Speech by President Javier Milei after receiving the International "Milton Friedman" Award in Rome.

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

14 December 2024 · International "Milton Friedman" Award ceremony · Rome, Italy

Context
Milei addressed an audience in Rome on December 14, 2024, after receiving the International Milton Friedman Award, delivering a lecture on Friedman's economic legacy.
Main themes
Milton Friedman's academic contributions, Keynesianism vs. Austrian school economics, Wicksellian intertemporal framework, interest rate theory, monetary policy and inflation, history of economic thought, ideas of freedom and liberalism, business cycle theory, saving and investment dynamics, critique of Keynes's General Theory
Duration
~48 min
93rd percentile
Words
5,708
93rd percentile
Sentences
243
93rd percentile
Readability
52
68th percentile
Grade
11.7
41st percentile
Syntax
3.25
77th percentile
Vocabulary
2.15
38th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 85%84%
  • Ceremonial 8%7%
  • Institutional 7%7%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

243 sentences in 5 paragraphs

I wish to thank you for this award and, given the name of the award, I thought it pertinent to give a talk on the academic contribution of Milton Friedman. From my point of view, Milton Friedman has played a fundamental role in reclaiming the path towards the ideas of freedom. In fact, the ideas of freedom, until the 1920s of the last century, were the dominant ideas, and, indeed, the dominant school at that time was the Austrian school. However, some mistakes, especially those related to the Great Depression, led to the erroneous belief that the ideas of freedom were not the correct ones. And the success of Keynesianism plunged the world into a cone of darkness, which was able to be ended in the early 1970s. And that was due to the contributions of Milton Friedman, as he dismantled the Keynesian apparatus. From my point of view, and this is what I will try to convey in this talk, it is basically that the academic work of Milton Friedman is a mirror of the work, in fact, of the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, by Keynes. Because Keynes's work is considerably more extensive, but generally the reference tends to be to the General Theory, which is probably one of the worst works of Keynes, from the standpoint of economic analysis. This does not detract from the fact that Keynes was a brilliant mind. What happens is that he worked for the wrong side, he was part of the evil, and thus developed an analytical apparatus in favor of the wrong side, so to speak.

So, the first point is: what was the world like before the General Theory? Moreover, it was a world in which Keynes himself participated in the debate, with what was the Cambridge school in England, with authors such as, for example, Robertson or Pigou, who discussed within a certain analytical framework and debated with the Austrian school, with Mises, with Hayek, or debated with the Swedish school. In that sense, the first thing we should understand is how the previous analytical scheme functioned, which was the entire Wicksellian framework. Basically, the Wicksellian framework was an intertemporal economy. It was a reinvestment scheme, where the interest rate was determined in the goods market and the price level was determined in the money market. That is to say, it was a model of an intertemporal nature because, precisely, saving is nothing more than future consumption. So, why does saving increase when the interest rate rises? Because basically the interest rate is the relative price of present goods compared to future goods. Therefore, if present prices were to rise, which means that this relative price is increasing, the interest rate is rising, the counterpart of that is that present consumption falls and future consumption increases. And that is what makes us see that saving increases. On the other hand, if future prices were to outpace present prices and the interest rate fell, it would be advantageous for a company to shift production from the present to the future; that is why investment increases. That is why there is a negative relationship between the interest rate and investment and a positive relationship between saving and the interest rate, because basically it is a model with intertemporal characteristics.

