Words spoken at the Anti-Imperialist Tribune "José Martí" on the

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

20 May 2005 · Anti-Imperialist Tribune "José Martí"

Context
Castro spoke at the Anti-Imperialist Tribune 'José Martí' on May 20, 2005, recounting a secret diplomatic message delivered to Washington regarding a terrorist plot.
Main themes
Confidential message delivery, US-Cuba relations, anti-terrorism cooperation, diplomatic back-channels, Clinton administration contacts, Bill Richardson intermediary, National Security Council negotiations, personal security of documents, Colombian situation, anti-imperialist context
Duration
~60 min
96th percentile
Words
7,254
96th percentile
Sentences
285
95th percentile
Readability
47
54th percentile
Grade
12.8
55th percentile
Syntax
3.17
69th percentile
Vocabulary
2.21
51st percentile

Translated from Russian

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 68%56%
  • Ceremonial 19%16%
  • Institutional 5%4%
  • Economic 4%4%
  • Social 4%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 17%

285 sentences in 109 paragraphs

At the end of March, when I confirmed to Princeton University that I would be going there to conduct a literary workshop starting April 25, and I asked Bill Richardson over the phone to arrange a private meeting with President Clinton to discuss the Colombian situation, Richardson asked me to call a week before my trip to give me an answer. A few days later, I traveled to Havana in search of some data I was missing for writing an article for the press about the Pope's visit, and during my conversation with Fidel Castro, I mentioned the possibility of meeting with President Clinton. At that point, the idea arose for Fidel to send him a confidential message about a nefarious terrorist plot just uncovered by Cuba, which could harm not only the two countries but many others as well. He decided that the letter would not be personal in nature, so as not to obligate Clinton to respond, and preferred to briefly describe in writing our conversation about the conspiracy and other topics of mutual interest. Outside of the text, he suggested two unrecorded questions that I could ask Clinton if circumstances allowed.

That evening, I realized that my trip to Washington had taken an unexpected and important turn, and I could not consider it a simple private visit. So I not only confirmed to Richardson the date of my arrival but also told him over the phone that I was bringing an urgent message for President Clinton. Out of respect for the agreed confidentiality, I did not tell him over the phone who the message was from—though he must have guessed—and I did not let him feel that the delay in the message could lead to great catastrophes and the deaths of innocent people. There was no response during the entire week of my stay in Princeton, which made me think that the White House was also assessing the fact that the reason for my initial request had changed. I even thought that there was no agreement for a meeting.

As soon as I arrived in Washington on Friday, May 1, Richardson's assistant informed me over the phone that the president could not meet with me because he would be in California until Wednesday the 6th, and I was scheduled to fly to Mexico the day before. Instead, I was offered to meet with the president's National Security Council advisor, Sam Berger, who could accept the message on behalf of the president.

I had a nagging suspicion that they were imposing conditions to ensure the message went to the security service rather than to the president. Berger had been present at one of my meetings with Clinton in the Oval Office in September 1997, and his sparse remarks about the situation in Cuba were not contrary to the president's, but I also cannot say that he fully shared them. Therefore, I could not take it upon myself to agree, on my own initiative and at my own risk, to let Berger receive me instead of the president, especially when it came to such a delicate message, and even more so since it was not mine. In my personal opinion, I should have handed it to Clinton personally.

The only thing that came to my mind at that moment was to inform Richardson's office that if the change of interlocutor was due only to the president's absence, I could extend my stay in Washington until he returned. I was told that he would be informed later. A little while later, I received a phone message at the hotel from Ambassador James Dobbins, the director for inter-American affairs at the National Security Council, but I thought it best to pretend I had not received it while they decided about my proposal to wait for the president's return.

I was in no hurry. I wrote more than twenty usable pages of my memoirs in the idyllic atmosphere of Princeton, and the pace did not decrease in the impersonal alcove of the Washington hotel, where I wrote up to ten hours a day. However, although I did not want to admit it to myself, the real reason for my seclusion was the safeguarding of the message, hidden in a safe. At the Mexico City airport, I lost my coat while simultaneously watching my portable computer, the bag containing drafts and diskettes of my new book, and the original message without a copy. The mere thought that I could lose it sent chills and panic through me, not so much because of the loss itself, but because of how easily its origin and intended recipient could be determined. Thus, I decided to guard it while I wrote, ate, and entertained guests in my hotel room, the safe of which did not inspire any trust, as it locked not with a code but with a key that looked like one bought at the corner store. I always carried it in my pocket and after each necessary outing, I checked to see if the paper was in place in the sealed envelope. I had read it so many times that I had almost memorized it to feel more confident in case I had to discuss any of the topics at the moment of its delivery.

