Words spoken at the Anti-Imperialist Tribune "José Martí" on the

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

20 May 2005 · Anti-Imperialist Tribune "José Martí" · Anti-Imperialist Tribune "José Martí", Cuba

Context
Castro addressed a crowd at the Anti-Imperialist Tribune on May 20, 2005, presenting archival evidence of terrorist attacks against Cuban hotels and US complicity.
Main themes
Terrorism against Cuba, Luis Posada Carriles, Cuban American National Foundation, hotel bombings in Havana, US-Cuba intelligence exchanges, anti-imperialism, Cuban exile network, accountability for terrorist acts, archival documentation of attacks
Duration
~79 min
97th percentile
Words
9,525
97th percentile
Sentences
389
97th percentile
Readability
46
52nd percentile
Grade
12.9
56th percentile
Syntax
3.12
63rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.26
65th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 63%61%
  • Ceremonial 17%16%
  • Institutional 11%11%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

389 sentences in 159 paragraphs

Dear compatriots:

What I will read to you immediately has been prepared from numerous archival documents. I had very little time to do this and relied on the collaboration of several colleagues, as I promised yesterday to have it ready for today at 6:00 PM. I chose to title it:

"THE DIFFERENT CONDUCT"

April 12, 1997: A bomb explodes at the "Aché" nightclub of the Meliá Cohíba hotel. It was the first action in a series of terrorist attacks against hotels carried out by the network set up in Central America by Luis Posada Carriles and financed by the Cuban American National Foundation.

April 30, 1997: Specialized forces from the Ministry of the Interior manage to deactivate an explosive device discovered on the 15th floor of the Meliá Cohíba hotel.

July 12, 1997: Two explosions occur almost simultaneously at the Capri and Nacional hotels. Four people were injured.

August 4, 1997: Terrorist explosion at the Meliá Cohíba hotel.

August 11, 1997: The Board of Directors of the Cuban American National Foundation publishes a triumphalist and cynical message presenting the bombs in the hotels as "incidents of internal rebellion that have been occurring across the Island in recent weeks" and that "The Cuban American National Foundation [...] supports without hesitation or reservation" such acts.

September 4, 1997: Explosions at the Copacabana, Chateau, and Tritón hotels, and at La Bodeguita del Medio. In the first, young Italian tourist Fabio di Celmo is killed.

From the terrorist acts perpetrated from October 17, 1992, to April 30, 1997, a list of 13 serious acts of this nature had been compiled, committed especially against tourist facilities, almost entirely financed by the Cuban American National Foundation, and a report was prepared that was sent to the President of the United States through a prominent political figure who made a private visit to Cuba in early May.

Numerous notes had also been sent to the United States government regarding these events through the U.S. Interests Section in Havana (SINA).

October 1, 1997: At 11:00 PM, a call is made to MINREX from Michael Kozak, Head of SINA, to convey information from a third country indicating that another bombing attack could take place at a tourist facility in Havana on October 1 or 2, within the next 24 hours, which they could not confirm but wanted us to be aware of.

October 2, 1997: In the morning, the Head of SINA was summoned to MINREX to clarify details about the previous information and to officially thank us for the communication.

October 5, 1997: The Head of SINA was summoned to MINREX to read and deliver a copy of the following message:

"Regarding the information about the possible bombing attack at a tourist facility in Havana on October 1 and 2, we wish to express that although no explosion occurred, it has been confirmed that this information was rigorously accurate, and its characteristics were similar to previous plans.

"Considering that it may be of interest and utility to the U.S. authorities, we wish to inform you that the source that provided this information proved to be truthful. We have acted with the utmost discretion requested. We express our gratitude."

The Head of SINA responded that the information provided was useful; that they obtained it, but that it was not possible to confirm it as it was a rumor; that they could now trust the source more; that he would travel to Washington the following Sunday and would take that information which he considered positive; that if they obtained more from this source, they would know how to act; that they had not discovered anything else in the investigations they had conducted in the United States, but that they were continuing them in Central America, especially after the article published by the Miami Herald. He said that any information Cuba had that could be provided to the United States would be very useful, and concluded by stating that "this was good."

March 7, 1998: The Head of SINA requested to be received urgently at MINREX to convey sensitive information. He said he had information from an undetermined reliable source that a group of Cuban exiles had plans to carry out a bombing attack between March 7 and 8 in Cuba. He did not know the specific place, time, and target; but according to the source, the explosives were already in Cuba.

March 9, 1998: The Minister of Foreign Affairs received the Head of SINA and read him the following note:

"In relation to the information verbally provided on Saturday, March 7, about terrorist attack plans organized by Cuban exiles possibly to be carried out on the 7th and 8th of this month, and that the explosives were already in Cuba, we wish to communicate the following:

"1. Once again, it is demonstrated that the information sources of the U.S. authorities regarding these activities are absolutely reliable.

"2. That on Wednesday, March 4, in the afternoon, two individuals from abroad were arrested and explosives and means with which they intended to carry out, under the promise of cash payment of a sum of money for each bomb, four acts of a terrorist nature similar to those previously carried out, organized in the same way and with the same purposes and methods.

"3. The Cuban authorities are trying to gather as much additional information as possible.

"4. These criminal acts are extremely serious and affect not only Cuba and the United States but also other countries in the region. We have a duty to prevent their impunity. This would not be difficult if both the United States and Cuba coordinate, through the corresponding bodies, the fight against such actions. This has been done in certain cases of drug trafficking with absolute seriousness and discretion.

