SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ON EUROPEAN AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE.

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

19 June 2023 · Working afternoon on European air and missile defence on the occasion of the Salon du Bourget · Salon du Bourget, France

Context
Macron addressed European and NATO defense ministers at the Hôtel National des Invalides in Paris on June 19, 2023, during a conference on European air defense held alongside the Salon du Bourget.
Main themes
European air and missile defense, strategic threat assessment, European defense autonomy, NATO cooperation, war in Ukraine lessons, drone and ballistic missile threats, defense capabilities vs. strategy, European industrial defense production, air defense cost-effectiveness, collective European security, territorial protection dilemmas
Duration
~22 min
69th percentile
Words
2,580
69th percentile
Sentences
124
73rd percentile
Readability
45
49th percentile
Grade
12.1
46th percentile
Syntax
2.97
43rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.10
27th percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 54%52%
  • Economic 28%27%
  • Ceremonial 16%15%
  • Technological 1%1%
  • Institutional 1%1%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

124 sentences in 38 paragraphs

Mr. Minister of the Armed Forces,

Ladies and gentlemen, Ministers of Defense,

Mr. European Commissioner, dear Thierry,

Mr. NATO Deputy Secretary General, dear friend,

Mr. Supreme Allied Commander Transformation,

Ladies and gentlemen, General Officers,

Madam Director General,

Mr. General Delegate,

Ladies and gentlemen,

First, I want to thank the Minister of the Armed Forces for organizing this working afternoon on the occasion of the Salon du Bourget and everything that will follow, and to thank all of you for your presence today, which cements the very strong cooperation we have with your nations, sometimes for decades, but in any case, which we have very strongly consolidated in recent years and which we continue to develop.

Indeed, I proposed during the Munich Security Conference in February that we host a conference on European air defense in June, and that has been accomplished, and I thank the Military Governor for his welcome at the heart of the Hôtel National des Invalides.

This event for which I have just thanked you is an opportunity to revisit a topic that has been familiar to all of us since the 1970s, and that we know well, with sometimes intense discussions, whether at NATO or elsewhere, in the 2000s and 2010s. But I would say that the question of air defense is now posed with a new light. Obviously, four years ago, the sudden destruction, by missiles, of oil installations in Saudi Arabia raised questions for many of our countries about our resilience. And above all, of course, the war in Ukraine brutally reminds us both of the vital nature of air defense and its dilemmas: what to protect when we cannot protect the entire territory? What balance between offensive and defensive? What economic model when the attacking objects now cost so little? And we see assailants who can, with very rudimentary equipment, circumvent all the usual rules of engagement, come to threaten us even as the defense systems are very costly, and we continue, rightly, to push for the best technologies. And tomorrow, what role in the security guarantees for Ukraine, even in the strategic balances in Europe?

All these questions show that when we talk about air defense, it would be a mistake to rush into the question of capabilities. The question is first and foremost strategic, and it consists of knowing what the state of the threats is, what the reality of what we can defend is, and what strategy we want to pursue? Then, what are we Europeans capable of producing, and what do we need to buy?

Because if we have an approach that is solely and primarily capability-based, we immediately buy massively what is on the shelf, even if it is unnecessary, and it is generally to buy massively non-European. That is why this collective reflection, without taboos as I have just shown, is necessary in a broad European format like this evening, which also includes representatives from the European Union and NATO.

So I do not want to revisit today's debates here, but just briefly share with you a few convictions.

The first, I alluded to it, is in a way to properly qualify the equation of vulnerability. On a vast territory like that of Europe, it would be totally illusory, even dangerous, to believe that we can establish impenetrable bubbles behind which we could feel safe. The tacit analogy with the Israeli "Iron Dome" is not really applicable because we are talking about a territory that is 200 times larger. With, if we wanted complete and watertight protection, something that would be technically unfeasible, economically unsustainable, and strategically contestable. We must therefore make choices. And our choices have a part of interdependence. And we must decide together what our vital interests are to protect, our most strategic interests, and where to make the most comprehensive investment possible as Europeans and Allies.

