On the effectiveness of state power in Russia

Russia Boris Yeltsin · President of Russia

16 February 1995 · Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly · 1995 · The Kremlin, Moscow, Russia

Context
Boris Yeltsin delivered a Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly on 16 February 1995 in Russia, during a period of economic reform and political transition following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Main themes
Treaty on civic accord, armed rebellion in Chechnya, democratic Constitution, financial stabilisation, privatisation of state enterprises, securities market, structural transformation of the economy
Duration
~28 min
79th percentile
Words
3,313
79th percentile
Sentences
156
82nd percentile
Readability
37
30th percentile
Grade
13.3
60th percentile
Syntax
2.83
25th percentile
Vocabulary
2.22
54th percentile

Russian Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly Translated from Russian

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 57%56%
  • Institutional 34%34%
  • Social 5%4%
  • Geopolitical 3%3%
  • Ceremonial 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

156 sentences in 29 paragraphs

A year ago the President of the Russian Federation addressed the Federal Assembly for the first time with an Address on the main directions of domestic and foreign policy. It formulated the strategic goals of Russia's development and set the tasks for 1994.

What has Russia become a year later? What has changed in our life? What has been achieved and what has not? It is difficult to give unambiguous answers to these questions.

The past year can with every justification be called a year of contrasts. It encompassed the signing of the Treaty on Civic Accord and at the same time social tension in the spring and at the end of the year; the conclusion of treaties with the republics on the delimitation of areas of jurisdiction and the mutual delegation of powers, and the armed rebellion in Chechnya; a sharp reduction of inflation in the summer, and 'Black Tuesday' in October.

Having adopted the first democratic Constitution in its history, Russia did not begin life 'with a clean slate'. The whole burden of the past is with us. Russia is passing from one historical epoch to another at a speed commensurate with the life of a single generation. The high pace of transformation frequently brings costs. The old technology of power, based on ideological and political coercion, is only with difficulty giving way to modern methods and approaches. Directive management still predominates, rather than governance through law. The renewal of the personnel of the state apparatus with competent people of modern outlook is proceeding against enormous resistance. The authorities and their representatives have not yet learned to be open and comprehensible. Hence the lag of state institutions and their representatives behind the flow of new problems and tasks. This is directly reflected in the quality of the functioning of the mechanisms of power and leads to imprecise decisions.

In the past year Russia continued to live in a rarefied legal space. The number of laws the country needs exceeds many times over the number adopted. The legislative process is frequently crushed by political struggle. New legal customs have not taken shape, and legal culture is low. It is important to recognise that respect for law will take root in society only when law is respected by the authorities. The judicial system has not yet become an equal branch of power, genuinely independent and authoritative. The Constitutional Court did not function for a year. The principle of the direct application of the Constitution is scarcely being realised.

The decade that has divided the life of the present generation into two epochs is coming to an end. In transforming the political system, the economy and public consciousness, we have still not been able to rid ourselves of the burden of former prejudices, ideological dogmas and standards of political action. The search continues for models to imitate, or attempts to construct and immediately bring to life one's own ideal model of social development. Old myths cannot be overcome overnight. The majority of Russia's citizens grew up and were brought up in another world, cardinally different from the one we are entering. Our civil society is only taking shape and has not yet become an effective controller of state institutions. Like the new authorities, it is subject to growing pains.

We do not yet perceive the state as one of the most significant achievements of world history and social culture. Without it, civilised human coexistence is impossible. The state is not merely the institutions of power and the officials employed in them. It is above all the political organisation of all the citizens of the country, their joint asset and common cause. That is why opposition to statehood as such is extremely dangerous.