"5. So far, we have not publicly informed about these events while we carry out certain management and investigations, but it will not be possible to refrain from making them public in due time.

"6. We sincerely appreciate the information provided."

Once the reading was finished, the initial reaction of the Head of SINA was to offer thanks and congratulations to the Cuban authorities for their efficiency. They added that if we had more information or leads that could be followed to determine who is supporting or controlling these activities, it would be very useful for us to convey it, as the U.S. government has already made a firm decision to pursue and enforce the law against those responsible for these events. He insisted that they still do not have information on who is leading these events, that there are several people with a history, but that not all live, work, or pass through Miami, not even through the United States; that some are in other countries, all of which complicates the possibilities of acting against them; that the U.S. government is clear that these events are not beneficial for anyone. An accompanying SINA official added that they found it very interesting what Colonel Rabeiro mentioned on television, stating that we had recordings of the Salvadoran in telephone conversations with Central America, that this information would be very useful, as it would help locate those who control these activities. They added that after the Central American war, many far-right individuals remain in those countries who engage in criminal activities; they valued the importance of corroborating that their source is reliable, and understood the importance of collaborating in this area. In the end, they insisted again on the usefulness of us sharing any information.

April 18, 1998: Based on the positive exchanges reported and knowing of an upcoming trip to the United States by writer Gabriel García Márquez, during which he would meet with William Clinton, a reader and supporter of his books like many others in the world and with whom the author had had previous contacts, I decided to send a message to the President of the United States, which I personally drafted.

The message briefly and succinctly addressed seven topics. I will limit myself to including in this report the first and most directly related to the serious events currently taking place: the terrorist acts organized and financed from the United States against the people of Cuba.

It bore the following title:

"SYNTHESIS OF THE WORDS EXPRESSED TO GABRIEL GARCÍA MÁRQUEZ THAT CAN BE TRANSMITTED CONFIDENTIALLY TO PRESIDENT CLINTON.

"Point 1" (verbatim), and without any deletions:

"An important matter. Plans for terrorist activity against Cuba are ongoing, paid for by the Cuban American National Foundation and using Central American mercenaries. Two new attempts to detonate bombs in our tourist centers have already been made before and after the Pope's visit. In the first case, the perpetrators managed to escape, returning by air to Central America without achieving their objectives, leaving behind the technical means and explosives, which were seized. In the second attempt, three mercenaries were arrested, with explosives and other means seized from them. They are of Guatemalan nationality. For each of the four bombs that were to explode, they would receive $1,500.

"Both cases were contracted and supplied by agents of the network created by the Cuban American National Foundation. They are now planning and already taking steps to detonate bombs on Cuban airlines or those of another country traveling to Cuba bringing and taking tourists to and from Latin American countries. The method is similar: placing a small-sized device in a hidden location on the plane, powerful explosive, detonator controlled by a digital clock that can be programmed up to 99 hours in advance, leaving the aircraft normally at the destination. The explosion would occur on the ground or in mid-flight later. Truly diabolical procedures: mechanisms easy to assemble, components almost impossible to detect, minimal training for their use, almost total impunity. Extremely dangerous for airlines, tourist facilities, or any other type. Instruments usable for very serious crimes and offenses. If such possibilities were to be disclosed and known, they could become an epidemic as happened in other times with aircraft hijackings. Other extremist groups of Cuban origin based in the United States are beginning to move in that direction.

"The police and intelligence agencies of the United States possess reliable and sufficient information about the main responsible parties. If they truly wish, they can abort this new form of terrorism in time. It is impossible to stop it if the United States does not fulfill the elementary duty of combating it. Responsibility for doing so cannot be left solely to Cuba; very soon any country in the world could be a victim of such acts."

May 6, 1998: Meeting of Gabo at the White House.

VERBATIM REPORT OF GABRIEL GARCÍA MÁRQUEZ ON THE REQUESTED MISSION TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CLINTON.

Verbatim copy without omitting a single word:

"At the end of March, when I confirmed to Princeton University that I would go to conduct a literature workshop from April 25, I called Bill Richardson to ask him to arrange a private visit with President Clinton to talk to him about the Colombian situation. Richardson asked me to call him a week before my trip to give me a response. Days later, I went to Havana in search of some data I was missing to write a press article about the Pope's visit, and in my conversations with Fidel Castro, I mentioned the possibility of meeting with President Clinton. From there arose the idea that Fidel would send him a confidential message about a sinister terrorist plan that Cuba had just discovered, which could affect not only both countries but many others. He himself decided that it should not be a personal letter from him, so as not to put Clinton in the position of having to respond to him, and preferred a written summary of our conversation about the plot and other topics of common interest. Aside from the text, he suggested two unwritten questions that I could pose to Clinton if circumstances were favorable.

"That night I became aware that my trip to Washington had taken an unexpected and important turn, and I could not continue treating it as a simple personal visit. So I not only confirmed to Richardson the date of my arrival, but I also announced to him by phone that I was bringing an urgent message for President Clinton. Out of respect for the agreed secrecy, I did not tell him over the phone who it was from — although he must have assumed it — nor did I let him feel that the delay in delivery could cause great catastrophes and deaths of innocents. His response did not arrive during my week in Princeton, and this made me think that the White House was also considering the fact that the reason for my initial request had changed. I even came to think that the audience would not be granted.

