- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on September 21, 1943, opening with tribute to the late Chancellor of the Exchequer and then surveying the war on land, air and sea, including Italy's overthrow of Mussolini.
- Main themes
- Death of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, North African campaign and Alamein, invasion of Sicily, Anglo-American strategic bombing of Germany, possible new German weapons, U-boat campaign and Atlantic convoys, Allied shipbuilding output, war against Japan in the Pacific, South-East Asia Command and Admiral Mountbatten, fall of Mussolini and the Badoglio Government, Russian advance on the Eastern Front
- Duration
- ~39 min
- Words
- 4,697
- Sentences
- 180
- Readability
- 50
- Grade
- 13.1
- Syntax
- 3.19
- Vocabulary
- 2.18
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other180 sentences in 48 paragraphs
I could not embark upon the Business which is set down for to-day without expressing what is in the hearts of all Members of this House—our profound regret at the very sad news which it has been your duty, Mr. Speaker, to announce from the Chair, of the sudden death early this morning of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Only yesterday evening he sat with us in Cabinet, apparently in the best of health and spirits, and now he has been instantaneously removed from our affairs in which he was playing a most important part. I would suggest that, on the next Sitting Day, we pause for a short time in our business in order to give the House the opportunity of paying a more formal tribute to one of its distinguished Members, who was holding an office of great consequence in the peculiar stresses of the present war. I will defer any remarks which I may make upon this sad matter, which to me is a very acute personal grief, until the proper time is reached.
I now turn to the statement upon the war which I understood it was desired by the House that I should make. I have to go some way back in order to place the whole broad scene before the House. At my conference with the President at Washington in June, 1942, a decision was taken to send an American Army and a strong British contingent to occupy French North-West Africa. Later on, 8th November, 1942, was, fixed for the descent. I was very much in favour of this for a variety of reasons, most of which are now well known. I have never regarded this African operation as a substitute for a direct attack across the Channel upon the Germans in France or the Low Countries. On the contrary, the opening of this new front in the Mediterranean was always in-
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tended by its authors to be an essential preliminary to the main attack upon Germany and her ring of subjugated and satellite States.
At that time, over 15 months ago, no decision was taken beyond the occupation of North Africa. There followed almost immediately, in fact while I was in Washington in June, 1942, the disaster at Tobruk and the retreat, with the loss of 80,000 men, of our Desert Army, of more than 400 miles to the approaches of Cairo and Alexandria. This raised very grave issues, the Delta, the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal all being in jeopardy. At the same time the German attack through the Caucasus was developing in a way which seemed to menace the Caspian basin and the vital oilfields of Baku, Iraq and Persia. At Moscow Premier Stalin was able to speak to me with confidence of his ability to withstand the German attack, and he told me beforehand of the counter-strokes by which he intended to relieve Stalingrad, and if possible destroy the German forces before it. At Cairo, Generals Alexander and Montgomery were placed in command and very substantial reinforcements, which had been sent there from Britain several months before, arrived to strengthen the Desert Army. Plans were made to resist Rommel's impending attack, and thereafter to regain the initiative by a major battle. These plans proved successful. Almost exactly a year ago, on 23rd September, began the heavy action which resulted in Rommel's decisive repulse. A month later the Desert Army won the hard and prolonged Battle of Alamein and set forth upon its immortal march, a march not yet concluded. From that time on for a whole year we and our great Allies have had almost unbroken success by land, by sea and in the air. I cannot recollect anything so complete and prolonged as the series of victories which have attended our Allied Arms in almost every theatre. In the same time that the Desert Army has been making its great march and that the conquests of North-West Africa and Sicily have taken place, the Russian Armies have advanced on 1000 miles of front from the Volga almost to the Dnieper, a distance in many places of more than 500 miles, driving before them with prodigious slaughter the hordes of Germans that invaded their country and inflicted so many indescribable barbarities upon its inhabitants.
