Foreign Affairs

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

17 November 1949 · House of Commons debate on foreign affairs · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on November 17, 1949, in a foreign affairs debate, correcting his account of the Casablanca 'unconditional surrender' formula and beginning a review of Germany and Europe.
Main themes
Origin of the 'unconditional surrender' formula at Casablanca, correction of Churchill's earlier statement to the House, Cabinet consultation in January 1943, Roosevelt's Press Conference remarks, exclusion of Italy from the formula, Foreign Secretary's July debate claims, German dismantlement, British zone in Germany, Berlin Air Lift, Soviet policy toward Berlin
Duration
~9 min
33rd percentile
Words
1,116
33rd percentile
Sentences
44
28th percentile
Readability
54
73rd percentile
Grade
11.4
37th percentile
Syntax
3.18
70th percentile
Vocabulary
2.23
57th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 34%34%
  • Institutional 34%34%
  • Ceremonial 25%25%
  • Economic 7%7%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

44 sentences in 16 paragraphs

(Woodford)

Before I come to the matter of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, it is my duty to clear up a matter upon which I was misinformed at our last foreign affairs Debate in July. The right hon. Gentleman introduced into the Debate as a controversial issue the question of responsibility for the introduction for the term "unconditional surrender" into our policy in the war-time conference at Casablanca. It seemed to me that he cast some of the responsibility on me for the use of that phrase. He seemed to complain that the Cabinet had not been consulted, and he asserted his inveterate opposition to the idea. It had left him, he said, with nothing but a shambles to deal with in Germany—the House will remember the occasion—and from this arose many of the difficulties of his task. This was, of course, the exact opposite of what he had said 18 months before when—and I entirely agree with him—he said that he did not think unconditional surrender had played an important part in the conditions in which the war was brought to an end.

The right hon. Gentleman raised this matter without giving me any notice, and on the spur of the moment I said that the first time I heard the words "unconditional surrender"—in regard, of course, to the late war—was when the President used them in his speech to the Press Conference at Casablanca. This was the impression which had been left in my mind and which I had expressed to Mr. Robert Sherwood three years before when he raised the point with me in connection with his biography of Mr. Harry Hopkins. This impression was confirmed in my mind by what President Roosevelt said himself on the point, which is quoted in the Hopkins' biography. This is the quotation:

Suddenly the Press Conference was on, and Winston and I had no time to prepare for it, and the thought popped into my mind that they had called Grant 'Old Unconditional Surrender,' and the next thing I knew, I had said it.

However, there is great danger in quoting, from memory when all these things crop up about the tumultuous past. We all remember the advice which the aged tutor gave to his disciples and followers on his deathbed when they came to him—"Verify your quotations." At

2218

any rate, I have now looked up the telegrams and records of the occasion, and I find that undoubtedly the words "unconditional surrender" were mentioned, probably in informal talks, I think at meal times, between the President and me. At any rate, on 19th January, 1942, five days before the end of the Conference, I sent the present Prime Minister, then the Deputy Prime Minister, the following message as part of a long telegram on other matters:

We propose to draw up a statement of the work of the conference for communication to the Press at the proper time. I should be glad to know what the War Cabinet would think of our including in this statement a declaration of the firm intention of the United States and the British Empire to continue the war relentlessly until we have brought about the 'unconditional surrender' of Germany and Japan. The omission of Italy would be to encourage a break-up there. The President liked this idea, and it would stimulate our friends in every country.

To which the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden)—he is not here today; he is absent in his constituency, as many hon. Members have to be in present circumstances—replied on the 21st:

The Cabinet were unanimously of opinion that balance of advantage lay against excluding Italy because of misgivings which would inevitably be aroused in Turkey, in the Balkans and elsewhere. Nor are we convinced that effect on Italians would be good. Knowledge of rough stuff coming to them is surely more likely to have desired effect on Italian morale.

It is clear, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman was mistaken, I have no doubt quite innocently—and I was in my own way, though not in such an important aspect—in saying that the Cabinet had not been consulted. They not only had been consulted but had expressed a very decided opinion. Also, I think he was mistaken in saying that he was not a party to that opinion before President Roosevelt's speech was given to the Press.

It will be seen that the opinion of the Cabinet was not against the policy of unconditional surrender. They only disapproved of it not being applied to Italy as well. I did not want this, because I hoped—and the hope has not been unfulfilled—that Italy, freed from Mussolini's dictatorship, might fight on our side, which she did for several years of the war, with lasting beneficial results

2219

to the state of Europe. I have the strong feeling that I cooled off on the point because I did not want to bring Italy into this sphere; and I thought that that would influence the President, too. This is borne out by the agreed communiqué which was drafted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by both of us, and which contains no mention of unconditional surrender.

As the issue was raised in debate by the right hon. Gentleman in his very responsible position, and as my own memory was at fault on the subject, I felt it my duty to place the true facts on record in the journals of the House if only in justice to the memory of President Roosevelt. I apologise for this digression which I think was necessitated by what had already occurred in the House.

I now come to the review of the spacious European scene which the right hon. Gentleman has given us in, I might almost say, dulcet tones—at any rate, in a manner which seems to leave it free from all atmosphere of urgency or danger. I will begin with this question of Germany and German dismantlement. We all admire the work which has been done since the war in the British zone in Germany. It has been a great achievement into which, as in the American zone, an immense fund of personal devotion has gone. We have also spent large quantities of British money which we could not properly afford, in enabling our enemies of yesterday to recover after the shattering conditions of defeat, and they have made a very remarkable recovery in many ways. The success of the Air Lift into Berlin, where the Allies were trying to feed the German people, and the Soviet Government were trying to starve them—