- Context
- Mao reported on the independent regime on the Hunan-Jiangxi border and the August defeat, with dated November 25, 1928, arguing for holding the Luoxiao middle section and a prolonged struggle around the Jinggang Mountains.
- Main themes
- Independent workers' and peasants' regime on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, August 1928 defeat and the southern Hunan expedition, conditions for Red political power, splits among the landlord-gentry and warlords, Red Army composition and democracy in the army, Party representatives and branches on a company basis, Red Guards and insurrection detachments, Jinggang Mountains military bases, land distribution and the intermediate class, policy towards the petty bourgeoisie, dispute with the Hunan Provincial Committee, Luoxiao mountain range as base area
- Duration
- ~103 min
- Words
- 12,350
- Sentences
- 431
- Readability
- 41
- Grade
- 14.6
- Syntax
- 3.32
- Vocabulary
- 2.41
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other431 sentences in 56 paragraphs
The Independent Regime on the Hunan-Jiangxi Border and the Defeat in August
The emergence, within a single country, of one or several small areas of Red political power surrounded on all sides by White political power is something that, in the present-day world, occurs only in China. On analysis, we find that one of the reasons for it lies in the incessant splits and wars within China's comprador and landlord-gentry classes. So long as the splits and wars within the comprador and landlord-gentry classes continue, the existence and development of the armed independent regime of the workers and peasants will also be able to continue. Beyond this, the existence and development of the armed independent regime of the workers and peasants requires the following conditions: (1) good masses; (2) a good Party; (3) a Red Army of adequate strength; (4) terrain favourable to military operations; (5) economic resources sufficient for sustenance.
In periods when the political power of the ruling classes is temporarily stable and in periods when it is splitting apart, the independent area must adopt different strategies towards the ruling classes surrounding it. In periods when splits occur within the ruling classes, as in Hunan and Hubei during the war between Li Zongren and Tang Shengzhi, and in Guangdong during the war between Zhang Fakui and Li Jishen, our strategy can be comparatively bold, and the area of the independent regime developed by military means can be comparatively extensive. Even then, however, attention must still be paid to building a solid foundation in the central districts, so that when the White terror comes we will have something to rely on and need not fear. In periods when the political power of the ruling classes is comparatively stable, as in the southern provinces since April of this year, our strategy must be one of gradual advance. At such times, the worst thing in military matters is to divide our forces and make reckless advances, and the worst thing in local work (distributing land, establishing political power, expanding the Party, organizing local armed forces) is to scatter our manpower in all directions without attending to building a solid foundation in the central districts. The defeats of many small Red areas in various places were due either to the absence of the objective conditions or to subjective errors in tactics. As for why the tactics were wrong, it was entirely because no clear distinction was made between the two different kinds of period, the period when the political power of the ruling classes is temporarily stable and the period when it is splitting apart. Some comrades, even in a period when the political power of the ruling classes is temporarily stable, advocate dividing our forces and advancing recklessly, and even advocate defending large areas with the Red Guards alone, as though entirely unaware that, besides the house-to-house militia, the enemy also has regular troops that will be concentrated to attack us. In local work, they pay no attention whatsoever to building a solid foundation in the central districts, and, regardless of what our subjective strength makes possible, seek only boundless expansion. If anyone advocates a policy of step-by-step expansion in military affairs and, in local work, concentrating our strength to build a solid foundation in the central districts so as to secure an invincible position, they brand him a "conservative". This erroneous view of theirs was the root cause of the defeat on the Hunan-Jiangxi border this August, as well as of the simultaneous defeat of the Fourth Red Army in southern Hunan.
Work on the Hunan-Jiangxi border began in October of last year. At the start, there was no Party organization at all in any of the counties; the only local armed forces were the two units of Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, with sixty bad rifles each, near the Jinggang Mountains; the peasant self-defence corps of the four counties of Yongxin, Lianhua, Chaling and Lingxian had surrendered all their rifles to the landlord-gentry class; and the revolutionary fervour of the masses had been suppressed. By February of this year, Ninggang, Yongxin, Chaling and Suichuan all had Party county committees, Lingxian had a special district committee, Party organization had also begun to be established in Lianhua, and contact had been made with the Wan'an county committee. Apart from Lingxian, every county had a small number of local armed forces. In Ninggang, Chaling, Suichuan and Yongxin, and especially in the two counties of Suichuan and Yongxin, many guerrilla uprisings were carried out to overthrow the landlord-gentry and arouse the masses, and the results were all fairly good. During this period the agrarian revolution had not yet been carried deep. The organs of political power were called governments of workers, peasants and soldiers. Soldiers' committees were organized in the army. When units operated separately, action committees were set up to command them. The Party's highest leading body at this time was the Front Committee appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee at the time of the Autumn Harvest Uprising (with Mao Zedong as secretary). In early March, at the request of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, the Front Committee was abolished and reorganized as a Divisional Committee (with He Tingying as secretary), becoming a body concerned solely with the Party in the army and having no say over the local Party. At the same time, again at the request of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, Mao's forces were transferred to southern Hunan, with the result that the border area was occupied by the enemy for more than a month. At the end of March came the defeat in southern Hunan, and in April the forces of Zhu and Mao and the peasant army of southern Hunan withdrew to Ninggang and began the independent regime on the border anew.
From April onward, the independent regime on the Hunan-Jiangxi border coincided with a time when the ruling forces in the South were temporarily stable. The reactionary troops sent by the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi to "suppress" us numbered at least eight or nine regiments, and at times as many as eighteen. Yet with a force of fewer than four regiments we fought the enemy for four whole months, the independent area expanding day by day, the agrarian revolution deepening day by day, the people's political power spreading day by day, and the Red Army and Red Guards growing day by day. The reason lay in the correctness of the policy of the border Party (the local Party and the Party in the army). The policy of the Border Special Committee (with Mao Zedong as secretary) and of the Army Committee (with Chen Yi as secretary) at that time was: to struggle resolutely against the enemy, create political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao mountain range, and oppose flightism; to deepen the agrarian revolution in the independent area; for the Party in the army to help develop the local Party, and the armed strength of the army to help develop the local armed forces; to take the defensive against Hunan, where the ruling forces were comparatively strong, and the offensive against Jiangxi, where the ruling forces were comparatively weak; to devote great efforts to building up Yongxin, create a mass independent regime, and prepare for a prolonged struggle; to concentrate the Red Army to meet the enemy at hand when opportunity arose, oppose the division of our forces, and avoid being destroyed by the enemy one by one; and to expand the independent area by a policy of advancing in waves, opposing the policy of reckless advance. Because these tactics were appropriate, and because, in addition, the terrain of the border was favourable to struggle and the attacking forces of the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi were not entirely of one mind, we had the military victories of the four months from April to July and the growth of the mass independent regime. Although the enemy was several times our strength, he was not only unable to destroy this independent regime but also unable to halt its growth. The influence of this independent regime on the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi was tending to grow day by day. The defeat in August was due entirely to some comrades failing to understand that this was precisely a period of temporary stability for the ruling classes, and instead adopting a policy suited to a period of splits within the ruling classes, dividing our forces for a reckless advance on southern Hunan, thereby causing defeat both on the border and in southern Hunan. Du Xiujing, the representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, and Yang Kaiming, appointed by the Provincial Committee as secretary of the Border Special Committee, taking advantage of the fact that Mao Zedong, Wan Xixian and others who strongly opposed the move were far away in Yongxin, failed to examine the circumstances of the time, disregarded the resolution of the joint meeting of the Army Committee, the Special Committee and the Yongxin County Committee, which had disagreed with the Hunan Provincial Committee's proposal, and, knowing only how to carry out formally the Hunan Provincial Committee's order to go to southern Hunan, fell in with the mood of the Twenty-ninth Regiment of the Red Army (composed of peasants from Yizhang), who wished to evade the struggle and return to their home villages; and so they brought about defeat both on the border and in southern Hunan.
What happened was this. In mid-July, Wu Shang's Eighth Army, of the Hunan enemy, invaded Ninggang and then advanced into Yongxin; seeking battle and not finding it (our troops had tried to strike at him by a side road but missed him), and fearing our masses, he hastily withdrew to Chaling by way of Lianhua. At that time the main force of the Red Army was advancing from Ninggang to attack Lingxian and Chaling, and at Lingxian changed its plan and turned towards southern Hunan; meanwhile five regiments of the Jiangxi enemy's Third Army under Wang Jun and Jin Handing, and six regiments of the Sixth Army under Hu Wendou, jointly attacked Yongxin. At this time we had only one regiment in Yongxin; under the cover of the broad masses, using the method of guerrilla attacks from all sides, it pinned down these eleven enemy regiments within thirty li of the Yongxin county town for as long as twenty-five days. In the end, because of the enemy's fierce assaults, we lost Yongxin, and then lost Lianhua and Ninggang as well. At this point internal strife suddenly broke out among the Jiangxi enemy: Hu Wendou's Sixth Army hurriedly withdrew and soon fought Wang Jun's Third Army at Zhangshu. The five Jiangxi regiments that remained also hurriedly withdrew into the Yongxin county town. Had our main force not gone to southern Hunan, it would have been entirely possible to rout this enemy and extend the independent area to Ji'an, Anfu and Pingxiang, linking up with Pingjiang and Liuyang. As the main force was no longer there, and our one regiment was utterly exhausted, it was decided to leave part of it to defend the Jinggang Mountains together with the units of Yuan and Wang, while I led part of the troops towards Guidong to meet the main force and bring it back. By then the main force had withdrawn from southern Hunan towards Guidong, and on August 23 we joined forces at Guidong.
When the main force of the Red Army first arrived at Lingxian in mid-July, the officers and men of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, wavering politically, wanted to return to their homes in southern Hunan and would not submit to discipline; the Twenty-eighth Regiment opposed going to southern Hunan and wanted to go to southern Jiangxi, but was also unwilling to return to Yongxin. Du Xiujing encouraged the erroneous views of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, and the Army Committee also failed to stop them, so the main force set out from Lingxian on July 17 and advanced on Chenzhou. On July 24 it fought the enemy Fan Shisheng at Chenzhou, at first winning and then losing, and withdrew from the battle. The Twenty-ninth Regiment then acted on its own and ran off to its home in Yizhang, with the result that part of it was wiped out at Lechang by the bandit Hu Fengzhang, and part scattered in various places around Chenzhou and Yizhang, its fate unknown; no more than a hundred men were gathered together that day. Fortunately the main force, the Twenty-eighth Regiment, did not suffer heavy losses, and on August 18 it occupied Guidong. On the 23rd it joined the troops that had come from the Jinggang Mountains, and it was decided to return to the Jinggang Mountains by way of Chongyi and Shangyou. On reaching Chongyi, battalion commander Yuan Chongquan mutinied, taking with him an infantry company and an artillery company; although these two companies were brought back, regimental commander Wang Erzhuo lost his life. On August 30, part of each of the Hunan and Jiangxi enemy armies, taking advantage of the moment when our army was about to return but had not yet returned, attacked the Jinggang Mountains. Our defending force, less than a battalion, resisted from its strong positions, routed the enemy and saved this base.
The causes of this defeat were: (1) some officers and men were wavering and homesick and lost their fighting capacity, while others, unwilling to go to southern Hunan, lacked enthusiasm; (2) the long march in the heat of summer exhausted the troops; (3) having ventured several hundred li from Lingxian, the troops lost contact with the border and became an isolated force; (4) the masses of southern Hunan had not risen, so the expedition became a purely military adventure; (5) the enemy situation was unknown; (6) preparation was poor, and the officers and men did not understand the purpose of the operation.
