Russia, for which we are responsible

Russia Boris Yeltsin · President of Russia

23 February 1996 · Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly · 1996 · The Kremlin, Moscow, Russia

Context
Boris Yeltsin delivered a Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly on 23 February 1996 in Russia, during a period of economic reform and political transition following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Main themes
Historical development of Russia, socio-economic problems of the twentieth century, the communist project and its consequences, perestroika and reform, collapse of the USSR, creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, restoration of Russian statehood
Duration
~29 min
80th percentile
Words
3,420
80th percentile
Sentences
148
80th percentile
Readability
41
37th percentile
Grade
13.2
58th percentile
Syntax
2.97
43rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.34
81st percentile

Russian Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly Translated from Russian

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 38%37%
  • Institutional 25%25%
  • Geopolitical 23%22%
  • Social 10%10%
  • Environmental 2%2%
  • Ceremonial 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

148 sentences in 33 paragraphs

The history of Russia is full of glorious successes and harsh trials. We have repelled attacks and lived through times of troubles. From generation to generation Russians have sought the road to happiness and justice, lost their way and again stubbornly striven for a better lot. Despite the heavy trials that the twentieth century brought Russia, our Fatherland has stood firm. Russia was and remains a great country. Its place in the world has for centuries been determined by a particular breadth and might, whether the matter concerns geographical scale and population, natural resources, cultural or scientific achievements, spirituality or military strength.

Today we are free from ideological dictate and monopolism in politics. The economy, spiritual life and the initiative of citizens are being emancipated. As never before we are open to the world, delivered from dangerous and exhausting confrontations.

The history of human civilisation has known few turns as sharp as those Russia has been living through in recent years. It is therefore not surprising that the movement forward is proceeding with difficulty, painfully, contradictorily. Reference points have been washed away, the inertia of destructive struggle among ourselves is great, there is not enough patience to wait for stable positive results and, as a consequence, people frequently do not hear and do not understand one another. We are in acute need of a historical understanding of what is happening, of acquiring a sense of historical responsibility for the fate of the country. For only that society has a future which respects its own history, understands its present and sees the paths of further development.

In this Address is my conception of Russia's present day, my understanding of its future. For all its striving for objectivity, it retains the imprint of the personal convictions of a man bearing the burden of responsibility for everything that has happened in the country in recent years. In this Address is my experience, including the experience of mistakes, and above all a firm faith in a free Russia and its citizens. In accordance with the powers defined by point 'e' of Article 84 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, I address the members of the Federation Council and the deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly, and all citizens of Russia, with the annual Address on the situation in the country and the main directions of the policy of the Russian Federation.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the main socio-economic problems demanding solution from Russia and the other leading countries of the world proved to be the costs of the spontaneous market and the need for a more just distribution of social wealth to prevent mass destitution and social explosions. Life gave its own answers to the questions posed. States renounced authoritarian forms of rule and passed over to democracy, to the search for sensible combinations of freedom and justice, of the market and the social guarantees of the state. Tsarist Russia, weighed down by the burden of its own historical problems, was unable to take this road. The depth of social contradictions and the absence of democratic traditions predetermined the radicalism of the Russian revolutionary process, its precipitate slide from February to October. This destructive radicalism, razing everything 'to the foundations, and then', explains the fact that in the course of the breaking of the former order much was lost of the achievements of pre-revolutionary Russia in the sphere of culture, the economy, law and socio-political development.

Using the communist doctrine as an ideological instrument, the Bolsheviks offered their own answer to the challenge of the time. The result was a super-rigid mobilisation model of development, concentrating all resources in the hands of a state under the control of a single party. Civil society, the rudiments of democracy and private property were destroyed. The transformation of Russia into a powerful military-industrial power was achieved by straining the people's strength to breaking point, at the cost of colossal human losses.

The communist project did not withstand the test of the long historical distance. The economic system proved rigid, containing no mechanisms of adaptation to changing conditions and new tasks, and the political regime did not correspond to the demands of the time, for total coercion no longer matched accelerating scientific and technological development. The result was a continuing lag behind the most developed countries in living standards and labour productivity, and an obvious incapacity to answer the new, ever more complex demands of modernisation that declared themselves with full force in the second half of the twentieth century: the scientific-technological revolution, the information society and the globalisation of world economic ties.

