The Prime Minister's speech in connection with the Foreign Policy Committee's hearing on Iraq on March 24, 2004.

Denmark Anders Fogh Rasmussen · Prime Minister of Denmark

24 March 2004 · Hearing of the Foreign Policy Committee on Iraq

Context
Rasmussen addressed the Danish Foreign Policy Committee's hearing on Iraq on March 24, 2004, defending Denmark's decision to join the military intervention.
Main themes
Denmark's participation in Iraq War, basis for military action, UN Security Council resolutions, weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein's non-cooperation, intelligence assessments, international law, forward-looking defense perspectives, human rights violations in Iraq, post-September 11 security
Duration
~25 min
76th percentile
Words
3,046
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Sentences
186
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Readability
42
41st percentile
Grade
11.1
33rd percentile
Syntax
2.73
15th percentile
Vocabulary
2.14
36th percentile

Translated from Danish

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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

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  • Geopolitical 54%52%
  • Institutional 30%28%
  • Social 7%6%
  • Ceremonial 6%5%
  • Economic 4%4%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

186 sentences in 100 paragraphs

"Perspectives on Denmark's Participation in Military Interventions in Light of Iraq"

The spoken word is valid

I would like to thank the Foreign Policy Committee for the initiative for today's hearing.

The debate on Iraq has so far been narrowly focused on the basis for military action. However, the Iraq situation raises a number of principled and more forward-looking questions about how we should handle the new threats we face.

The time has come for these questions to be debated. Therefore, I welcome today's hearing.

I will focus on three things in my statement:

the basis for the war,

the developments in Iraq, and the forward-looking perspectives.

* * *

I would like to begin by stating that the decision to participate in the military action in Iraq was difficult. Using military force will always be the heaviest decision a government and Parliament can face. Many conflicting considerations and arguments had to be weighed against each other in March last year. Hardly any other issue in recent times has been debated as intensely around the world. There were no easy answers or simple solutions.

But it is my and the government's firm belief that the basis for the decision to participate in Iraq was sound – and that the decision was right. Let me recap why.

First: The government supported the military action against Iraq due to the country's lack of cooperation with the UN.

The government's justification for participation is outlined in proposal B 118 from March 2003. The justification was that Saddam Hussein would not take the last chance that a united Security Council had given him to cooperate immediately, actively, and unconditionally with the UN.

Iraq had previously produced and used weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi regime would not account for what had happened to the weapons it had previously acknowledged possessing.

This behavior created significant uncertainty in the region and internationally. Only through Saddam Hussein's active cooperation could the uncertainty about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction be removed. Therefore, cooperation was absolutely central.

And there was reason to be concerned about Iraq's lack of cooperation. It was an aggressive regime that had previously invaded its neighboring countries and used chemical weapons against its own population.

It was a barbaric and totalitarian regime of the worst kind. The Iraqi people suffered from massive violations of human rights. Violence, torture, and mass graves were part of everyday life.

At the same time, it was a regime that did not shy away from supporting terrorists. A regime that actively supported Palestinian suicide bombers and that would not cooperate with the UN on the dismantling of illegal weapons of mass destruction – we could not live with that after September 11, 2001.

Second: It was not the Danish government, or for that matter the British or American government, that claimed that Iraq's lack of cooperation with the UN and the country's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed a threat to international peace and security.

The UN Security Council had established this in November 2002 in resolution 1441.

Unanimously.

Third: The government based its decision to participate in the Iraq war on open sources.

We relied on the same open sources that were available to Parliament. First and foremost, the Security Council's resolutions and the reports that the UN's weapons inspectors continuously provided to the UN Security Council regarding how cooperation between Saddam Hussein and the UN was progressing.

As the government has openly stated all along, we also received ongoing information from other sources, including from the Defense Intelligence Service.

However, it was not this information that made the difference. For the Danish government, the open sources constituted a fully sufficient basis.

The information we received from intelligence services did not give us grounds to question the Security Council's assessment of the threat from Iraq's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Thus, in the period leading up to the Iraq war, the Defense Intelligence Service's assessment was that Iraq likely possessed biological and chemical weapons.

Fourth: The military action against Iraq was clearly anchored in the UN.

The Security Council had authorized the use of force to disarm Iraq with resolution 678 and later resolutions. There was broad consensus in Parliament back in 1998. And that authorization was still in effect when the military action took place.

Resolution 1441 actually strengthened and clarified the basis for the use of military means against Iraq that was already laid out in the earlier resolutions.

We share this assessment of the legal basis with a number of countries. But international law is not an exact science. And not surprisingly, not all international law experts have agreed on the assessment. But the government's position has always been clear. And we have from the outset presented our legal assessments openly.

In this context, I would like to remind you that a broad majority in Parliament in 1998 and 1999 approved Danish participation in the military action in Kosovo. This occurred, as is well known, without a proper mandate from the UN Security Council.