I had always been sure that my phone conversations, as well as those of my interlocutors, were being monitored in those days. However, I remained calm in the knowledge that I was carrying out a flawless mission, beneficial for both Cuba and the United States. Another serious problem I faced was that I had no one to ventilate my doubts with without breaking the secrecy. Cuba's diplomatic representative in Washington, Fernando Remírez, had placed himself entirely at my disposal to maintain open channels with Havana. However, confidential communications from Washington were so slow and fraught with interference—especially for such a delicate case—that in our situation, they could only be resolved through a special messenger. A courteous request came back to wait in Washington for as long as necessary to carry out my mission as I had done, and I was convincingly asked to be very careful so that Sam Berger would not perceive my refusal to meet with him as impolite. The smiling conclusion of the message did not need a signature to identify who had written it: "We wish you to write a lot."

By happy coincidence, former President César Gaviria organized a private dinner on Monday evening with Thomas McLarty, who had just stepped down as President Clinton's advisor on Latin America but who continued to be his oldest and closest friend. We had met him last year, and the Gaviria family had planned the dinner with a dual purpose: to talk with McLarty about the unfathomable situation in Colombia and to satisfy his wife's desire to clarify with me some troubling questions regarding my books.

This moment seemed providential. Gaviria is a friend, a wise advisor, unique and informed like no one else about the realities of Latin America, a vigilant and understanding observer of Cuban reality. I arrived at his home an hour earlier than agreed, and without time to consult anyone, I decided to open up to him about the essence of my mission so that he

Gaviria gave me a true assessment of the problem and laid all the pieces out in order. He told me that the precautions of Clinton's advisors were hardly normal, given the political risk and the security implications that receiving such delicate information through unusual means posed for the President of the United States. No further explanation was needed, as I instantly recalled a similar precedent: during our dinner in Martha's Vineyard, during the mass immigration crisis in 1994, when President Clinton allowed me to talk about this and other "hot" topics regarding Cuba, but first warned me that he would not be able to say a word. I will never forget how attentively he listened to me and the titanic efforts he made to refrain from interjecting when discussing explosive topics.

Gaviria also warned me that Berger was a capable and serious staff member, and that this had to be taken very much into account in dealings with the president. He also explained to me that the very fact that he had been assigned to receive me was a special distinction at a high level, as such private requests like mine usually went through many side offices of the White House for years or were passed on to lower-ranking officials from the CIA or the State Department. In any case, Gaviria seemed confident that the text handed to Berger would reach the president, and that was the most important thing. Finally, as I had hoped, he stated that at the end of the dinner, he would leave us alone with McLarty so that I could open a direct path to the president.

The evening was pleasant and fruitful, both for us and for the Gaviria family. McLarty is a Southerner, like Clinton, and both are easy to communicate with right away, just like people from the Caribbean region. During dinner, the ice was broken from the very beginning, especially regarding U.S. policy towards Latin America, particularly issues related to drug trafficking and peace processes. Mac was so well-informed that he even knew the smallest details of President Clinton's meeting with me last September, during which topics concerning the downed planes in Cuba were thoroughly discussed, and the idea was also mentioned that during his visit to Cuba, the Pope could act as a mediator for the United States.

McLarty's overall position regarding Colombia—for which, it seems, he is ready to work—is that U.S. policy needs radical changes. He told us that the government was ready to establish contacts with any president who would be elected to fundamentally help establish peace. However, neither he nor other officials I spoke with later had a clear idea of what those changes should be. The dialogue was so candid and coherent that when Gaviria and his family left us alone in the dining room, McLarty and I felt like old friends.