On the other hand, in the goods market, the purchasing power of money was determined, so that when the money supply increases, the purchasing power of money falls, meaning that all prices expressed in monetary units rise. This analytical framework had methodological defects, but conceptually it is clear, the idea of determining the goods market, the real interest rate or Wicksellian interest rate, and thinking of the interest rate as a mechanism for intertemporal coordination and not that aberration of determining it in the money market, which is what Keynes did. But aside from that, you are left with the problem that was called the invalid dichotomy, and that arose from the fact that the excess demand functions in the goods market were homogeneous of degree zero and the quantitative theory was homogeneous of degree one, and therefore, that generated problems. A problem that was solved by Mises by incorporating money into the utility function and deriving the demand for money in the format of another good. So, when one has an excess. So, if you have a Central Bank artificially lowering the interest rate, that generates an excess demand in the goods market, the counterpart is an excess supply in the money market and therefore the purchasing power of money falls and that is what generates the rise in prices and if you do this systematically, it generates inflation. Or it can generate cycles of “boom and busts,” stimulating activity and then when that is generated artificially through the issuance of money, it is not genuine and then, when you want to materialize future consumption, it does not succeed and consequently there is a collapse of the system that is also apart from Mises's contribution. But beyond this, it was the mechanism, how this works, that I want to focus on. Because Keynes, he came from mathematics and was a great mathematician, and so he understood the analytical structure perfectly. So, what Keynes did was destroy this analytical framework, creating a mathematical structure functional to messianic, corrupt, and thieving politicians. That is to say, he wrote a work for those criminals called politicians (...) the caste, exactly. So, in that sense, notice that the first thing Keynes does is break the temporality in the goods market, he breaks the intertemporal character of the goods market. And the first thing he does is build a consumption function that only depends on income. And he generates this monstrosity called the marginal propensity to consume, and the multiplier appears, which is basically…, notice how delirious, because the multiplier implies a violation of the budget constraint. Because it is the idea of the multiplication of loaves. That is, suppose you have an economy that consumes 80 and invests 20. This means that the multiplier would tell you that five times the investment gives you GDP. So, what do they say? Well, let’s raise investment by issuing money, so we move investment from 20 to 40, then GDP, instead of being 100, is 200. It’s magical. It’s just about printing bills, a truly delirious thing. I know a country that did that for more than 100 years, it’s called Argentina. From being one of the richest countries in the world, it became a middle-income country. It destroyed five monetary signs, had two hyperinflations, but well, something good had to come after such a disaster. It was obvious that these were not normal conditions of pressure and temperature and a liberal libertarian president appeared. Therefore, what this does is that now consumption is not an intertemporal function and savings become a residue. Hence, it removes the relationship between the interest rate and savings, and consumption only depends on income. At the same time, he then destroys the idea of investment depending on the interest rate. Although one of the chapters on investment is brilliant, in the other he says: "Well, all that no, now it depends…". I use a rather crude expression in Argentina which is "invest for a lyrical-testicular reason, if they feel like it…". You know. Therefore, now investment ceases to have a functional relationship with the interest rate and becomes an exogenous thing, the famous animal spirits. Notice that now savings and investment do not determine the interest rate, but now savings and investment determine income. And from determining income, they determine the demand for labor. Which in the other system did not make much sense, because all those excess demand functions, from where savings and investment came, were included in the labor market. So, what does this imply? From there, the demand for labor derives, which depends on how aggregate demand fluctuates. And given the supply, the nominal wage is determined. So, we move to a goods market that now does not determine the real interest rate, but determines the level of income. And, on the other hand, the labor market is created, where the nominal wage is determined. Now, the problem is that now we lack two things to determine: we need to determine the price level and we need to determine the interest rate. So, one of the things Keynes does is say okay then, I have to determine the interest rate and what he does is determine the interest rate in the money market. Which is an aberration, because the interest rate has to do with a mechanism of intertemporal coordination of how to transfer consumption and production from the present to the future and vice versa. That is, the interest rate exists because time exists. So there Keynes puts the interest rate in the money market. So, we move from a model where the interest rate was determined in the goods market and the purchasing power of money, that is, the inverse of the price level in the money market and now we have that in the goods market income is determined, in the money market the nominal interest rate is determined and of course, the model lacks how to determine prices. So, he creates the labor market as a function, a linear combination of what the goods market is and there determines the nominal wage and ends up destroying the entire theory of value by saying that prices are a markup over costs, which in this case would be the wage. That is, he destroys the entire subjective theory of value created by Menger, William Stanley Jevons, and Léon Walras to return to the past. Thus, the theory of value is destroyed and in this way creates a tool and although it is wonderful for politicians, because you can spend and as long as you are not at full employment, the system makes you have a first stage where the product grows, a stage where the product grows and the price level rises and a stage where there is no effect on quantities and all that price. That is basically