- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on January 18, 1945, in a debate on the war and foreign policy, defending British policy in Italy, Yugoslavia and especially Greece.
- Main themes
- British role in the Mediterranean, Italy's post-liberation government and the Bonomi administration, principle of free elections in liberated countries, Yugoslavia and the Tito-Subasic agreement, Anglo-Soviet understanding on joint policy in the Balkans, King Peter II and a plebiscite on monarchy, British intervention in Greece, Greek Communists and E.L.A.S., criticism of British and American press, Papandreou Cabinet and E.A.M. ministers, opposition to private armies
- Duration
- ~22 min
- Words
- 2,614
- Sentences
- 107
- Readability
- 52
- Grade
- 11.9
- Syntax
- 3.17
- Vocabulary
- 2.17
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other107 sentences in 27 paragraphs
I gathered that it was the desire of the House that there should be a further discussion of the war and foreign situations and policies at this time, before any new important international conferences take place. I will try to survey the whole—I cannot say the whole, but large and select portions—of this vast scene to the best of my ability. It has fallen to the hard lot of Britain to play a leading part in the Mediterranean, and particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. We have great responsibilities, and we have made great exertions, there. In Italy the British, or
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British-controlled, divisions under Field Marshal Alexander's command, and still more if the whole area of the Mediterranean is included, outnumber three-fold those of the United States. There is battle along the whole front in Italy, and behind the front, in the hard-stricken peninsula, are many economic and political difficulties. The old structure with its hateful rigours has been destroyed, and in its place we have had to raise a Government of improvisation. We have the Bonomi Government, which has been trying to do its best under extraordinary difficulties, but which, of course, has no electoral authority behind it. But now, at any time, perhaps in a few months, perhaps much sooner—for no one can tell what is proceeding in the minds of the German war leaders—the Germans will be driven out of Italy, o[...] will perhaps withdraw; and immediately the great populous districts of the North, the cities of Turin, Milan, and other centres of industry and activity, and a large population of all kinds of political views but containing great numbers of vehement or violent politicians, and in touch with brave men, who have been fighting, and maintaining a guerilla warfare in the Alps, all these will be thrown—probably at a time when the Northern regions have been stripped bare of food by the retreating Germans—hungry, upon the fragile structure of the Italian Government in Rome, with consequences which cannot be accurately foreseen, and certainly not measured.
How necessary it is for Britain and the United States, who bear the chief responsibilities, to maintain the closest and most intimate contact in the solution of all these new problems. Let me say once and for all that we have no political combinations, in Europe or elsewhere, in respect of which we need Italy as a party. We need Italy no more than we need Spain, because we have no designs which require the support of such Powers. We must take care that all the blame of things going wrong is not thrown on us. This, I have no doubt, can be provided against, and to some extent I am providing against it now.
We have one principle about the liberated countries or the repentant satellite countries which we strive for according to the best of our ability and resources. Here is the principle. I will state it in the broadest and most familiar terms: Government of the people, by the people, for the people, set up on a basis of free
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and universal suffrage election, with secrecy of the ballot and no intimidation. That is and has always been the policy of this Government in all countries. That is our only aim, our only interest, and our only care. It is to that goal that we try to make our way across all the difficulties, obstacles and perils of the long road. Trust the people, make sure they have a fair chance to decide their destiny without being terrorised from either quarter or regimented. There is our policy for Italy, for Yugoslavia and for Greece. What other interests have we than that? For that we shall strive and for that alone.
The general principle which I have enunciated guides us in our relations with Yugoslavia. We have no special interest in the political régime which prevails in Yugoslavia. Few people in Britain, I imagine, are going to be more cheerful or more downcast because of the future Constitution of Yugoslavia. However, because the King and the Royal Yugoslav Government took refuge with us at the time of the German invasion we have acquired a certain duty towards the Government and peoples on the other side of the Adriatic which can only be discharged in a correct and formal manner such as, for instance, would be provided by a plebiscite. I am the earliest outside supporter of Marshal Tito. It is more than a year since in this House I extolled his guerilla virtues to the world. Some of my best friends and the hon. and gallant Member for Preston (Major Churchill) are there with him or his Forces now. I earnestly hope he may prove to be the saviour and the unifier of his country, as he is undoubtedly at this time its undisputed master.