"As soon as I arrived in Washington on Friday, May 1, an assistant to Richardson informed me by phone that the President could not meet with me because he would be in California until Wednesday, May 6, and I was scheduled to travel to Mexico the day before. Instead, they proposed that I meet with the Director of the National Security Council of the Presidency, Sam Berger, who could receive my message on behalf of the President.

"My malicious suspicion was that conditions were being imposed for the message to reach the security services but not to the hands of the President. Berger had been present at a meeting that Clinton granted me in the Oval Office of the White House in September 1997, and his few interventions regarding the situation in Cuba were not contrary to those of the President, but I cannot say that I shared them unreservedly. So I did not feel authorized to accept at my own risk the alternative of meeting with Berger instead of the President, especially regarding such a delicate message, which was not even mine. My personal opinion was that it should only be delivered to Clinton in his hand.

"The only thing I could think of for the moment was to inform Richardson's office that if the change of interlocutor was only due to the President's absence, I could extend my stay in Washington until he returned. They replied that they would let him know. Shortly after, I found a phone note from Ambassador James Dobbins, Director for Inter-American Affairs of the National Security Council (NSC) in my hotel, but I thought it best not to acknowledge it while my proposal to wait for the President's return was being processed.

"I was not in a hurry. I had written more than twenty usable pages of my memoirs on the idyllic campus of Princeton, and the pace had not declined in the impersonal hotel room in Washington, where I came to write up to ten hours a day. However, although I did not confess it to myself, the real reason for my confinement was the custody of the message kept in the safe. At the airport in Mexico, I had lost a coat while being attentive at the same time to the laptop, the briefcase where I carried the drafts and diskettes of the ongoing book, and the original without a copy of the message. The mere thought of losing it sent a chill of panic through me, not so much because of the loss itself but because of how easy it would have been to identify its origin and destination. So I dedicated myself to guarding it while I wrote, ate, and received visitors in the hotel room, whose safe I did not trust at all, because it did not close with a combination but with a key that seemed bought at the corner hardware store. I always carried it in my pocket, and after each inevitable outing, I checked that the paper was still in its place and in the sealed envelope. I had read it so much that I had almost memorized it to feel more secure if I had to support any of the topics at the moment of delivering it.

"I also took for granted that my phone conversations during those days—like those of my interlocutors—were being monitored. But I was kept calm by the knowledge that I was on an irreproachable mission, which was beneficial for both Cuba and the United States. My other serious problem was that I had no one with whom to air my doubts without violating confidentiality. The diplomatic representative of Cuba in Washington, Fernando Remírez, fully dedicated himself to my service to keep the channels open with Havana. But confidential communications are so slow and uncertain from Washington—and especially for a case of such care—that ours were only resolved with a special emissary. The response was a kind request for me to wait in Washington as long as necessary to fulfill the task, just as I had resolved, and they urged me to be very careful so that Sam Berger would not feel slighted by not being accepted as an interlocutor. The smiling conclusion of the message did not need a signature to know who it was from: 'We hope you write a lot.'

"By a fortunate coincidence, former President César Gaviria had organized a private dinner on Monday night with Thomas 'Mack' McLarty, who had just resigned from his position as advisor to President Clinton for Latin America but continued to be his oldest and closest friend. We had met the previous year, and the Gaviria family had planned the dinner since then with a dual purpose: to talk with McLarty about the indecipherable situation in Colombia and to satisfy his wife's desire to clarify with me some concerns she had about my books.

"The occasion seemed providential. Gaviria is a great friend, an intelligent, original, and well-informed advisor about the reality of Latin America, and an alert and understanding observer of the Cuban reality. I arrived at his house an hour before the agreed time, and without time to consult anyone, I took the liberty of revealing to him the essence of my mission so that he could give me new insights.

"Gaviria gave me the true measure of the problem and put his pieces in order. He showed me that the precautions of Clinton's advisors were merely normal, given the political and security risks that it implies for a President of the United States to receive such delicate information in his hands and through an irregular channel. He did not have to explain it to me, as I instantly recalled an exemplary precedent: at our dinner in Martha's Vineyard during the crisis of massive emigration in 1994, President Clinton authorized me to speak to him about that and other hot topics in Cuba, but first he warned me that he could not say a word. I will never forget the concentration with which he listened to me, and the titanic efforts he must have made not to reply to me on some explosive topics.

"Gaviria also alerted me that Berger is an efficient and serious official who should be taken very seriously in relations with the President. He pointed out to me that the mere fact of commissioning him to attend to me was a special high-level courtesy, as private requests like mine usually circulated for years through the peripheral offices of the White House, or were transferred to lower-ranking officials of the CIA or the State Department. Gaviria, in any case, seemed sure that the text delivered to Berger would reach the President, and that was the essential thing. Finally, as I had dreamed, he announced that at the end of the dinner he would leave me alone with McLarty so that he could open the direct path to the President.

"The night was pleasant and fruitful, just with us and the Gaviria family. McLarty is a man from the South, like Clinton, and both have an easy and immediate manner like that of Caribbean people. At dinner, the ice was broken from the beginning, especially regarding U.S. policy toward Latin America, and especially concerning drug trafficking and peace processes. 'Mack' was so informed that he even knew the details of the interview that President Clinton granted me last September, in which the downing of planes in Cuba was thoroughly discussed, and the idea was mentioned that the Pope would be a mediator for the United States during his visit to Cuba.