The second reflection is the equation of the threat. The war in Ukraine shapes our immediate perception, which is totally legitimate, but I think we must at least avoid two mistakes in this regard. The first is that each threat corresponds to a specific technical response. I believe that would be false, and you know it as well, if not better than I do. Our defense is global, air defense is too, and therefore effective protection is not a category of protection. It is not an industrial model, even if we need a set. No, whether it is the threat represented by drones, ballistic missiles, or the hijacking of commercial aircraft for terrorist purposes — we see it clearly — the response to this is a set that does not even limit itself to ground-to-air defense. It is a technological ensemble. It is also a coherent response, which is strategic, which depends on scenarios from which a set of capabilities is derived.

The second mistake would be to think that we are all exposed in the same way as Ukraine. That is false, and I think it can lead us to make two errors. First, to overreact. This war has something, it must be said, also somewhat dated. It is coming. It is a huge geographical and strategic shock. But it should not make us forget the new threats and the intensity that very credible threats will have, which can cause significant harm using and combining cyber and space and others. So let us not have myopia solely in light of what we are experiencing in Ukraine.

But above all, let us not forget what the Alliance is. And here too, we are not all exposed like Ukraine because we are members of the Alliance, unlike Ukraine. And so we already have a protection that has its deterrent character, and I remind you, the Alliance is nuclear as well. And France contributes greatly to it. Therefore, striking the territory of the Alliance would have considerable consequences for the aggressor. I myself have had very clear words within the framework of our doctrine on this subject, and so you can see, it must be articulated with the equation of the threat.

My third point is the strategic equation for Europe. The Russian aggression in Ukraine requires us to think about the parameters of a lasting peace beyond this war. If we decide that we are going to challenge the balance found at the Chicago Summit on ballistic missile defense; if we decide that we are going to develop capabilities that can impact the balance of nuclear deterrence of NATO members; this must be done within a deliberate collective framework, and we must consider the implications, the potential for destabilization, or perhaps negotiations in the long term.

For example, regarding precision strike capabilities in depth, I have already said it, but it seems very relevant to me to initiate a discussion among Europeans about our needs, about our capacity to respond to them because this is entirely within this framework.

The fourth is the industrial equation. I know you have talked about it. Today's discussions have shown that there are many European solutions across all key segments: detection sensors, command and control systems, and of course effectors such as missiles, combat aircraft, or ground-to-air systems.

I want to salute all the Italian, British, German, French, and other European industrialists who have joined us today. And I also commend the tireless efforts of the European Commission to stimulate the European defense industry, dear Thierry, as well as NATO's work on interoperability, dear friend, thank you again for that.

But the industrial equation is also an equation of sovereignty. And what Ukraine shows is that we can only give Kiev with certainty what we have and what we produce. And what comes to us from non-European third parties is less manageable, obviously: subject to schedules, queues, priorities, sometimes to authorizations from third countries. By depending too much on the outside, as I said in Bratislava, we are preparing the problems of tomorrow. And you can see it well by having cited interoperability; I say very clearly, this desire to develop a more robust European defense industry does not contradict interoperability. It simply states two things: when we have a tension at the same time, our American friends may have other priorities and deliver their capabilities at the pace of their needs and other priorities.

By benefiting from NATO interoperability, we must have a European defense industry that will allow us to have more stocks, production adapted to our rhythms, which will also allow us to give more muscle to our armies – we have seen that on some of our capabilities, we have already delivered a lot – and which allows us to choose the allies, partners, and third countries with which we want to work and to whom we want to deliver, to choose the pace, to choose the rhythms, to build a production. Dependence on essential elements of our protection does not seem desirable to me, and we have immense work to do beyond what is already consolidated in this area.

So, once these observations are made, we must act, and in this perspective, we all have a role to play.

Individually, states must give themselves the means to guarantee their defense. France has taken its responsibilities with its military programming law, which, after the previous one, means that between 2017 and 2030, France will have simply doubled its defense budget. We have recognized the risk and the changing world well before the start of the war and the collective awakening. We had a very expansionist programming law as early as 2018; this one adds another 100 billion that have been long debated. We will have doubled our budget, this investment, with of course the means for ground-to-air defense, anti-drone capabilities, and the means to ensure effective command and control of our resources.