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When I next met the President in January, 1943, and the combined Anglo-American staffs went into their protracted conference at Casablanca, the whole scene of the war was already transformed. No decision had hitherto been taken by us to go beyond North Africa. But now the advance of the Desert Army, which already stood before the gates of Tripoli, brought another quarter of a million men into play and enabled us to carry out the policy which I mentioned in my broadcast in November last of using North Africa not as a seat but as a springboard. We resolved therefore to complete the conquest of Tunisia and meanwhile to make all preparations for invading Sicily. The final victories in Tunisia were obtained in May, and the whole of the enemy forces in North Africa, then little short of half a million strong, were destroyed or captured.
When I visited the President again in Washington in May, 1943, during and after the victory in Tunisia, the British and American Armies had great results to display. We therefore extended our review and set before ourselves as our principal objective the knocking of Italy completely out of the war this year. No one in attempting to frame a time-table for this task would have expected it would be so rapidly achieved. On 10th July British and American Armies, on the scale of perhaps half a million men, the first wave of whom were carried, as the House knows, in upwards of 2,700 ships and landing craft, began their attack upon Sicily, and in a campaign of 38 days the entire island was conquered, with a loss to the enemy of 165,000 in killed, wounded and prisoners, or more than four times our Allied losses in the operation.
In order to have the correct perspective and proportion of events, it is necessary to survey the whole chain of causation, the massive links of which have been forged by the diligence and burnished with the devotion and skill of our combined Forces and their commanders until they shine in the sunshine of to-day and will long shine in the history of war. This same year of victory on land has been accompanied by an ever-increasing mastery of the air by the British, Americans and Russians over the enemy in Europe. Speaking particularly of our own air power, the weight of bombs dis-
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charged by the Royal Air Force on Germany in the last 12 months is three times that of the preceding 12 months. The weight of bombs discharged in the last three months is half as great again as that of the preceding three months. There has also been a great improvement in accuracy owing to technical devices. The percentage of loss for the first eight months of 1943 is less than in the same period last year, and the morale and ardour of our bombing crews are very high.
The almost total systematic destruction of many of the centres of German war effort continues on a greater scale and at a greater pace. The havoc wrought is indescribable. and the effect upon the German war production in all its forms and upon U-boat building is matched by those wrought upon the life and economy of the whole of that guilty organisation. There has been an enormous diversion of German energy from the war fronts to internal defence against air attack and the offensive power of the enemy has been notably crippled thereby. The German air force has been driven increasingly on to the defensive. The attacks we have had in this island, though marked by occasional distressing incidents, are at present negligible compared with the vast scale of the war. The enemy is increasingly compelled to concentrate on building fighter aircraft and night fighter aircraft for home defence at the expense of bomber production. He is also forced to save his strength so far possible on all the fighting fronts, and is therefore restricted to a far lower rate of activity than we and our Allies maintain. This throws the burden increasingly upon his fully occupied ground forces. The Royal Air Force is at present maintaining in action throughout the war scene in all the theatres nearly 50 per cent. more first line aircraft than Germany. That is the Royal Air Force alone apart from Russia.
On top of this already heavy preponderance comes the whole rapidly expanding weight of the United States Air Forces, building up ceaselessly in this country and already in action on a great scale both here and in the Mediterranean. The American system of daylight bombing gives great accuracy on special targets, and it is also accompanied by severe fighting, producing heavy losses among the enemy's fighter aircraft and notably diminishing the increase which they are seek-
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ing to make. Many superb actions of courage and daring have been fought by the great American Air Forces which are developed here and in the Mediterranean, and a high spirit of fellowship and generous emulation subsists between them and their British comrades. The British and American Air Forces are fed by an ever-broadening and improving supply of new aircraft, which together exceeds the corresponding German supply by more than four to one.
The continued progress of Anglo-American air preponderance, which can certainly be expected month after month, opens the possibilities of saturating the German defences both on the ground and in the air, in spite of the desperate efforts which the enemy is making and will certainly continue to make to strengthen those defences in proportion to the mounting weight of our attack. Now this word "saturation" comes to have particular significance in the general field of the air war. If a certain degree of saturation can be reached, and we can be sure that this will only be won after a hard-fought and bitter struggle with the enemy air defences, reactions of a very far-reaching character will be produced. We shall in fact have created conditions in which, with very small loss to ourselves, the accurate, methodical destruction by night and by day of every building of military significance in the widest sense will become possible. Complete strategic air domination of Germany by the Anglo-American Air Forces is not necessarily beyond our reach even in 1944, with consequences, if it were attained, which cannot be measured but must certainly be profound.