"McLarty's general position in relations with Colombia—and for which he seems willing to work—is that U.S. policies require a radical change. He told us that the government was willing to make contact with any president who was elected to help significantly with peace. But neither he nor other officials I spoke with later were clear on what the changes would be. The dialogue was so frank and fluid that when Gaviria and his family left us alone in the dining room, McLarty and I seemed like old friends.

"Without any reticence, I revealed to him the content of the message for his president, and he did not hide his shock at the terrorist plan, even without knowing the atrocious details. He was not informed of my request to see the president, but he promised to speak with him as soon as he returned from California. Encouraged by the ease of the dialogue, I dared to propose that he accompany me in the interview with the president, preferably without any other official, so that we could speak without reservations. The only question he asked me about that—and I never knew why—was whether Richardson knew the content of the message, and I answered that he did not. He then concluded the conversation with the promise that he would speak with the president.

"On Tuesday morning, I informed Havana through the usual channel about the basic points of the dinner, and I allowed myself a timely question: if the president ultimately decided not to receive me and entrusted the task to McLarty and Berger, to whom should I deliver the message? The response seemed to lean in favor of McLarty, but with the care of not slighting Berger.

"That day I had lunch at the Provence restaurant with Mrs. McLarty, as our literary conversation had not been possible during Gaviria's dinner. However, the questions she had noted ran out quickly, and only her curiosity about Cuba remained. I clarified all that I could, and I think she was more at ease. For dessert, without my asking, she called her husband from the table, and he let me know that he had not yet seen the president but hoped to give me some news during the day.

"Before two hours had passed, indeed, one of his assistants informed me through César Gaviria's office that the meeting would be tomorrow at the White House, with McLarty and three senior officials from the National Security Council. I thought that if one of them had been Sam Berger, they would have mentioned his name, and now my feeling was the opposite: I was alarmed that he was not there. To what extent could it have been due to my oversight in some monitored call? Now it did not matter: since McLarty had arranged the matter with the president, he must already be aware of the message. So my decision not to wait any longer was immediate and unconsulted: I would attend the appointment to deliver the message to McLarty. I was so sure of it that I booked a seat on a direct flight to Mexico at five-thirty the next afternoon. I was in that state of mind when I received from Havana the response to my last inquiry with the most compromising authorization I have ever been given in my life: 'We trust in your talent.'

"The appointment was at 11:15 on Wednesday, May 6, in McLarty's offices at the White House. I was received by the three announced officials from the National Security Council (NSC): Richard Clarke, principal director of multilateral affairs and advisor to the president on all international policy issues, especially in the fight against terrorism and narcotics; James Dobbins, principal director of NSC for inter-American affairs with ambassadorial rank, and advisor to the president for Latin America and the Caribbean; and Jeff Delaurentis, director of inter-American affairs at the NSC and specialized advisor on the issue of Cuba. At no time did a situation arise to ask why Berger was not there. The three officials were friendly and displayed great professional courtesy.

"I did not bring personal notes, but I knew the message by heart, and in the electronic agenda, I had noted the only two questions I feared forgetting: the two off-the-record questions. 'Mack' was finishing a meeting in another office. While he arrived, Dobbins gave me a rather pessimistic overview of the situation in Colombia. His data was the same as McLarty's at the dinner on Monday, but he handled it with more familiarity. I had told Clinton the previous year that the U.S. drug policy was a disastrous aggravator of Colombia's historical violence. That is why I was struck that this NSC group—without referring to my phrase, of course—seemed to agree that it should be changed. They were very careful not to pass judgment on the government or the current candidates, but they left no doubt that they found the situation catastrophic and of uncertain future. I was not pleased with the intentions of amendment, as several observers of our policy in Washington had commented on them to me with alarm. 'Now that they really want to help, they are more dangerous than ever,' one of them told me, 'because they want to get involved in everything.'

"McLarty, in a tailored suit and with good manners, entered with the urgency of someone who had interrupted a major matter to attend to us. However, he imposed a calm, useful, and good-humored tone on the meeting. Since the night of the dinner, I was pleased that he spoke while always looking into my eyes. So it was in the meeting. After a warm hug, he sat across from me, rested his hands on his knees, and opened the conversation with a well-articulated cliché that seemed true: 'We are at your disposal.'

"I wanted to establish from the outset that I was going to speak on my own authority with no more merits or mandate than my condition as a writer, and especially about such a abrasive and compromising case as Cuba. So I began with a precision that did not seem superfluous for the hidden recorders: 'This is not an official visit.'"

"Everyone nodded, and their unexpected solemnity surprised me. I then recounted in a simple manner and in a domestic narrative style when, how, and why I had the conversation with Fidel Castro that gave rise to the informal notes I was to deliver to President Clinton. I handed them to McLarty in a sealed envelope and asked him to read them so we could discuss them. It was the English translation of seven numbered topics on six double-spaced pages: terrorist plot, relative complacency regarding the measures announced on March 20 to resume flights to Cuba from the United States, Richardson's trip to Havana in January 1998, Cuba's reasoned rejection of humanitarian aid, acknowledgment of the Pentagon's favorable report on Cuba's military situation" — it was a report stating that Cuba posed no danger to the security of the United States, I add — "approval of the resolution of the Iraq crisis, and gratitude for the comments Clinton made to Mandela and Kofi Annan regarding Cuba."

Here, as can be seen, he lists the other points.