Recently Bulgaria and Rumania have passed under the control of the Soviet military authorities and Russian-controlled Armies are in direct contact with Yugoslavia. As we feared that there might be misunderstandings and contrary policies between us and the Soviet Government about Yugoslavia, which can easily arise when armies enter a country which is in great disorder, the Foreign Secretary and I reached at Moscow an understanding with Marshal Stalin by which our two countries pursue a joint policy in these regions, after constant discussions. This agreement raised no question of divisions of territory or spheres of interest after the war. It arrived only at the avoidance, during these critical days, of friction between the great Allies. In practice
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I exchange telegrams on behalf of His Majesty's Government personally with Marshal Stalin about the difficulties which arise, and about what is the best thing to do. We keep President Roosevelt informed constantly.
In pursuance of our joint policy, we encouraged the making of an agreement between the Tito Government, which, with Russian assistance, has now installed itself in Belgrade, and the Royal Government of Yugoslavia, which is seated in London, and recognised by us, as, I believe, by all the Powers of the United Nations. Marshal Stalin and His Majesty's Government consider that agreement on the whole to be wise. We believe that the arrangements of the Tito-Subasic agreement are the best that can be made for the immediate future of Yugoslavia. They preserve the form and the theme of monarchy pending the taking of a fair and free plebiscite as soon as conditions allow. King Peter II agrees in principle with these arrangements, but he makes certain reservations. The nature and effect of these are, I understand, at present under discussion. I should hesitate to prophesy or to promise how all this will turn out, but in all the circumstances, and having regard to the chaotic conditions arising out of this war, I do not see what else except this Tito-Subasic agreement could be done by His Majesty's Government and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to contribute what they can to bringing about the widest possible measure of agreement among Yugoslays, and to ensure that these issues should not become a cause of friction among Allies. It is a matter of days within which a decision must be reached upon this matter, and if we were so unfortunate as not to be able to obtain the consent of King Peter, the matter would have, in fact, to go ahead, his assent being presumed. The King's point of view, as I understood it, was that he was anxious about becoming responsible, while he had no power, for any severities or confiscations which might take place in his country before the plebiscite decided whether it was to be a monarchy or a republic. Such scruples must be respected, but cannot necessarily, in these times, indefinitely prevent the march of events.
From the troubles of Italy and Yugoslavia, we come naturally to those of
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Greece. Once again, we are guided by our simple policy: Victory against the Germans; the establishment of and aid to the most coherent and substantial government machine that can be found; the delivery of such food as we and our Allies can spare and our combined shipping afford; the maintenance of tolerable conditions of law and order; and the holding of plebiscites or general elections fairly and squarely—then, exit at the earliest practicable moment. We toil through a mighty maze, but I can assure the Committee it is not without plan. The story of events in Greece has been told so fully in the newspapers that I shall not attempt a chronological or descriptive account—. I beg that I may not be interrupted. Every two or three minutes the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher), who receives exceptional courtesy in this House, thinks it necessary to assert himself by making some half-inaudible and occasionally partially- intelligent interruption. I do not think that is in accordance with the wish of the Committee or the conditions of our Debate.
I said that I should not attempt a long chronological account, but there is no case in my experience, certainly not in my war-time experience, where a British Government has been so maligned and its motives so traduced in our own country by important organs of the Press or among our own people. That this should be done amid the perils of this war, now at its climax, has filled me with surprise and sorrow. It bodes ill for the future in which the life and strength of Britain compared to other Powers will be tested to the full, not only in the war but in the aftermath of war. How can we wonder at, still less how we can complain of, the attitude of hostile or indifferent newspapers in the United States when we have, in this country, witnessed such a melancholy exhibition as that provided by some of our most time-honoured and responsible journals—and others to which such epithets would hardly apply? Only the solid and purposeful strength of the National Coalition Government could have enabled us to pursue unflinching and unyielding the course of policy and principle on which we were and are resolved.