At the beginning of the century in Russia, the idea of freedom and justice was set against the idea of statehood. And this opposition was taken to such a degree that the existing statehood was overthrown, and on its ruins there arose a state of political terror. The danger of such a mistake is repeating itself today too. Just as furiously and recklessly, the idea of statehood is being set against the principles of the observance of human and civil rights and other democratic values. Certain political forces do not cease their attempts to 'topple' the Government, to provoke the 'dispersal' of the State Duma, and demand again and again the holding of early presidential and parliamentary elections. The traditional 'search for enemies', social and political intolerance and indiscriminateness in means turn into the deliberate or unwitting undermining of the very foundations of the country's viability, security and integrity.

In these conditions responsibility for the fate of the country lies equally on state institutions and on society. The constructive position is the one that expresses civic-mindedness, that is, active conscious participation in the affairs of the state, the use of all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, and at the same time the conscientious fulfilment of one's constitutional duties.

The experience of the past year showed that the main goals of the development of society and the state defined by the first Address were accepted by the various political forces. This is no accident, for the central theme of the Address, the strengthening of the Russian state, was based on the fundamental legal, democratic and federative principles of the Constitution, on its basic tasks: the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, the creation of conditions for ensuring a dignified life and the free development of Russia's citizens, and the strengthening of Russia's position in the outside world and its security. It is now clear: common positions can be defined and the most important, socially significant goals formulated. But whatever goals society sets before the authorities, their realisation depends on the effectiveness of state institutions, on their capacity to find timely and correct answers to the most acute questions of social development within the framework of law. For this the following are necessary: a fundamental transformation of state practice and personnel policy, and strict observance by representatives of the state of laws and ethical norms; a sharp rise in the quality of norm-making activity; and the development of law-application practice ensuring the direct application of the Constitution, above all in the sphere of the protection of the rights and freedoms of Russia's citizens.

The year 1994 has ended. It is difficult, and probably unnecessary, to try to determine who, which branch or organ of state power, made the greatest positive contribution or, on the contrary, is more to blame than others for the fact that much of what was planned could not be done. Something else is far more important: to give an objective assessment of the experience of 1994, to find a common understanding of the problems of 1995 and the ways of solving them, to gather political will and to act in concert.

In accordance with the powers defined by point 'e' of Article 84 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, I address the deputies of the chambers of the Federal Assembly and all citizens of Russia with the annual address on the situation in the country and the main directions of domestic and foreign policy.

Russia will have reliable guarantees of sovereignty, independence and integrity no sooner than it overcomes the economic crisis. Financial stabilisation, the growth of savings and their transformation into investment, the revival of production and positive changes in its structure, and the raising of citizens' quality of life: such is the path of economic recovery and emergence onto the stage of sustained upturn. In 1994 a certain part of this path was travelled. It proved smaller than that marked out in last year's Address.

The 1994 Address was the first document of a strategic character flowing from the new Constitution. The solution of a number of the tasks it identified, on such a scale as, for example, structural transformation or the creation of a securities market, is not the work of a single year. How close the economy has come to the goals defined by the 1994 Address: that must be the most important criterion for assessing its fulfilment.

The past year brought results that cannot be assessed unambiguously. In some directions progress was tangible, in others barely noticeable, and setbacks were not avoided either. But on the whole 1994 was not lost for economic reform.

Although the beginning of last year was marked by a large fall in production, signs of stabilisation then appeared, and not only in the extractive but also in some manufacturing sectors of industry. Annual inflation was three times lower than in 1993 and almost seven times lower than in 1992. Fairly strict control over the size of the federal budget deficit, the refusal to grant concessional credits and the introduction of a genuinely positive interest rate of the Central Bank had their effect. As a result savings grew substantially, which means that the financial preconditions for raising investment activity appeared.

Large-scale privatisation was carried out in a compressed timeframe. By the end of 1994 more than 110,000 state and municipal enterprises had changed their form of ownership. The non-state sector, creating 62 per cent of gross domestic product, became dominant in the Russian economy. Privatisation gave a powerful impulse to the development of the securities market. In 1994 the volume of state treasury obligations alone grew almost ninety-fold, amounting to about 28 trillion roubles. The potential of the market in the shares of privatised enterprises is high. Market infrastructure (banks, trading, financial and insurance companies), which previously was extremely weakly developed, progressed rapidly. Largely for this reason the share of services in gross domestic product rose from 30 per cent in 1989 to 51 per cent in 1994. The economy became more open. The motivation of economic activity changed substantially.