All this must be considered in relation to the gigantic struggle proceeding ceaselessly along the 2,000-mile Russian front, from the White Sea to the Black Sea, where the Russian Air Force is already at many points superior in strength to that which the Germans have been able to leave there in the face of the hard pressures from the West and from the South.
We must not in any circumstances allow these favourable tendencies to weaken our efforts or lead us to suppose that' our dangers are past or that the war is coming to an end. On the contrary, we must expect that the terrible foe we are smiting so heavily will make frenzied efforts to retaliate. The speeches of the German leaders, from Hitler downwards,
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contain mysterious allusions to new methods and new weapons which will presently be tried against us. It would, of course, be natural for the enemy to spread such rumours in order to encourage his own people, but there is probably more in it than that. For example we now have experience of a new type of aerial bomb which the enemy has begun to use in attacks on our shipping, when at close quarters with the coast. This bomb, which may be described as a sort of rocket-assisted glider, is released from a considerable height, and is then apparently guided towards its target by the parent aircraft. It may be that the Germans are developing other weapons on novel lines with which they may hope to do us damage and to compensate to some extent for the injury which they are daily receiving from us. I can only assure the House that unceasing vigilance and the most intense study of which we are capable are given to these possibilities. We have always hitherto found the answer to any of the problems which have been presented to us. At the same time I do not exclude, and no one must exclude from their minds, that novel forms of attack will be employed, and, should they be employed, I should be able to show to the House in detail the prolonged, careful examination beforehand which we have made into these possibilities, and I trust we shall be able to show the measures which will be brought into force against them.
So much for the air. I have dealt with the land. Not less remarkable than the air or the land and certainly not less important is the revolution effected in our position at sea. I have repeatedly stated in this House that our greatest danger in this war since invasion has become so much more remote is the U-boat attack upon our sea communications and upon Allied shipping all over the world. This must be measured by three tests: First: the sinkings of our own ships; second, the killings of the enemy U-boats; and, third, the volume of new building. The great victory which was won by our North Atlantic convoys and their escorts in May was followed by a magnificent diminution in sinkings. The monthly statements which are issued on the authority of the President and myself, and about which the Canadian Government, who contribute to the Battle of the Atlantic brave
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men, planes and escort vessels are also consulted, deserve close attention. I have little to add to them to-day. But it is a fact that for the four months which ended on 18th September no merchant vessel was sunk by enemy action in the North Atlantic. The month of August was the lowest month we have ever had since the United States entered the war, and it was less than half the average of British and Allied sinkings in the 15 months preceding the American entry into the war. During the first fortnight in this September no Allied ships were sunk by U-boat action in any part of the world. This is altogether unprecedented in the whole history of the U-boat struggle, ether in this war or in the last. Naturally I do not suggest for a moment that this immunity or any-think like it could possibly continue. A new herd of U-boats have been coming out in the last week or so into the Atlantic from their bases in France and Germany, and they have no doubt been fitted with what is thought to be the best and latest apparatus. We for our part have not been idle, and we await this renewal of the conflict, which has in fact already begun, with sober confidence. One convoy is being attacked at the present time. If they will come and attack the convoys, we shall be able to attack the U-boats.
In spite, however, of the reduced number of U-boats which have been at work since the May massacre, a day rarely passes without our getting one of these ill-starred vessels. Moreover the United States and British air attacks on the German bases and building yards and on factories where the component parts are made has definitely reduced the rate of production of U-boats in Germany. The high percentage of killings has certainly affected the morale of the U-boat crews, and many of the most experienced U-boat captains have been drowned or are now prisoners in British or American hands.
Thirdly—I said you must look at it from three points of view—the output of new building from the United States has fulfilled all that was ever hoped from it and more. We build our regular quota in this Island, and the Canadian output, an entirely new development for Canada, is also remarkable. The credit balance of new building over losses of all kinds,
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including marine risks, since the beginning of the year, the net gain that is to say, exceeds 6,000,000 tons, and should the present favourable conditions hold, we shall soon have replaced all the losses suffered by the United Nations since the beginning of the war. As set forth in the letter from the President to me which I laid on the Table of the House before we rose, the massive achievement of United States' shipbuilding has been shared generously with us on those principles of the division of war-labour in accordance with the highest economy of effort, which were from the beginning of our association with the United States in this war our guide and which are now becoming increasingly our rule. The favourable position now enjoyed has enabled a larger number of faster ships to be built and projected with 111 the advantages attaching to speed.