It is important to recognise fully that the tragic consequences of the communist experiment were law-governed. Of course, something could have been avoided, and something could have been softened. But on the whole the mass repressions, the rigid political monopolism, the class purges, the total ideological 'thinning out' of culture, the walling-off from the outside world and the maintenance of an atmosphere of hostility and fear are all generic features of a totalitarian regime.

Now, on the eve of a new century, it is clear that states which suppress freedom are doomed to defeat. History has pronounced its verdict on those who ruled by means of violence and deception. And all this means that the road back is a road into a historical dead end, to the inevitable ruin of Russia.

The first attempt at reform within the framework of the former system was undertaken in the times of the 'Khrushchev thaw'. After Stalin's death, the weakening of total control over society and the introduction of certain elements of openness allowed the USSR to accelerate development and even to become one of the leaders of the scientific-technological revolution in the military and space spheres. But for anything else the means no longer sufficed. The absence of real changes in the economy and the socio-political order quickly extinguished the impulses of the scientific-technological revolution. The striving to maintain military parity with the 'world of capitalism', to help the countries of the 'socialist camp' and all 'progressive forces', sucked the last juices out of the economy and destroyed the consumer market. And the nomenklatura's fear of the necessity of political transformations, which should have reinforced the economic ones, led to the renunciation even of timid attempts at reform, and then to stagnation. This was evidence of the system's incapacity for self-reform.

At the end of the 1960s the next consumer crisis broke out, whose reality became the 'sausage trains' into the big cities. In the first half of the 1970s the decline in the efficiency indicators of the USSR economy also began. Suffice it to say that, despite enormous subsidies, in 1980 some 70 per cent of collective and state farms were loss-making. In those years our economy was rescued by the world energy crisis. A powerful surge of demand and a sharp jump in energy prices postponed the collapse of the economy.

The consequences of this crisis proved different for different countries. Thus, if to the West it gave a new stimulus of development, taught it to husband resources and became the threshold of the computer revolution, for the USSR the effect was quite different: the petrodollars went to satisfy administrative ambitions, dubious 'projects of the century', and foreign-policy and military adventures. The degradation of the natural environment intensified. The predatory use of lands, waters, forests and minerals, which in the twentieth century no society considering itself civilised could permit itself, was turning the USSR, one of the most resource-endowed countries, into a devastated territory. The country's technical potential was used not to multiply the inheritance received but in effect to destroy lands developed by the centuries-long labour of previous generations, which proved to be flooded by gigantic reservoirs or turned into zones of ecological disaster.

It cannot, of course, be said that all this time was spent in vain. The creative potential of the people remained as inexhaustible as ever. Science-intensive branches and high technologies appeared, and the educational level of the majority of the population rose. The achievements of that time are the merit of the people, who managed to preserve, despite everything, their best national traits and qualities; they are the result of its labour and talent.

And nevertheless all achievements were stubbornly hammered into the narrow framework of the 'competition of the two systems', above all in the military field, and, as a consequence, the lag behind the developed countries in the economy and in the level and quality of life grew. Several attempts to reverse these tendencies ended without result. This was an incurable disease whose symptoms worsened from the end of the 1950s, gradually growing into an economic coma.

In the second half of the 1980s, against the background of the progressive worsening of the economic situation, perestroika began: the most radical attempt to reform the system within the framework of preserving the party's and the state's control over the economy. But it too ended in failure, despite evident public support. Already after the start of 'acceleration', on 9 July 1986 the economic department of the Central Committee of the CPSU reported that in June of that year cases of the late payment of wages to workers and employees had become more frequent, with signals of the unfavourable situation coming from Ukraine, Moldavia, Latvia, Lithuania and many oblasts of the RSFSR. The situation was defused by means of the additional issue of money into circulation. In 1989 and 1990 rationed distribution already covered the whole country, which, however, did not save even rationed products from shortage. When an economy exists on the principle of 'guns instead of butter' (and precisely such it was), the principle of 'coupons for butter instead of butter' inevitably triumphs. In February 1990 the secretary of the Chita regional committee of the CPSU appealed to M. S. Gorbachev, reporting that the provision of the region's requirements for meat and dairy products had sharply worsened, that no credits had been allocated for these products and that a coupon system of distribution had been introduced, with one coupon buying from 0.2 to 0.5 kg of butter and 1 kg of meat, that there were no resources to honour coupons even at such norms, and that explaining the situation to the inhabitants of the towns and workers' settlements, to the miners, foresters and metallurgists, was becoming impossible.