Without any evasiveness, I conveyed to him the content of the message for his president, and he did not hide his shock at the terrorist plot, still unaware of its gruesome details. He was not informed about my request for a meeting with the president, but he promised to speak with him as soon as he returned from California. Encouraged by the ease of the dialogue, I dared to suggest that he accompany me.

On Tuesday morning, I informed Havana through the usual channel about the main points discussed during dinner and allowed myself to ask a timely question: in the event that the president ultimately decides not to meet with me and assigns this task to McLarty and Berger, to whom of the two should I hand the message? The response leaned more towards McLarty, but cautiously, so as not to offend Berger.

That day, I had lunch at the "Provence" restaurant with Mrs. McLarty, as our literary conversation had not taken place during the dinner at Gaviria's. However, the questions she had written down quickly ran out, and only curiosity about Cuba remained. I answered the questions I could, and I think she was satisfied. During dessert, she directly called her husband from the table, although I had not asked her to do so, and he informed me that he had not yet seen the president but hoped to have some news for me during the day.

Indeed, not even two hours had passed when his assistant informed me through César Gaviria's office that the meeting would take place tomorrow at the White House, with McLarty and three senior officials from the National Security Council. I thought that one of them would be

The meeting took place at 11:15 a.m. on Tuesday, May 6, in McLarty's offices at the White House. I was greeted by the three aforementioned officials from the National Security Council: Richard Clarke, the senior director for multilateral affairs and the president's advisor on all international policy issues, especially regarding terrorism and drug issues; James Dobbins, the senior director of the NSC for inter-American affairs with ambassadorial status and the president's advisor on Latin America and the Caribbean; and Jeff DeLaurentis, the NSC director for inter-American affairs and a specialized advisor on the Cuban issue. There never seemed to be an appropriate moment to ask why Berger was not there. All three officials were polite and displayed great professional courtesy.

I did not have personal notes with me, but I knew the content of the message thoroughly, and in my electronic notebook, I had recorded the only thing I was afraid of forgetting: the two questions outside the text. Mac was finishing a meeting in another office. Before his arrival, Dobbins briefed me on a rather pessimistic picture of the situation in Colombia. His data matched what McLarty had said during dinner on Monday, but he addressed it with greater familiarity. Last year, I told Clinton that U.S. policy aimed at combating drugs was a devastating aggravating circumstance of the historical violence in Colombia. Therefore, I was struck by the fact that this group from the NSC—without, of course, referring to my phrase—seemed to agree on what changes needed to occur in the fight against drugs. They were very cautious, not expressing judgments about the government or the current candidates, but left no doubt that they found the situation catastrophic and the future uncertain. I was not encouraged by the intentions to amend, as some observers of our policy in Washington had told me about this with concern. "Now that they really want to help, they are more dangerous than ever."

McLarty, in a suit tailored to fit him and corresponding to his good manners, entered with the demeanor of a man who had urgently interrupted the most important business to attend to us. Nevertheless, he set a moderate and helpful tone for the meeting with a good mood. Since dinner, I had liked that he always spoke while looking into people's eyes. He did the same during the meeting. After a warm embrace, he sat down across from me, placed his hands on his knees, and began the conversation with the usual phrase, so well said that it seemed true:

"We are at your disposal."

From the very beginning, I wanted to clarify that I would speak solely on my own behalf as a writer without any other merits or authority, and especially about such an abrasive and compromising issue as Cuba. I started with a clarification that did not seem excessive for hidden microphones:

"This is not an official visit."

Everyone nodded in agreement, and their unexpected solemnity surprised me. Then, in simple form and in a homey narrative style, I recounted when, how, and why the conversation with Fidel Castro took place, which gave rise to the informal notes I was to hand over to President Clinton. I handed them to McLarty in a sealed envelope and asked him to read them so we could discuss them afterward. It was a translation of seven topics in English, numbered on six pages, printed with double spacing: a terrorist conspiracy, relative satisfaction with the measures announced on March 20 aimed at resuming flights to Cuba from the United States, Richardson's trip to Havana in January 1998, Cuba's reasoned refusal of humanitarian aid, gratitude for the favorable Pentagon report on the military situation in Cuba—I add that this report confirmed that Cuba poses no threat to the security of the United States—approval of the resolution of the crisis in Iraq, and gratitude for the comments made by Clinton in the presence of Mandela and Kofi Annan regarding Cuba.