In 1994 there was also progress towards other goals identified in the Address: the first part of the Civil Code, the legal foundation of a market economy, was adopted; work unfolded on identifying and reorganising insolvent enterprises; and the liquidation began of the system of unjustified individual concessions on the payment of taxes and customs duties.

But it must be honestly admitted: much of what the Address envisaged could not be fulfilled, and not only because of the long-term character of the problems facing us. Considerable reserves of lawmaking remained unused. There is still no modern land, tax, housing or labour legislation, and no laws on banks, joint-stock companies or the securities market. In order to close the gaping tears in the legislative fabric and provide the normative base for solving the most acute socio-economic problems, a series of presidential decrees was adopted. However, the economy should be regulated not by decrees but by laws. The period of validity of most decrees will end with the entry into force of the corresponding laws.

The Government too committed not a few miscalculations. It did not prove possible to take advantage of the comparatively favourable economic situation that had taken shape by the summer of last year and to begin the mass transformation of savings into investment. As a result a number of branches of industry, especially its science-intensive part, found themselves in an extremely difficult position. Although the positive tendency towards a reduction of inflation persisted for quite a long time, strength did not suffice for the whole year. A sharp fall in the exchange rate of the rouble was allowed, and at the end of the year the rate of price growth increased again. Owing to an acute shortage of budget resources, the selective structural policy announced by the Government never materialised. The ideas of transforming the economy through the selective financing of 'growth point' projects remained unrealised. Modern markets in land and real estate are still absent. Regulation of the securities market has only recently begun. In practice it did not prove possible to simplify the procedures regulating the creation of new enterprises. As a result the creative energy of the market remained to a considerable degree unclaimed.

Despite some positive changes, an effective system for managing state-owned enterprises has still not been established. The slow pace of agrarian reform is being paid for with a grave crisis in agriculture. The drafting and adoption of the Land Code have clearly dragged on. As before, the tax system does not stimulate investment and production. The intolerable mass concealment of income from taxation continues. Financial discipline is low, which, alongside inflation, has become one of the main causes of the persisting crisis of non-payments. The rules of foreign trade were violated, above all in the export of energy carriers and non-ferrous metals, and the shortfall in foreign-currency receipts from the export of goods and services remained high. The growth of organised crime and corruption and the criminalisation of entrepreneurship continue to represent a serious danger for the Russian economy and society.

Among the main causes of the failures of 1994 are: the asynchrony of market processes and the actions of the state (in some cases the authorities did not keep pace with the dynamics of the market; in other cases, when market transformations needed to be spurred on, they showed unjustified slowness); the low effectiveness of all branches of power, because of which it did not prove possible to carry out a number of adopted decisions and to use the numerous reserves of the reform; and a grave error with the revenue side of the budget, which compelled the Government to conduct economic policy in conditions of an acute deficit of financial resources.

In 1995 we must come right up close to financial stability, preserve savings and make them secure, achieve a rise in investment activity, and turn the structural crisis into a managed process. We must ensure the predictability of the economic situation and give enterprises the possibility of planning investment; in a word, we must normalise the economic climate. Only then will the accumulated financial capital begin to work for the needs of production. The task of 1995 is the formation of the starting conditions and potential of future economic growth. From survival to development: such must be the vector of the reform. This year we must build a bridge between the inflationary past and the investment future. If we fail to do this, we shall unforgivably lose time. Then we shall not escape a prolonged depression and the transformation of the country into a raw-materials periphery of the world economy, and we shall not preserve the scientific and technological base of economic development.