"McLarty did not read it aloud to everyone as I had expected, and as he undoubtedly would have done had he known it in advance. He read it only for himself, apparently using the speed-reading method popularized by President Kennedy, but the changes in his emotions were reflected on his face like flashes on water. I had read it so many times that I could almost deduce which points of the document corresponded to each of his mood changes.

"The first point, about the terrorist plot, elicited a grunt from him: 'It's terrible.' Later, he suppressed a mischievous laugh and exclaimed without interrupting his reading: 'We have common enemies.' I believe he said that regarding the fourth point, where the conspiracy of a group of senators to sabotage the approval of the Torres-Rangel and Dodd projects is described, and Clinton's efforts to save it are appreciated.

"At the end of the reading, he passed the paper to Dobbin, and he to Clarke, who read it while 'Mack' extolled the personality of Mortimer Zuckerman, owner of US News and World Report, who had traveled to Havana last February. He made the comment due to a mention he had just read in the sixth point of the document, but he did not answer the implicit question of whether Zuckerman had informed Clinton of the two twelve-hour conversations he had with Fidel Castro.

"The point that took up almost all the useful time after the reading was the terrorist plan that impressed everyone. I told them that I had flown to Mexico after learning about it in Havana and had to overcome the terror of a bomb going off. The moment seemed opportune to pose the first personal question that Fidel had suggested to me: Would it be possible for the FBI to make contact with their Cuban counterparts for a common fight against terrorism? Before they could react, I added a line of my own: 'I am sure they would find a positive and prompt response from the Cuban authorities.'

"I was surprised by the immediacy and energy of the reaction from the four. Clarke, who seemed to be the closest to the topic, said that the idea was very good, but warned me that the FBI did not deal with matters that were published in newspapers while they were under investigation. Would the Cubans be willing to keep the case secret? Eager to pose the second question, I gave a response to lighten the atmosphere:

'Nothing Cubans like more than keeping a secret.'

"Lacking an appropriate motive for the second question, I resolved it as my own assertion: cooperation in security matters could pave the way for a favorable climate for the resumption of American travel to Cuba. The cleverness backfired, as Dobbin got confused and said that would be resolved when the measures announced on March 20 were implemented.

"Once the misunderstanding was clarified, I spoke about the pressure I am under from many Americans of all kinds who seek my help to make business or pleasure contacts in Cuba. Among them, I mentioned Donald Newhouse, editor of several periodicals and president of the Associated Press (AP), who offered me a wonderful dinner at his country mansion in New Jersey after my workshop at Princeton University. His current dream is to go to Cuba to discuss with Fidel in person the establishment of a permanent AP office in Havana, similar to the one CNN has.

"I cannot be sure, but it seems to me that in the lively conversation at the White House, it became clear that they had no immediate purpose to resume American travel to Cuba, or they did not know or did not want to reveal it. What I must highlight is that at no time was there any talk of democratic reforms, free elections, or human rights, nor of any of the political clichés with which Americans seek to condition any collaboration project with Cuba. On the contrary, my clearest appreciation of this trip is the certainty that reconciliation is beginning to settle as something irreversible in the collective unconscious.

"Clarke called us to order when the conversation began to drift, and he specified to me — perhaps as a message — that they would take immediate steps for a joint plan between Cuba and the United States against terrorism. At the end of a long note in his notebook, Dobbins concluded that they would communicate with their embassy in Cuba to advance the project. I made an ironic comment about the rank he gave to the Interests Section in Havana, and Dobbins replied good-naturedly: 'What we have there is not an embassy, but it is much bigger than an embassy.' Everyone laughed, not without a certain malice of complicity. No further points were discussed, as it truly was not the case, but I trust they analyzed them later among themselves.

"The meeting, counting 'Mack's' delay, lasted fifty minutes. 'Mack' ended it with a ritual phrase: 'I know you have a very tight schedule before returning to Mexico, and we also have many things ahead.' He then made a brief and concise paragraph that seemed a formal response to our management. It would be reckless to attempt a literal quote, but the sense and tone of his words expressed his gratitude for the great importance of the message, worthy of all the attention of his government, and that they would address it urgently. And as a happy ending, looking me in the eyes, he crowned me with a personal laurel: 'Your mission was indeed of the utmost importance, and you have fulfilled it very well.' Neither the excess modesty nor the lack of modesty I possess has allowed me to leave that phrase to the ephemeral glory of the microphones hidden in the vases.

"I left the White House with the certain impression that the effort and uncertainties of the past days had been worth it. The disappointment of not having delivered the message to the president in his own hand seemed compensated by what was a more informal and operational conclave whose good results would not be long in coming. Moreover, knowing Clinton's and 'Mack's' affinities, and the nature of their friendship since elementary school, I was sure that the document would reach the president's hands sooner or later in the conspiratorial atmosphere of a post-meal discussion. At the end of the meeting, the Presidency of the Republic also made its presence felt with a gallant gesture: upon leaving the office, an usher handed me an envelope with the photos of my previous visit taken six months earlier in the Oval Office. So my only frustration on the way to the hotel was not having discovered and enjoyed until then the miracle of the cherry blossoms of that splendid spring.

"I barely had time to pack my suitcase and catch the five o'clock flight. The one that had taken me from Mexico fourteen days earlier had to return to its base with a malfunctioning turbine, and we waited four hours at the airport until another plane became available. The one I took back to Mexico, after the meeting at the White House, was delayed in Washington for an hour and a half while they repaired the radar with passengers on board. Before landing in Mexico, five hours later, due to a runway being out of service. Since I started flying fifty-two years ago, I had never experienced anything like it. But it could not be otherwise for a peaceful adventure that is to have a privileged place in my memoirs. May 13, 1998."