The Present Situation in the Independent Area
Since April of this year, the Red area has gradually expanded. After the battle of Longyuankou (on the border of Yongxin and Ninggang) on June 23, in which we defeated the Jiangxi enemy for the fourth time, our area comprised the whole of the three counties of Ninggang, Yongxin and Lianhua, a small part of each of Ji'an and Anfu, the northern part of Suichuan, and the south-eastern part of Lingxian; this was the border area at its height. In the Red area, most of the land had been distributed, and the rest was being distributed. District and township governments were set up everywhere. Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua and Suichuan all had county governments, and a border government was established. Workers' and peasants' insurrection detachments were organized everywhere in the villages, and there were Red Guards at the district and county levels. In July the Jiangxi enemy attacked, and in August the Hunan and Jiangxi enemies jointly attacked the Jinggang Mountains; the county towns and the plains of the border counties were all occupied by the enemy. The peace preservation corps and the house-to-house militia, the tiger's accomplices, ran amok, and the White terror spread over town and countryside. Most of the Party organizations and the organs of political power collapsed. The rich peasants and the opportunists in the Party went over to the enemy one after another. Only after the battle of the Jinggang Mountains on August 30 did the Hunan enemy withdraw to Lingxian, while the Jiangxi enemy still held the county towns and most of the villages. But the mountain areas the enemy was never able to take: in Ninggang, the western and northern districts; in Yongxin, the Tianlong district in the northern section, the Xiaojiang district in the western section, and the Wannianshan district in the southern section; in Lianhua, the Shangxi district; in Suichuan, the Jinggangshan district; and in Lingxian, Qingshigang and the Dayuan district. In July and August, one regiment of the Red Army, together with the Red Guards and insurrection detachments of the counties, fought several dozen battles large and small, losing only thirty rifles, and finally withdrew into the mountain areas.
As our army was returning to the Jinggang Mountains by way of Chongyi and Shangyou, Liu Shiyi's Independent Seventh Division, of the enemy in southern Jiangxi, pursued us to Suichuan. On September 13 our army defeated Liu Shiyi, captured several hundred rifles and occupied Suichuan. On September 26 we returned to the Jinggang Mountains. On October 1 we fought Zhou Hunyuan's brigade of the enemy Xiong Shihui's forces at Ninggang and won, recovering the whole of Ninggang county. At this time 126 men of Yan Zhongru's unit of the Hunan enemy, stationed at Guidong, came over to our army and were formed into a special task battalion, with Bi Zhanyun as battalion commander. On November 9 our army again defeated a regiment of Zhou's brigade at the Ninggang town and at Longyuankou. The next day we advanced and occupied Yongxin, and soon withdrew to Ninggang. At present our area stretches from the southern slopes of the Jinggang Mountains in Suichuan in the south to the border of Lianhua in the north, including the whole of Ninggang county and part of each of Suichuan, Lingxian and Yongxin, forming a single long, narrow block running north and south. The Shangxi district of Lianhua, and the Tianlong and Wannianshan districts of Yongxin, are not well connected with this block. The enemy is attempting to destroy our base by military attacks and economic blockade, and we are preparing to smash his attacks.
Military Questions
The struggle on the border is entirely a military struggle, and the Party and the masses have had to be militarized together. How to deal with the enemy and how to fight have become the central questions of daily life. An independent regime must be an armed one. Wherever there are no armed forces, or the armed forces are inadequate, or the tactics for dealing with the enemy are wrong, the area is immediately seized by the enemy. This struggle grows fiercer day by day, and so the problems are extremely complex and serious.
The sources of the Red Army on the border are: (1) the former troops of Ye Ting and He Long from Chaozhou and Shantou; (2) the former Guards Regiment of the Wuchang National Government; (3) peasants from Pingjiang and Liuyang; (4) peasants from southern Hunan and workers from Shuikoushan; (5) captured soldiers from the forces of Xu Kexiang, Tang Shengzhi, Bai Chongxi, Zhu Peide, Wu Shang, Xiong Shihui and others; (6) peasants from the border counties. But after more than a year of fighting, only a third remain of the former troops of Ye and He, the Guards Regiment and the peasants from Pingjiang and Liuyang. The peasants from southern Hunan have also suffered heavy casualties. Thus, although the first four categories are still the backbone of the Fourth Red Army to this day, they are now far outnumbered by the last two. Of the last two, captured enemy soldiers are the more numerous; without this source of replenishment, manpower would be a serious problem. Even so, the increase in men has not kept pace with the increase in rifles; rifles are not easily lost, whereas men, through wounds, death, sickness and desertion, are easily lost. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised to send workers from Anyuan here, and we earnestly hope this will be carried out.
As for the composition of the Red Army, part consists of workers and peasants and part of lumpen-proletarians. Too high a proportion of lumpen elements is of course not good. But since we are fighting every day and casualties are heavy, and the lumpen elements do have fighting capacity, it is already no easy matter even to find lumpen elements as replacements. In these circumstances, the only way is to intensify political training.
Most of the Red Army soldiers come from mercenary armies, but their character changes as soon as they join the Red Army. First of all, the Red Army has abolished the mercenary system, making the soldiers feel that they are fighting not for others but for themselves and for the people. To this day the Red Army has no regular system of pay; it issues only grain, money for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, and a little pocket money. All officers and men of the Red Army who are natives of the border area have been given land, but it is rather difficult to allocate land to those from distant places.
Through political education, the Red Army soldiers have all acquired class consciousness and a general knowledge of distributing land, establishing political power, arming the workers and peasants, and so on, and they all know that they are fighting for themselves and for the working class and the peasantry. Hence they can endure the hardships of a bitter struggle without complaint. Each company, battalion and regiment has a soldiers' council, which represents the interests of the soldiers and carries out political work and work among the masses.
Experience has proved that the system of Party representatives must not be abolished. The Party representative is especially important at the company level, since the Party branch is organized on a company basis. He has to see to it that the soldiers' committee carries out political training, to guide the work among the masses, and at the same time to serve as secretary of the Party branch. Facts have proved that the better the Party representative of a company, the sounder the company, whereas the company commander can hardly play so great a role politically. Because casualties among the lower cadres are so heavy, captured enemy soldiers often become company or platoon commanders not long after coming over; some of the soldiers captured in February or March of this year are now battalion commanders. On the surface it might seem that, since it is called the Red Army, it can do without Party representatives, but this is utterly mistaken. The Twenty-eighth Regiment once abolished its Party representatives in southern Hunan, and later restored them. To rename them "instructors" would cause confusion with the instructors of the Kuomintang, whom the captured soldiers detest. Moreover, changing the name does not affect the substance of the system. We have therefore decided not to change it. Casualties among the Party representatives have been very heavy; besides training replacements in training courses of our own, we hope that the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us at least thirty comrades capable of serving as Party representatives.
Ordinary soldiers need six months' or a year's training before they can fight, but our soldiers, recruited yesterday, have to fight today, with practically no training at all. Their military technique is very poor, and in battle they rely on courage alone. A long period of rest and training is impossible; the only thing is to try to avoid some battles in order to gain time for training, and see whether that is possible. To train lower-ranking officers, we now run a training corps of 150 people and intend to keep it going permanently. We hope that the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us more officers of the rank of company or platoon commander and above.
The Hunan Provincial Committee has asked us to attend to the material life of the soldiers and to make it at least somewhat better than that of the average worker or peasant. At present it is the very opposite. Apart from grain, each man receives only five cents a day in silver for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, and even this is hard to keep up. The money for oil, salt, firewood and vegetables alone requires more than ten thousand silver dollars a month, all of it obtained by expropriating the local tyrants. For winter clothing for the whole army of five thousand men we now have the cotton but are still short of cloth. Cold as it is, many of our soldiers are still wearing only two layers of thin clothing. Fortunately we are used to hardship. What is more, everyone shares the same hardship: from the army commander to the cook, everyone lives on a food allowance of five cents a day, apart from grain. When pocket money is issued, if it is twenty cents it is twenty cents for all, if it is forty cents it is forty cents for all. Hence the soldiers bear no one any grudge.
After each battle there are a number of wounded. And owing to malnutrition, cold and other causes, a great many officers and men fall ill. Our hospitals are in the mountains and use both Chinese and Western methods of treatment; there is a shortage of both doctors and medicines. At present there are more than eight hundred people in the hospitals. The Hunan Provincial Committee promised to procure medicines, but so far none have arrived. We still ask the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees to send us a few doctors trained in Western medicine and some iodine.
That the Red Army, whose material life is so meagre and whose battles are so frequent, can still keep going without breaking down is due, apart from the role of the Party, to the practice of democracy within the army. The officers do not beat the soldiers; officers and men are treated as equals; soldiers are free to hold meetings and speak out; trivial formalities have been abolished; and the accounts are open for all to inspect. The soldiers manage the mess, and out of the daily five cents for oil, salt, firewood and vegetables they can still save a little for pocket money, called "mess savings", amounting to about sixty or seventy coppers per man per day. All this gives great satisfaction to the soldiers. The newly captured soldiers in particular feel that our army and the Kuomintang army are worlds apart. Although they feel that the material life in the Red Army is not equal to that in the White army, they have been spiritually liberated. The same soldier who was not brave in the enemy army yesterday is very brave in the Red Army today; such is the effect of democracy. The Red Army is like a furnace in which captured soldiers are melted down as soon as they come over. In China, not only the people but also the army need democracy. Democracy in the army will be an important weapon for undermining the feudal mercenary army.
The Party organization is now in four levels: the company branch, the battalion committee, the regimental committee and the army committee. There is a branch in each company and a group in each squad. One important reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on such an arduous struggle without falling apart is that "the Party branch is organized on a company basis". Two years ago, our organizations in the Kuomintang army had no hold at all on the soldiers; even in Ye Ting's forces there was only one branch to a regiment, and so they could not stand severe tests. At present the ratio of Party members to non-members in the Red Army is about one to three, that is, on average one Party member in every four men. It has recently been decided to increase the number of Party members among the combat troops, with the aim of reaching a ratio of half Party members and half non-members. At present the company branches lack good secretaries, and we ask the Central Committee to send us a large number of activists who can no longer remain where they are to fill these posts. Almost all the cadres who came from southern Hunan are doing Party work in the army. But some of them were scattered in southern Hunan in August, so at present we cannot spare anyone for other work.
The local armed forces consist of the Red Guards and the workers' and peasants' insurrection detachments. The insurrection detachments are armed with spears and fowling pieces and are organized on a township basis, one detachment to each township, the number of men varying with the size of the township. Their job is to suppress counter-revolution, protect the township government, and help the Red Army or Red Guards in battle when the enemy comes. The insurrection detachments began in Yongxin; originally they were secret, but they came into the open after we took the whole county. This system has now been extended to all the border counties, without change of name. The Red Guards are armed chiefly with five-round rifles, but also with nine-round and single-round rifles. The number of rifles in each county is: Ninggang 140, Yongxin 220, Lianhua 43, Chaling 50, Lingxian 90, Suichuan 130, Wan'an 10, making 683 in all. Most were issued by the Red Army; a small number were captured from the enemy by the Red Guards themselves. The Red Guards of most counties are constantly fighting the peace preservation corps and house-to-house militia of the landlord-gentry, and their fighting capacity is growing steadily. Before the Horse Day Incident, every county had its peasant self-defence corps. Their rifles numbered: Youxian 300, Chaling 300, Lingxian 60, Suichuan 50, Yongxin 80, Lianhua 60, Ninggang (Yuan Wencai's unit) 60, Jinggangshan (Wang Zuo's unit) 60, making 970 in all. After the Horse Day Incident, apart from the units of Yuan and Wang, which suffered no losses, only six rifles were kept in Suichuan and one in Lianhua; all the rest were seized by the landlord-gentry. That the peasant self-defence corps were so incapable of holding on to their rifles was the result of the opportunist line. At present the Red Guards of the counties are still very short of rifles and have fewer than the landlord-gentry, and the Red Army must continue to help the Red Guards with arms. So long as the fighting capacity of the Red Army is not reduced, we must do everything possible to help arm the people. We have already laid down that each battalion of the Red Army shall have four companies, with seventy-five rifles to a company; adding the special task company, the machine-gun company, the trench-mortar company, regimental headquarters and the three battalion headquarters, each regiment shall have 1,075 rifles. Rifles captured in battle are used as far as possible to arm the local forces. The commanders of the Red Guards are men sent by the counties for training in the training corps run by the Red Army, who then take up command. Sending men from distant places in the Red Army to serve as commanders of local units must be gradually reduced. Zhu Peide and Wu Shang are also arming the peace preservation corps and the house-to-house militia, and the numbers and fighting capacity of the landlord-gentry's armed forces in the border counties are quite considerable. The expansion of our Red local armed forces brooks not a moment's delay.