The crisis was not confined to the consumer market. The disorganisation of centralised supply and of the economic ties based on it began. The fulfilment of state obligations for supply, which at the beginning of the 1980s amounted to about 70 per cent, fell sharply. The experiments with 'regional cost-accounting' gave a powerful push to disintegrative tendencies. As a result, by the beginning of the 1990s the country's economic space proved torn apart by republican, regional and local systems of administrative distribution and by semi-natural exchange between enterprises, regions and the population. The country became a kingdom of coupons and barter.

Economic ties between the Soviet republics were being destroyed, as a result of which trade between them fell by half in 1991. This contributed to the collapse of the USSR. Chaos was growing. The country stood on the edge of an abyss. That this was precisely so is known to everyone who stood for hours in queues and experienced on themselves the 'couponisation' of the whole country. In Tver, for example, where almost everything was already sold by coupon, from 1 April 1991 coupons were introduced even for salt, soap and washing powder. And such things were everywhere.

No less eloquent are the secret documents of the CPSU Central Committee revealing the real situation in the economy of the USSR in 1990 and 1991. Already in 1990 the general level of inflation (open and hidden, determined by the injection of 'empty money' into the economy and by commodity shortage) amounted to 119 per cent. In 1991 inflation became still higher. It differed little from the inflation of 1995. The difference is only that now the shop shelves are packed with goods, whereas five years ago they were empty.

Now, about production. In the first quarter of 1991 alone the fall in national income amounted to 13 per cent. Let me stress: even in the hardest years of the reform such a fall occurred only once. In January to November 1991 coal extraction fell by 10 per cent, finished rolled metal by 13 per cent, sawn timber by 13 per cent and oil by 19 per cent. Exports were contracting unstoppably: oil by 51 per cent, ferrous metals by 59 per cent, ferroalloys by 37 per cent. Now in these and other items we are observing not decline but growth.

Falling production, fixed prices and the headlong growth of the population's money incomes, unbacked by commodity cover: such was the explosive mixture that literally blew up the economy of 1991. The chairman of the State Bank, V. V. Gerashchenko, in a secret letter to M. S. Gorbachev complained that, working three shifts, Goznak simply could not keep up with printing money. If in 1989 and 1990 the state budget deficit amounted respectively to 10 and 12 per cent of gross domestic product, in 1991 its size reached 20 per cent. Such a deficit carried an inflationary charge of gigantic destructive force. Now the situation is completely different: the budget deficit does not exceed three per cent of gross domestic product, and moreover is financed mainly by non-inflationary means.

The trade balance deficit grew in 1991 to 10 billion dollars. Today everything is the other way round: the trade balance has been positive for several years now. Foreign-currency resources proved practically exhausted; they did not suffice even for the fulfilment of the state's unconditional obligations. In May 1991 the foreign-currency funds in Vnesheconombank's accounts abroad that could be used for daily payments fell to an indecently low sum, of the order of 60 million dollars (now the Central Bank alone has about 12 billion dollars). The country stood on the brink of insolvency. The external debt of the USSR at the beginning of 1992 reached 64.3 billion dollars. And this heavy burden weighs on Russia's economy to this day.

So, we inherited from our predecessors a bankrupt economy that had no way out of the systemic crisis.

The failures in the economy pushed the leadership of the USSR towards reforms in other spheres, above all the overcoming of the legacy of communist totalitarianism in the ideological and political spheres by means of glasnost and democratisation. The ideological emancipation of society became an enormous achievement of perestroika and the most important political conquest of the people. But without real shifts in the economy, against the background of shelves emptied once and for all, glasnost inevitably struck at the foundations of the political order. And this had twofold consequences.