It was also discussed at that time whether there was a legal basis for the intervention. From certain quarters, it is now described as if everyone was in agreement that the action was fully in accordance with international law. But it was, as mentioned, controversial. The broad recognition today of the justification for the Kosovo action is a good illustration that international law is constantly evolving and is challenged by new situations.

And let me finally emphasize that the fact that no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq does not mean that the government's basis for participating in Iraq was flawed.

The Danish decision was precisely not based on secure evidence of Saddam Hussein's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. It was based on the lack of cooperation with the UN.

Precisely because Saddam Hussein would not cooperate, there was a fundamental and unacceptable uncertainty about what illegal weapons he had. It was this unacceptable uncertainty that we had to contend with in March last year.

The overarching political question was: Could we take the risk that a ruler like Saddam Hussein had these weapons and would use them? Should we let doubt benefit a ruthless and unpredictable dictator? Could we, in the twelfth year, accept that he defied the UN Security Council?

For me, there was no doubt. We not only had the right to act. It was our duty.

* * *

Today, Saddam Hussein's regime is gone. The world is rid of an aggressive tyrant. The capture of Saddam Hussein put the final period on 30 years of oppression of the Iraqi people.

A free, independent, and democratic Iraq is now being rapidly established. Reconstruction is in full swing. Sovereignty will be transferred to the Iraqis on July 1 of this year.

On March 8, a temporary Iraqi constitution was signed. Even now, the law must be described as one of the most democratic in the Middle East. It has the most liberal section on human rights and civil rights in the entire region.

The temporary constitution contains two main elements: First, a two-phase roadmap for the establishment of the final Iraqi government.

Second, the legal basis for the temporary administration of Iraq until a final elected parliament is in place. This is expected to happen around the turn of 2005.

The signing of the temporary constitution is a significant step towards an independent Iraq. And furthermore, it is an example of the Iraqi parties' willingness to make the necessary compromises and move the transition process forward.

We must acknowledge that a long and difficult road lies ahead. Ruthless terrorists are doing everything they can to derail the process in order to seize power themselves and impose a new despotic regime.

But we should take heart that less than a year after the Iraqi regime fell, there is now actually a temporary Iraqi constitution. And that sovereignty will be transferred to the Iraqi people within a few months.

At the same time, it is positive that there are signs of increasing UN engagement in Iraq. And there should be no doubt that the government supports a strengthened UN role in Iraq.

It is also encouraging that Iraqi society – despite the terror – has actually begun to function again:

The command economy has been replaced by a market economy.

The supply of energy and water is back to the same level as before the military action.

Oil production is up to over 2 million barrels of oil per day.

33,000 Iraqi teachers have been retrained and 2,300 schools have been renovated.

Education is again focused on acquiring knowledge. Not on indoctrination for war and hatred.

3 million Iraqi children under five years old have been vaccinated against preventable diseases.

And local markets are seeing an increasing supply of food.

I had the opportunity to observe some of these advances during my visit to Iraq last month.

My impression was that the Iraqi people are very interested in moving forward quickly and bringing Iraq back into the international community.

And I am pleased that the majority of Iraqis, according to a recent BBC poll, share this optimism.

Although the poll reflects a critical view of the military action in Iraq among many Iraqis in several ways, it is encouraging that nearly 57 percent of those surveyed believe that life in Iraq is better now than under Saddam. And that 71 percent believe that their lives will be even better in a year's time.

It is crucial that countries like Denmark do not betray this hope in Iraq. That countries like Denmark actively support efforts to stabilize Iraq and bring Iraq back into the international community. That we do everything to prevent destructive forces from taking over. And that we support the difficult cooperation between Iraq's internal factions.

Therefore, the government has no plans to withdraw Danish forces. But it is clear that the Danish troops will only remain in Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty in July if the new Iraqi government wishes it.

The Danish effort is extensive and broad-based. It covers both military, humanitarian, and commercial aspects. We have over 500 soldiers, police officers, and advisors in Iraq. So far, 350 million kroner have been allocated solely for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts.

The reconstruction of Iraq has implications beyond the country's own borders. A free and independent Iraq based on democratic values will have a stabilizing effect throughout the region.

A new and democratic Iraq will also serve as an important model for reform processes in other countries in the region. These are reform processes that the government wishes to actively support both bilaterally, in the EU, and together with the USA through efforts that can strengthen dialogue with Arab countries and promote reform and modernization in the Arab world.

This is an effort that is extremely important for stability in the Middle East and for addressing Islamic terror at its roots. We must enter into a partnership with Arab countries to promote democratic development, advance human rights, improve women's opportunities, and strengthen education and social systems.

* * *

Let me finally turn to the more principled and forward-looking questions that the Iraq effort raises.

The course of the Iraq situation should give rise to reflection in Denmark and in the international community.