Here the historic report concluded.

May 9, 1998: The interim head of the SINA, John Boardman, was received at the MINREX. The objective was to convey a message for which they received instructions on the night of May 8 to communicate to Alarcón and the MINREX — undoubtedly that same day the message arrived or had the effects that Gabo expected from the message. He said — the interim chief — that by some means he did not know, the Government of Cuba had made it known to his government that our authorities had well-founded concerns that there was an intention on the part of organizations based in the United States to carry out terrorist actions against Cuba, particularly in the tourism sphere and very specifically actions against passenger planes with tourists traveling to and from Cuba.

The response from the United States government that was conveyed through this means was the following:

"

"

"

"

"

May 11, 1998: Remírez reports that he was summoned by the State Department for a meeting with John Hamilton, who made the following points:

"1) The objective of the meeting was to reiterate the SINA's statement from last Saturday, and it consisted of responding to our concerns about terrorist activities against Cuba, using to expedite 'double track diplomacy.'

"2) As on previous occasions, they took our concerns about possible terrorist acts against tourist facilities and aircraft seriously.

"3) According to the verifications they have conducted, there are no elements indicating the existence of plans from the United States.

"4) In the past, in response to our allegations that individuals and/or organizations in the United States might be involved in terrorist acts against Cuba, they have asked for evidence with an interest in investigating.

"5) At this time, they want to emphasize the seriousness of the United States' offer to investigate and take appropriate actions in light of any evidence we have. It is not an attempt to return the ball to our court nor a mere formal procedure.

"6) They seriously want to examine any evidence we have as a whole and follow up until it is clarified. For our part, we thanked the offer, assuring him we would convey it to our authorities, and we asked if the offer included cooperation between the two countries in any investigative process, to which Hamilton replied that he assumed it would be so. He reiterated that the offer was serious and not a mere diplomatic response, adding that the only objective of the meeting, given its importance, was that."

May 12, 1998: The MINREX summoned the Interim Head of the SINA and conveyed the following response to the request they made last Saturday, May 9, on behalf of the Government of the United States:

Remember that the interview was on the 6th, Gabo's, at the White House. Our response said:

"Our information is very secure, but through very sensitive channels regarding the disclosure of sources. We cannot work as you propose. We are pleased to know that you are alert and paying attention to the problem."

The interim head of the SINA accepted and thanked the prompt response and expressed his willingness to process any information we deemed appropriate without compromising the source. His companion, who had been described as the SINA official in charge of legal compliance and security issues, intervened to state that they would closely follow this matter through all possible channels, through all their agencies, and in contact with different groups. They would also verify with services from other countries. He commented that they consider that "at this point, any threat of this nature is intolerable."

May 20, 1998: Alarcón receives a call from Hamilton from Washington in which he explained that he was calling personally due to the importance of the matter and that he wished to raise the following:

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"

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June 3, 1998: The head of the SINA, Michael Kozak, meets with Alarcón. He informs him about the preparations for sending an FBI delegation to Cuba and hands him the text that the Americans plan to circulate among the airlines for the consideration of the Cuban side. The text says the following:

"We have received unconfirmed information about a plot to place explosive devices aboard civilian aircraft operating between Cuba and Latin American countries. The individuals involved in the plot plan to leave a small explosive device aboard an aircraft with the intent of causing the device to explode during the prolongation of service. The explosive device, according to reports, is small, contains a fuse, and a digital timer capable of being programmed 99 hours in advance. No specific target, location, or timeframe has been identified.

"We cannot rule out the possibility that the threat may include international cargo operations from the United States. The Government of the United States continues to seek additional information to clarify, verify, or refute this threat."

June 4, 1998: Alarcón is instructed to respond that the delegation can travel starting on the 15th.

June 5, 1998: Alarcón delivers to the Head of the SINA the Cuban response, which I also personally drafted —I had been following the problem, as is logical, as is elementary, since the moment we sent the message— to the proposal for a circular information presented by the Americans, which states verbatim:

"We do not request that any warning be made to the aviation companies. That is not the way to address this problem for which other measures can and should be taken." Indeed, we took many measures to protect the planes, especially, for weeks we were raising that issue, until, of course, the blows they received with the arrests here, the discovery of all their plans, the confessions of all the arrested, allowed us to know everything in detail, denounce it, and dismantle their plans. It was Cuba that dismantled those plans. So we said, that is why I must explain it: That is not the way to address this problem for which other measures can and should be taken. "No one could guarantee discretion. An indiscretion in this case could even hinder the investigation and obstruct more efficient measures.

"Its dissemination could also create panic," and, indeed, it created panic "causing considerable damage to the economy of Cuba, which is precisely what the terrorists are seeking. This damage would also affect the airlines.

"For these reasons, we do not agree that the warning be transmitted and we seriously oppose it. With the group of experts, we can analyze the most advisable steps."

Because they, really, had the delicacy, if you will, or the elementary courtesy to consult with us the note they were going to circulate. We presented our point of view.

In the meeting, the Head of the SINA raised the possibility that there could be confusion with the initial message (which they thought asked them to make the warning) or that there might be some legal obligation for their authorities to warn the airlines and protect themselves from potential claims. He said he would convey the Cuban position to Washington and that they would not make a warning.