The principle for the Red Army is concentration, and that for the Red Guards is dispersion. In the present period of temporary stability of the reactionary regime, the enemy can concentrate large forces to attack the Red Army, and dispersion is disadvantageous for the Red Army. In our experience, dividing our forces has almost always led to defeat, whereas concentrating our forces to strike at an enemy force smaller than, equal to, or slightly larger than ours has often led to victory. The area which the Central Committee has instructed us to develop for guerrilla warfare extends several thousand li in length and breadth, which is far too large; this is probably due to an overestimate of our strength. For the Red Guards, dispersion is advantageous, and at present the Red Guards in all the counties are adopting the method of dispersed operations.
The most effective method of propaganda directed at the enemy forces is to release captured soldiers and give medical treatment to the enemy's wounded. When soldiers or battalion, company or platoon commanders of the enemy are captured by us, we immediately conduct propaganda among them; they are divided into those who wish to stay and those who wish to leave, and those who wish to leave are given travelling expenses and set free. This immediately exposes the enemy's lie that "the Communist bandits kill everyone they see". Yang Chisheng's Ninth Division Ten-Day Bulletin exclaimed of this method of ours, "How vicious!" The Red Army soldiers are extremely warm in comforting and seeing off the prisoners they have taken, and at every "farewell party for new brothers" the captured soldiers in their speeches repay us with warm gratitude. Giving medical treatment to the enemy's wounded is also very effective. Clever enemies like Li Wenbin have lately been imitating our method, not killing prisoners and giving medical treatment to captured wounded. Nevertheless, when fighting takes place again, some of our men still come back to us bringing their rifles; this has happened twice already. In addition, we are doing as much written propaganda as possible, such as writing slogans. Wherever we go, the walls are covered with slogans. But we are short of people skilled in drawing, and ask the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees to send us a few.
Military bases: The first base is the Jinggang Mountains, which lie where the four counties of Ninggang, Lingxian, Suichuan and Yongxin meet. At the northern foot is Maoping in Ninggang, and at the southern foot is Huang'ao in Suichuan; the distance between the two is ninety li. At the eastern foot is Nashan in Yongxin, and at the western foot is Shuikou in Lingxian; the distance between the two is 180 li. The circuit, starting from Nashan and passing through Longyuankou (the above in Yongxin), Xincheng, Maoping, Dalong (the above in Ninggang), Shidu, Shuikou, Xiacun (the above in Lingxian), Yingpanxu, Daijiapu, Dafen, Duiziqian, Huang'ao, Wudoujiang, Che'ao (the above in Suichuan) back to Nashan, totals 550 li. On the mountains there are paddy fields and villages at Dajing, Xiaojing, Shangjing, Zhongjing, Xiajing, Ciping, Xiazhuang, Xingzhou, Caoping, Baiyinhu and Luofu, which have always been the lairs of bandits and deserters and have now become our base. But the population is less than two thousand and the yield of grain less than ten thousand dan, so that the army's grain must all be brought in from the three counties of Ninggang, Yongxin and Suichuan. Fortifications have been built at all the strategic passes on the mountains. Our hospitals, bedding and clothing workshop, ordnance department and the rear offices of the regiments are all here. At present grain is being carried up the mountains from Ninggang. Given sufficient supplies, the enemy can never break in. The second base is Jiulongshan, at the junction of the four counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua and Chaling; it is not as important as the Jinggang Mountains, but serves as the last base for the local armed forces of the four counties, and fortifications have been built there too. For a Red independent regime surrounded by White political power, it is necessary to make use of mountain strongholds.
The Land Question
The land situation on the border: Broadly speaking, more than 60 per cent of the land was in the hands of the landlords and less than 40 per cent in the hands of the peasants. On the Jiangxi side, land was most concentrated in Suichuan, where about 80 per cent belonged to the landlords. Yongxin came next, with about 70 per cent belonging to the landlords. In Wan'an, Ninggang and Lianhua there were more owner-peasants, but the landlords still owned the comparatively greater part of the land, about 60 per cent, the peasants only 40 per cent. On the Hunan side, in both Chaling and Lingxian about 70 per cent of the land was in the hands of the landlords.
The question of the intermediate class: Given the land situation described above, the confiscation and redistribution of all land can win the support of the majority. But the rural population is roughly divided into three classes: the class of big and middle landlords, the intermediate class of small landlords and rich peasants, and the class of middle and poor peasants. The rich peasants' interests are often bound up with those of the small landlords. The land of the rich peasants makes up only a small portion of the total, but taken together with that of the small landlords it amounts to quite a lot. This is probably much the same throughout the country. On the border the policy adopted towards land is complete confiscation and thorough distribution; hence in the Red area both the landlord-gentry class and the intermediate class were hit. That was the policy, but in its actual execution it met with great obstruction from the intermediate class. In the early days of the revolution, the intermediate class ostensibly capitulated to the poor-peasant class, but in reality they made use of their former social position and of clan ties to intimidate the poor peasants and delay the distribution of land. When no further delay was possible, they concealed the true amount of their land, or kept the good land for themselves and gave up the poor land. During this period the poor peasants, having long been trampled upon and feeling that the victory of the revolution was not secure, often accepted the views of the intermediate class and did not dare to take vigorous action. Only when the revolution reaches a high tide, when, for instance, political power has been won in a whole county or even several counties, the reactionary troops have been defeated several times, and the might of the Red Army has been shown several times, is vigorous action taken in the countryside against the intermediate class. For example, the southern section of Yongxin, where the intermediate class is most numerous, was where the delaying of land distribution and the concealment of land were worst. Only after the Red Army's great victory at Longyuankou on June 23, and after the district government had dealt with several people who delayed the distribution, was the land actually distributed. But in every county the feudal clan organization is extremely widespread, often one clan to a village or one clan to several villages; and it will take a rather long time before class differentiation can be completed within the villages and clan sentiment overcome.
The defection of the intermediate class under the White terror: Having been hit during the revolutionary high tide, the intermediate class went over to the enemy as soon as the White terror came. It was the small landlords and rich peasants of the two counties who led the reactionary troops in burning down on a large scale the houses of the revolutionary peasants in Yongxin and Ninggang. Following the instructions of the reactionaries, they burned houses and arrested people, with great boldness. When the Red Army returned to the area around Xincheng, Gucheng and Longshi in Ninggang, several thousand peasants, believing the reactionaries' propaganda that the Communists would kill them, followed the reactionaries and fled to Yongxin. Only after our propaganda, "We will not kill the peasants who went over to the enemy" and "Welcome to the peasants who went over to the enemy to come back and reap their crops", did some of these peasants gradually come back.
When the revolution throughout the country is at a low ebb, the most difficult problem in the independent area is that we cannot hold the intermediate class. The chief reason for the intermediate class turning against us is that it has been hit too hard by the revolution. But when there is a revolutionary upsurge throughout the country, the poor-peasant class has something to rely on and becomes more courageous, while the intermediate class has something to fear and dares not get out of hand. When the war between Li Zongren and Tang Shengzhi spread to Hunan, the small landlords in Chaling sued for peace with the peasants, and some even sent the peasants pork for the New Year (by then the Red Army had already left Chaling for Suichuan). When the Li-Tang war ended, such things were no longer seen. Now, when there is a counter-revolutionary high tide throughout the country, the intermediate class, having been hit, has in the White areas almost entirely attached itself to the landlord-gentry class, and the poor-peasant class has been left isolated. This problem is very serious indeed.
The pressure of daily life and its influence on the defection of the intermediate class: The Red and the White areas confront each other like two hostile countries. Owing to two causes, the enemy's tight blockade and our mishandling of the petty bourgeoisie, trade between the two areas has almost entirely ceased; daily necessities such as salt, cloth and medicines are scarce and dear, and agricultural products such as timber and tea-oil cannot be sent out, so that the peasants' cash income is cut off and the people as a whole are affected. The poor-peasant class is comparatively better able to bear such hardships, but when the middle class can bear them no longer, it capitulates to the landlord-gentry class. If the splits and wars among the landlord-gentry and warlords of China were not continuing, and if the revolutionary situation throughout the country were not developing, the small Red independent areas would come under great economic pressure, and their long-term existence would be in doubt. For not only would the middle class be unable to bear such economic pressure, but the workers, the poor peasants and the Red Army might also find it unbearable at some point. In the two counties of Yongxin and Ninggang there was no salt to eat, and the supply of cloth and medicines was completely cut off, not to mention other things. Now salt can be bought again, but it is very dear. Cloth and medicines are still unobtainable. Timber and tea-oil, which are produced in large quantities in Ninggang, western Yongxin and northern Suichuan (all of which are within the present independent area), still cannot be sent out.
The criterion for land distribution: The township is taken as the unit for distributing land. In places with many hills and few fields, such as the Xiaojiang district of Yongxin, there have been cases of taking three or four townships as a unit for distribution, but these are very few. All the inhabitants of the villages, men and women, old and young, receive equal shares. Now, in accordance with the Central Committee's method, the criterion has been changed to labour power, so that those able to work receive twice as much as those unable to work.
The question of concessions to the owner-peasants: This has not yet been discussed in detail. The rich peasants among the owner-peasants have put forward the demand that productive capacity be taken as the criterion, that is, that those with more manpower and capital (farm implements and so on) should receive more land. The rich peasants feel that both equal distribution and distribution according to labour power are unfavourable to them. Their view is that, as regards manpower, they are willing to work harder, and, with the addition of their capital, they can reap larger harvests. If they are given the same share as everybody else, their special efforts and surplus capital will be disregarded (left idle), and they are not willing to accept this. Here we are still carrying out the Central Committee's method. But this question should still be discussed, and we will report when we have reached a conclusion.
The land tax: In Ninggang the tax collected is 20 per cent, 5 per cent more than under the Central Committee's method; as collection is already under way, it cannot be changed now, but it will be reduced next year. Besides, the parts of Suichuan, Lingxian and Yongxin within the independent area are all hilly country, and the peasants are so poor that it is not right to tax them. The expenses of the government and the Red Guards are met by expropriating local tyrants in the White areas. As for supplies for the Red Army, rice can for the time being be obtained from the land tax in Ninggang, while money, too, comes entirely from expropriating the local tyrants. During our guerrilla operations in Suichuan in October we raised more than ten thousand dollars, which will last us for a while, and we shall see what can be done when it is spent.
The Question of Political Power
People's political power has been organized everywhere at the county, district and township levels, but more in name than in reality. In many places there are no councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies to speak of. The executive committees of the township, district and even county governments have been elected at some kind of mass meeting. Mass meetings hastily called together cannot discuss questions, cannot give the masses political training, and, moreover, are most easily manipulated by intellectuals or opportunists. Some places do have councils of deputies, but they are regarded merely as temporary bodies for electing the executive committees; once the election is over, authority is monopolized by the committee and the council is never heard of again. Councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies worthy of the name are not non-existent, but they are very few. The reason for this is the lack of propaganda and education about this new political system of councils of deputies. The evil feudal habit of arbitrary dictation is so deeply rooted in the minds of the masses and even of ordinary Party members that it cannot be swept away at once; when anything comes up, they choose the easy way and have no liking for the bothersome democratic system. The system of democratic centralism can be widely and genuinely applied in mass organizations only when its effectiveness has been demonstrated in revolutionary struggle and the masses have come to understand that it is the best means of mobilizing their strength and is of the greatest help in their struggle. We are drawing up detailed organic laws for the councils of deputies at all levels (based on the outline of the Central Committee), so as gradually to correct the errors of the past. In the Red Army, conferences of soldiers' deputies at all levels are now being set up on a regular basis, to correct the past error of having only soldiers' committees and no soldiers' councils.
What the people generally know as the "workers', peasants' and soldiers' government" means the committees, because they do not yet recognize the power of the councils of deputies and think that the committees are the real organs of power. Executive committees without the backing of a congress of deputies often act without regard to the views of the masses; hesitation and compromise over the confiscation and distribution of land, the squandering and embezzlement of funds, and the avoidance of the White forces or irresolute struggle against them are found everywhere. Moreover, the committees seldom hold plenary sessions, and matters are decided by the standing committees. In the district and township governments even the standing committees seldom meet, and matters are dealt with and decided individually by the chairman, the secretary, the treasurer or the commander of the Red Guards (or of the insurrection detachment), these four being permanently on duty at the government offices. Thus democratic centralism has not become customary in the work of the government either.
In the early days, the small landlords and rich peasants scrambled to get on to the government committees, especially at the township level. Wearing red ribbons and feigning enthusiasm, they wormed their way into the government committees by trickery and seized control of everything, so that the poor-peasant members were left with only minor roles. They can be got rid of only when their masks are torn off in the course of struggle and the poor-peasant class rises up. Although this phenomenon is not universal, it has been found in a great many places.
