The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains

China Mao Zedong

25 November 1928

Context
Mao reported on the independent regime on the Hunan-Jiangxi border and the August defeat, with dated November 25, 1928, arguing for holding the Luoxiao middle section and a prolonged struggle around the Jinggang Mountains.
Main themes
Independent workers' and peasants' regime on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, August 1928 defeat and the southern Hunan expedition, conditions for Red political power, splits among the landlord-gentry and warlords, Red Army composition and democracy in the army, Party representatives and branches on a company basis, Red Guards and insurrection detachments, Jinggang Mountains military bases, land distribution and the intermediate class, policy towards the petty bourgeoisie, dispute with the Hunan Provincial Committee, Luoxiao mountain range as base area
Duration
~103 min
98th percentile
Words
12,350
98th percentile
Sentences
431
98th percentile
Readability
41
39th percentile
Grade
14.6
73rd percentile
Syntax
3.32
84th percentile
Vocabulary
2.41
91st percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 39%33%
  • Institutional 32%28%
  • Economic 17%14%
  • Social 11%9%
  • Ceremonial 2%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 14%

431 sentences in 56 paragraphs

The Independent Regime on the Hunan-Jiangxi Border and the Defeat in August

The emergence, within a single country, of one or several small areas of Red political power surrounded on all sides by White political power is something that, in the present-day world, occurs only in China. On analysis, we find that one of the reasons for it lies in the incessant splits and wars within China's comprador and landlord-gentry classes. So long as the splits and wars within the comprador and landlord-gentry classes continue, the existence and development of the armed independent regime of the workers and peasants will also be able to continue. Beyond this, the existence and development of the armed independent regime of the workers and peasants requires the following conditions: (1) good masses; (2) a good Party; (3) a Red Army of adequate strength; (4) terrain favourable to military operations; (5) economic resources sufficient for sustenance.

In periods when the political power of the ruling classes is temporarily stable and in periods when it is splitting apart, the independent area must adopt different strategies towards the ruling classes surrounding it. In periods when splits occur within the ruling classes, as in Hunan and Hubei during the war between Li Zongren and Tang Shengzhi, and in Guangdong during the war between Zhang Fakui and Li Jishen, our strategy can be comparatively bold, and the area of the independent regime developed by military means can be comparatively extensive. Even then, however, attention must still be paid to building a solid foundation in the central districts, so that when the White terror comes we will have something to rely on and need not fear. In periods when the political power of the ruling classes is comparatively stable, as in the southern provinces since April of this year, our strategy must be one of gradual advance. At such times, the worst thing in military matters is to divide our forces and make reckless advances, and the worst thing in local work (distributing land, establishing political power, expanding the Party, organizing local armed forces) is to scatter our manpower in all directions without attending to building a solid foundation in the central districts. The defeats of many small Red areas in various places were due either to the absence of the objective conditions or to subjective errors in tactics. As for why the tactics were wrong, it was entirely because no clear distinction was made between the two different kinds of period, the period when the political power of the ruling classes is temporarily stable and the period when it is splitting apart. Some comrades, even in a period when the political power of the ruling classes is temporarily stable, advocate dividing our forces and advancing recklessly, and even advocate defending large areas with the Red Guards alone, as though entirely unaware that, besides the house-to-house militia, the enemy also has regular troops that will be concentrated to attack us. In local work, they pay no attention whatsoever to building a solid foundation in the central districts, and, regardless of what our subjective strength makes possible, seek only boundless expansion. If anyone advocates a policy of step-by-step expansion in military affairs and, in local work, concentrating our strength to build a solid foundation in the central districts so as to secure an invincible position, they brand him a "conservative". This erroneous view of theirs was the root cause of the defeat on the Hunan-Jiangxi border this August, as well as of the simultaneous defeat of the Fourth Red Army in southern Hunan.