The House will also realise that we have taken full advantage of the lull in the U-boat attack to bring in the largest possible convoys and that we have replenished the reserves in these Islands of all essential commodities, especially oil fuel, which is almost at its highest level since the outbreak of the war, and we have substantial margins between us and what is called the "danger level," on which we have never trenched even at the worst time.
All this has not come about accidentally. It is the result of the most astonishing and praiseworthy efforts of industry and organisation on both sides of the Atlantic. It is also the result of hard, faithful, unwearying service given by the multitudes of escort vessels of all kinds, and most of all, so far as last year is concerned, it is the result of the startling intervention of the long-range aircraft of the British Empire and the United States, and especially of our Coastal Command. Besides this the large numbers of auxiliary aircraft carriers which are now coming into service are able to give a measure of air protection to convoys and to conduct an aggressive warfare against U-boats in those ocean spaces which are beyond the reach even of the very long-range aircraft, the V.L.R.'s as they are called, of the two countries.
I repeat as I have always done, and as I am bound to do, my warning that no guarantee can be given of a continuance of these favourable conditions. But on this occasion I will go so far as to say
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that we could only be defeated by the U-boats if we were guilty of gross neglect of duty in the shipyards and on the sea, and of an inexcusable falling-off in that scientific and technical ability on both sides of the Atlantic which has hitherto stood us in good stead.
I cannot pass from this subject without paying tribute once more to the officers and men of the Merchant Navy, whose losses have been in greater proportion than those even of the Royal Navy. We never call upon them in vain, and we are confident that they will continue to play their part in carrying our men and their equipment and munitions to any place that may be required and under whatever conditions may exist at the time. I must add also when these new resources of shipbuilding are coming into view, that every saving made on the sea is immediately demanded by the Fighting Services in their endeavour to intensify and augment our offensive overseas actions. Their appetite keeps far ahead of the supply, even if it increases beyond our expectation. The more ships we have, the more we seem to want.
I have dealt with the land, the air and the Navy, but now I must turn to another part of the world. At the Conference at Quebec much attention was given to the prosecution of the war against Japan. The offensive is already on foot on a considerable scale in various parts of the Pacific, and the main strength of the United States is deployed in that ocean. The main weight of the offensive operations there at present is in the Solomons and New Guinea, where General MacArthur, an officer of outstanding personality, to whom we and our Australian brothers in the Commonwealth are under a measure of debt, is directing a large-scale offensive. The first steps were taken by the eviction of the Japanese from Guadalcanal and from Papua. These were exploited by landings which took place on 30th June on New Georgia also, and on 4th September in Huon Bay, North-East of Lae. New Georgia has been cleared of the enemy, and the twin bases of Salamaua and Lae were reduced in a manner which shows a remarkable development in the use of amphibian and air-borne power, and which furnished, I may say, another opportunity for the Ninth Australian Division to display those
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qualities to the Japanese which the Germans tasted at El Alamein. These operations give great promise for the future, and they will unfold stage by stage as the months pass by.
Then, while we were in Quebec, we also received the news of the eviction of the Japanese from the Aleutian Islands, which are American territory, by the occupation of Kiska, in which Canadian Forces also took part. This was the sequel to the annihilation of the Japanese garrison on the island of Attu, and it is certainly remarkable for the fact that the Japanese, who had occupied Kiska with a garrison of 10,000 or more men, were not prepared to await the assault, but fled beforehand, under cover of darkness in their ships. Here is a new feature in the resistance of Japan. Hitherto we have reckoned upon their dying to the last man, which they certainly did at Attu, and in which respect we were prepared to serve them as well as we could. But at Kiska, and also to some extent at Salamaua and Lae, a somewhat different mood has seemed to possess the enemy. Evacuation and retreat in order to save their lives now seem to have taken a place in their method of fighting. We shall see in due course whether these new tendencies become pronounced. If so, it will not alter the result, but it will save cost and trouble.
