Supply.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom

29 July 1941 · House of Commons debate on war production · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on July 29, 1941, during a debate on war production, defending the existing supply system and rejecting calls for a Ministry of Production.
Main themes
System of war production administration, War Supply Budget for 1941, rejection of a Ministry of Production, Production Executive, Import Executive, North American Supply Committee and Purchasing Commissions, departmental rivalry among the Supply Departments, abolition of absolute priorities in favour of allocation, machine tool shortages and census, French-ordered Tomahawk aircraft from the United States, anonymous complaints and criticism of production
Duration
~38 min
89th percentile
Words
4,539
89th percentile
Sentences
194
88th percentile
Readability
49
61st percentile
Grade
12.3
48th percentile
Syntax
3.05
54th percentile
Vocabulary
2.17
42nd percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 51%50%
  • Economic 34%34%
  • Ceremonial 7%7%
  • Geopolitical 6%6%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

194 sentences in 44 paragraphs

On 22nd January of this year I explained to the House the system of administration and production which it was proposed to adopt. I stated this in detail and at length, and I hope my statement may be studied again by those who have forgotten it, because it is the system we have followed since, and it is the system to which, in general and in principle, I propose to adhere. Changes in personnel are caused from time to time by the march of events and by the duty of continual improvement. Changes in machinery are enjoined by experience, and naturally while we live we ought to learn. Change is agreeable to the human mind and gives satisfaction, sometimes short-lived, to ardent and anxious public opinion. But, if Parliament is convinced, and those to whom it has given its confidence are convinced, that the system is working well and smoothly, then I say change for the sake of change is to be deprecated. In war-time, especially in vast, nation-wide and in some respects world-wide organisation, continuity and stability must not be underrated. If we were perpetually to be altering our system or lending ourselves too lightly to that process, we might achieve the appearance of energy and reform only at the expense of the authority of individuals and only to the detriment of the smooth working of the machinery, and at a heavy cost in output, which is the sole objective. Therefore, it is at the point where I left off this subject when I discussed it with the House in January that I take up my theme to-day.

There are two main aspects in which production must be considered. First, the organisation of planning and control, and, secondly the actual conditions present in the factories. Let us see first of all what was, and what is the system upon which the high administrative control of our war effort proceeds. The foundation must, of course, be a single, co-ordinated plan for the programmes of the three Services based upon our strategic needs. In my capacity as Minister of Defence, without which I could not bear the responsibilities entrusted to me for bringing about a successful outcome of the war, in that capacity, I prepared for the War Cabinet during the first three months of this year a revised general scheme, bringing together the whole of our munition pro-

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duction and import programme, and prescribing the highest reasonable target at which we ought to aim. For this purpose I was furnished with the forward programmes of the various fighting Departments, very much in the same way as the Service Estimates are brought before the Cabinet and the Treasury in the autumn in time of peace. I discussed these programmes orally and in writing with the Ministers and Service Chiefs of those Departments. The programmes were also examined by my own statistical Department under Professor Lindemann, now Lord Cherwell, and through the machinery of the Office of the Minister of Defence, which, as the House knows, embodies the peace-time Committee of Imperial Defence organisation. The work of these organisations proceeds ceaselessly. The strategic aspect of production is also continually considered by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which meets every day, to advise upon or direct the conduct of the war. The general scheme, or War Supply Budget for the year 1941, a series of printed documents agreed with the Service Ministers and comprising a perfectly clear apportionment of resources and tasks, received the final approval of the War Cabinet on 31st March, and thereafter became mandatory on all Departments. There is, of course, no absolute finality in this scheme. Within its general framework revision and adjustment under the pressure of events are continuous.