what Keynes does and it is a mechanism by which he justifies public intervention, but what underlies that is also a violation of the budget constraint, which is the multiplier. That is why it is tremendous that you go to Parliament, yes, you go to the Chamber of Deputies and talk to them about the Keynesian multiplier. It is an intellectual offense because it is something that violates budget constraints, but well, these are things that happen between the world of politics and academia. So, what we have is that Keynes destroys the entire analytical framework. This is not minor, because there is an article that I love, which is wonderful, but it has an error. It is an article by Axel Leijonhufvud, called “The Wicksell Connection,” and basically what Wicksell says is that the Keynes of the Treatise on Money and the General Theory, and that… there in the middle… there is a "theory Z," and says that, in reality, from the Treatise on Money, if one adds the preference for liquidity and adds the adjustment for quantity, one arrives at the General Theory. And moreover, in the same article, he says that there should be a "theory Z," which would eradicate the preference for liquidity, because it was a mechanism by which the action of monetary policy was invalidated. And then what he says is: One should go to the Treatise of Money plus quantity adjustment or General Theory minus preferences for liquidity. That is the "theory Z." For me, that is incorrect, aside from how wonderful the article is for framing the debate, that is incorrect because the analytical framework of Keynes in the Treatise of Money is totally different from that of Keynes in the General Theory. Now, once you have the General Theory, then Hicks appears in England, much to my chagrin a disciple of Hayek, but he had others much better like Mick Jagger. And then in Harvard, Hansen appears and gives rise to what is known as the literature that dealt with the IS-LM model, which was a model that determines, in the goods market, income and determines, in the money market, the nominal interest rate. And it is interpreted that, although Hicks in “Keynes and the Classics” makes the proposal of the aggregate supply and demand model, the supply block was not correctly specified or in a complete way, to put it in some way. So, the whole debate turned into a debate between what is called the Keynesian cross, which is a situation where investment is absolutely insensitive to the interest rate and there is a preference for liquidity, therefore, they have a flat LM and a vertical IS; or the classical world, which is the other cross, where the demand for money is a fraction of income and, therefore, there is no role for monetary policy, and the LM is vertical, while investment is absolutely sensitive to the interest rate, and therefore the IS is flat. That is, that is basically the discussion between the extreme Keynesian model and the discussion between the classical model, where in the extreme Keynesian model fiscal policy is powerful and monetary policy is absolutely useless. And in the classical case, fiscal policy is tremendously harmful, because it causes a crowding out effect, because the expansion of public spending generates an increase in the interest rate, which has as a counterpart a decrease in private investment. Therefore, the degree of productivity of private investment tends to be substantially higher than public investment, it would be better to leave things in private hands. Meanwhile, in terms of monetary policy, this is perfectly effective, but the problem is that this then manifests itself in an increase in prices. So, there was a whole discussion about elasticities and there is the whole discussion of the Pigou effect, so that what Pigou does is try to refute Keynes's argument that only depended on consumption, on income and that also depended on real balances and that then you could boost demand by injecting money. And so the debate was, it was absolutely bogged down until a gentleman named Milton Friedman came along and began to break what Keynes did in the General Theory or if you want to repair the damage that Keynes committed. So, what is Milton Friedman’s first great contribution? and which is, in fact, one of the considerations for which he is awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. It is a book called, A Theory of the Consumption Function, where he develops the permanent income hypothesis. Where, when income rises permanently, consumption automatically accompanies the increase in income, therefore, the marginal propensity tends to be one and when you have a transitory increase, as that is going to be spread over a whole intertemporal situation, then savings increase and it does not have an instant or full translation on the level of income. Therefore, the first thing he does there is to return intertemporality to the consumption function and by returning intertemporality to the consumption function, the interest rate again has an important role in the determination of consumption and therefore in savings. So, now what did he have to break? Well, now what he had to return was to demonstrate that investment was sensitive to the interest rate. On the other hand, to counter this idea that monetary policy was not effective, which had left the idea of the liquidity trap and on which Keynesians worked to prove that monetary policy was not effective, was for example, that example you can take the horse to the lake but if it does not drink water, it does not drink water, you cannot force it to drink water. So, he says: there is a limit to the interest rate, which is zero and therefore you cannot go beyond that and then you cannot force the horse to drink water. So, something that later when the 2008 crisis came, you saw cases of negative interest rates, but that is part of another discussion. So Milton Friedman along with Anna Jacobson Schwartz writes a book called A Monetary History of the United States, and in chapter 7, which is the Great Contraction from 1929 to 1933, he basically demonstrates two things: First, that indeed monetary policy was not that it was ineffective, it was tremendously effective, because precisely the Great Depression occurs due to a mismanagement of the Central Bank, that is, of the Federal Reserve. And there he demonstrates that, in the face of a banking panic, what happens is that people get scared, they leave the banks, which had a fractional reserve system and went to demand money, that also generated a drop in the demand for goods and, therefore, generated a deflationary situation. So, appealing to the Fisher effect, automatically debts, in terms of income, soared and companies went bankrupt.