Here, as can be seen, other points are listed.

McLarty did not read aloud for everyone as I had expected, and undoubtedly would have done had he known me beforehand. He read only for himself, apparently using the rapid reading method popularized by President Kennedy; however, changes in his emotions were reflected on his face like ripples in water. I had read this message so many times that I could almost guess which point corresponded to each change in his mood.

Upon reading the first point about the terrorist conspiracy, he exclaimed, "This is terrible." Then he stifled a mischievous laugh and exclaimed, without interrupting his reading, "We have common enemies." I think he said this in reference to the fourth point, which describes a conspiracy by a group of senators to sabotage the passage of the Torres-Rangel and Dodd bills, and where gratitude is expressed to Clinton for his efforts to save them.

After finishing the reading, he passed the paper to Dobbins, who then passed it to Clark, who read while McLarty extolled the personality of Mortimer Zuckerman, the owner of US News and World Report, who had visited Havana in February. He commented on what was mentioned in the sixth point of the document just read but did not answer the question of whether Zuckerman had informed Clinton about the two conversations with Fidel Castro that lasted twelve hours.

The point that took up almost all the useful time after the reading concerned the terrorist plan, which shocked everyone. I told you that I flew to Mexico after learning about it in Havana and had to compose myself in the face of the fear that a bomb might explode. The moment seemed opportune for me to ask the first question.

Not finding a suitable pretext for the second question, I decided to express my assertion: cooperation in the field of security could open opportunities for a favorable atmosphere for Americans to be allowed to travel to Cuba again. The trick did not work, as Dobbins expressed confusion and said that this would be resolved when the measures announced on March 20 were implemented.

After clarifying the misunderstanding, I spoke about the pressure I was receiving from many Americans of all classes who were seeking me out to help them establish connections in Cuba for business or pleasure. Among them, I mentioned Donald Newhouse, the publisher of several periodicals and president of the Associated Press (AP), who organized a magnificent dinner in my honor at his country mansion in New Jersey.

I cannot assure you, but it seems to me that in the lively conversation at the White House, it became clear that they did not have, or did not know, or did not want to immediately disclose plans for resuming American travel to Cuba. But what I must truly note is that at no point was there any mention of democratic reforms, free elections, or human rights, nor of any political scourge by which Americans intend to impose conditions for the fulfillment of any cooperation project with Cuba. On the contrary, my clearest perceptions of this trip are based on the confidence that reconciliation is beginning to manifest as something irreversible in the collective subconscious.

Clark called us to order when the conversation began to stray from the topic and clarified to me—perhaps as a message—that they would take immediate steps to develop a joint plan between Cuba and the United States to combat terrorism. After finishing a long entry in his notebook, Dobbins concluded by saying that they would contact their embassy in Cuba to begin developing the project. I ironically commented regarding the status given to them by the Interests Section of the United States in Havana, to which Dobbins humorously replied, "What we have there is not an embassy, but it is much more than an embassy." Everyone laughed, not without the slyness of conspirators. Other points were not discussed, and in reality, they were out of place, but I am sure they later analyzed them among themselves.

The meeting, considering McLarty's tardiness, lasted fifty minutes. McLarty concluded it with the traditional phrase: "I know you have a busy schedule before returning to Mexico, and we have a lot to do as well." He immediately added a calculated short paragraph that seemed to us a formal response to our request. It would be bold of me to attempt to quote it literally, but the meaning and tone of his words expressed his gratitude for the importance of the message, worthy of his government's attention, which they would urgently attend to. And in the spirit of a happy ending, looking me in the eyes, he crowned me with a personal laurel: "Your mission was indeed very important, and you carried it out very well." Neither the shyness I have in abundance nor the modesty I lack allowed me to leave this phrase in the fleeting glory of microphones hidden in flower vases.