So much for the framework of the general layout. The execution of this scheme on the military side is confided to the three great Supply Departments, namely, the Controller's Department of the Admiralty, the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Aircraft Production. The work had been parcelled out, and it remained for them to do it. The picture so luridly drawn of the chaotic and convulsive struggles of the three Supply Departments, without guidance or design, is one which will no doubt be pleasing to our enemies, but happily has no relation to the facts. The question however arises whether, in their execution of the approved scheme, the three Supply Departments have either been wanting in energy, or, on the contrary, through excess of zeal have quarrelled with each other or have trespassed upon each other's domain. There are no doubt instances of friction at the

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fringe of these powerful organisations, but I do not believe they bear any proportion worth mentioning to their individual and concerted efforts. It must be remembered that a very high proportion of our war production is carried out in factories working solely for one Department. That is true of aircraft factories, naval shipbuilding firms, ordnance factories, automobile factories and many others. A system has also been worked out for the allocation of the capacity of private engineering firms, either to single departments, or, in other cases, to two or more Departments in stated proportions. Probably half the factories concerned and certainly more than three-quarters of the men employed are working now, at this time, for one single Department. The Admiralty has its many firms, with their factories dating from long ago and kept alive during our rotten periods by Admiralty orders. The Air Ministry has been striving for a great many years to build up an aircraft industry in this island pending the day when Parliament should decide to have an Air Force equal to any within striking distance of these shores. The War Office, always in time of peace the drudge and starveling of British defence, had its own Ordnance Factories and was at last on the eve of the war accorded a Ministry of Supply and this Ministry of Supply has of course extended over a very large part of the remaining British industry.

At the point which we have now reached in our munitions development almost all firms and factories are working under the complete control of the Government at the fulfilment of the approved and concerted programmes. They are either working directly or indirectly in the sphere of war production, or they are ministering to our domestic and other needs. In this domestic field also, however, a very complete and searching organisation under Government control has been instituted. At the present moment, the whole industry of the country with inconsiderable exceptions, which may soon be licked up and absorbed, is assigned its function under Government authority. There are no doubt a number of minor aspects of our national life which have not yet been effectively regimented. When and as they are wanted, their turn will come. We are not a totalitarian State but we are steadily, and I believe as fast as possible, working ourselves into total war organi-

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sation. When we are given vivid instances of lack of organisation or of interdepartmental rivalry in some of the shops and factories, and when these are all bunched together to make an ill-smelling posy, it is just as well to remember that the area of disputation is limited, circumscribed and constantly narrowing.

In order to regulate the imports of commodities from abroad in accordance with the policy prescribed by the War Cabinet, we have, as I explained six months ago, the Import Executive comprising the heads of the Importing Departments, and presided over by my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, and formerly by him when he was Minister of Supply. This is working very smoothly and I am not aware of any troubles or disputes which have arisen. I should certainly hear of these soon enough if there were any. By the side of this Import Executive we have the North American Supply Committee with its elaborate corresponding organisation in the United States. We are always trying to tighten up and make more precise and definite the work of our Purchasing Commissions in the United States. I should certainly not pretend that there is not a great deal of room for improvement and refinement, but it would be a mistake to suppose that the efficiency of our Purchasing Commissions under the supreme control of Mr. Purvis has not reached a very high level or that it is not constantly being shaped and sharpened. A year ago, six months ago, there were a lot of troubles and discordances but latterly, although again I should be the first to hear of them, my information is that they have very largely died away.

We have of course to come to very clear-cut agreements with our American friends and helpers. They are making an immense effort for the common cause and they naturally ask for the fullest and clearest information about what is happening to their goods and whether there is waste or misdirection. It is our duty to satisfy them that there is no muddle, or that muddle is reduced to a minimum and that they are getting value for their money. We welcome their criticism because it is at once searching, friendly and well informed. The improvement in the ordering of imports and of the British purchases in the United States, and in the relations of the very large number of

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competent persons who work night and day on both sides of the ocean, in this sphere is, I am glad to say, steady and progressive.