June 6, 1998: New meeting of Alarcón with the Head of the SINA. He delivers the American message in response to the document delivered the day before, which he had previously read to him by phone, in which it states:

"1. The draft notice already provided to the Cuban side is called a 'circular information.' According to the laws and regulations of aviation in the United States, circular information must be provided to the internal security offices of the airlines whenever the government of the United States has any credible information regarding a possible threat to the aircraft."

They explain that there are laws, that there are regulations, that obligate them to inform. Well, in reality, this could have been discussed on how to do it, and not with all the data that we had included in the message.

"2. Approximately 15 to 20 circular information notices are issued each year by the Federal Aviation Administration. These are not public documents."

Of course, they are not public; but if you circulate dozens and hundreds of documents, you create alarm everywhere, there is no way to carry out a serious investigation, which is what is important, to investigate, prove, discover, and capture the perpetrators. But well, I have the duty to inform that what was argued; it is possible, I do not know all those regulations, that they felt legally obligated to inform.

"3. According to our laws and regulations, we are required to proceed immediately with the notification to the airlines that have planes flying between the United States and Cuba directly or through third countries, and to notify the governments of the third countries. We have no alternative in this regard" —they said—, "to the extent that we believe the information is credible."

Yes, the information was quite credible; we had all the elements to know it, as demonstrated by the responses we gave, which indicated with all certainty that the data they had sent us was true, and that in some cases the perpetrators had been captured and in others had escaped.

"4. Given the nature of this information, and our obligation to cooperate with other countries to prevent attacks against aviation, we still believe it is important that you or we notify the airlines flying from other destinations and the responsible governments. If it were possible for the Cuban side to advance the meeting of experts to the beginning of next week (for example, Tuesday or Wednesday), we would propose to make such notifications after we had an opportunity to assess the information with the Cuban side. If such an early meeting is not feasible, we would proceed to make the notifications. Any additional steps could be determined during the expert meeting the week of June 15."

In reality, this note is from June 6. A meeting like that on the 15th is not improvised, it is not prepared in two days, it required a minimum of five or six days; so it could not be advanced to the 7th, it actually took place on the 15th, which was the agreed date.

"5. We recognize the points raised by the Cuban authorities that we should seek to avoid damage to the investigation in adverse pacts regarding the airlines and the Cuban economy. We are doing our utmost regarding these points within the limited discretion granted by our laws and regulations and the priority we assign to preventing attacks against civil aircraft. Again, these circulars of information are relatively routine and in our experience, even when they have been made public, they normally do not have a significant or lasting impact on the air transportation of passengers or cargo."

In reality, I must say that they were responding to each of the issues we raised. In my opinion, these exchanges were conducted in good faith, there was no bad faith. We tried to delve deeper and we saw the insistence with which they argued that certain legal instruments obliged them to do that.

On that same day, Alarcón delivers to the Head of the SINA a new response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, drafted in the following terms:

"We disagree. The probable publicity of that information harms the investigative work, satisfies and encourages the plans of terrorists against the Cuban economy.

"We ignore and cannot understand the existence of legal obligations that, far from benefiting, can affect the efforts being made to avoid human casualties and material damage.

"The detailed disclosure of the procedures that may be used for such acts constitutes an unquestionable error that can favor the plans of active or potential terrorist groups" —we did not want them to publish it, because they were providing technical data on how to prepare those attacks. "We respect the criteria of the American authorities, but we do not agree on how such activities should be countered, which should be analyzed, based on the available information, with the care and depth required."

Now it is understood very clearly. It is unquestionable that they harbored the fear that an event, a sabotage of that type, could occur, and they, having the information, would not have disclosed it to the airline, even though this would not serve any purpose at all; the airlines are not in a position, do not have the means or the background, nor the information to prevent a terrorist act of that type.

The Head of the SINA noted that he had spoken with Mr. Dobbins, responsible for Latin America at the National Security Council, who asked him to convey the following additional comments:

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And they demonstrated that tremendous concern that immediately led them to circulate the information.

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I have no doubt, really, that these exchanges on their part were in good faith; they were serious on both sides, I must acknowledge, it is fair.

June 8, 1998: The Federal Aviation Agency issues the circular information. This that we have been mentioning. That is, that same day almost, two days later.

June 15, 1998: An FBI delegation arrives in Havana to hold contacts with the Cuban authorities.

June 16-17, 1998: Several joint meetings are held in Havana between Cuban experts and American FBI officials on the issue of terrorist attack plans. Abundant documentary and testimonial information is delivered to the American FBI delegation. The materials delivered included 64 pages providing investigative elements about 31 actions and terrorist plans against our country, which occurred between 1990 and 1998. Most of these actions were linked to the Cuban American National Foundation, which also organized and financed the most dangerous ones, especially those carried out by the terrorist structure led by Luis Posada Carriles in Central America. Detailed lists and photographs of the weapons, explosives, and means used in each incident were attached. Additionally, 51 pages of information were provided about the money supplied by the Cuban American National Foundation to different terrorist groups to carry out actions against Cuba; 14 recordings of telephone conversations of Luis Posada Carriles were also included, in which he provided information about terrorist actions against Cuba; data to locate Posada Carriles, such as addresses of his residences, places he frequented, characteristics of the cars and plates in El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Panama. The transcripts of 8 conversations of terrorists detained in Cuba were also delivered, in which they revealed their links with Posada Carriles.