Work on the Hunan-Jiangxi border began in October of last year. At the start, there was no Party organization at all in any of the counties; the only local armed forces were the two units of Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, with sixty bad rifles each, near the Jinggang Mountains; the peasant self-defence corps of the four counties of Yongxin, Lianhua, Chaling and Lingxian had surrendered all their rifles to the landlord-gentry class; and the revolutionary fervour of the masses had been suppressed. By February of this year, Ninggang, Yongxin, Chaling and Suichuan all had Party county committees, Lingxian had a special district committee, Party organization had also begun to be established in Lianhua, and contact had been made with the Wan'an county committee. Apart from Lingxian, every county had a small number of local armed forces. In Ninggang, Chaling, Suichuan and Yongxin, and especially in the two counties of Suichuan and Yongxin, many guerrilla uprisings were carried out to overthrow the landlord-gentry and arouse the masses, and the results were all fairly good. During this period the agrarian revolution had not yet been carried deep. The organs of political power were called governments of workers, peasants and soldiers. Soldiers' committees were organized in the army. When units operated separately, action committees were set up to command them. The Party's highest leading body at this time was the Front Committee appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee at the time of the Autumn Harvest Uprising (with Mao Zedong as secretary). In early March, at the request of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, the Front Committee was abolished and reorganized as a Divisional Committee (with He Tingying as secretary), becoming a body concerned solely with the Party in the army and having no say over the local Party. At the same time, again at the request of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, Mao's forces were transferred to southern Hunan, with the result that the border area was occupied by the enemy for more than a month. At the end of March came the defeat in southern Hunan, and in April the forces of Zhu and Mao and the peasant army of southern Hunan withdrew to Ninggang and began the independent regime on the border anew.

From April onward, the independent regime on the Hunan-Jiangxi border coincided with a time when the ruling forces in the South were temporarily stable. The reactionary troops sent by the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi to "suppress" us numbered at least eight or nine regiments, and at times as many as eighteen. Yet with a force of fewer than four regiments we fought the enemy for four whole months, the independent area expanding day by day, the agrarian revolution deepening day by day, the people's political power spreading day by day, and the Red Army and Red Guards growing day by day. The reason lay in the correctness of the policy of the border Party (the local Party and the Party in the army). The policy of the Border Special Committee (with Mao Zedong as secretary) and of the Army Committee (with Chen Yi as secretary) at that time was: to struggle resolutely against the enemy, create political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao mountain range, and oppose flightism; to deepen the agrarian revolution in the independent area; for the Party in the army to help develop the local Party, and the armed strength of the army to help develop the local armed forces; to take the defensive against Hunan, where the ruling forces were comparatively strong, and the offensive against Jiangxi, where the ruling forces were comparatively weak; to devote great efforts to building up Yongxin, create a mass independent regime, and prepare for a prolonged struggle; to concentrate the Red Army to meet the enemy at hand when opportunity arose, oppose the division of our forces, and avoid being destroyed by the enemy one by one; and to expand the independent area by a policy of advancing in waves, opposing the policy of reckless advance. Because these tactics were appropriate, and because, in addition, the terrain of the border was favourable to struggle and the attacking forces of the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi were not entirely of one mind, we had the military victories of the four months from April to July and the growth of the mass independent regime. Although the enemy was several times our strength, he was not only unable to destroy this independent regime but also unable to halt its growth. The influence of this independent regime on the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi was tending to grow day by day. The defeat in August was due entirely to some comrades failing to understand that this was precisely a period of temporary stability for the ruling classes, and instead adopting a policy suited to a period of splits within the ruling classes, dividing our forces for a reckless advance on southern Hunan, thereby causing defeat both on the border and in southern Hunan. Du Xiujing, the representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, and Yang Kaiming, appointed by the Provincial Committee as secretary of the Border Special Committee, taking advantage of the fact that Mao Zedong, Wan Xixian and others who strongly opposed the move were far away in Yongxin, failed to examine the circumstances of the time, disregarded the resolution of the joint meeting of the Army Committee, the Special Committee and the Yongxin County Committee, which had disagreed with the Hunan Provincial Committee's proposal, and, knowing only how to carry out formally the Hunan Provincial Committee's order to go to southern Hunan, fell in with the mood of the Twenty-ninth Regiment of the Red Army (composed of peasants from Yizhang), who wished to evade the struggle and return to their home villages; and so they brought about defeat both on the border and in southern Hunan.