We must recognize that the international threat landscape has changed. And we must consider what consequences this should have for the UN, for international law, and for the rules on the use of force.

Here, I would like to remind you that it is not only Iraq that has given rise to difficult considerations. In a number of other cases, the international community has faced difficult choices for or against military intervention in recent years.

In Kosovo, NATO chose to take action when the UN Security Council was blocked and did not live up to its responsibility to stop massive violations of human rights and deportations that posed a threat to peace and stability in the region.

In Rwanda, however, the international community did not intervene, despite a full-blown genocide taking place.

And in Iraq, the USA, as is well known, led an international military action in 1991 and 1998 to enforce the Security Council's resolutions.

It is easy to state that the international threat landscape has changed dramatically in recent years. It is much more difficult to assess what consequences this should have for the development of the international legal order and the rules for the use of force.

The right to self-defense is enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is generally recognized that this right to self-defense not only includes cases where an attack has taken place but also cases where an attack is imminent.

The question, however, is whether this right also applies in cases where there is reason to fear an attack, but it is not known with certainty whether the threat is imminent.

Let me ask: Can we, in an age where the threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction cannot be ignored, afford to wait for secure evidence before we intervene?

From several quarters, there is talk of the need for so-called preemptive defense and preventive actions. The main argument is that thousands of lives are put at risk if one waits until the threat has become a reality.

There are international law experts who speak of a genuine obligation for UN member states to prevent such a threat from arising. This is obviously particularly relevant in cases where leaders without political control over their exercise of power are acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

In any case, it must be acknowledged that a state that fears massive attacks, e.g., from weapons of mass destruction or terrorists, cannot or will not passively watch if the Security Council is unable to act.

From the perspective of the threatened state, a necessary alternative to collective action approved by the Security Council in such a situation may be for the individual state to take matters into its own hands and resort to military force out of the desire to protect its population. Whether we like it or not, that is the actual reality.

To avoid any misunderstanding: I advocate for an international legal order where all countries – large and small – adhere to a set of common rules. I am firmly against an international legal disorder where individual countries simply take matters into their own hands. But there is a need to consider international legal rules that take into account the threats of the new era.

In the same way, there is a need for clearer international legal rules regarding humanitarian interventions. The developments during the 1990s clearly showed that massive violations of human rights can evolve into threats to international peace and security. And that we cannot afford to passively watch while ruthless tyrants commit unspeakable crimes, even if they do not pose a direct threat to us.

Despite the recent unrest, everyone today can agree that the military intervention in Kosovo was right and had a significant and positive impact on the developments in the Balkans. As I mentioned earlier, there are voices from several quarters stating that the international community not only has a right but indeed an obligation to intervene in such situations.

The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is fully aware of these issues. Kofi Annan spoke on September 23, 2003, to the UN General Assembly about the need to develop criteria for so-called early authorization from the Security Council to use force against this new type of threat. Following his speech, the Secretary-General has established a high-level panel to propose possible common responses to the threats of the new era.

The government supports an expansion of the international legal order. Kofi Annan's thoughts are important contributions to the absolutely necessary debate.

There is a need for a discussion of criteria for the use of force and other options that can better enable the Security Council – and the international community in general – to address the threats of the new era.

These are significant questions that I hope will be discussed at today's hearing. But which should also be discussed and analyzed afterwards.

The Danish Parliament's inquiry debate F 7 in November 2003 contributed constructively to the discussion here at home. The government has, in follow-up to the inquiry, requested the Danish Institute for International Studies to prepare an update of its 2001 report on humanitarian interventions. I look forward to this contribution to the considerations in the field.

It is particularly important for Denmark to consider these questions in light of our upcoming membership in the UN Security Council. Membership gives us a special responsibility that we must prepare for as best as we can.

* * *

It is difficult to talk about handling the threats of the new era without touching on the threat of terrorism. Especially not after the horrifying terrorist attacks in Madrid.

Terror and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction today represent the two most serious threats to our security. This situation is relatively new. It is crucial that we recognize it. That we equip ourselves to handle it. That we act with firmness and consistency.

It is a particularly frightening thought that weapons of mass destruction may one day fall into the hands of utterly unscrupulous terrorists. Let us sincerely hope that it never happens.

But hope is not enough in politics. As responsible politicians, it is our duty to confront the risk. To prepare for the worst possible scenario.

The decisions made by political leaders today have implications for how our children and grandchildren will live with this risk. It is therefore a great responsibility that rests on today’s political leaders.

We fail in our responsibility if we push uncomfortable but necessary decisions aside. If we remain paralyzed with the desire to give the benefit of the doubt to the guilty. And if we cling to a naive hope that evil will somehow disappear on its own.

The Danish population can expect from this government that it will continue to demonstrate the firmness and consistency that the decision to participate in Iraq represented.

With that, I wish the participants a good and fruitful hearing.