The fundamental fact, however, in the war against Japan is the steady diminution of Japanese shipping in relation to the tasks their war policy has imposed upon them. The wasting process is most marked. Their widely dispersed conquests depend upon a certain minimum shipping supply. They cannot possibly hold the vast areas they have occupied except upon a certain- minimum shipping supply. Their losses certainly exceed any means which they have, or can ever obtain, of replacement. This is also true of their air force, which can scarcely keep its initial strength and has long ago been overtaken, and is now increasingly surpassed every month, by the enormous United States expansion. So that in both those vital respects upon which the Japanese conquests depend for their maintenance, a steady process of attrition is at work, and the strength of the enemy must be considered a wasting asset.
I have ventured to dwell upon these favourable aspects of the war against
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Japan only because I know it is realised throughout the United States that the slightest slackening of effort would destroy all those favourable tendencies. Those tendencies depend upon a small margin. If that margin is lost by any slackening and those tendencies cease to operate, we shall get into a static, stagnant condition and we might well find ourselves condemned to a long-term process of futile expenditure of life and treasure which would be marking time and treading water. We should not be getting on. It is the pace that kills; that is what has to be borne in mind in bringing this war to an end.
I now turn to another but cognate aspect of the war which was discussed at Quebec. Considerable progress has been made in the organisation of the South-East Asia Command, which is being set,up in India to intensify the war against Japan. The supreme Allied Commander, Admiral Mountbatten, will shortly arrive in India, accompanied by a staff of officers who will form the Combined Allied Headquarters, modelled on that which has been set up under General Eisenhower with so much advantage. This form of Combined Allied Headquarters for the South-East Asia front was absolutely necessary because of the many United States establishments which were growing up separately for many purposes in that area, and particularly in respect of the great air route to China, which is being expanded and manned on an ever-increasing scale. Although there are excellent liaison and good feeling, it is absolutely necessary to have unity of command in this theatre.
Another step which was foreseen when we examined these matters as much as 16 or 17 years ago on the Committee of Imperial Defence, was the separation from the ordinary normal Command in India, the statutory Command in India, of any large extensive campaign fought on or beyond the frontiers of India. That also has been achieved. The headquarters of the new Command will be set up first in Delhi so as to be in close liaison during the organisation period with the Government of India. They have to be in the closest liaison with the Government of India and with General Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India; The new Command and the appointment of Admiral Mountbatten,
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have been warmly welcomed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and are in full accord with the views of our American Allies. In all these questions of Commands, matters have to be so arranged that the men who are chosen to command have the full confidence of all the parties concerned.
A general survey of this amazing and fearful world war is an essential part of any balanced statement. Without it the events in any one theatre cannot be viewed in their proper setting or proportion. To understand fully any part of this war, one must have at least a broad conception of the whole. I now return, after placing these general considerations before the House, to the more recent events in the Mediterranean theatre which are so fresh and vivid in our minds.
25th July was a memorable day. Even before we had half completed the conquest of Sicily or had set foot on the Italian mainland, the Dictator Mussolini was overthrown, and the Fascist regime, which had lasted for 21 years, was cast down and vehemently repudiated by the whole mass of the Italian people. The Badoglio Government came into existence with the intention of making peace in accordance with the will of the nation. They were however intruded upon at all points and overlaid by the Germans, and they had the greatest difficulty in maintaining themselves against this hateful pressure. We knew nothing about this new regime. Once Fascism was completely overthrown we were naturally anxious to find some authority with whom we could deal, so as to bring about the unconditional surrender of Italy in the shortest time and with the least possible cost in the blood of our soldiers. It was necessary, as I advised the House, to wait till the position became more definite. We therefore continued our preparations for the invasion in strength of the mainland of Italy and of Europe, on which we had resolved at the May Conference in Washington.
Presently feelers were put out by the new Italian Government through various channels, asking far terms and explaining the deadly character of the difficulties in which they were involved. These difficulties arose from the menacing presence of German armies, police and spies all around them and in their midst and all among them. We were sympathetic to those difficulties.