The Party enjoys immense prestige and authority among the masses, the government much less. The reason is that, for the sake of convenience, the Party has done many things directly itself, pushing the organs of political power aside. This happens a great deal. In some places there are no Party groups in the organs of political power, and in others where they exist they are not functioning properly. From now on the Party must carry out its task of giving leadership to the government; with the exception of propaganda, the Party's policies and measures must be carried out through the government organizations. The wrong practice of the Kuomintang of issuing orders directly to the government is to be avoided.
Questions of Party Organization
The course of the struggle against opportunism: Around the time of the Horse Day Incident, the Party in the border counties may be said to have been controlled by opportunism. When the counter-revolution came, there was very little resolute struggle. In October of last year, when the Red Army (the First Regiment of the First Division of the First Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army) arrived in the border counties, only a few Party members remained who had fled into hiding, and the Party organizations had been completely destroyed by the enemy. The period from November to April of this year was one of rebuilding the Party, and the period after May one of great expansion. Over the past year, manifestations of opportunism have still been found everywhere in the Party: some Party members, lacking the will to fight, hide in the depths of the mountains when the enemy comes, which they call "lying in ambush"; other Party members, though full of activity, slide into blind insurrectionism. Both are expressions of petty-bourgeois ideology. After a long period of tempering in struggle and of education within the Party, such things have gradually diminished. At the same time, this petty-bourgeois ideology also exists in the Red Army. When the enemy comes, some advocate a desperate fight, or else running away. Both ideas often come from the same person in the course of a discussion on military operations. Only after a long period of inner-Party struggle and the lessons of objective facts, for example, suffering losses in a desperate fight or suffering defeat in running away, have they gradually been changed.
Localism: The economy of the border area is agricultural, and some places are still at the stage of the pestle and mortar (in the hill areas rice is mostly husked with pestle and mortar, while in the flat country there are many stone mortars). The prevailing social organization everywhere is the clan, with each clan of one surname as a unit. As regards Party organization in the villages, because of the way people live, many branches are made up of Party members of a single surname, so that a branch meeting is practically a clan meeting at the same time. Under such circumstances it is truly very hard to build "a militant Bolshevik Party". They barely understand when told that the Communists recognize no national or provincial boundaries, and they barely understand that they should recognize no county, district or township boundaries either. Localism is very strong between the counties, and there is deep localism even between the districts, and even the townships, within a county. Reasoning can at best bring about some slight change in this localism; for the most part it depends on the non-local oppression of the White forces. For instance, only when the counter-revolutionary "joint suppression" campaigns of the two provinces gave the people common interests in the struggle could their localism gradually be broken down. After many such lessons, localism has decreased.
The question of the native and the Hakka inhabitants: There is another peculiar feature in the border counties, namely the division between the natives and the Hakkas. There exists a deep rift between the native inhabitants and the Hakkas, who migrated from the North several hundred years ago; the historical feud between them is very deep, and sometimes it breaks out in fierce struggles. The Hakkas, numbering perhaps several million, live in an area stretching from the borders of Fujian and Guangdong along the border of Hunan and Jiangxi as far as southern Hubei. The Hakkas occupy the hill country and are oppressed by the natives, who occupy the plains, and they have never had any political rights. They welcomed the national revolution of the year before last and of last year, thinking that their day had come. Unexpectedly, the revolution was defeated and the Hakkas continued to be oppressed by the natives. Within our area there is a native-Hakka problem in Ninggang, Suichuan, Lingxian and Chaling, and it is most serious in Ninggang. From the year before last to last year, the native revolutionaries of Ninggang, joining with the Hakkas under the leadership of the Communist Party, overthrew the political power of the native landlord-gentry and took control of the whole county. In June of last year the Jiangxi government of Zhu Peide turned against the revolution, and in September the landlord-gentry led Zhu Peide's troops to "suppress" Ninggang, stirring up afresh the struggle between the native and the Hakka people. In principle, this division between natives and Hakkas ought not to extend into the exploited classes of workers and peasants, still less into the Communist Party. But in fact, because of habits handed down over many years, the division still persists. For example, after the August defeat on the border, the native landlord-gentry led the reactionary troops back to Ninggang, spreading the propaganda that the Hakkas were about to kill the natives; most of the native peasants went over to the enemy, put on white ribbons, and led the White army in burning houses and searching the hills. When the Red Army defeated the White army in October and November, the native peasants fled with the reactionaries, and the Hakka peasants in turn confiscated the property of the native peasants. This situation is reflected in the Party, and senseless struggles often occur. Our method is, on the one hand, to spread the propaganda "We will not kill the peasants who went over to the enemy" and "Peasants who went over to the enemy will get land just the same when they come back", so as to get them away from the influence of the landlord-gentry and return home with their minds at ease; and, on the other hand, to have the county government order the Hakka peasants to return the confiscated property to its owners, and issue notices that the native peasants will be protected. Within the Party, education is being intensified to ensure unity between the two sections of Party members.
The defection of the opportunists: During the revolutionary high tide (in June), many opportunists took advantage of the open recruitment of Party members to sneak into the Party, and Party membership in the border area rose at once to more than ten thousand. Since most of the leaders of the branches and the district committees were new members, good inner-Party education was impossible. As soon as the White terror struck, the opportunists went over to the enemy and led the reactionaries in seizing our comrades, and most of the Party organizations in the White areas collapsed. From September onward the Party was rigorously purged, and strict restrictions were placed on the qualifications for membership. The Party organizations of the two counties of Yongxin and Ninggang were entirely dissolved and re-registration was carried out. Party membership was greatly reduced, but its fighting capacity increased. Formerly the Party organizations were entirely open; since September, secret organizations have been built so as to be able to carry on activities even when the reactionaries come. At the same time we have pushed into the White areas in many ways and are operating inside the enemy camp. But in the nearby towns we still have no Party foundation. The reasons are, first, that the enemy is stronger in the towns, and, second, that when our army occupied these towns it damaged the interests of the bourgeoisie too much, making it difficult for Party members to gain a footing there. We are now correcting these mistakes and trying hard to build up our organizations in the towns, but so far without much success.
The leading bodies of the Party: The branch executive has been renamed the branch committee. Above the branch is the district committee, and above the district committee the county committee. Where special circumstances require, a special district committee is formed between the district and county committees, as with the Northern Section Special District and the South-eastern Special District in Yongxin. There are five county committees in the border area, Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, Suichuan and Lingxian. There was a county committee in Chaling, but since our work could not take hold there, most of the many organizations built last winter and this spring were smashed by the White forces, and for the past six months we have been able to work only in the hill areas near Ninggang and Yongxin; so the county committee has been changed into a special district committee. To reach Youxian and Anren one must pass through Chaling; we sent people there, but they returned without accomplishing anything. In January the Wan'an County Committee held a joint meeting with us in Suichuan, but for the greater part of the year we were cut off from it by the White forces; only in September, when the Red Army made a guerrilla foray into Wan'an, did we make contact again. Eighty revolutionary peasants followed us to the Jinggang Mountains and were organized into the Wan'an Red Guards. There is no Party organization in Anfu. Ji'an borders on Yongxin, but the Ji'an County Committee has made contact with us only twice and has given us no help whatsoever, which is very strange. In the Shatian area of Guidong, land was distributed twice, in March and in August, and Party organizations were built; these come under the Southern Hunan Special Committee, centred on the twelve caves of Longxi. Above the county committees is the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee. On May 20 the First Congress of the Party in the border area was held at Maoping in Ninggang and elected twenty-three members of the first Special Committee, with Mao Zedong as secretary. In July the Hunan Provincial Committee sent Yang Kaiming, and Yang became acting secretary. In September Yang fell ill, and Tan Zhenlin became acting secretary. In August, when the main force of the Red Army went to southern Hunan and the White forces were bearing down heavily on the border area, we held an emergency meeting in Yongxin. In October, after the Red Army had returned to Ninggang, the Second Congress of the Party in the border area was convened at Maoping. It met for three days beginning on October 4, adopted resolutions including "The Political Problems and the Tasks of the Border Area Party Organization", and elected the following nineteen persons as members of the second Special Committee: Tan Zhenlin, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Long Chaoqing, Zhu Changxie, Liu Tiangan, Pan Yuanzhu, Tan Sicong, Tan Bing, Li Quefei, Zhu Yiyue, Yuan Wencai, Wang Zuonong, Chen Zhengren, Mao Zedong, Wan Xixian, Wang Zuo, Yang Kaiming and He Tingying. Five were made members of the standing committee, with Tan Zhenlin (a worker) as secretary and Chen Zhengren (an intellectual) as deputy secretary. On November 14 the Sixth Congress of the Red Army elected twenty-three persons to form the Army Committee, five of them as members of the standing committee, with Zhu De as secretary. The Special Committee and the Army Committee are both subordinate to the Front Committee. The Front Committee was reconstituted on November 6, as designated by the Central Committee, and consists of five persons, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, the secretary of the local Party organization (Tan Zhenlin), a worker comrade (Song Qiaosheng) and a peasant comrade (Mao Kewen), with Mao Zedong as secretary. For the time being the Front Committee has set up a secretariat, a propaganda section, an organization section, a labour movement commission and a military commission. The Front Committee directs the local Party. It is still necessary to keep the Special Committee, because the Front Committee sometimes has to move with the army. We feel that the question of proletarian ideological leadership is a very important one. The Party organizations in the border counties are composed almost entirely of peasants, and unless they are given proletarian ideological leadership, they will tend to go astray. Besides paying active attention to the labour movement in the county towns and larger market towns, we should increase the representation of workers in the organs of political power. The proportion of workers and poor peasants should also be increased in the leading bodies of the Party at all levels.
The Question of the Character of the Revolution
We fully agree with the resolution of the Communist International on China. There is no doubt that China is still at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The programme for a thoroughgoing democratic revolution in China comprises, externally, the overthrow of imperialism so as to achieve complete national liberation, and, internally, the elimination of the power of the comprador class in the cities, the completion of the agrarian revolution and the abolition of feudal relations in the countryside, and the overthrow of the warlord government. Only by passing through such a democratic revolution can a real basis be laid for the transition to socialism. In the past year we have fought in many places and are keenly aware that the revolutionary tide in the country as a whole is ebbing. On the one hand, Red political power has been established in a few small areas; on the other, the people of the country as a whole still lack ordinary democratic rights; the workers, the peasants and even the democratic sections of the bourgeoisie have no freedom of speech or assembly, and joining the Communist Party is the greatest of crimes. Wherever the Red Army goes, the masses are cold and aloof, and only after our propaganda do they slowly bestir themselves. Whatever enemy unit we face, we have to fight it out hard; there are hardly any mutinies or uprisings within the enemy forces. Even the Sixth Army, which recruited the most "rioters" after the Horse Day Incident, is no exception. We are keenly aware of our loneliness, and we are constantly hoping for the end of this lonely life. To pass into a seething, nationwide revolutionary upsurge, it is necessary to launch a political and economic struggle for democracy, embracing also the urban petty bourgeoisie; this is the road that must be travelled.
Up to February of this year, we carried out our policy towards the petty bourgeoisie comparatively well. In March, representatives of the Southern Hunan Special Committee came to Ninggang and criticized us for being too far to the Right, for not burning and killing enough, and for not carrying out the so-called policy of "turning the petty bourgeois into proletarians and then forcing them into the revolution"; whereupon the leadership of the former Front Committee was changed and the policy changed. After the whole army came to the border area in April, there was still not much burning and killing, but the confiscation of the property of middle merchants in the towns and the levies imposed on the small landlords and rich peasants in the countryside were carried out very severely. The slogan put forward by the Southern Hunan Special Committee, "All factories to the workers", was also widely propagated. This ultra-Left policy of attacking the petty bourgeoisie drove most of them to the side of the landlord-gentry, so that they put on white ribbons and opposed us. Lately this policy has been gradually changed and the situation has been gradually improving. Particularly good results have been obtained in Suichuan, where the merchants in the county town and the market towns no longer shun us, and quite a few speak well of the Red Army. The fair at Caolinxu (held at midday, once every three days) is attended by twenty thousand people, which has never happened before. This shows that our policy is now correct. The landlord-gentry imposed very heavy taxes and levies on the people; the Suichuan Pacification Corps levied five tolls along the seventy-li road from Huang'ao to Caolin, and no farm produce was exempt. We smashed the Pacification Corps and abolished these tolls, winning the support of all the peasants and of the small and middle merchants.