The FBI officials also received 60 pages with the files of 40 terrorists of Cuban origin, most of whom reside in Miami, including data for their location. They also took three samples of explosive substances of 2 grams each, from the bombs deactivated before exploding in the Meliá Cohíba Hotel on April 30, 1997, and in a tourist minibus on October 19, 1997, as well as from the explosive device seized from two Guatemalan terrorists on March 4, 1998.

Additionally, 5 video cassettes and 8 audio cassettes were delivered with statements from Central American terrorists arrested for placing bombs in hotels, in which they narrate their links with Cuban terrorist organizations operating from the United States and particularly with Luis Posada Carriles.

The American side recognized the value of the information received and committed to respond with the analysis conducted on these materials in the shortest possible time.

Strangely, almost three months pass without the promised serious response. Only some insignificant news is received.

On September 12 —pay close attention, three months had not yet passed— the five comrades, now Heroes of the Republic of Cuba, who, stationed in Miami, constituted the main source of information about terrorist activities against our country, are arrested. No terrorist was arrested anywhere; the comrades who had provided the information were arrested —although, of course, there was no element to identify the sources—; but what they could appreciate is that there was serious and reliable information, and that our denunciations were very well founded, they were accurate; of course, not the only ones, but they were among the fundamental ones.

One of them had the mission of following the activities of Orlando Bosch, no less, that one who was pardoned there, despite his monstrous crimes.

Who was one of the main responsible parties for the breakdown of contacts? The head of the FBI in Miami: Héctor Pesquera. This official had held the same position in Puerto Rico, coinciding with the arrest of the command organized directly by the paramilitary group of the Cuban American National Foundation captured by the coast guard near that island where they were arrested, with their yacht and weapons seized. Everyone knows what the objective of that command was in Isla Margarita, at an international meeting to which we were invited and attended.

Pesquera, who was a member of the mafia, was key in achieving total impunity for the terrorist group.

It is known that at the highest levels of the FBI there was certain resistance to the idea of breaking off exchanges with Cuba, but the push and political influence of the mafia leaders prevailed. They prevailed even over the President of the United States and the National Security Council of that country, it was evident.

Without a doubt, the FBI was already following the steps of the Cuban anti-terrorist group, whose information about plans to blow up airline planes on the ground or in mid-flight, I had sent to the President of the United States. Such monstrous acts could cost the lives of both Cuban and American citizens, many of whom traveled to Cuba on those planes.

Pesquera, head of the FBI in Miami, concentrated all his forces on identifying, pursuing, and prosecuting the Cubans. The brutal treatment received by the Cuban patriots is known.

According to what was published by El Nuevo Herald on September 15, 1998, the first to whom Pesquera informed about the arrest of our Five Heroes was Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Díaz-Balart.

Pesquera himself made confessions on a radio program in Miami, which allow us to verify how he had arrived from Puerto Rico with the intention of proceeding at any cost against the group of Cubans infiltrated in the Miami terrorist organizations:

"I arrived here in May of this same year, 1998. I was informed of what was happening. We then began to emphasize this investigation. For intelligence purposes, it should no longer be maintained there. It should change course and then move to a criminal investigation."

He has already made the decision and received the orders and says that there is no need to continue the search for intelligence activity, but rather to carry out a criminal investigation against the Cuban patriots.

The line that our country followed was very different. In an interview granted to journalist Lucía Newman of CNN, in Porto, Portugal, the venue of an Ibero-American Summit, on October 19, 1998, I said verbatim — the legal monstrosities that we later came to know had not yet been committed. That was on October 19, a month and a few days after they had even arrested the first comrades:

"We are willing to collaborate in the fight against terrorist activities that may affect Cuba or may affect the United States.

"The United States faces a potential risk regarding the hundreds of extremist organizations, many of which are armed within the United States itself, and some of the procedures they use against Cuba could be used there, because some of these are developed, sophisticated" — I refer to the methods, the procedures, the technique. "We have raised to the authorities of the United States, we have made them aware, we have communicated the terrorist experiences that are used against our country, which is a contribution that can help them defend themselves, because I consider it a very vulnerable country to those types of attacks."

The most dramatic thing for the American people is that while Pesquera and his forces were obsessively dedicated to the persecution, arrest, and scandalous prosecution of the Cubans, no less than 14 of the 19 participants in the September 11 attacks against the Twin Towers in New York and other targets were living and training precisely in the area of responsibility and right under Pesquera's nose.

Barely three years had passed since the arrest of our selfless and brave comrades — who with the reports they gathered and were made available by Cuba to the people of the United States may have saved numerous lives of citizens of that country — when thousands of innocent Americans lost their lives that fateful day in 2001. That is to say, not even three years had actually passed since that arrest and thousands of Americans perished there in New York, victims of an attack, in which the vast majority of the perpetrators trained in Florida.

As our compatriots and the international public opinion can observe, none of the documents declassified by us contains a single redaction.

Before concluding, I wish to express that the author of the report, Gabriel García Márquez, was consulted about its publication. Just yesterday I sent a message to Europe, in which I conveyed the following:

"I have an essential need to talk about the topic of the message I sent you regarding the terrorist activities against our country. It does not affect the recipient at all and much less will it affect your literary glory.

"It is essentially about the text I sent and the wonderful report you sent me that carries your unmistakable style. They are like my memoirs, and I think yours would be incomplete if they do not contain that message."

Everything I have narrated explains why, when I began my words, I spoke of "The different conduct."

Long live the friendship between the peoples of Cuba and the United States!

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!