What happened was this. In mid-July, Wu Shang's Eighth Army, of the Hunan enemy, invaded Ninggang and then advanced into Yongxin; seeking battle and not finding it (our troops had tried to strike at him by a side road but missed him), and fearing our masses, he hastily withdrew to Chaling by way of Lianhua. At that time the main force of the Red Army was advancing from Ninggang to attack Lingxian and Chaling, and at Lingxian changed its plan and turned towards southern Hunan; meanwhile five regiments of the Jiangxi enemy's Third Army under Wang Jun and Jin Handing, and six regiments of the Sixth Army under Hu Wendou, jointly attacked Yongxin. At this time we had only one regiment in Yongxin; under the cover of the broad masses, using the method of guerrilla attacks from all sides, it pinned down these eleven enemy regiments within thirty li of the Yongxin county town for as long as twenty-five days. In the end, because of the enemy's fierce assaults, we lost Yongxin, and then lost Lianhua and Ninggang as well. At this point internal strife suddenly broke out among the Jiangxi enemy: Hu Wendou's Sixth Army hurriedly withdrew and soon fought Wang Jun's Third Army at Zhangshu. The five Jiangxi regiments that remained also hurriedly withdrew into the Yongxin county town. Had our main force not gone to southern Hunan, it would have been entirely possible to rout this enemy and extend the independent area to Ji'an, Anfu and Pingxiang, linking up with Pingjiang and Liuyang. As the main force was no longer there, and our one regiment was utterly exhausted, it was decided to leave part of it to defend the Jinggang Mountains together with the units of Yuan and Wang, while I led part of the troops towards Guidong to meet the main force and bring it back. By then the main force had withdrawn from southern Hunan towards Guidong, and on August 23 we joined forces at Guidong.

When the main force of the Red Army first arrived at Lingxian in mid-July, the officers and men of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, wavering politically, wanted to return to their homes in southern Hunan and would not submit to discipline; the Twenty-eighth Regiment opposed going to southern Hunan and wanted to go to southern Jiangxi, but was also unwilling to return to Yongxin. Du Xiujing encouraged the erroneous views of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, and the Army Committee also failed to stop them, so the main force set out from Lingxian on July 17 and advanced on Chenzhou. On July 24 it fought the enemy Fan Shisheng at Chenzhou, at first winning and then losing, and withdrew from the battle. The Twenty-ninth Regiment then acted on its own and ran off to its home in Yizhang, with the result that part of it was wiped out at Lechang by the bandit Hu Fengzhang, and part scattered in various places around Chenzhou and Yizhang, its fate unknown; no more than a hundred men were gathered together that day. Fortunately the main force, the Twenty-eighth Regiment, did not suffer heavy losses, and on August 18 it occupied Guidong. On the 23rd it joined the troops that had come from the Jinggang Mountains, and it was decided to return to the Jinggang Mountains by way of Chongyi and Shangyou. On reaching Chongyi, battalion commander Yuan Chongquan mutinied, taking with him an infantry company and an artillery company; although these two companies were brought back, regimental commander Wang Erzhuo lost his life. On August 30, part of each of the Hunan and Jiangxi enemy armies, taking advantage of the moment when our army was about to return but had not yet returned, attacked the Jinggang Mountains. Our defending force, less than a battalion, resisted from its strong positions, routed the enemy and saved this base.

The causes of this defeat were: (1) some officers and men were wavering and homesick and lost their fighting capacity, while others, unwilling to go to southern Hunan, lacked enthusiasm; (2) the long march in the heat of summer exhausted the troops; (3) having ventured several hundred li from Lingxian, the troops lost contact with the border and became an isolated force; (4) the masses of southern Hunan had not risen, so the expedition became a purely military adventure; (5) the enemy situation was unknown; (6) preparation was poor, and the officers and men did not understand the purpose of the operation.

