—giving proper notice, of course—all our difficulties will be considerably lessened, and if other interested Powers wish us to continue, it is for them to make proposals and help us in our work. We have at this moment a large proportion of our overseas Army in Palestine engaged in a horrible, squalid conflict with the Zionist community there. This is a disproportionate exertion for us, a wrong distribution of our limited forces, and the most thankless task ever undertaken by any country. If we stand on the treaty with Egypt about the Canal zone, we have no need to seek a new strategic base of very doubtful usefulness in Palestine, and we can present ourselves to the world organisation as a totally disinterested party. Superior solutions may then, for the first time, become open. I strongly commend this course of action to His Majesty's Government and to the House.

I was very glad yesterday to hear what the Foreign Secretary said about Greece. The result of the Greek plebiscite upon the return of the King fully vindicates the course pursued by the National Coalition Government, by the interim Government of which I was the head, and by His Majesty's present advisers. We have always said it was a question for the Greek people to decide freely for themselves. This they have done under conditions which impartial foreign observers have pronounced not unfair, and which are incomparably more free and valid than anything that has been seen in that part of the world for a very long time. That pronouncement ought to be the end of our special wartime responsibilities towards Greece. I was glad to hear that our troops will be brought home as soon as possible. I am not pressing for details. There is a kind of guerrilla warfare on the Northern frontier of Greece which does not arise out of internal Greek affairs. It arises out of very much larger complications. But still I am most anxious that our troops should come home. I am tired of hearing it said that we are in Greece for something which we wish to get out of the country, or for some advantage. I know of no advantage that we gain or seek in Greece except those ordinary advantages enjoyed by all nations, of trade and friendship, which we ourselves enjoyed before the war.

The future safety and independence of Greece, like many other vital matters, lie in the hands of U.N.O. Our ancient friendship with Greece will never flag or die, but here, as elsewhere, we seek no gain or benefit of a selfish character for ourselves and, as I have just said, we have no desire for any advantages which we did not possess before the war. I hope that all Greeks who wish for the survival of their country will help the new regime and Government, and that the Government will be continually broadened to include all who prefer the life and freedom of Greece to its ruin and absorption in a Communist Balkan bloc. I hope fair play will be given to the new regime and the new Government of Greece, and that every step taken will not be the target for sharp arrows of carefully barbed, poisoned propaganda. It is very easy for foreign observers in a position of perfect detachment, to abuse a Government which is struggling against a Communist conspiracy, fermented and supported by outside intrigues. An armed Communist advances upon you, you react against him; therefore, you are a reactionary.

I must now speak about Poland. Here, indeed, an unhappy scene is unfolded to our eyes. In my opinion, the Soviet Government have departed, I am sorry to say, in the spirit and in the letter from many of the agreements and understandings into which we entered with them before Yalta, and at Yalta. It was my firm belief that Marshal Stalin would rest content with the Curzon line, and with a Poland friendly to Russia, and permanently divorced from Germany. On that, I offered on many occasions my counsel

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to the House. It was agreed that, on this basis, there should be free elections in Poland and that the Polish Republic should be an independent Power. What has happened now? A Government has been set up in Poland which in no way represents the Polish nation. This Government is incapable of holding free or fair elections. The Peasant Party are to be given no full and free opportunity of voting in accordance with their convictions, and of having their votes counted in accordance with their numbers. We must be very careful to distinguish in our minds between the present Polish Government, and the heart of the Polish nation, to whose sorrows and sufferings there seems never to be an end.

I presume that the most delicate and difficult situation at the moment is that which exists around Trieste, where British and American divisions confront the very much larger forces which Marshal Tito has kept under arms and assembled there. Gratitude does not seem to be the outstanding feature of Marshal Tito's character. I am sure every one here was shocked at the brutal and callous manner in which American aeroplanes and their passengers were shot down by the air force of a country, whose liberation and independence would never have been achieved but for British and American aid and exertion, or without the victorious campaigns fought in Italy and Germany by the Western Allies. The whole attitude of the Yugoslav Communist Government towards this country, and even more towards the United States, is far from friendly. Considering that the United States is the main contributor to U.N.R.R.A., and that scores of millions of pounds of supplies have been poured into Yugoslavia since the end of the German war, the murder of the American airmen and passengers presents itself in a singularly repulsive light.

Conditions in Yugoslavia are sinister and melancholy. The whole country is being converted, as far as possible, into a Communist area. Communism is being taught in the schools, and every effort is being made to create a Soviet Socialist Republic in the closest association with Moscow. It is not for us to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. Well, I am afraid I make my principle of general application. The Catholic Church and clergy in Croatia are being persecuted with the greatest

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severity, and the strictest measures of police government are applied to political dissentients. The circumstances of the trial and condemnation of the Archbishop of Zagreb have created widespread regret. There is growing discontent in Serbia, to whose peasant proprietors Communist doctrines are unwelcome. I am sorry to be embarrassing to the Foreign Secretary—