- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on September 26, 1939, during a debate on the war at sea, outlining Britain's three-part response to U-boat attack and warning of further losses.
- Main themes
- British response to U-boat attack, convoy system, arming of merchant vessels, offensive against U-boats, comparison with the 1917 U-boat campaign, shipping tonnage losses, destroyer hunting flotillas, role of the Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm, sinking of HMS Courageous, German submarine losses, risk and expected further losses
- Duration
- ~9 min
- Words
- 1,070
- Sentences
- 50
- Readability
- 57
- Grade
- 10.9
- Syntax
- 3.09
- Vocabulary
- 2.23
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other50 sentences in 11 paragraphs
The war at sea opened with some intensity. All our ships were going about the world in the ordinary way, when they were set upon by lurking U-boats, carefully posted beforehand. In the first week our losses in tonnage were half the weekly losses of the month of April, 1917, which was the peak year of U-boat attack in the late War. That was a very serious proportion. We immediately replied in three ways. First, we set in motion the convoy system. This could be very quickly done for all outgoing ships, but it took a fortnight to organise from the other end the convoys of homeward-bound ships. This system is now in full operation — in full operation both ways. Meanwhile, however, large numbers of ships which had started independently, under the ordinary conditions of peace, had day after day to run the gauntlet of the waiting U-boats with-
1240
out being either armed or escorted, and in consequence a serious, though, I am glad to say, diminishing, toll was exacted. The convoy system is a good and well-tried defence against U-boat attack, but no one can pretend that it is a complete defence. Some degree of risk and a steady proportion of losses must be expected. There are also other forms of attack besides U-boats, attacks from surface craft and from the air, against which we must be on our guard. I can assure the House that every preparation is being made to cope with such attacks, but I must again warn the House that we cannot guarantee immunity and that we must expect further losses.
Our second reply to the U-boat attack is to arm all our merchant vessels and fast liners with defensive armament against both the U-boat and the aeroplane. For a fortnight past armed ships have been continually leaving the harbours of this island in large numbers. Some go in convoy, some go independently. This applies not only to the United Kingdom, but to our ports all over the world. Thus in a short time the immense Mercantile Marine of the British Empire will be armed. As we usually have 2,000 ships on salt water every day, this is a considerable operation. However, all the guns and equipment are ready at the various arming stations, together with a proportion of trained gunners to man them and to instruct the ordinary seamen. Let me pay my tribute to the care of my predecessors at the Admiralty, who have provided so well for this contingency.
Our third reply is, of course, the British attack upon the U-boats. This is being delivered with the utmost vigour and intensity. It is a strange experience to me to sit at the Admiralty again, after a quarter of a century, and to find myself moving over the same course, against the same enemy, and in the same months of the year — the sort of thing that one would hardly expect to happen. But it gives me an opporunity of making comparisons which, perhaps, no one else could make, and I see how much greater are the advantages which we possess to-day in coping with the U-boat than we did in the first U-boat campaign 25 years ago. In those days there were moments when the problem seemed well-nigh insoluble. Very often to hunt down a U-boat it was necessary to use a flotilla of 15 or 20 vessels
1241
working together for a whole day on the vaguest indications. Now two destroyers or even one can maintain prolonged and relentless pursuit. A very large number of attacks have been made by our flotillas and hunting craft. Of course, there are many false alarms, some even of a comical character. Still, it is no exaggeration to say that the attacks upon the German U-boats have been five or six times as numerous as in any equal period in the Great War, in which, after all, they did not beat us.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister mentioned last week the figure of six or seven U-boats destroyed. That was, as he said, probably an understatement. Since then we have had some fruitful and hopeful days; but even taking six or seven as a safe figure, that is one-tenth of the total enemy submarine fleet as it existed at the declaration of war destroyed during the first fortnight of the war, and it is probably one-quarter, or perhaps even one-third, of all the U-boats which are being employed actively. All these vessels, those that have been sunk and those that have escaped, have subjected themselves to what is said to be one of the most trying ordeals which men can undergo in wartime. A large proportion never return home, and those who do have grim tales to tell. But the British attack upon the U-boat is only just beginning. Our hunting force is getting stronger every day. By the end of October we expect to have three times the hunting force which was operating at the beginning of the war, while at the same time the number of targets open to U-boats upon the vast expanses of the seas and oceans will be greatly reduced by the use of convoys, and, at the same time, the U-boat means of attacking them will be heavily clogged and fettered.
In all this very keen and stem warfare the Royal Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm, as the Prime Minister has already mentioned this afternoon, have played an important part both in directing the hunting destroyers upon their quarry and in actually attacking it themselves. It was to bridge the gap between what we had ready at the beginning and what we have ready now that the Admiralty decided to use the aircraft carriers with some freedom in order to bring in the unarmed, unorganised and unconvoyed traffic which was then approaching our
1242
shores in large numbers. Risks have to be run all the time in naval war, and sometimes grievous forfeit is exacted. The "Courageous" was attended by four destroyers, but two had to go to hunt a U-boat attacking a merchant ship towards evening. When the "Courageous" turned into the wind at the dusk in order to enable her own aircraft to alight upon her landing deck, she happened, by what may have been a hundred to one chance or more, to meet a U-boat in her unpredictable course.