The Present Situation in the Independent Area

Since April of this year, the Red area has gradually expanded. After the battle of Longyuankou (on the border of Yongxin and Ninggang) on June 23, in which we defeated the Jiangxi enemy for the fourth time, our area comprised the whole of the three counties of Ninggang, Yongxin and Lianhua, a small part of each of Ji'an and Anfu, the northern part of Suichuan, and the south-eastern part of Lingxian; this was the border area at its height. In the Red area, most of the land had been distributed, and the rest was being distributed. District and township governments were set up everywhere. Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua and Suichuan all had county governments, and a border government was established. Workers' and peasants' insurrection detachments were organized everywhere in the villages, and there were Red Guards at the district and county levels. In July the Jiangxi enemy attacked, and in August the Hunan and Jiangxi enemies jointly attacked the Jinggang Mountains; the county towns and the plains of the border counties were all occupied by the enemy. The peace preservation corps and the house-to-house militia, the tiger's accomplices, ran amok, and the White terror spread over town and countryside. Most of the Party organizations and the organs of political power collapsed. The rich peasants and the opportunists in the Party went over to the enemy one after another. Only after the battle of the Jinggang Mountains on August 30 did the Hunan enemy withdraw to Lingxian, while the Jiangxi enemy still held the county towns and most of the villages. But the mountain areas the enemy was never able to take: in Ninggang, the western and northern districts; in Yongxin, the Tianlong district in the northern section, the Xiaojiang district in the western section, and the Wannianshan district in the southern section; in Lianhua, the Shangxi district; in Suichuan, the Jinggangshan district; and in Lingxian, Qingshigang and the Dayuan district. In July and August, one regiment of the Red Army, together with the Red Guards and insurrection detachments of the counties, fought several dozen battles large and small, losing only thirty rifles, and finally withdrew into the mountain areas.

As our army was returning to the Jinggang Mountains by way of Chongyi and Shangyou, Liu Shiyi's Independent Seventh Division, of the enemy in southern Jiangxi, pursued us to Suichuan. On September 13 our army defeated Liu Shiyi, captured several hundred rifles and occupied Suichuan. On September 26 we returned to the Jinggang Mountains. On October 1 we fought Zhou Hunyuan's brigade of the enemy Xiong Shihui's forces at Ninggang and won, recovering the whole of Ninggang county. At this time 126 men of Yan Zhongru's unit of the Hunan enemy, stationed at Guidong, came over to our army and were formed into a special task battalion, with Bi Zhanyun as battalion commander. On November 9 our army again defeated a regiment of Zhou's brigade at the Ninggang town and at Longyuankou. The next day we advanced and occupied Yongxin, and soon withdrew to Ninggang. At present our area stretches from the southern slopes of the Jinggang Mountains in Suichuan in the south to the border of Lianhua in the north, including the whole of Ninggang county and part of each of Suichuan, Lingxian and Yongxin, forming a single long, narrow block running north and south. The Shangxi district of Lianhua, and the Tianlong and Wannianshan districts of Yongxin, are not well connected with this block. The enemy is attempting to destroy our base by military attacks and economic blockade, and we are preparing to smash his attacks.

Military Questions

The struggle on the border is entirely a military struggle, and the Party and the masses have had to be militarized together. How to deal with the enemy and how to fight have become the central questions of daily life. An independent regime must be an armed one. Wherever there are no armed forces, or the armed forces are inadequate, or the tactics for dealing with the enemy are wrong, the area is immediately seized by the enemy. This struggle grows fiercer day by day, and so the problems are extremely complex and serious.

The sources of the Red Army on the border are: (1) the former troops of Ye Ting and He Long from Chaozhou and Shantou; (2) the former Guards Regiment of the Wuchang National Government; (3) peasants from Pingjiang and Liuyang; (4) peasants from southern Hunan and workers from Shuikoushan; (5) captured soldiers from the forces of Xu Kexiang, Tang Shengzhi, Bai Chongxi, Zhu Peide, Wu Shang, Xiong Shihui and others; (6) peasants from the border counties. But after more than a year of fighting, only a third remain of the former troops of Ye and He, the Guards Regiment and the peasants from Pingjiang and Liuyang. The peasants from southern Hunan have also suffered heavy casualties. Thus, although the first four categories are still the backbone of the Fourth Red Army to this day, they are now far outnumbered by the last two. Of the last two, captured enemy soldiers are the more numerous; without this source of replenishment, manpower would be a serious problem. Even so, the increase in men has not kept pace with the increase in rifles; rifles are not easily lost, whereas men, through wounds, death, sickness and desertion, are easily lost. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised to send workers from Anyuan here, and we earnestly hope this will be carried out.