However, we must also do better collectively, under two conditions. The first is to develop a common understanding of the strategic framework. What are the areas for which we want to master our defense and which cannot be subject to the decisions of other actors? This is key. This conference on air defense, in which aviation plays a key role, as we measure on the eastern flank of our continent, is an important moment in this regard. And so, yes, the course now is for us, as Europeans, to define the strategic framework of the industrial or operational cooperations that we want to strengthen in the coming months and years.

And the second is to give full place to European industrial options. By doing what? By looking together at our independence in the value chain. We have experienced it, whether in the military or civilian sectors regarding titanium. We can make all the plans we want. If we continue to depend, on parts of our value chain, on what was almost 100% Russian and, with only our Canadian and American partners as a capacity for change, who themselves are ramping up their production, we do not have the answer. It is done by reorganizing what we are doing with our additive manufacturing industries by diversifying our sourcing, etc.

So we must push our European industries to build the independence of value chains, to relocate, to also provide multiple options, and therefore to diversify our sourcing. We must also standardize more as Europeans. I will come back to this, but the announcements today, and what we have done in recent years, go in this direction. Why are we still forced to buy too often American? Because the Americans have standardized much more than we have, and they themselves have federal agencies that massively subsidize their industries. So, we can decide to use our taxpayers' money to increase defense budgets to better buy what the Americans will continue to produce. I believe we can be stronger as armies, succeed in developing a defense and technology industrial base that creates jobs here and makes good use of taxpayers' money and, in doing so, gain sovereignty because we will be less dependent on technological choices. Simply, we need to standardize more. And so we cannot have such a diversity of standards on many elements of our range. We must succeed with our industries in changing our logic, and by standardizing more, sometimes push for a logic of stocks that we had forgotten, increase the pace, and know how to change production rhythms.

This is our famous war economy, the stock, the pace. Sometimes we have tripled production lines. It took us a year to do it. In a way, we are very fortunate that the war is not on our soil, I say this with great humility. We have done our utmost for our friends, our allies, our Ukrainian partners. Fortunately, we were all allies and the Americans sometimes had more reserves than we did and were also able to help us a lot, that some large countries had reserves, but we did not have enough collectively. So more independence of supply chains, standardization, stocks, rhythms, and continuing and massifying innovation and flexibility in developments is the course we must follow.

I would like to conclude by illustrating these words with three major concrete cases that are the result of your work.

The first is the signing of a letter of intent between France, Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, and Estonia for the joint acquisition of Mistral missiles. This is a very fine example of sovereign cooperation among Europeans on a range that is quite relevant and was not sufficiently covered.

The second concerns aviation, a key component of air defense. I am pleased to confirm to you the upcoming joining of Belgium to the SCAF program, initially as observers, this future combat air system that we are developing with Germany and Spain, which we initiated six years ago with our German partners and then expanded with our Spanish partners. This is a major evolution and this expansion will further anchor this project in Europe at the heart of tomorrow's air defense.

Finally, and to return to the more immediate and ruthless reality of the war in Ukraine, I am pleased to announce, along with my Italian colleague Giorgia Meloni, that the Franco-Italian SAMP/T is now deployed and operational in Ukraine, where it protects key installations and lives.

It is truly Europe that protects Europe, and that is essentially how we should summarize the heart of our project.

These are the few words I wanted to add to your work on what you have initiated today. I believe we must, with determined steps, continue to advance to create more joint projects based on this greater strategic intimacy. But it must be adapted to the evolution of threats, realistic about what we can do, and take into account all of our capabilities that are, I would say, already put together.

I will not be any longer. I thank you again for your presence in Paris today and especially for the intimate, frank work of each day because I never forget that when we talk about these subjects, we are obviously talking about Government-to-Government partnership, we are talking about our teams, our ministries, our industrialists, our engineers, but we are also talking about our soldiers, all our military personnel, and this brotherhood of souls and arms that allows our countries to endure and our Europe to endure. It is a matter of their lives and it is a matter of our security. And they deserve this coherence, this demand, and these investments. Thank you.