And at the same time, as banks take short-term deposits and lend long-term, when they face a run on deposits, they have liquidity problems, and thus, they stop granting loans. This explains how the actions of the Federal Reserve in response to a run, in a fractional reserve system, truly generated the disaster. And when it corrected monetary policy, the world, the United States, recovered. Therefore, what Keynes demonstrates is that the hypothesis of the liquidity trap was merely a methodological trap, a mathematical trap, to generate the idea that monetary policy is ineffective and to justify fiscal policy. At the same time, it undermines the hypothesis of permanent income. This was later refined by Barro in the 1974 paper. You implement expansive fiscal policy, and agents discount future taxes, therefore, fiscal policy ceases to have an effect. But not only that, he also shows, he says, investments are not made based on the nominal interest rate, they are made based on the real interest rate. And when you take the real interest rate into account, the real interest rate skyrocketed, therefore, that collapse in investment was justified. So basically, what Friedman does is restore the temporality to the consumption function and therefore to the savings function. He restores the value of intertemporal choice, that is, the weight of the interest rate explaining investment. And he also demonstrates that monetary policy is effective. But that was not enough, because there was still the issue of how to deal with the problem of the liquidity trap, the relationship between the money supply and the price level. So, Milton Friedman does the work on quantitative theory and demonstrates that the demand for money is a stable function, and being a stable function, when you increase the money supply, you have a corresponding increase in prices. Hence, Friedman coins that famous phrase that says: "Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon." I usually complement it with a phrase that says: "Generated by an excess supply of money, whether because the supply increased or because the demand fell, or both happened at the same time, and that translates into a loss of purchasing power of money, which implies that all prices expressed in monetary units rise. Therefore, in these works I am mentioning, whether it is the consumption function, monetary history, and works in quantitative theory, it reconstructs savings investment, determining interest rates, the effectiveness of monetary policy, and that in the money market the price level is basically determined. Now, what happens is, Milton Friedman did not live on Mars, he lived on planet Earth with some beasts that discussed in terms of 10. So, he does a wonderful work called: The Monetary Framework of Milton Friedman. And in that context, what does he do? Friedman puts all these elements into the construction of what we, in the literature, if you want Modigliani or if you want Battiti, let’s say, called the classical model and he confronts that against the Keynesian model. So, he tells the Keynesians, he synthesizes the entire first part in one phrase, you Keynesians have no way to determine the price level, in the ISLM. Therefore, the Keynesian Ford T model is much more precarious than Keynes himself. I believe that Hicks himself was dying to see all that. In fact, when he was awarded the Nobel in 1971 alongside Arrow, one of the things Hicks says is, they are giving me the Nobel for a contribution I am not so proud of, for the article Keynes & The Classics, where the ISLM is developed. ISLM, moreover, is Hansen's terminology, because he called it ISLL. As you can see, I have a picky issue with articles and so on. As you can see, I am a rather strange president because I am talking about economic theory. So, there he tells the world accelerating the inflation rate, then he tells the Keynesians: "You cannot explain this, because you have no way to determine the price level." In other words, the entire logic of that first part of the book is this: you cannot explain this because you have no way to determine the price level, because you are determining the nominal interest rate in the money market and you are determining income in the goods market, and therefore you cannot determine anything. Then, a gentleman named Phillips appears and finds a relationship between the percentage change in nominal wages and the level of unemployment. He finds a negative relationship. From that, Richard Lipsey, based on his hypothesis, which he had been working on regarding the labor market and based on the fact that Keynes himself had said that prices were determined like a sea that absorbs costs - that is, Lipsey did read Keynes - then that makes prices a linear combination of wages and consequently, you can find a relationship between the rate of price change and the unemployment rate. And that contribution is accompanied by an empirical estimation by Samuelson and Solow, where they test the Phillips curve and from there recommendations start to be made: Well, then, if I want to have a lower unemployment rate, I have to tolerate this level of inflation. And the world was going around with those things. Obviously, Mr. Milton Friedman was quite angry with that - to say the least - for several years... A topic he resolves in 1968, in parallel with Edmund Phelps, who, by the way, sent me a book dedicated to Edmund Phelps, dedicated to President Milei, for eradicating inflation in Argentina. And in that context, Friedman writes the most read economics article in history, which is The Role of Monetary Policy. And that is where he develops the Phillips curve augmented by inflation. It is interesting because later, if you read the second edition of the book Price Theory, he dedicates a chapter to the Phillips curve. And this is very important. I would say that, beyond closing the debate on the Phillips curve, the most important thing is that it returns to microfoundations. How does Milton Friedman dismantle the Phillips curve? This is the important part: he returns to classical foundations, that is, he goes and delves into the labor market. So, in the labor market you have supply and demand for labor, which depends on real wages. But what happens? Expectations in Friedman’s model are adaptive, they relate to what happened with prices before. So, what happens? If today the Central Bank