Now I come to the home scene. What are the relations of the three Supply Departments in the vast fertile production field of this busy island? I have already said that for their chief production each of the Fighting Services through its Supply Department or Ministry to an overwhelming extent commands its own factories and labour. Nevertheless, there is an inevitable region of debatable ground of firms which serve several Departments at once. Many of them are small sub-contracting firms or firms which make components. Besides this, a process of change is continually going forward to meet the rapidly varying demands of the war. A firm is resigned by the Admiralty and can be transferred either to the Ministry of Aircraft Production or to the Ministry of Supply. Particular lines of production acquire special urgency or importance as we gain experience from the fighting or as new ideas come along. One line of production dries up because it is no longer needed; another opens or grows in scale. Obviously there is rivalry in this part of the field between the Supply Departments. There ought to be rivalry and there ought to be zealous competition within the limits of the programme prescribed. It is this zealous competition, limited though it be to a fraction of our industry, which presents the hard cases and sometimes the bad instances of which so much is made.

It is among other things for the purpose of resolving the disputes and rivalries of the Departments in this limited field that the Production Executive was called into being in January. The Minister of Labour, himself a contributory factor as Minister of Labour to the work of the rest of the Executive and himself a Member of the War Cabinet, presides over a committee of six, three of whom are the heads of the Supply Departments, and the other two are the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of Works and Buildings. As I explained to the House six months ago, all the members of this body have every interest to agree. They may have different interests to advocate because they have different duties to discharge, but it is a delusion to suppose that they do not feel a corporate responsibility and try to work together for

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the common purpose and for the execution of the approved programmes entrusted to them. If they agree they have the power to act. Each can make his contribution to the common action immediately and the movement of labour and materials can be ordered there and then. If there is a difference which cannot be settled by agreement of compromise, any Minister of Cabinet rank, and they are all such, has the right of appeal to the War Cabinet, or, as between the Service Supply Departments, in the first instance to me as Minister of Defence. During my tenure I have seen some very sharp differences but those differences have never been so sharp as they were, as I well remember having lived through it, in the days of the last war. All I can say now is that for the last four months no question of departmental rivalry or dispute has been brought to me or the War Cabinet from the Production Executive. I give the assurance to the House to-day that in the high controlling organisation there is now no dispute in progress about priorities of labour, raw materials, factory space or machine tools. Do not suppose however that this remarkable fact is the result of inertia or decay. On the contrary, as I shall show before I sit down—I am afraid I shall have to make a somewhat prolonged demand on the patience of the Committee, the subject is of great importance and must be dealt with comprehensively—production in all its forms is gaining steadily and swiftly, not only in volume, but, even at its present high altitude, in momentum.

I may say, while I am on the point, that much of this talk about the difficulties of settling priorities is a back number. The whole business of priorities has undergone a complete transformation. We have no more of these arrogant, absolute priorities in virtue of which one Department claimed all that there was of a particular commodity and left nothing for the lesser but indispensable needs of others. Although the 1A priority is still maintained largely for psychological reasons, for certain particular spheres of production such as aircraft, and tanks now, it is no longer exercised in the crude manner of the last war or in the early months of this. The method of allocation of labour, materials, and facilities has modified and to a large extent replaced the scale of

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priorities. Allocation is the governing principle, and priorities are becoming little more than a stimulus upon its detailed assignments.

It is at this point and in this setting that I will deal with the suggestion that a Ministry of Production should be formed. Several speakers referred to this in the recent Debate, and apparently it is regarded by some of our most important newspapers as an easy and speedy solution of our difficulties. There is however a difference among the advocates of a Ministry of Production. Some ask that there should be a complete merging of the Supply Departments of the Admiralty, the Air Ministry and the War Office, and that there should be one great common shop, or vast Department or emporium serving all fighting needs. That would be very pretty if we were not at war. Others, recoiling from the frightful disturbance and confusion which would accompany the transition and the danger of upsetting so much in the midst of war, are content to ask for one Minister, presumably assisted by a secretarial staff, who should be interposed between the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and the three Supply Departments. Nothing would be easier than for me to gratify this request by asking one of my colleagues in the War Cabinet to call himself Minister of Production and to duplicate the work of general apportionment which I already do. But, so far from helping me in my task, or helping the Departments in theirs, this would be an additional complication, burden and cause of delay.