The Central Committee wants us to issue a political programme that takes into account the interests of the petty bourgeoisie; we, for our part, propose that the Central Committee draw up a programme for the democratic revolution as a whole, embracing the interests of the workers, the agrarian revolution and national liberation, so that every locality has something to follow.
One characteristic of the revolution in China, where the economy is predominantly agricultural, is the use of military action to develop insurrection. We recommend that the Central Committee devote great efforts to military work.
The Question of the Location of Our Independent Regime
The area from the northern part of Guangdong along the Hunan-Jiangxi border to southern Hubei lies wholly within the Luoxiao mountain range. We have traversed the entire range, and by comparison of its different parts, the middle section, with Ninggang as its centre, is the most suitable for our armed independent regime. The terrain of the northern section is not as good as that of the middle section for either advance or defence, and it is too close to the major political centres; unless there is a plan to take Changsha or Wuhan swiftly, it is very dangerous to station the bulk of our forces in the area of Liuyang, Liling, Pingxiang and Tonggu. The terrain of the southern section is better than that of the northern, but our mass base there is not as good as in the middle section, and its political influence on the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi is also smaller; it is not like the middle section, where every action can influence the lower reaches of the rivers in the two provinces. The advantages of the middle section are: (1) a mass base that we have been building up for more than a year; (2) a fairly good foundation for the Party organizations; (3) local armed forces, rich in experience of struggle, which have been built up over more than a year, a thing very hard to come by; these local armed forces, together with the Fourth Red Army, cannot be destroyed by any enemy force whatsoever; (4) an excellent military base, the Jinggang Mountains, and bases for the local armed forces in every county; (5) its influence on the two provinces, and on the lower reaches of the rivers in the two provinces, which gives it a political significance altogether different from that of southern Hunan or southern Jiangxi, whose influence extends to only one province, and to the upper reaches and remote areas of that province. The disadvantage of the middle section is that, as it has been under the independent regime for a long time and faces large "encirclement and suppression" forces, its economic problems, especially the shortage of cash, are extremely difficult.
Within a few weeks in June and July, the Hunan Provincial Committee changed its proposals for our plan of action here three times. First Yuan Desheng came and approved the plan for political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao range. Then Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming came and urged that the Red Army should push towards southern Hunan without the slightest hesitation, leaving only two hundred rifles to defend the border area together with the Red Guards; this, they said, was the "absolutely correct" policy. The third time, Yuan Desheng came again, barely ten days later, with a letter which, besides giving us a long dressing-down, urged that the Red Army should go to eastern Hunan; this again was described as the "absolutely correct" policy, and again we were to go "without the slightest hesitation". Faced with such rigid instructions, we were in a real dilemma: not to comply would be close to insubordination, while to comply meant certain defeat. When the second letter arrived, the Army Committee, the Special Committee and the Yongxin County Committee held a joint meeting, considered it dangerous to go to southern Hunan, and decided not to carry out the Provincial Committee's views. A few days later, however, Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming, insisting on the Provincial Committee's views and exploiting the home-sickness of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, dragged the Red Army off to attack Chenzhou, causing the defeat of both the border area and the Red Army. The Red Army lost about half its strength; in the border area, countless houses were burned down and countless people killed; one county after another was lost, and to this day not all of them have been recovered. As for going to eastern Hunan, so long as the landlord-gentry regimes in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi have not split, the main force of the Red Army should on no account be sent there. Had there been no expedition to southern Hunan in July, not only could the August defeat in the border area have been avoided, but we could have taken advantage of the fighting between the Kuomintang Sixth Army and Wang Jun at Zhangshu in Jiangxi to smash the enemy forces in Yongxin, sweep through Ji'an and Anfu, and push our vanguard to Pingxiang, thus linking up with the Fifth Red Army in the northern section. Even at that time, Ninggang should have remained our general headquarters, and only guerrilla units should have been sent to eastern Hunan. Since war had not broken out among the landlord-gentry, and powerful enemy forces were still present in Lingxian, Chaling and Youxian on the Hunan border, had our main force moved north, the enemy would certainly have taken advantage of it. The Central Committee wants us to consider going to eastern Hunan or to southern Hunan; both would be very dangerous in practice. The proposal to go to eastern Hunan was not carried out, but the southern Hunan expedition has already proved it. This bitter experience is worth our remembering at all times.