As for the composition of the Red Army, part consists of workers and peasants and part of lumpen-proletarians. Too high a proportion of lumpen elements is of course not good. But since we are fighting every day and casualties are heavy, and the lumpen elements do have fighting capacity, it is already no easy matter even to find lumpen elements as replacements. In these circumstances, the only way is to intensify political training.

Most of the Red Army soldiers come from mercenary armies, but their character changes as soon as they join the Red Army. First of all, the Red Army has abolished the mercenary system, making the soldiers feel that they are fighting not for others but for themselves and for the people. To this day the Red Army has no regular system of pay; it issues only grain, money for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, and a little pocket money. All officers and men of the Red Army who are natives of the border area have been given land, but it is rather difficult to allocate land to those from distant places.

Through political education, the Red Army soldiers have all acquired class consciousness and a general knowledge of distributing land, establishing political power, arming the workers and peasants, and so on, and they all know that they are fighting for themselves and for the working class and the peasantry. Hence they can endure the hardships of a bitter struggle without complaint. Each company, battalion and regiment has a soldiers' council, which represents the interests of the soldiers and carries out political work and work among the masses.

Experience has proved that the system of Party representatives must not be abolished. The Party representative is especially important at the company level, since the Party branch is organized on a company basis. He has to see to it that the soldiers' committee carries out political training, to guide the work among the masses, and at the same time to serve as secretary of the Party branch. Facts have proved that the better the Party representative of a company, the sounder the company, whereas the company commander can hardly play so great a role politically. Because casualties among the lower cadres are so heavy, captured enemy soldiers often become company or platoon commanders not long after coming over; some of the soldiers captured in February or March of this year are now battalion commanders. On the surface it might seem that, since it is called the Red Army, it can do without Party representatives, but this is utterly mistaken. The Twenty-eighth Regiment once abolished its Party representatives in southern Hunan, and later restored them. To rename them "instructors" would cause confusion with the instructors of the Kuomintang, whom the captured soldiers detest. Moreover, changing the name does not affect the substance of the system. We have therefore decided not to change it. Casualties among the Party representatives have been very heavy; besides training replacements in training courses of our own, we hope that the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us at least thirty comrades capable of serving as Party representatives.

Ordinary soldiers need six months' or a year's training before they can fight, but our soldiers, recruited yesterday, have to fight today, with practically no training at all. Their military technique is very poor, and in battle they rely on courage alone. A long period of rest and training is impossible; the only thing is to try to avoid some battles in order to gain time for training, and see whether that is possible. To train lower-ranking officers, we now run a training corps of 150 people and intend to keep it going permanently. We hope that the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us more officers of the rank of company or platoon commander and above.

The Hunan Provincial Committee has asked us to attend to the material life of the soldiers and to make it at least somewhat better than that of the average worker or peasant. At present it is the very opposite. Apart from grain, each man receives only five cents a day in silver for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, and even this is hard to keep up. The money for oil, salt, firewood and vegetables alone requires more than ten thousand silver dollars a month, all of it obtained by expropriating the local tyrants. For winter clothing for the whole army of five thousand men we now have the cotton but are still short of cloth. Cold as it is, many of our soldiers are still wearing only two layers of thin clothing. Fortunately we are used to hardship. What is more, everyone shares the same hardship: from the army commander to the cook, everyone lives on a food allowance of five cents a day, apart from grain. When pocket money is issued, if it is twenty cents it is twenty cents for all, if it is forty cents it is forty cents for all. Hence the soldiers bear no one any grudge.