Moreover, the relations of this Minister of Production with the three Supply Departments would be most unsatisfactory. He would either have to trust them and use them, as I do, for the purpose of executing the prescribed programmes, or he would be left to break into these Departments, interfere with their work and try to get things done by his personal exertions. The Ministers at the head of these Departments are men of energy, experience and knowledge. They work night and day, and they have powerful, far-reaching, swift-running machinery at their disposal. If, in the sphere assigned to them, they cannot execute the programme with which they are charged, I do not myself see how a super-Minister from outside, with his

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skeleton staff, could do it for them. If the new Minister's control were nominal, and did not affect the Ministerial responsibility of the heads of the Supply Departments, it would be a farce and a fraud upon the public to which I will not stoop. If, on the other hand, the Minister of Production attempted to lay strong hands on the internal administration and day-today work of these Departments, they would confront him with a knowledge superior to his own and far more intimate, and all the resulting differences would have to come tome, with very great friction to the administrative machine and additional burdens upon the head of the Government.

Furthermore, these matters cannot be considered without reference to the personalities involved. I have not been told who is to be this superman who, without holding the office of Prime Minister, is to exercise an overriding control and initiative over the three Departments of Supply and the three Ministers of Supply. Where is the super-personality who, as one of the members of the War Cabinet, will dominate the vast, entrenched, established, embattled organisation of the Admiralty to whose successful exertions we owe our lives? Where is the War Cabinet Minister who is going to teach the present Minister of Aircraft Production how to make aircraft quicker and better than they are being made now? Who is the War Cabinet Minister who is going to interfere with Lord Beaverbrook's control and discharge of the functions of Minister of Supply duly and constitutionally conferred upon him? When you have decided on the man, let me know his name, because I should be very glad to serve under him, provided that I was satisfied that he possessed all the Napoleonic and Christian qualities attributed to him. In the conduct of vast, nation-wide administration there must be division of functions, and there must be proper responsibility assigned to the departmental chiefs. They must have the power and authority to do their work, and be able to take a proper pride in it when it is done, and be held accountable for it if it is not done.

Moreover, as I have tried to show, such difficulties as exist are not found at the summit but out in the country in a minority of smaller firms and factories. I do not for a moment deny that there

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are many things that go wrong and ought to be put right, but does anyone in his senses suggest that this should be the task of the super-Minister, that he should take up the hard cases and breakdowns by direct intervention from above? All he could do would be to refer complaints or scandals that came to his notice to the heads of the three Supply Departments, and, if he did not get satisfaction, he, having no power to remove or change the Ministers involved, would have to come to me, on whom rests the responsibility of advising His Majesty in such matters.

For good or ill, in any sensible organisation you must leave the execution of policies already prescribed to the responsible Ministers and Departments. If they cannot do it, no one can. It is to them that complaints should be addressed. It is to them that Members should write. Any case of which full particulars are provided—I must add that proviso—will be searchingly examined. We do not stand here to defend the slightest failure of duty or organisation. But let us have the facts. A kind of whispering campaign has been set on foot; there is a, flood of anonymous letters. Vague and general charges are made. And all this fills our shop window, greatly to our detriment. It is impossible for me, within the limits of this Debate, to deal with various specific allegations which were made by Members in different parts of the House in the two preceding days of this Debate. Such a treatment of the matter would be entirely out of proportion, and I should have to trespass upon the Committee altogether unduly.

I turn aside, however, for a moment to deal with one particular aspect of the problem of production, namely machine tools. The "Times," in its leading article this morning, makes the valuable suggestion that a census of machine tools throughout the country should be held. There have already been three—in June, 1940, in November, 1940, and a partial census of the principal firms in June, 1941. The Supply Ministers are responsible for the use of machine tools to the best advantage. There is, however, a controller of machine tools, Mr. Mills, a business man of the highest repute, whose sole duty is to supervise their employment by all Departments. By the joint agreement and good will of the three Supply

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Departments, this gentleman has independent powers. He has his own representatives throughout the country. Although he is actually under the Ministry of Supply, he can remove any machine tool that is idle from any Department or factory and transfer it to another, and he is continually exercising these powers. He exercised them on several occasions against the late Minister of Aircraft Production before the recent changes in the Government took place. This functionary is given these powers with good will by people who wish to submit their Departments to his use of them.