At present the rule of the landlord-gentry class has not yet split, and the enemy forces surrounding the border area for the "suppression" campaign still number more than ten regiments. But if we can continue to find ways of solving the problem of cash (grain and clothing are no longer major problems), then, relying on the foundation we have in the border area, we can deal with these enemy forces, and even larger ones. For the sake of the border area, if the Red Army were to leave, ravages like those of August would immediately recur. Although the Red Guards would not be completely wiped out, the Party and our mass base would suffer a crushing blow; apart from the mountain strongholds, where some of the independent regime could be preserved, everything in the flat country would have to go underground, as in August and September. If the Red Army does not leave, then, with our present foundation, we can gradually expand in all directions, and the prospects are very bright. For the sake of the Red Army, if it wants to expand, the only way is to wage a prolonged struggle against the enemy around the Jinggang Mountains, where we have a mass base, that is, in the four counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lingxian and Suichuan, taking advantage of the conflicting interests of the Hunan and Jiangxi enemies, who must defend themselves on all sides and cannot concentrate their forces. By using correct tactics, fighting no battle unless we can win it and taking prisoners and booty in every battle we fight, we can gradually expand the Red Army. Given the preparations made by the masses in the border area between April and July, the Red Army would undoubtedly have expanded in August had its main force not made the expedition to southern Hunan. Although we made one mistake, the Red Army has come back to the border area, which enjoys favourable terrain and the support of the people, and the prospects are still not bad. Only in places like the border area can the Red Army, if it makes up its mind to struggle and has the courage to sustain it, increase its weapons and train good soldiers. The red flag has now been flying in the border area for a full year. Although, on the one hand, it has aroused the bitter hatred of the landlord-gentry class of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi and even of the whole country, on the other hand it has gradually aroused the hopes of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers in the neighbouring provinces. Take the soldiers: because the warlords regard the "bandit suppression" campaign against the border area as a major undertaking, with talk such as "a year's bandit suppression has cost a million dollars" (Lu Diping) and "they are said to number twenty thousand, with five thousand rifles" (Wang Jun), the attention of the enemy soldiers and of the lower-ranking officers who have no way out is gradually being drawn to us, and more and more of them will break away and come over to us; this is yet another source for the expansion of the Red Army. Moreover, the fact that the red flag in the border area has never been lowered shows not only the strength of the Communist Party but also the bankruptcy of the ruling classes, and this is of great significance in national politics. Therefore we have always held that the creation and expansion of political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao range is entirely necessary and entirely correct.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
湘赣边界的割据和八月失败
一国之内,在四围白色政权的包围中间,产生一小块或若干小块的红色政权区域,在目前的世界上只有中国有这种事。我们分析它发生的原因之一,在于中国有买办豪绅阶级间的不断的分裂和战争。只要买办豪绅阶级间的分裂和战争是继续的,则工农武装割据的存在和发展也将是能够继续的。此外,工农武装割据的存在和发展,还需要具备下列的条件:(1)有很好的群众;(2)有很好的党;(3)有相当力量的红军;(4)有便利于作战的地势;(5)有足够给养的经济力。
在统治阶级政权的暂时稳定的时期和破裂的时期,割据地区对四围统治阶级必须采取不同的战略。在统治阶级内部发生破裂时期,例如两湖在李宗仁唐生智战争时期,广东在张发奎李济深战争时期,我们的战略可以比较地冒进,用军事发展割据的地方可以比较地广大。但是仍然需要注意建立中心区域的坚实基础,以备白色恐怖到来时有所恃而不恐。若在统治阶级政权比较稳定的时期,例如今年四月以后的南方各省,则我们的战略必须是逐渐地推进的。这时在军事上最忌分兵冒进,在地方工作方面(分配土地,建立政权,发展党,组织地方武装)最忌把人力分得四散,而不注意建立中心区域的坚实基础。各地许多小块红色区域的失败,不是客观上条件不具备,就是主观上策略有错误。至于策略之所以错误,全在未曾把统治阶级政权暂时稳定的时期和破裂的时期这两个不同的时期分别清楚。有些同志在统治阶级政权暂时稳定的时期,也主张分兵冒进,甚至主张只用赤卫队保卫大块地方,好像完全不知道敌人方面除了挨户团之外还有正式军队集中来打的一回事。在地方工作方面,则完全不注意建立中心区域的坚实的基础,不顾主观力量的可能,只图无限量的推广。如果遇到什么人在军事方面主张采取逐步推广的政策,在地方工作方面主张集中力量建立中心区域的坚实基础,以求自立于不败之地,则谥之曰“保守主义”。他们的这种错误意见,就是今年八月湘赣边界失败以及同时红军第四军在湘南失败的根本原因。
湘赣边界的工作,从去年十月做起。开头,各县完全没有了党的组织,地方武装只袁文才、王佐各六十枝坏枪在井冈山附近,永新、莲花、茶陵、酃县四县农民自卫军枪枝全数缴给了豪绅阶级,群众革命情绪已经被压下去了。到今年二月,宁冈、永新、茶陵、遂川都有了党的县委,酃县有了特别区委,莲花亦开始建立了党的组织,和万安县委发生了关系。地方武装,除酃县外,各县都有了少数。在宁冈、茶陵、遂川、永新,特别是遂川、永新二县,进行了很多次打倒豪绅、发动群众的游击暴动,成绩都还好。这个时期,土地革命还没有深入。政权机关称为工农兵政府。军中组织了士兵委员会。部队分开行动时,则组织行动委员会指挥之。这时党的高级指导机关,是秋收起义时湖南省委任命的前敌委员会(毛泽东任书记)。三月上旬,前委因湘南特委的要求而取消,改组为师委(何挺颖为书记),变成单管军中党的机关,对地方党不能过问。同时毛部又因湘南特委的要求调往湘南,遂使边界被敌占领者一个多月。三月底湘南失败,四月朱、毛两部及湘南农军退到宁冈,再开始边界的割据。
四月以后,湘赣边界的割据,正值南方统治势力暂时稳定的时候,湘赣两省派来“进剿”的反动军队,至少有八九个团,多的时候到过十八个团。然而我们以不足四个团的兵力,和敌人斗争了四个月之久,使割据地区一天一天扩大,土地革命一天一天深入,民众政权一天一天推广,红军和赤卫队一天一天扩大,原因就在于边界党(地方的党和军队的党)的政策是正确的。当时边界特委(毛泽东为书记)和军委(陈毅为书记)的政策是:坚决地和敌人作斗争,造成罗霄山脉中段政权,反对逃跑主义;深入割据地区的土地革命;军队的党帮助地方党的发展,军队的武装帮助地方武装的发展;对统治势力比较强大的湖南取守势,对统治势力比较薄弱的江西取攻势;用大力经营永新,创造群众的割据,布置长期斗争;集中红军相机迎击当前之敌,反对分兵,避免被敌人各个击破;割据地区的扩大采取波浪式的推进政策,反对冒进政策。因为这些策略的适当,加以边界地形的利于斗争,湘赣两省进攻军队的不尽一致,于是才有四月至七月四个月的各次军事胜利和群众割据的发展。虽以数倍于我之敌,不但不能破坏此割据,且亦不能阻止此割据的发展。此割据对湘赣两省的影响,则有日益扩大之势。八月失败,完全在于一部分同志不明了当时正是统治阶级暂时稳定时期,反而采取在统治阶级破裂时期的政策,分兵向湘南冒进,致使边界和湘南同归失败。湖南省委代表杜修经和省委派充边界特委书记的杨开明,乘力持异议的毛泽东、宛希先诸人远在永新的时候,不察当时的环境,不顾军委、特委、永新县委联席会议不同意湖南省委主张的决议,只知形式地执行湖南省委向湘南去的命令,附和红军第二十九团(成分是宜章农民)逃避斗争欲回家乡的情绪,因而招致边界和湘南两方面的失败。
原来七月中旬,湖南敌人第八军吴尚侵入宁冈,再进永新,求战不得(我军从间道出击不值),畏我群众,仓卒经莲花退回茶陵。这时红军大队正由宁冈进攻酃县、茶陵,并在酃县变计折赴湘南,而江西敌人第三军王均、金汉鼎部五个团,第六军胡文斗部六个团,又协力进攻永新。此时我军只有一个团在永新,在广大群众的掩护之下,用四面游击的方式,将此十一团敌军困在永新县城附近三十里内至二十五天之久。最后因敌人猛攻,才失去永新,随后又失去莲花、宁冈。这时江西敌人忽然发生内讧,胡文斗的第六军仓皇退去,随即和王均的第三军战于樟树。留下的赣军五个团,亦仓皇退至永新城内。设我大队不往湘南,击溃此敌,使割据地区推广至吉安、安福、萍乡,和平江、浏阳衔接起来,是完全有可能的。大队已不在,我一团兵复疲惫不堪,乃决留一部分会同袁、王两部守井冈山,而由我率兵一部往桂东方向迎还大队。此时大队已由湘南退向桂东,八月二十三日我们在桂东得到会合。
红军大队七月中刚到酃县时,第二十九团官兵即因政治动摇,欲回湘南家乡,不受约束;第二十八团反对往湘南,欲往赣南,但也不愿回永新。杜修经导扬第二十九团的错误意见,军委亦未能加以阻止,大队遂于七月十七日由酃县出发,向郴州前进。七月二十四日与敌范石生战于郴州,先胜后败,撤出战斗。第二十九团随即自由行动,跑向宜章家乡,结果一部在乐昌被土匪胡凤章消灭,一部散在郴宜各地,不知所终,当日收集的不过百人。幸主力第二十八团损失不大,于八月十八日占领桂东。二十三日,会合从井冈山来的部队,议决经崇义、上犹重回井冈山。当到崇义时,营长袁崇全率一步兵连一炮兵连叛变,虽然追回了这两个连,但牺牲了团长王尔琢。八月三十日敌湘赣两军各一部乘我军欲归未归之际,攻击井冈山。我守军不足一营,凭险抵抗,将敌击溃,保存了这个根据地。
此次失败的原因是:(1)一部官兵动摇思家,失掉战斗力;一部官兵不愿往湘南,缺乏积极性。(2)盛暑远征,兵力疲惫。(3)从酃县冒进数百里,和边界失去联系,成了孤军。(4)湘南群众未起来,成了单纯的军事冒险。(5)敌情不明。(6)准备不好,官兵不了解作战的意义。
割据地区的现势