changes monetary policy, expectations are formed with old prices. So, what happens? The Central Bank changes monetary policy, injects money, then people start to spend more. So, what do entrepreneurs see? That their business prospects are improving, therefore, they see real wages falling. And, consequently, what do they do? They go out to hire more money. On the other hand, workers, who are looking with past expectations, with the old monetary policy, believe that their real wages are rising. So, temporarily, everyone makes transactions out of equilibrium and, temporarily, the level of economic activity increases. Therefore, when you tighten monetary policy, the inflation rate decreases. Why? Because expectations are adaptive. Now, when agents see that they misjudged their expectations, they revert, and then the unemployment rate remains at the natural level. And you go to a higher inflation level, where Phelps’ contribution is the hypothesis, he says that if you want to keep the unemployment rate systematically below the natural rate, you have to keep accelerating the inflation rate. That’s how everyone ended up with a lot of inflation. And in that context, the debate ends because the Keynesians end up winning in the last refuge they had left. And the one who finishes off all this is, in 1972, Robert Lucas Jr., in a paper in The Journal of Economic Theory, where, using Muth's hypothesis of rational expectations applied to macroeconomics, he ends up demonstrating that the Phillips curve is vertical. But, while Friedman’s approach had a short-term trade-off and no long-term trade-off, in Robert Lucas’s case, if individuals knew the monetary policy, they would automatically correct, and thus there was no trade-off even in the short term. And the only thing the politician could do, given, let’s say, the monetary policy, was to make a regime change, deceive agents temporarily, achieve an effect, but that would then dissipate. And what he said is that, given that this volatility has an impact on the responsiveness of supply, as you increase volatility, supply responds less and less. And this Robert Lucas Jr. closes in 1973, when he empirically validates the Phillips curve, under rational expectations. This also generates a debate about rules and discretion, where clearly rule-based policy is better. And in fact, Friedman had also made a contribution by siding with rules. So, from my point of view, Friedman’s work, in the academic realm, includes the recovery of intertemporal choice in consumption, in savings, the recovery of the investment function, the power of monetary policy, the monetary nature of inflation, the value of rules, and the return to microfoundations. And this return to microfoundations and intertemporal choice makes Robert Lucas Jr. say, let’s see what we are discussing? Because the truth is we spent almost 30 years discussing nonsense, or almost 40 years discussing nonsense, 37 years. So, what are we doing? So, with the return to microfoundations and intertemporal choice, Robert Lucas Jr. asks: well, let’s stop the ball and what do we want to talk about when we talk about economics? So, what did he do? He went back to the sources, back to Adam Smith. Although there are three books by Adam Smith, one that has articles that were left floating around, which were compiled after his death. Adam Smith has The Theory of Moral Sentiments; and he has An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, better known as The Wealth of Nations, for friends. So, in that context, he says what did Adam Smith want to explain? Economic growth. And then he starts to explore economic growth. So, what happens? He encounters the Solow model and the empirical problems that the Solow model had, which only explained 15% of growth and, therefore, everything else was residual. Obviously, Robert Lucas Jr. was not going to concern himself too much with the Harrod-Domar models, obviously… So, in that context, he starts to explore other cases like what Arrow had done regarding Learning by Doing, there was a problem because the models did not converge, they had certain problems and all that discussion. So he went and revalued the Ramsey model again, but the Ramsey model solved the problem of dynamic efficiency, but could not generate sustained long-term growth once the steady state was reached. So, it was a growth model that did not explain growth. And that all growth came from outside, so it was like a whole problem and then, in the 1980s, a gentleman, a mathematician decides to go study at the University of Chicago and his thesis advisor is Robert Lucas Jr., the gentleman Paul Rober, later Nobel Prize in Economics, is the one who develops endogenous growth models. And from there, Lucas popularizes that idea of endogenous growth in Lionel Robbins’ readings from 1985 and from there, all the new macroeconomics of the intertemporal format appears, with all the endogenous growth models and that culminates in the theory of real cycles, which was a profoundly interesting theory. You may ask, and what do you have about the theory of real cycles? Well, I will give you some applications, the first is that when I arrived we were on the brink of hyperinflation and the only way we had to cut inflation was by cutting the growth of the money supply and for that we had to make a fiscal adjustment and a cleaning of the Central Bank's balance sheet, we had a consolidated deficit of 15 points of GDP, 5 in the treasury and 10 in the Central Bank. And we decided to undertake the largest fiscal adjustment in the history of humanity, with an adjustment of 15 points of GDP that was realized in the span of 6 months and the wholesale inflation that was coming in at 54 monthly, which implies 17,000 annually, the last available data was 1.2%, meaning we reduced inflation from 17,000 to 15 annually. So as you can see, I believe in the monetary nature of inflation, but on the other hand, and more in my Austrian spirit, yes. Because starting in 2014 I became a quasi-fanatic fundamentalist devotee of the Austrian school, to the point that I not only fell in love with Mises, with Hayek, but I also fell in love with Rothbard and became an anarchist. Therefore, I am an anarcho-capitalist, which also means I despise the State and I am inside the State to break it all down, to shrink it. In fact, I have a ministry that is the Ministry of Deregulation.