There are, however, three limiting factors in the use of machine tools. The first is any shortage that may exist of skilled labour, which we are striving by every method to overcome. The second is the undoubted difficulty we have found in working to the full extent night shifts under conditions of air attack. It is the third limiting factor which gives rise to the complaints which are made. I am not an expert in these matters, but I am told that there are between 200 and 300 kinds of machine tools in our census. Their effective use is governed by certain precision machine tools of which there is a shortage. I need not say how intense are the efforts to break down these vexatious bottle-necks. Moreover, the precision tools of which there is a shortage vary sometimes with the varying demands of war production, and sometimes the block is found here and sometimes there. Thus, when people go about the country and see at some garage or factory or in some small firm a number of machine tools of the lower grades, or of peace-time specialised types, lying idle and write to their Member about it, the explanation is not that the supply of machine tools is not organised to the highest degree, not that the Government do not know about these machine tools, where they are and what they are, not that they do not in general know about them and have them on their census list, it is because, owing to the shortage at key points of special precision types, many of these tools cannot be brought into action, and there would be no sense in crowding out the factories with redundant machinery.

That is a digression which I have made because I have read with some interest the thoughtful article which appears in the

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"Times" this morning. Hardly any part of our common organisation for war production has been more thoroughly and precisely examined than the question of machine tools. No one can be engaged, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) knows, in munition production for one day without feeling that this is, as it were, the ganglion nerve, the centre of the whole of supply.

I said just now that I cannot go into details of many of the cases which hon. Members brought up in the Debate. If they will write about them, they will be gone into in detail. There was, however, one charge made by my hon. Friend the Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Garro Jones) which, as it has had wide publicity and as it affects the United States supplies, requires to be answered. My hon. Friend said:

The sad feature of the United States supply of aircraft is that whereas orders were energetically placed in the last two years or more for airframes and engines, those who placed them forgot at the same time to ensure that supplies of maintenance equipment and ancillary equipment were provided. What is the result? Of one type of aircraft imported from the United States, complete and operationally ready, there are several hundreds—or were a few weeks ago—lying unpacked in inland warehouses, in their crates, for the sole reason that those who placed the orders on behalf of the Ministry of Aircraft Production did not order the necessary ancillary equipment."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th July, 1941; col. 204, vol. 373.]

So far as aircraft on British order are concerned, this statement is quite untrue. All British orders for American aircraft have always been placed with spare engines and spares for airframes. There has been no failure or oversight of this kind in ordering British aircraft.

The mistake into which my hon. Friend has fallen arose from an exceptional event. When the French collapsed, all their contracts for aircraft in the United States were taken over immediately, for what they were worth, by the Minister of Aircraft Production. There was not an hour's delay. These aircraft had to be accepted in the condition in which they were prepared for the French, under French orders. This is the case to which I am sure reference was made in this passage of my hon. Friend's speech. They had to be accepted in the condition in which the French had specified them and in which they were delivered by the

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American manufacturers. This was a windfall, but it had its drawbacks. For instance, the French Tomahawks arrived without spare engines or spares for their airframes, exactly as my hon. Friend pointed out. They were built to take French guns. Their wireless sets did not tune with ours. Their instruments were on the metric system. They were not armoured according to our conditions. They differed in many ways from our methods of control and manoeuvre. Instead of pushing some lever forwards, you had to pull it backwards, which our pilots found most inconvenient.

As swiftly as possible these aircraft have been modified and brought into use. The "cannibal" system was frequently resorted to of necessity, leaving lots of them partly gutted, but practically all of these French American aeroplanes are in use and have been most satisfactory in operation. Now there is the whole of that story that has been paraded as a typical scandal and example of how we do our business.