But our task, hard as it was, has been and is still being rendered vastly more difficult by a spirit of gay, reckless, unbridled partisanship which has been let
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loose on the Greek question and has fallen upon those who have to bear the burden of Government in times like these. I have never been connected with any large enterprise of policy about which I was more sure in mind and conscience of the rectitude of our motives, of the clarity of our principles and of the vigour, precision and success of our action, than what we have done in Greece.
We went to Greece for the second time in this war. We went with the full approval of both our great Allies. We went on the invitation of a Greek Government in which all parties, even the Communists, were represented, and as a result of a military conference at which the generals of E.L.A.S. and of E.D.E.S. were equally present. We came with good gifts in our hands, stability and assistance to the all-party Greek Government who were formed and had to face the confusion left by the flight of the Germans. We brought food, clothing and supplies. We came with a small force of troops. We took up our positions from no military point of view, scattering and spreading our troops in a number of places on the coast and at small points inland where we hoped to be able to pour in the largest numbers of supplies as quickly as possible to a very hungry people. We were received with flowers and cheers, and other expressions of rapture, and we British, the wicked British—so denounced by the American correspondents, whose names have, no doubt, been noted by the House, and so hounded by some of our own—busied ourselves in the distribution of supplies throughout those parts of the country to which we had access.
We had made Greece safe for U.N.R.R.A. before the outbreak took place. Meanwhile, for a period of six weeks or so, the Greek Government, representative of all parties, were distracted by internal divisions and street demonstrations, and all the time the Communist-directed forces were drawing down from the North and infiltrating into the city of Athens in which they had also a strong local faction. We had furnished these men, for several years, with arms in considerable quantities in the hope that they would fight against the Germans. They accepted the arms, and they kept them and other arms they procured from the Italians and the Germans in their retreat—captured or bought, or otherwise
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obtained—and they kept them with a plan to seize the power of the Greek State in Athens once the Germans cleared out and went away. I cannot guarantee to carry unanimous opinion with me at every stage in the discussion of what is admittedly the most controversial matter of the hour in British policy.
I must speak a little about these Greek Communists, among whom Macedonian and Bulgarian elements are also found, possibly with territorial ideas of their own. They are a very formidable people. They have a theme and a policy which they pursue by merciless methods while all sorts of other people in these regions have only been trying to keep body and soul together. I have been told that I made a mistake in under-rating the power of the Communist-directed E.L.A.S. I must admit that I judged them on their form against the Germans. I do not wish to do them any military injustice. Of course, it was not against the Germans they were trying to fight to any great extent. They were simply taking our arms, lying low and awaiting the moment when they could seize power in the capital by force, or intrigue, and make Greece a Communist State with the totalitarian liquidation of all opponents. I was misled by the little use they were against the Germans, especially once the general victory of the Allies became probable, in spite of the arms we gave to them. I certainly under-rated them as a fighting force. If I am accused of this mistake, I can only say with M. Clemenceau on a celebrated occasion: "Perhaps I have made a number of other mistakes of which you have not heard."
While the British were busy distributing the food and endeavouring to keep things steady, the E.A.M. and Communist Ministers, who were eventually increased to seven in the Papandreou Cabinet, were playing a different game. Throughout, this has been a struggle for power. They were playing the game of the E.L.A.S. bands and of their Communist directors. While sitting in M. Papandreou's Cabinet they were working in the closest combination with the forces gathering to destroy it and all that he and other colleagues represented in the everyday life of Greece. E.A.M. and Communist Ministers threw sand in the wheels of the Government at every stage. They did
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their best to hamper the landing and distribution of food by provoking strikes on some occasions. In addition, they fought over every officer in the Army which it was necessary for the poor State to raise—you cannot have a State without some kind of national army; I am entirely against private armies, and we are not going to have private armies. Every single appointment was wrangled over in this time of crisis till the last minute, and then, when the moment came, when the fierce mountaineers, who had been so tame and idle against the Germans, had got well into the city of Athens——