I left the White House with the impression that the effort and uncertainty of the past days were worth it. The annoyance that I could not deliver the message to the president in person seemed compensated by the informal operational meeting, the positive results of which did not take long to manifest. Furthermore, having become acquainted with the similar traits of Clinton and McLarty and the nature of their friendship, which had begun in elementary school, I was confident that the document would sooner or later end up in the president's hands when they were in a friendly atmosphere after dinner. At the end of the meeting, the presidency of the Republic made its presence known with a bold gesture: as I was leaving the office, the doorman handed me an envelope with photographs of my previous meeting, taken six months ago in the Oval Office. My only disappointment on the way to the hotel was that I did not open and enjoy the wonder of cherry color from that generous spring until that moment.

I barely had time to pack my suitcase and make it to the plane that was departing at five in the evening. The one that had brought me from Mexico fourteen days ago was supposed to return to base with a broken turbine, and we waited four hours at the airport until another available plane was found. The one I was on returning to Mexico after the meeting at the White House was delayed in Washington for an hour and a half while they repaired the radar with passengers on board. Five hours later, before landing in Mexico City, the plane had to circle over the city for almost two hours due to a malfunctioning runway. Since I started flying fifty-two years ago, nothing like this had ever happened to me.

But it could not have been otherwise, in the case of a peaceful adventure that holds a special place in my memories. May 13, 1998."

Thus he concluded the historical account.

May 9, 1998. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Chief of USIS, John Boardman, is received. The purpose of the reception was to convey a message regarding which instructions had been received on the evening of May 6, to inform Alarcón and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—certainly, that on the same day a message was received or effects were caused that Gabo expected from it. He, the acting chief, said that by some means, which he did not know, the government of Cuba informed the government of his country that our authorities were justifiably concerned about the intentions of organizations in the United States to commit terrorist acts against Cuba, particularly in the area of tourism and, especially, against passenger planes flying to and from Cuba.

The response of the United States government, conveyed through this means, was as follows:

▪ The United States government does not have information regarding any existing connection between United States citizens and terrorist acts committed in hotels. The press has speculated on this matter, but the United States government has no serious information in this regard.

▪ The United States government has made numerous diplomatic statements indicating its willingness to analyze any information or physical evidence provided by the Cuban government.

▪ The United States government wishes to reiterate that this is a serious proposal. It is ready to receive any information and evaluate some possibilities for its experts to examine any physical evidence that the Cuban government may have in this regard.

▪ The United States government expresses its concern regarding terrorist acts and is prepared to act in accordance with the law regarding this information and to combat international terrorism.

▪ The United States government requests the Cuban government to share relevant information from other governments that they may have regarding the risk of terrorist acts during flights to Cuba from their territories.

May 11, 1998. Remires reports that he was summoned to the State Department to meet with John Hamilton, who outlined the following to him:

1) The purpose of the meeting was to reiterate the proposal of USIS made last Saturday, which consisted of responding to our concerns about terrorist activities against Cuba, using "double track diplomacy" to facilitate this.

2) As in previous cases, they took our concerns about possible terrorist acts in tourist establishments and on airplanes seriously.

3) According to their investigation, there is no evidence that would indicate the existence of plans from United States territory.

4) In the past, before our arguments that individuals and/or organizations in the United States might be involved in terrorist acts against Cuba, we were asked to provide evidence for an investigation.

5) At this time, they want to emphasize the seriousness of the United States' proposal to conduct investigations and take appropriate actions if we have any evidence. This is not an attempt to return the ball to our court and is not a formal action.

6) They seriously want to jointly verify any evidence we have and continue this until everything is clarified. From our side, we thanked them for this proposal, assuring them that we would pass it on to our authorities and asked them if this proposal included cooperation between the two countries in a possible investigation process, to which Hamilton replied that he assumed it would. He reiterated that this was a serious proposal, not just a diplomatic response, adding that, given the possibility of this information, this was the sole purpose of this meeting.

May 12, 1998. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited the Deputy Chief of USIS and conveyed the following response to the proposal made last Saturday, May 9, on behalf of the United States government:

Recall that Gabo's meeting at the White House took place on the 8th. Our response stated:

"Our information is very reliable and obtained through very sensitive channels, which may lead to the disclosure of sources, so we cannot operate as you suggest. We are satisfied that you are cautious and vigilantly monitoring the issue."