On the one hand, the remnants of the totalitarian system were being uprooted, and the monopolistic hegemony of the party nomenklatura destroyed. Society revived; people, overcoming indifference, began to display great political activity; the first free elections took place. But, on the other hand, with the collapse of the party and repressive fastenings, the old 'drive belts', the state mechanism partly fell apart and partly ran idle. In the republics of the Union their own institutions of power began to gather strength, compensating for the weakness of the Union Centre. From Estonia to Tajikistan sentiments in favour of greater sovereignty grew, and an upsurge of national movements was observed, often setting as their goal secession from the USSR, as is testified also by the results of the general elections held at that time in some republics, where nationally oriented forces and leaders came to power.

The proclamation of the state sovereignty of Russia, supported by all the main political forces of the republic, paralysed the very possibility of using the Russian Federation as a springboard in a forcible struggle with the other republics and at the same time opened the way to the preservation of the Soviet Union on a fundamentally new basis. The belated answer of the Union Centre was the Novo-Ogarevo process. But even this provoked a reaction in the form of the GKChP: a desperate attempt to fasten the Union together by force, by means of the restoration of the old power structures. The result of the putschists' actions was the disappearance of any possibility of preserving the USSR. After the separation of the Baltic republics and the all-Ukrainian referendum on independence (1 December 1991), at which even the 'Russian-speaking' regions (including Crimea) came out for the independence of Ukraine, the collapse of the USSR was in fact accomplished. The 'time bomb' laid at the founding of the USSR, in the form of the propaganda formula of self-determination up to and including secession with the right of free exit, a formula that it was never supposed would be used, exploded.

The country was threatened either with uncontrolled disintegration or with military clashes in attempts to preserve the Union by force, which would have led to consequences more terrible than in Yugoslavia. The Belovezha agreements drew a line under what had come to pass. They consolidated the desire to preserve traditional relations of friendship and cooperation. They reflected a common understanding of the threats of uncontrolled disintegration. Precisely for this reason the decision taken, and then the Alma-Ata agreements on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, were supported by the parliaments of the sovereign states that entered the new community.

The Soviet Union collapsed under the weight of an all-embracing crisis, torn to pieces by economic, political and social contradictions. Russia stood on the threshold of chaos, and it seemed there was no force capable of stopping it. In the autumn of 1991 it was necessary simultaneously to build a new state, to bring the mechanisms of administration out of paralysis, and to save the economy and the social sphere. There was no possibility of choosing what to do first and what later: the still unformed edifice of Russian statehood was already collapsing under the blows of the crisis, and it was necessary to react promptly to ever new threats of disintegration arising by the hour.

Before the leadership of Russia stood a strategic task: the re-creation of Russian statehood. Without exaggeration, this was a problem of survival.

What could be done in the conditions that had arisen? Various political forces offered society three variants: to return to the command-administrative system; to try to carry out reforms under rigid state control; or to rely to a greater degree on the strength of Russian society, on the forming market relations and on democracy.

The return to the past was closed. This was the conscious choice of Russians, who had repeatedly and convincingly confirmed their commitment to the ideals of democracy, freedom and a law-governed state. The communist experiment had ended, and there was no force that could turn time back. Dosed reforms under state control we could not carry out, because there was no longer a state in the full sense of the word. Any good wishes of the Russian authorities would have been worth no more than the sheet of paper on which they were written. There were no mechanisms of power capable of translating directives into life.

There remained the single real way out, which gave hope of passing along the edge of the abyss and not falling into it. The strategy consisted in using, in conditions of the insufficiency of the levers of state administration, the energy of the forming market institutions and stimuli, and in relying on the basic potential of the nascent democracy: the civic responsibility of people and the first manifestations of the free self-organisation of society.

Let us remember with what moods and expectations the citizens of Russia greeted 1992. There were optimists: there, we have defeated totalitarianism, now we shall give everyone economic freedom, and everything will become splendid. But few thought so. Far more often people spoke of catastrophes of various kinds. With alarm they awaited the collapse of Russia, territorial disintegration and inter-ethnic conflicts; they prophesied famine in freezing cities. All these threats were real.

In assessing now the results of the reforms and the price paid by society for the salvation of the country, it is necessary to take into account also the price of the many years of indecision of the Union leadership, which marked time and brought itself to ruin, and the sta