今年四月以来,红色区域逐渐推广。六月二十三日龙源口(永新宁冈交界)一战,第四次击破江西敌人之后,我区有宁冈、永新、莲花三个全县,吉安、安福各一小部,遂川北部,酃县东南部,是为边界全盛时期。在红色区域,土地大部分配了,小部在分配中。区乡政权普遍建立。宁冈、永新、莲花、遂川都有县政府,并成立了边界政府。乡村普遍组织了工农暴动队,区县两级则有赤卫队。七月赣敌进攻,八月湘赣两敌会攻井冈山,边界各县的县城及平原地区尽为敌据。为虎作伥的保安队、挨户团横行无忌,白色恐怖布满城乡。党的组织和政权的组织大部塌台。富农和党内的投机分子纷纷反水。八月三十日井冈山一战,湘敌始退往酃县,赣敌仍盘踞各县城及大部乡村。然而山区是敌人始终无法夺取的,这在宁冈有西北两区,在永新有北乡的天龙区、西乡的小江区、南乡的万年山区,在莲花有上西区,在遂川有井冈山区,在酃县有青石冈和大院区。七、八两月,红军一个团配合各县赤卫队、暴动队大小数十战,仅失枪三十枝,最后退入山区。
我军经崇义、上犹向井冈山回军之际,赣南敌军独立第七师刘士毅部追至遂川。九月十三日,我军击败刘士毅,缴枪数百,占领遂川。九月二十六日回到井冈山。十月一日,与敌熊式辉部周浑元旅战于宁冈获胜,收复宁冈全县。此时湘敌驻桂东的阎仲儒部有一百二十六人投入我军,编为特务营,毕占云为营长。十一月九日,我军又击破周旅一个团于宁冈城和龙源口。翌日进占永新,随即退回宁冈。目前我区南自遂川井冈山南麓,北至莲花边界,包括宁冈全县,遂川、酃县、永新各一部,成一南北狭长的整块。莲花的上西区,永新的天龙区、万年山区,则和整块不甚连属。敌人企图以军事进攻和经济封锁消灭我们的根据地,我们正在准备打破敌人的进攻。
军事问题
边界的斗争,完全是军事的斗争,党和群众不得不一齐军事化。怎样对付敌人,怎样作战,成了日常生活的中心问题。所谓割据,必须是武装的。哪一处没有武装,或者武装不够,或者对付敌人的策略错了,地方就立即被敌人占去了。这种斗争,一天比一天激烈,问题也就非常地繁复和严重。
边界红军的来源:(一)潮汕叶贺旧部;(二)前武昌国民政府警卫团;(三)平浏的农民;(四)湘南的农民和水口山的工人;(五)许克祥、唐生智、白崇禧、朱培德、吴尚、熊式辉等部的俘虏兵;(六)边界各县的农民。但是叶贺旧部、警卫团和平浏农民,经过一年多的战斗,只剩下三分之一。湘南农民,伤亡也大。因此,前四项虽然至今还是红军第四军的骨干,但已远不如后二项多。后二项中又以敌军俘虏为多,设无此项补充,则兵员大成问题。虽然如此,兵的增加和枪的增加仍不相称,枪不容易损失,兵有伤、亡、病、逃,损失甚易。湖南省委答应送安源工人来此,亟盼实行。
红军成分,一部是工人、农民,一部是游民无产者。游民成分太多,当然不好。但因天天在战斗,伤亡又大,游民分子却有战斗力,能找到游民补充已属不易。在此种情形下,只有加紧政治训练的一法。
红军士兵大部分是由雇佣军队来的,但一到红军即变了性质。首先是红军废除了雇佣制,使士兵感觉不是为他人打仗,而是为自己为人民打仗。红军至今没有什么正规的薪饷制,只发粮食、油盐柴菜钱和少数的零用钱。红军官兵中的边界本地人都分得了土地,只是远籍人分配土地颇为困难。
经过政治教育,红军士兵都有了阶级觉悟,都有了分配土地、建立政权和武装工农等项常识,都知道是为了自己和工农阶级而作战。因此,他们能在艰苦的斗争中不出怨言。连、营、团都有了士兵会,代表士兵利益,并做政治工作和民众工作。
党代表制度,经验证明不能废除。特别是在连一级,因党的支部建设在连上,党代表更为重要。他要督促士兵委员会进行政治训练,指导民运工作,同时要担任党的支部书记。事实证明,哪一个连的党代表较好,哪一个连就较健全,而连长在政治上却不易有这样大的作用。因为下级干部死伤太多,敌军俘虏兵往往过来不久,就要当连排长;今年二三月间的俘虏兵,现在有当了营长的。从表面看,似乎既称红军,就可以不要党代表了,实在大谬不然。第二十八团在湘南曾经取消了党代表,后来又恢复了。改称指导员,则和国民党的指导员相混,为俘虏兵所厌恶。且易一名称,于制度的本质无关。故我们决定不改。党代表伤亡太多,除自办训练班训练补充外,希望中央和两省委派可充党代表的同志至少三十人来。
普通的兵要训练半年一年才能打仗,我们的兵,昨天入伍今天就要打仗,简直无所谓训练。军事技术太差,作战只靠勇敢。长时间的休息训练是不可能的,只有设法避开一些战斗,争取时间训练,看可能否。为着训练下级军官,现在办了一个百五十人的教导队,准备经常办下去。希望中央和两省委多派连排长以上的军官来。
湖南省委要我们注意士兵的物质生活,至少要比普通工农的生活好些。现在则相反,除粮食外,每天每人只有五分大洋的油盐柴菜钱,还是难乎为继。仅仅发油盐柴菜钱,每月也需现洋万元以上,全靠打土豪供给。现在全军五千人的冬衣,有了棉花,还缺少布。这样冷了,许多士兵还是穿两层单衣。好在苦惯了。而且什么人都是一样苦,从军长到伙夫,除粮食外一律吃五分钱的伙食。发零用钱,两角即一律两角,四角即一律四角。因此士兵也不怨恨什么人。
作战一次,就有一批伤兵。由于营养不足、受冻和其它原因,官兵病的很多。医院设在山上,用中西两法治疗,医生药品均缺。现在医院中共有八百多人。湖南省委答应办药,至今不见送到。仍祈中央和两省委送几个西医和一些碘片来。
红军的物质生活如此菲薄,战斗如此频繁,仍能维持不敝,除党的作用外,就是靠实行军队内的民主主义。官长不打士兵,官兵待遇平等,士兵有开会说话的自由,废除烦琐的礼节,经济公开。士兵管理伙食,仍能从每日五分的油盐柴菜钱中节余一点作零用,名曰“伙食尾子”,每人每日约得六七十文。这些办法,士兵很满意。尤其是新来的俘虏兵,他们感觉国民党军队和我们军队是两个世界。他们虽然感觉红军的物质生活不如白军,但是精神得到了解放。同样一个兵,昨天在敌军不勇敢,今天在红军很勇敢,就是民主主义的影响。红军像一个火炉,俘虏兵过来马上就熔化了。中国不但人民需要民主主义,军队也需要民主主义。军队内的民主主义制度,将是破坏封建雇佣军队的一个重要的武器。
党的组织,现分连支部、营委、团委、军委四级。连有支部,班有小组。红军所以艰难奋战而不溃散,“支部建在连上”是一个重要原因。两年前,我们在国民党军中的组织,完全没有抓住士兵,即在叶挺部也还是每团只有一个支部,故经不起严重的考验。现在红军中党员和非党员约为一与三之比,即平均四个人中有一个党员。最近决定在战斗兵中发展党员数量,达到党员非党员各半的目的。现在连支部缺乏好的书记,请中央从各地不能立足的活动分子中派遣多人来此充当。湘南来的工作人员,几乎尽数在军中做党的工作。可是八月间在湘南跑散了一些,所以现在不能调出人去。
地方武装有赤卫队和工农暴动队。暴动队以梭镖、鸟枪为武器,乡为单位,每乡一队,人数以乡的大小为比例。职务是镇压反革命,保卫乡政权,敌人来了帮助红军或赤卫队作战。暴动队始于永新,原是秘密的,夺取全县以后,公开了。这个制度现已推行于边界各县,名称未改。赤卫队的武器主要是五响枪,也有九响和单响枪。各县枪数:宁冈百四十,永新二百二十,莲花四十三,茶陵五十,酃县九十,遂川百三十,万安十,共六百八十三。大部是红军发给的,小部是自己从敌人夺取的。各县赤卫队大都经常地和豪绅的保安队、挨户团作战,战斗力日益增强。马日事变以前,各县有农民自卫军。枪数:攸县三百,茶陵三百,酃县六十,遂川五十,永新八十,莲花六十,宁冈(袁文才部)六十,井冈山(王佐部)六十,共九百七十。马日事变后,除袁、王两部无损失外,仅遂川保存六枝,莲花保存一枝,其余概被豪绅缴去。农民自卫军如此没有把握枪枝的能力,这是机会主义路线的结果。现在各县赤卫队的枪枝还是很不够,不如豪绅的枪多,红军必须继续在武器上给赤卫队以帮助。在不降低红军战斗力的条件之下,必须尽量帮助人民武装起来。我们业经规定红军每营用四连制,每连步枪七十五枝,加上特务连,机关枪连,迫击炮连,团部和三个营部,每团有步枪一千零七十五枝。作战缴获的枪,则尽量武装地方。赤卫队的指挥官,由各县派人进红军所办的教导队受训后充当。由红军派远地人到地方去当队长,必须逐渐减少。朱培德、吴尚亦在武装保安队和挨户团,边界各县豪绅武装的数量和战斗力,颇为可观。我们红色地方武装的扩大,更是刻不容缓。
红军以集中为原则,赤卫队以分散为原则。当此反动政权暂时稳定时期,敌人能集中大量军力来打红军,红军分散是不利的。我们的经验,分兵几乎没有一次不失败,集中兵力以击小于我或等于我或稍大于我之敌,则往往胜利。中央指示我们发展的游击区域,纵横数千里,失之太广,这大概是对我们力量估计过大的缘故。赤卫队则以分散为有利,现在各县赤卫队都采取分散作战办法。
对敌军的宣传,最有效的方法是释放俘虏和医治伤兵。敌军的士兵和营、连、排长被我们俘虏过来,即对他们进行宣传工作,分为愿留愿去两种,愿去的即发路费释放。这样就把敌人所谓“共匪见人就杀”的欺骗,立即打破。杨池生的《九师旬刊》,对于我们的这种办法有“毒矣哉”的惊叹。红军士兵们对于所捉俘虏的抚慰和欢送,十分热烈,在每次“欢送新弟兄大会”上,俘虏兵演说也回报我们以热烈的感激。医治敌方伤兵,效力也很大。聪明的敌人例如李文彬,近来也仿效我们的办法,不杀俘虏,医治被俘伤兵。不过,在再作战时,我们的人还是有拖枪回来的,这样的事已有过两回。此外,文字宣传,如写标语等,也尽力在做。每到一处,壁上写满了口号。惟缺绘图的技术人材,请中央和两省委送几个来。
军事根据地:第一个根据地是井冈山,介在宁冈、酃县、遂川、永新四县之交。北麓是宁冈的茅坪,南麓是遂川的黄坳,两地相距九十里。东麓是永新的拿山,西麓是酃县的水口,两地相距百八十里。四周从拿山起经龙源口(以上永新)、新城、茅坪、大陇(以上宁冈)、十都、水口、下村(以上酃县)、营盘圩、戴家埔、大汾、堆子前、黄坳、五斗江、车坳(以上遂川)到拿山,共计五百五十里。山上大井、小井、上井、中井、下井、茨坪、下庄、行洲、草坪、白银湖、罗浮各地,均有水田和村庄,为自来土匪、散军窟宅之所,现在作了我们的根据地。但人口不满两千,产谷不满万担,军粮全靠宁冈、永新、遂川三县输送。山上要隘,都筑了工事。医院、被服厂、军械处、各团留守处,均在这里。现在正从宁冈搬运粮食上山。若有充足的给养,敌人是打不进来的。第二个根据地是宁冈、永新、莲花、茶陵四县交界的九陇山,重要性不及井冈山,为四县地方武装的最后根据地,也筑了工事。在四围白色政权中间的红色割据,利用山险是必要的。
土地问题
边界土地状况:大体说来,土地的百分之六十以上在地主手里,百分之四十以下在农民手里。江西方面,遂川的土地最集中,约百分之八十是地主的。永新次之,约百分之七十是地主的。万安、宁冈、莲花自耕农较多,但地主的土地仍占比较的多数,约百分之六十,农民只占百分之四十。湖南方面,茶陵、酃县两县均有约百分之七十的土地在地主手中。
中间阶级问题:在上述土地状况之下,没收一切土地重新分配,是能得到大多数人拥护的。但农村中略分为三种阶级,即大、中地主阶级,小地主、富农的中间阶级,中农、贫农阶级。富农往往与小地主利害联在一起。富农土地在土地总额中占少数,但与小地主土地合计,则数量颇大。这种情形,恐全国亦差不多。边界对于土地是采取全部没收、彻底分配的政策;故在红色区域,豪绅阶级和中间阶级,同被打击。政策是如此,实际执行时却大受中间阶级的阻碍。当革命初期,中间阶级表面上投降贫农阶级,实际则利用他们从前的社会地位及家族主义,恐吓贫农,延宕分田的时间。到无可延宕时,即隐瞒土地实数,或自据肥田,把瘠田让人。此时期内,贫农因长期地被摧残及感觉革命胜利无保障,往往接受中间阶级的意见,不敢积极行动。必待进至革命高涨,如得了全县甚至几县政权,反动军队几次战败,红军的威力几次表现之后,农村中才有对于中间阶级的积极行动。如永新南乡,是中间阶级最多的地方,延宕分田及隐瞒土地也最厉害。到六月二十三日龙源口红军大胜之后,区政府又处理了几个延宕分田的人,才实际地分下去。但是无论哪一县,封建的家族组织十分普遍,多是一姓一个村子,或一姓几个村子,非有一个比较长的时间,村子内阶级分化不能完成,家族主义不能战胜。
白色恐怖下中间阶级的反水:中间阶级在革命高涨时受到打击,白色恐怖一来,马上反水。引导反动军队大烧永新、宁冈革命农民的房子的,就是两县的小地主和富农。他们依照反动派的指示,烧屋、捉人,十分勇敢。红军再度到宁冈新城、古城、砻市一带时,有数千农民听信反动派的共产党将要杀死他们的宣传,跟了反动派跑到永新。经过我们“不杀反水农民”、“欢迎反水农民回来割禾”的宣传之后,才有一些农民慢慢地跑回来。
全国革命低潮时,割据地区最困难的问题,就在拿不住中间阶级。中间阶级之所以反叛,受到革命的过重打击是主因。然若全国在革命高涨中,贫农阶级有所恃而增加勇气,中间阶级亦有所惧而不敢乱为。当李宗仁唐生智战争向湖南发展时,茶陵的小地主向农民求和,有送猪肉给农民过年的(这时红军已退出茶陵向遂川去了)。李唐战争结束,就不见有这等事了。现在全国是反革命高涨时期,被打击的中间阶级在白色区域内几乎完全附属于豪绅阶级去了,贫农阶级成了孤军。此问题实在严重得很。
日常生活压迫,影响中间阶级反水:红区白区对抗,成为两个敌国。因为敌人的严密封锁和我们对小资产阶级的处理失当这两个原因,两区几乎完全断绝贸易,食盐、布匹、药材等项日常必需品的缺乏和昂贵,木材、茶油等农产品不能输出,农民断绝进款,影响及于一般人民。贫农阶级比较尚能忍受此苦痛,中等阶级到忍不住时,就投降豪绅阶级。中国豪绅军阀的分裂和战争若不是继续进行的,全国革命形势若不是向前发展的,则小块地区的红色割据,在经济上将受到极大的压迫,割据的长期存在将成问题。因为这种经济压迫,不但中等阶级忍不住,工人、贫农和红军亦恐将有耐不住之时。永新、宁冈两县没有盐吃,布匹、药材完全断绝,其它更不必说。现在盐已有卖,但极贵。布匹、药材仍然没有。宁冈及永新西部、遂川北部(以上均目前割据地)出产最多的木材和茶油,仍然运不出去。
土地分配的标准:以乡为分配土地的单位。山多田少地方,如永新之小江区,以三四乡为一个单位去分配的也有,但极少。所有乡村中男女老幼,一律平分。现依中央办法,改以劳动力为标准,能劳动的比不能劳动的多分一倍。
向自耕农让步问题:尚未详细讨论。自耕农中之富农,自己提出要求,欲以生产力为标准,即人工和资本(农具等)多的多分田。富农觉得平均分和按劳动力分两种方法都于他们不利。他们的意思,在人工方面,他们愿意多努力,加上资本的力量,他们可以多得收获。若照普通人一样分了,蔑视了(闲置了)他们的特别努力和多余的资本,他们是不愿意的。此间仍照中央办法执行。但此问题,仍当讨论,候得结论再作报告。
土地税:宁冈收的是百分之二十,比中央办法多收半成,已在征收中,不好变更,明年再减。此外,遂川、酃县、永新各一部在割据区域内,都是山地,农民太苦,不好收税。政府和赤卫队用费,靠向白色区域打土豪。至于红军给养,米暂可从宁冈土地税取得,钱亦完全靠打土豪。十月在遂川游击,筹得万余元,可用一时,用完再讲。
政权问题