The Deputy Chief of USIS accepted and thanked for the prompt response and expressed his willingness to pass on any information we deem appropriate without compromising the source. His companion, introduced as a USIS official responsible for law enforcement and security-related matters, intervened to confirm that they would closely monitor this matter through all possible means, with all their agencies in conjunction with various groups. This will also be verified by the services of other countries. He explained that they believe that "at this level, any threat of this type is intolerable."

May 20, 1998. Alarcón received a call from Hamilton in Washington, explaining that he was calling personally due to the importance of the matter and that he wanted to propose the following:

"Regarding the risk of terrorist acts against planes flying to Cuba: They take very seriously the information that Cuba has provided and will take security measures on planes departing from the United States."

- For the development of other acts, they would need to analyze the evidence we have in Cuba. They are ready to send American experts to Cuba to analyze it together with us.

- Based on the data they received from us, they cannot warn other countries from which planes also fly to Cuba. In the event that we make such a warning, we will be able to inform these countries that the United States would be willing to consider requests for technical assistance to prevent incidents without hindrance.

On June 3, 1998. Chief of the U.S. Interests Section Michael Kozak meets with Alarcón. He reports on the preparation to send an FBI delegation to Cuba and hands over the text that the Americans intend to distribute among airlines for the Cuban side's consideration.

The text states the following:

"We have received unconfirmed information about a conspiracy being prepared to place explosive devices on board civilian aircraft flying between Cuba and Latin American countries. The individuals involved in the conspiracy plan to place a small explosive device on board an aircraft with the aim of having the device explode during the flight. Reports indicate that this explosive device is small in size, consisting of a fuse and a digital timer, which can be programmed to go off 99 hours earlier. The target, location, and exact time have not been established.

We cannot rule out the possibility that the threat may involve international transport operations from the territory of the United States. The government of the United States continues to seek additional information to clarify, verify, or refute this threat."

On June 4, 1998.

On June 5, 1998. Alarcón handed the chief of the U.S. Interests Section the response from the Cuban side, which I personally wrote, - as it is logical, elementary, I continued to deal with this issue since the message was sent, - to the proposal presented by the Americans regarding circular information, which states verbatim:

"We did not ask for any warnings to airlines. This is not the way to address this problem, for which other measures can and should be taken." Indeed, we have taken many measures to protect aircraft, we specifically planned this over weeks, while, of course, the blows they received due to the arrests made here, the disclosure of all their plans, the testimonies of all the arrested, did not allow us to learn more details, to accuse them of this, to dismantle their plans. It was Cuba that dismantled all their plans. We told them then, and therefore I must explain: this is not how to deal with the problem, for which other measures can and should be taken. " No one could guarantee confidentiality. Any indiscretion in this case could even hinder the investigation and prevent the implementation of more effective measures.

Moreover, its disclosure could lead to panic," and in fact, panic was created, causing significant damage to the Cuban economy, which is precisely what the terrorists aim for. Furthermore, this damage could negatively affect the operation of airlines.

Therefore, we do not agree with the warning and strongly oppose it. Together with a group of specialists, we can properly analyze the most appropriate steps." Because they actually showed delicacy or, let’s say, basic politeness to consult with us regarding the note they wanted to circulate. We expressed our point of view to them. At the meeting, the chief of the U.S. Interests Section said that there might have been a misunderstanding with the main message (that they thought they were being asked to make a warning), or that some legal obligation was imposed on their authorities to warn airlines and protect against all kinds of demands. He said he would convey the Cuban position to Washington, and that no warnings would be made.

On June 6, 1998. A new meeting of Alarcón with the chief of the U.S. Interests Section, who hands over the American message in response to the document delivered the previous day, which was read to them over the phone, and which proposed:

1.

They explain that there are laws, norms, that obligate them to inform. So, in fact, it could be discussed how to do this, without considering all the data we included in the message.

We acknowledge the points indicated by the Cuban authorities, that we promised to avoid damage that could be caused to the investigation when concluding other agreements regarding airlines and the Cuban economy. We do everything possible regarding these points, within the limited discretion provided by our laws and norms, and prioritize preventing attacks on civilian aircraft. We note again that these circulars are quite ordinary, and in our experience, there have been cases where they were even made public; usually, they do not have significant or lasting impact in the case of passenger or cargo transport." Indeed, I must say that they responded to all the questions we raised. In my opinion, they conducted this exchange with propriety, without duplicity. We tried to delve deeper into this and saw how insistently they stated that certain legal instruments obliged them to do this. On the same day, Alarcón handed the chief of the U.S. Interests Section a new response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the following words:

"We do not agree. The possible publication of this information negatively affects the investigation, satisfies and inspires the plans of terrorists aimed against the Cuban economy.