In 1995 we face problems that in complexity and scale are not inferior to those that had to be solved at the beginning of 1992. A serious task is to survive the transition to financial stability with minimal losses. A high-inflation economy, which has formed definite stereotypes of behaviour in everyone (producers, consumers, the state), is one thing. A low-inflation economy, which will demand a fundamentally different psychology and tactics, is quite another. If over the years of reform considerable experience has already been accumulated in the field of financial and monetary policy, the potential for growth in the conditions of a market economy has in effect to be formed anew.

The main starting condition is financial stabilisation and the strengthening of the rouble. From the autumn of 1993 to the end of the summer of 1994 there was a consistent reduction in the level of inflation. From September 1994 prices went up again.

The most important task of the Government and the Central Bank in 1995 is to take the decisive step towards the completion of financial stabilisation, to suppress inflation, to hold real positive interest rates and to strengthen the rouble. Over the years of reform two serious attempts were made to stop inflation: in the first half of 1992 and at the end of 1993 and beginning of 1994. For various reasons the matter could not be carried through to the end. The third attempt must be successful. To reduce inflation substantially and make it predictable: such is the target for 1995. If we hold to this condition, we shall be able really to set about creating the potential of economic growth. Only in this case will productive investment become effective. Enterprises with a long production cycle will begin to work steadily, and it is precisely they that largely determine Russia's scientific and technological prospects. The working capital of enterprises will stabilise, which means that the gravest problem, which has been exhausting Russian industry throughout the years of reform, will be solved. Favourable conditions will appear for the technological reconstruction of domestic industry. A genuine recovery of the financial market will take place, reorienting it from short-term speculative operations to the mobilisation of investment in long-term investment projects.

To defeat inflation and achieve financial stabilisation is a feasible task. Something else is also clear: restraining inflation at the price of deferred budget payments gives a temporary and, on the whole, illusory result. Real success will be brought only by the speediest adoption by the Federal Assembly of a realistic budget, the non-inflationary covering of its deficit, ensuring the fullest possible receipt of funds into the revenue side, and the concerted actions of the Government and the Central Bank. Strict control over the targeted use of budget resources is needed. The main role here belongs to the Federal Treasury. Unlike last year, in 1995 the unconditional fulfilment by the state of the financial obligations it has assumed must be ensured. At the same time not a single institution of state power, be it the Federal Assembly, the Government or the President, has the right to take decisions that undermine the budget and intensify inflation. If discipline is to be strengthened, then at all levels of power; if there is to be economising, then by everyone without exception. Then it will be possible to count on the reduction and stabilisation of inflationary expectations. It is time to get used to it: there is no more 'easy' money, blown into pockets and onto accounts by the wild wind of inflation; there is, and always will be, only 'hard' money, earned by labour.

It is not enough, however, to achieve financial stabilisation. One must also be able to make use of its fruits, with the final aim not only of stabilising production but of raising its efficiency. Efficient production is the most important component of the potential of economic growth. For the present, the low-efficiency Russian economy is living through a crisis of uncompetitiveness. A considerable part of domestic industry is subject to radical modernisation. Reduction of costs, improvement of quality and better management are urgently necessary.

The path from financial stabilisation to a rise in the efficiency of production lies through the activation of investment activity. The still weak market motives for investment must be reinforced by energetic actions of the state, including in the sphere of legislation. A favourable investment climate must be created for everyone, both domestic and foreign investors. The Government needs to switch over to the stimulation of private investment, and to direct state investment to the realisation of investment projects jointly with private investors. The provision of state guarantees for the securities they issue will make it possible to raise the profitability of productive investment and reduce the risks connected with it. An effective policy of accelerated depreciation is envisaged, with the inclusion of mechanisms preventing the use of depreciation-fund resources for purposes other than their designated ones. In 1995 the organs of state power will promote: the creation of advantageous conditions for the inflow of investment resources to privatised enterprises; the maximum use for investment of the funds of small depositors and the population; the work of institutional investors, namely reliable investment funds and banks, pension funds, leasing and insurance companies; and the attraction of financial resources to enterprises by means of secondary issues