县、区、乡各级民众政权是普遍地组织了,但是名不副实。许多地方无所谓工农兵代表会。乡、区两级乃至县一级,政府的执行委员会,都是用一种群众会选举的。一哄而集的群众会,不能讨论问题,不能使群众得到政治训练,又最便于知识分子或投机分子的操纵。一些地方有了代表会,亦仅认为是对执行委员会的临时选举机关;选举完毕,大权揽于委员会,代表会再不谈起。名副其实的工农兵代表会组织,不是没有,只是少极了。所以如此,就是因为缺乏对于代表会这个新的政治制度的宣传和教育。封建时代独裁专断的恶习惯深中于群众乃至一般党员的头脑中,一时扫除不净,遇事贪图便利,不喜欢麻烦的民主制度。民主集中主义的制度,一定要在革命斗争中显出了它的效力,使群众了解它是最能发动群众力量和最利于斗争的,方能普遍地真实地应用于群众组织。我们正在制订详细的各级代表会组织法(依据中央的大纲),把以前的错误逐渐纠正。红军中的各级士兵代表会议,现亦正在使之经常建立起来,纠正从前只有士兵委员会而无士兵代表会的错误。
现在民众普遍知道的“工农兵政府”,是指委员会,因为他们尚不认识代表会的权力,以为委员会才是真正的权力机关。没有代表大会作依靠的执行委员会,其处理事情,往往脱离群众的意见,对没收及分配土地的犹豫妥协,对经费的滥用和贪污,对白色势力的畏避或斗争不坚决,到处发现。委员会也很少开全体会,遇事由常委处决。区乡两级政府则常委会也少开,遇事由主席、秘书、财务或赤卫队长(暴动队长)各自处理决定,这四个人是经常驻会的。所以,民主集中主义,在政府工作中也用得不习惯。
初期的政府委员会中,特别是乡政府一级,小地主富农争着要干。他们挂起红带子,装得很热心,用骗术钻入了政府委员会,把持一切,使贫农委员只作配角。只有在斗争中揭破了他们的假面,贫农阶级起来之后,方能去掉他们。这种现象虽不普遍,但在很多地方都发现了。
党在群众中有极大的威权,政府的威权却差得多。这是由于许多事情为图省便,党在那里直接做了,把政权机关搁置一边。这种情形是很多的。政权机关里的党团组织有些地方没有,有些地方有了也用得不完满。以后党要执行领导政府的任务;党的主张办法,除宣传外,执行的时候必须通过政府的组织。国民党直接向政府下命令的错误办法,是要避免的。
党的组织问题
与机会主义斗争的经过:马日事变前后,边界各县的党,可以说是被机会主义操纵的。当反革命到来时,很少坚决的斗争。去年十月,红军(工农革命军第一军第一师第一团)到达边界各县时,只剩下若干避难藏匿的党员,党的组织全部被敌人破坏了。十一月到今年四月,为重新建党时期,五月以后为大发展时期。一年以来,党内机会主义现象仍然到处发现:一部分党员无斗争决心,敌来躲入深山,叫做“打埋伏”;一部分党员富有积极性,却又流于盲目的暴动。这些都是小资产阶级思想的表现。这种情形,经过长期的斗争锻炼和党内教育,逐渐减少了。同时,在红军中,这种小资产阶级的思想,也是存在的。敌人来了,主张拚一下,否则就要逃跑。这两种思想,往往在讨论作战时由一个人说出来。经过了长时间党内的斗争和客观事实的教训,例如拚一下遭了损伤,逃跑遭了失败,才逐渐地改变过来。
地方主义:边界的经济,是农业经济,有些地方还停留在杵臼时代(山地大都用杵臼舂米,平地方有许多石碓)。社会组织是普遍地以一姓为单位的家族组织。党在村落中的组织,因居住关系,许多是一姓的党员为一个支部,支部会议简直同时就是家族会议。在这种情形下,“斗争的布尔什维克党”的建设,真是难得很。说共产党不分国界省界的话,他们不大懂,不分县界、区界、乡界的话,他们也是不大懂得的。各县之间地方主义很重,一县内的各区乃至各乡之间也有很深的地方主义。这种地方主义的改变,说道理,至多发生几分效力,多半要靠白色势力的非地方主义的压迫。例如反革命的两省“会剿”,使人民在斗争中有了共同的利害,才可以逐渐地打破他们的地方主义。经过了许多这样的教训,地方主义是减少了。
土客籍问题:边界各县还有一件特别的事,就是土客籍的界限。土籍的本地人和数百年前从北方移来的客籍人之间存在着很大的界限,历史上的仇怨非常深,有时发生很激烈的斗争。这种客籍人从闽粤边起,沿湘、赣两省边界,直至鄂南,大概有几百万人。客籍占领山地,为占领平地的土籍所压迫,素无政治权利。前年和去年的国民革命,客籍表示欢迎,以为出头有日。不料革命失败,客籍被土籍压迫如故。我们的区域内,宁冈、遂川、酃县、茶陵,都有土客籍问题,而以宁冈的问题为最严重。前年至去年,宁冈的土籍革命派和客籍结合,在共产党领导之下,推翻了土籍豪绅的政权,掌握了全县。去年六月,江西朱培德政府反革命,九月,豪绅带领朱培德军队“进剿”宁冈,重新挑起土客籍人民之间斗争。这种土客籍的界限,在道理上讲不应引到被剥削的工农阶级内部来,尤其不应引到共产党内部来。然而在事实上,因为多年遗留下来的习惯,这种界限依然存在。例如边界八月失败,土籍豪绅带领反动军队回宁冈,宣传客籍将要杀土籍,土籍农民大部分反水,挂起白带子,带领白军烧屋搜山。十月、十一月红军打败白军,土籍农民跟着反动派逃走,客籍农民又去没收土籍农民的财物。这种情况,反映到党内来,时常发生无谓的斗争。我们的办法是一面宣传“不杀反水农民”,“反水农民回来一样得田地”,使他们脱离豪绅的影响,安心回家;一面由县政府责令客籍农民将没收的财物退还原主,并出布告保护土籍农民。在党内,加紧教育,务使两部分党员团结一致。
投机分子的反水:革命高涨时(六月),许多投机分子乘公开征收党员的机会混入党内,边界党员数量一时增到一万以上。支部和区委的负责人多属新党员,不能有好的党内教育。白色恐怖一到,投机分子反水,带领反动派捉拿同志,白区党的组织大半塌台。九月以后,厉行洗党,对于党员成分加以严格的限制。永新、宁冈两县的党组织全部解散,重新登记。党员数量大为减少,战斗力反而增加。过去党的组织全部公开,九月以后,建设秘密的组织,准备在反动派来了也能活动。同时多方伸入白区,在敌人营垒中去活动。但在附近各城市中还没有党的基础。其原因一因城市中敌人势力较大,二因我军在占领这些城市时太损害了资产阶级的利益,致使党员在那里难于立足。现在纠正错误,力求在城市中建设我们的组织,但成效尚不多见。
党的领导机关:支部干事会改称委员会。支部上为区委,区委上为县委。区委县委之间因特别情况有组织特别区委的,如永新的北乡特区及东南特区。边区共有宁冈、永新、莲花、遂川、酃县五个县委。茶陵原有县委,因工作做不进去,去冬今春建设的许多组织大部被白色势力打塌了,半年以来只能在靠近宁冈永新一带的山地工作,因此将县委改为特别区委。攸县、安仁均须越过茶陵,派人去过,无功而返。万安县委一月间曾和我们在遂川开过一次联席会议,大半年被白色势力隔断,九月红军游击到万安,才又接一次头。有八十个革命农民跟随到井冈山,组织万安赤卫队。安福没有党的组织。吉安邻接永新,吉安县委仅和我们接过两次头,一点帮助不给,奇怪得很。桂东的沙田一带,三月八月两度分配土地,建设了党的组织,属于以龙溪十二洞为中心的湘南特委管辖。各县县委之上为湘赣边界特委。五月二十日,边界党的第一次代表大会在宁冈茅坪开会,选举第一届特委会委员二十三人,毛泽东为书记。七月湖南省委派杨开明来,杨代理书记。九月杨病,谭震林代理书记。八月红军大队往湘南,白色势力高压边界,我们曾在永新开过一次紧急会议。十月红军返至宁冈,乃在茅坪召集边界党的第二次代表大会。十月四日起开会三天,通过了《政治问题和边界党的任务》等决议,选举了谭震林、朱德、陈毅、龙超清、朱昌偕、刘天干、盘圆珠、谭思聪、谭兵、李却非、朱亦岳、袁文才、王佐农、陈正人、毛泽东、宛希先、王佐、杨开明、何挺颖等十九人为第二届特委会的委员。五人为常委,谭震林(工人)为书记,陈正人(知识分子)为副书记。十一月十四日红军第六次全军大会,选举二十三人组织军委,五人为常委,朱德为书记。特委及军委统辖于前委。前委是十一月六日重新组织的,依中央的指定,以毛泽东、朱德、地方党部书记(谭震林)、一工人同志(宋乔生)、一农民同志(毛科文)五人组成,毛泽东为书记。前委暂设秘书处、宣传科、组织科和职工运动委员会、军事委员会。前委管理地方党。特委仍有存在的必要,因为前委有时要随军行动。我们感觉无产阶级思想领导的问题,是一个非常重要的问题。边界各县的党,几乎完全是农民成分的党,若不给以无产阶级的思想领导,其趋向是会要错误的。除应积极注意各县城和大市镇的职工运动外,并应在政权机关中增加工人的代表。党的各级领导机关也应增加工人和贫农的成分。
革命性质问题
我们完全同意共产国际关于中国问题的决议。中国现时确实还是处在资产阶级民权革命的阶段。中国彻底的民权主义革命的纲领,包括对外推翻帝国主义,求得彻底的民族解放;对内肃清买办阶级的在城市的势力,完成土地革命,消灭乡村的封建关系,推翻军阀政府。必定要经过这样的民权主义革命,方能造成过渡到社会主义的真正基础。我们一年来转战各地,深感全国革命潮流的低落。一方面有少数小块地方的红色政权,一方面全国人民还没有普通的民权,工人农民以至民权派的资产阶级,一概没有言论集会的权利,加入共产党是最大的犯罪。红军每到一地,群众冷冷清清,经过宣传之后,才慢慢地起来。和敌军打仗,不论哪一军都要硬打,没有什么敌军内部的倒戈或暴动。马日事变后招募“暴徒”最多的第六军,也是这样。我们深深感觉寂寞,我们时刻盼望这种寂寞生活的终了。要转入到沸热的全国高涨的革命中去,则包括城市小资产阶级在内的政治的经济的民权主义斗争的发动,是必经的道路。
对小资产阶级的政策,我们在今年二月以前,是比较地执行得好的。三月湘南特委的代表到宁冈,批评我们太右,烧杀太少,没有执行所谓“使小资产变成无产,然后强迫他们革命”的政策,于是改变原来前委的领导人,政策一变。四月全军到边界后,烧杀虽仍不多,但对城市中等商人的没收和乡村小地主富农的派款,是做得十分厉害的。湘南特委提出的“一切工厂归工人”的口号,也宣传得很普遍。这种打击小资产阶级的过左的政策,把小资产阶级大部驱到豪绅一边,使他们挂起白带子反对我们。近来逐渐改变这种政策,情形渐渐好些。在遂川特别收到了好的效果,县城和市镇上的商人不畏避我们了,颇有说红军的好话的。草林圩上逢圩(日中为市,三天一次),到圩两万人,为从来所未有。这件事,证明我们的政策是正确的了。豪绅对人民的税捐很重,遂川靖卫团在黄坳到草林七十里路上要抽五道税,无论什么农产都不能免。我们打掉靖卫团,取消这些税,获得了农民和中小商人全体的拥护。
中央要我们发布一个包括小资产阶级利益的政纲,我们则提议请中央制订一个整个民权革命的政纲,包括工人利益、土地革命和民族解放,使各地有所遵循。
以农业为主要经济的中国的革命,以军事发展暴动,是一种特征。我们建议中央,用大力做军事运动。
割据地区问题
广东北部沿湖南江西两省边界至湖北南部,都属罗霄山脉区域。整个的罗霄山脉我们都走遍了;各部分比较起来,以宁冈为中心的罗霄山脉的中段,最利于我们的军事割据。北段地势不如中段可进可守,又太迫近了大的政治都会,如果没有迅速夺取长沙或武汉的计划,则以大部兵力放在浏阳、醴陵、萍乡、铜鼓一带是很危险的。南段地势较北段好,但群众基础不如中段,政治上及于湘赣两省的影响也小些,不如中段一举一动可以影响两省的下游。中段的长处:(1)有经营了一年多的群众基础。(2)党的组织有相当的基础。(3)经过一年多的时间,创造了富有斗争经验的地方武装,这是十分难得的;这个地方武装的力量,加上红军第四军的力量,是任凭什么敌人也不能消灭的。(4)有很好的军事根据地——井冈山,地方武装的根据地则各县都有。(5)影响两省,且能影响两省的下游,比较湘南赣南等处只影响一省,且在一省的上游和僻地者,政治意义大不相同。中段的缺点,是因割据已久,“围剿”军多,经济问题,特别是现金问题,十分困难。
湖南省委对于此间的行动计划,六七月间数星期内,曾三变其主张。第一次袁德生来,赞成罗霄山脉中段政权计划。第二次杜修经、杨开明来,主张红军毫不犹豫地向湘南发展,只留二百枝枪会同赤卫队保卫边界,并说这是“绝对正确”的方针。第三次袁德生又来,相隔不过十天,这次信上除骂了我们一大篇外,却主张红军向湘东去,又说是“绝对正确”的方针,而且又要我们“毫不犹豫”。我们接受了这样硬性的指示,不从则迹近违抗,从则明知失败,真是不好处。当第二次信到时,军委、特委、永新县委举行联席会议,认为往湘南危险,决定不执行省委的意见。数天之后,却由杜修经杨开明坚持省委意见,利用第二十九团的乡土观念,把红军拉去攻郴州,致边界和红军一齐失败。红军数量上约损失一半;边界则被焚之屋、被杀之人不可胜数,各县相继失陷,至今未能完全恢复。至于往湘东,在湘鄂赣三省豪绅政权尚未分裂之前,亦决不宜用红军的主力去。设七月无去湘南一举,则不但可免边界的八月失败,且可乘国民党第六军和王均战于江西樟树之际,击破永新敌军,席卷吉安、安福,前锋可达萍乡,而与北段之红第五军取得联络。即在这种时候,也应以宁冈为大本营,去湘东的只能是游击部队。因豪绅间战争未起,湘边酃县、茶陵、攸县尚有大敌,主力北向,必为所乘。中央要我们考虑往湘东或往湘南,实行起来都很危险,湘东之议虽未实现,湘南则已有证验。这种痛苦的经验,是值得我们时时记着的。
现在是豪绅阶级统治还没有破裂的时期,环边界而“进剿”的敌军,尚有十余团之多。但若我们于现金问题能继续找得出路(粮食衣服已不成大问题),则凭借边界的基础,对付此数敌人,甚至更多的敌人,均有办法。为边界计,红军若走,则像八月那样的蹂躏,立可重来。赤卫队虽不至完全消灭,党和群众的基础将受到极大的摧残,除山头割据可以保存一些外,平地均将转入秘密状态,如八九月间一样。红军不走,以现在的基础可以逐渐向四周发展,前途的希望是很大的。为红军计,欲求扩大,只有在有群众基础的井冈山四周即宁冈、永新、酃县、遂川四县,利用湘赣两敌利害不一致,四面防守,无法集中的情况,和敌人作长期的斗争。利用正确的战术,不战则已,战则必胜,必有俘获,如此可以逐渐扩大红军。以四月至七月那时边界群众的准备,红军大队若无湘南之行,则八月间红军的扩大是没有疑义的。虽然犯了一次错误,红军已卷土重来此地利人和之边界,前途希望还是不恶。红军必须在边界这等地方,下斗争的决心,有耐战的勇气,才能增加武器,练出好兵。边界的红旗子,业已打了一年,虽然一方面引起了湘鄂赣三省乃至全国豪绅阶级的痛恨,另一方面却渐渐引起了附近省份工农士兵群众的希望。以士兵论,因军阀们把向边界“剿匪”当做一件大事,“剿匪经年,耗费百万”(鲁涤平),“人称二万,枪号五千”(王均),如此等类的话,逐渐引起敌军士兵和无出路的下级官长对我们注意,自拔来归的将日益增多,红军扩充,又是一条来路。并且边界红旗子始终不倒,不但表示了共产党的力量,而且表示了统治阶级的破产,在全国政治上有重大的意义。所以我们始终认为罗霄山脉中段政权的创造和扩大,是十分必要和十分正确的。