We ignore and cannot understand the existence of legal obligations that, instead of having a favorable effect, could impact the efforts made to avoid human casualties and material damage.

Detailed disclosure of procedures that could be used for such acts is an irreparable mistake that could favor the plans of active or potential terrorist groups. - we did not want this to be published because it contained technical data on how these attacks were prepared. We respect the criteria of the American authorities, but we do not agree on how to resist these actions, which should be analyzed based on the available information, with the required caution and depth." Now everything is understood with complete clarity. They certainly feared that something might happen, a diversion of any kind, and having the information they would not inform the airlines, although it would not help; airlines are not capable, do not have the means and have neither precedents nor information to prevent a terrorist act of this kind.

The chief of the U.S. Interests Section noted that he spoke with Mr. Dobbins, responsible for Latin American affairs at the National Security Council, who asked to convey the following additional comments:

▪ "Regarding paragraph 4 of the document, Dobbins insisted that we not interpret this as an element of pressure. It states that they are obliged to immediately inform the airlines whose planes fly from the United States, although there is also an obligation regarding those whose planes fly from other countries, but this does not exert such pressure on them, but they cannot hold it for an entire week. Theoretically, a meeting of specialists could lead them to conclude that the threat was not so imminent, but since they assume that our information must be taken seriously and considered plausible, they cannot wait all this time without fulfilling their obligations." In fact, I have no doubt that these exchanges were conducted in good faith on their part; I must acknowledge, and rightly so, that on both sides they were conducted with full seriousness.

On June 8, 1998.

On June 15, 1998. An FBI delegation arrives in Havana to maintain contacts with the Cuban authorities.

On June 16-17, 1998. Various joint meetings are held in Havana between Cuban experts and American FBI officers on issues related to plans for terrorist acts. The American FBI delegation is handed extensive documentation and witness testimonies. The materials provided were completed on 64 pages, detailing investigations into 31 terrorist acts and plans directed against our country, committed between 1990 and 1998. Most of these acts were associated with the National Cuban-American Foundation, which also organized and financed the most dangerous acts, especially those carried out by the terrorist organization led by Luis Posada Carriles in Central America. Detailed lists and photographs of weapons, explosives, and means seized in each case were attached. Additionally, 51 pages of information were provided about the money allocated by the National Cuban-American Foundation to various terrorist groups for acts against Cuba; records of 14 phone calls made by Luis Posada Carriles containing information about terrorist acts against Cuba; information about Posada Carriles' whereabouts, such as addresses of his residences; places he visited, characteristics of vehicles, and license plates used in El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Panama. Records of 8 conversations of terrorists detained in Cuba were also provided, revealing their connections with Posada Carriles.

FBI officers also received 60 pages of cards on 40 Cuban-born terrorists, most of whom reside in Miami, as well as information about their whereabouts. Furthermore, they took with them three samples of 2 grams of explosives taken from bombs defused before detonation at the Melia Cohiba hotel on April 30, 1997, and in a tourist minibus on October 19, 1997, as well as from an explosive device seized from two Guatemalan terrorists on March 4, 1998.

Additionally, 5 videotapes and 8 audiotapes containing statements from Central American terrorists arrested for placing bombs in hotels were provided, in which they discuss their connections with Cuban terrorist organizations operating from the United States and, in particular, with Luis Posada Carriles.

The American side acknowledged the value of the information received and committed to respond as soon as possible after reviewing these materials.

Strangely enough, almost three months passed without the promised serious response. Only minor news was received.