We made a structural reform that is 8 times larger than the one Menem made, which was the largest in history. We made 800 structural reforms. Every day my Minister of Deregulation, a brilliant economist and excellent human being like Federico Sturzenegger, deregulates something. I’m going to tell you a very funny anecdote. I was at a bilateral G20 meeting with Modi from India. So I said to him, "No, well, I have my Minister of Happiness here." Because he is... My Minister of Economy cuts things, he is the Chainsaw Man. I adore my Minister of Economy. Moreover, he was named the best Minister of Economy in the world, a genius, Toto Caputo. And on the other hand, I have Sturzenegger who also gives me a lot of happiness when he deregulates. So, in general, one sees between 1 and 5 deregulations per day, and that day I said four. I think out of politeness Federico didn’t say anything to me because I believe that if he had pointed out my mistake it would have been tremendous because he hadn’t removed 4 regulations, he had removed 44. I think he either would have jumped up and given me a fanatical goal hug or, alternatively, he would have started dancing on the table. He removed 44 regulations that impacted prices, a wonderful thing. I couldn’t have resisted it. The meeting would have been dynamited. It seems like I’m exaggerating, but those who really know me know that, in the face of a shock of that nature, I can get very euphoric. Or I would have quickly finished the meeting and gone to celebrate with Sturzenegger such productivity. Therefore, this is also unique in the history of modern democracies. Next year we have an election year and we enter next year with the commitment to zero deficit. That if there is growth and it is permanent, we will lower taxes. And, in addition, zero issuance. That is, without active fiscal policy and without active monetary policy. Tell me if that is not believing in real business cycles. And to conclude, on the 10th, the day I gave the speech, I was fortunate to speak with a very prestigious Argentine economist named Juan Pablo Nicolini, who works at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. He told me about a study he did that determined how much the Argentine economy can grow based on budgetary balance. We have balance on the financial line: we pay operating expenses and we pay interest. In that sense, the study only looks at the impact on the per capita GDP growth rate of fiscal balance, and only with fiscal balance Argentina ensures, according to a study by Robert Lucas Jr., a growth of 4.5% per year. In about 10 years, Argentina will make its GDP grow by at least 50%. And, as we discussed with Dr. Nicolini, that is a floor. That is a floor because we achieve fiscal balance by shrinking the state. As we have economic growth, we will lower taxes, we will remove the state from the way, and we will give more freedom to the people. This will also generate more growth. In fact, the structural reform we made allowed us to jump about 70 places in terms of economic freedom: from being among the worst and most unpresentable in the world, today we are in the middle pack. And I still have 3,200 structural reforms in my pocket. Therefore, I will also make Argentina the freest country in the world. Something that, when Ireland did it for 30 years, made it the richest country in the world. Not richer, but it has a per capita GDP 50% higher than that of the United States. But not only that, but also, if you consider all the structural reforms we are implementing, Argentina will surely grow much more than that 4.5%. And that will make it so that, if we continue to cling to the ideas of freedom and defending those ideas, we will make Argentina great again. We will make Argentina a power again and we will be a testimony to the whole world that what really works are the ideas of freedom. Long live Freedom, damn it!