On September 12 – pay close attention, not even three months had passed – five comrades were arrested – today - heroes of the Republic of Cuba, - who, while in Miami, were the main source of information about terrorist acts against our country. Not a single terrorist was detained anywhere, but comrades who provided information were arrested, - although, of course, there was no element to identify the sources, - but they were able to see that there was serious and credible information, and that our accusations were very well substantiated, they were accurate; undoubtedly, they were not the only ones, but they were the main ones. One of them was tasked with nothing less than monitoring the activities of Orlando Bosch, the one who was pardoned there despite his monstrous crimes.

What actually happened? The leadership of the Miami mafia learned about the contacts and exchange of information between the Cuban and American authorities regarding the brutal terrorist acts that were committed against our country with impunity, and unleashed all their forces and influence, - which, as is known, are numerous, - to prevent any progress in this area at all costs.

Who was one of the main responsible for the severing of contacts? What was the decisive factor? The head of the FBI office in Miami - Hector Pesquera. This officer held the same position in Puerto Rico when the team organized directly by the militarized group of the National Cuban-American Foundation was arrested, which was captured by the coast guard near the island, where they were arrested, and from which a vessel and weapons were seized. It is well known what the goal of this group was on Margarita Island, at the international meeting to which we were invited and which we attended.

Pesquera, being a member of the mafia, became a key link in achieving complete impunity for the terrorist group.

It is known that at the highest level of the FBI there was certain resistance to the idea of stopping the exchange with Cuba, but the pressure and political influence of mafia leaders proved stronger. But they managed to achieve even more than the President of the United States and the National Security Council of that country, this is evident.

Without a doubt, the FBI was already monitoring the steps of the Cuban anti-terrorist group, and I conveyed to the President of the United States information about plans to blow up planes on the ground or in the air. Such monstrous acts could cost the lives of both Cuban and American citizens, many of whom flew to Cuba on these planes.

Pesquera, the head of the FBI office in Miami, focused his efforts on identifying, pursuing, and prosecuting Cubans. The harsh treatment of Cuban patriots is well known.

According to an article published in the Nuevo Herald on September 15, 1998, Congresswomen Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart were the first to be informed by Pesquera about the arrest of our five heroes.

Pesquera himself testified during a Miami radio broadcast, which confirmed how he came from Puerto Rico with instructions to act at all costs against the group of Cubans who had infiltrated Miami's terrorist organizations:

"I came here in May of that year, 1998. I was informed about what was to come. Then we began to focus on this investigation. For intelligence, he should not have stayed there. It was necessary to change direction and begin investigating criminal activity.

He has already made a decision and has an order, and he says that we must continue not the search for intelligence activities, but to begin an investigation of a criminal nature against Cuban patriots.

Our country has followed a completely different path. During an interview given to Lucia Newman, a CNN journalist, on October 19, 1998,

"We are ready to cooperate in the fight against terrorist actions that may harm Cuba or may harm the United States.

The United States is at potential risk due to hundreds of extremist, fundamentalist organizations, many of which are armed by the United States itself, and some procedures applied against Cuba, they may apply there, since they are advanced, the latest

The most dramatic thing for the American people is that while Pesquera and his troops, full of malice, were engaged in the persecution, arrest, and preparation of a scandalous trial against Cubans, no less than 14 of the 19 participants in the attacks carried out on September 11 on the World Trade Center in New York and other targets lived and trained precisely in the place for which Pesquera is responsible.

Barely three years have passed since the arrest of our selfless and brave comrades – whose reports were provided by Cuba to the people of the United States, and thanks to which many Americans may have been saved from the brutal plans of Posada Carriles, financed by the National Cuban-American Foundation – while thousands of innocent Americans died. That is, not even three years have passed since the arrest, when thousands of Americans died there, in New York, becoming victims of an attack, most of the authors of which were trained in Florida.

Our compatriots and the international community may notice that none of the declassified documents we have released contain a single redaction.

Before I finish, I want to say that I consulted with the author of the report, Gabriel García Márquez, about its announcement. Just yesterday, I sent a message to Europe, in which I conveyed the following to him:

"I urgently need to talk about the message

Essentially, it is about the text I sent, and the beautiful report written in your characteristic style that you sent me. It is like my memoirs, and I think yours will be incomplete if this message is not included in them."

Everything I have said explains why at the beginning of my speech I spoke of "Another Behavior."

Long live the friendship between the peoples of Cuba and the United States!

Homeland or Death!

We will win!