After each battle there are a number of wounded. And owing to malnutrition, cold and other causes, a great many officers and men fall ill. Our hospitals are in the mountains and use both Chinese and Western methods of treatment; there is a shortage of both doctors and medicines. At present there are more than eight hundred people in the hospitals. The Hunan Provincial Committee promised to procure medicines, but so far none have arrived. We still ask the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees to send us a few doctors trained in Western medicine and some iodine.

That the Red Army, whose material life is so meagre and whose battles are so frequent, can still keep going without breaking down is due, apart from the role of the Party, to the practice of democracy within the army. The officers do not beat the soldiers; officers and men are treated as equals; soldiers are free to hold meetings and speak out; trivial formalities have been abolished; and the accounts are open for all to inspect. The soldiers manage the mess, and out of the daily five cents for oil, salt, firewood and vegetables they can still save a little for pocket money, called "mess savings", amounting to about sixty or seventy coppers per man per day. All this gives great satisfaction to the soldiers. The newly captured soldiers in particular feel that our army and the Kuomintang army are worlds apart. Although they feel that the material life in the Red Army is not equal to that in the White army, they have been spiritually liberated. The same soldier who was not brave in the enemy army yesterday is very brave in the Red Army today; such is the effect of democracy. The Red Army is like a furnace in which captured soldiers are melted down as soon as they come over. In China, not only the people but also the army need democracy. Democracy in the army will be an important weapon for undermining the feudal mercenary army.

The Party organization is now in four levels: the company branch, the battalion committee, the regimental committee and the army committee. There is a branch in each company and a group in each squad. One important reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on such an arduous struggle without falling apart is that "the Party branch is organized on a company basis". Two years ago, our organizations in the Kuomintang army had no hold at all on the soldiers; even in Ye Ting's forces there was only one branch to a regiment, and so they could not stand severe tests. At present the ratio of Party members to non-members in the Red Army is about one to three, that is, on average one Party member in every four men. It has recently been decided to increase the number of Party members among the combat troops, with the aim of reaching a ratio of half Party members and half non-members. At present the company branches lack good secretaries, and we ask the Central Committee to send us a large number of activists who can no longer remain where they are to fill these posts. Almost all the cadres who came from southern Hunan are doing Party work in the army. But some of them were scattered in southern Hunan in August, so at present we cannot spare anyone for other work.

The local armed forces consist of the Red Guards and the workers' and peasants' insurrection detachments. The insurrection detachments are armed with spears and fowling pieces and are organized on a township basis, one detachment to each township, the number of men varying with the size of the township. Their job is to suppress counter-revolution, protect the township government, and help the Red Army or Red Guards in battle when the enemy comes. The insurrection detachments began in Yongxin; originally they were secret, but they came into the open after we took the whole county. This system has now been extended to all the border counties, without change of name. The Red Guards are armed chiefly with five-round rifles, but also with nine-round and single-round rifles. The number of rifles in each county is: Ninggang 140, Yongxin 220, Lianhua 43, Chaling 50, Lingxian 90, Suichuan 130, Wan'an 10, making 683 in all. Most were issued by the Red Army; a small number were captured from the enemy by the Red Guards themselves. The Red Guards of most counties are constantly fighting the peace preservation corps and house-to-house militia of the landlord-gentry, and their fighting capacity is growing steadily. Before the Horse Day Incident, every county had its peasant self-defence corps. Their rifles numbered: Youxian 300, Chaling 300, Lingxian 60, Suichuan 50, Yongxin 80, Lianhua 60, Ninggang (Yuan Wencai's unit) 60, Jinggangshan (Wang Zuo's unit) 60, making 970 in all. After the Horse Day Incident, apart from the units of Yuan and Wang, which suffered no losses, only six rifles were kept in Suichuan and one in Lianhua; all the rest were seized by the landlord-gentry. That the peasant self-defence corps were so incapable of holding on to their rifles was the result of the opportunist line. At present the Red Guards of the counties are still very short of rifles and have fewer than the landlord-gentry, and the Red Army must continue to help the Red Guards with arms. So long as the fighting capacity of the Red Army is not reduced, we must do everything possible to help arm the people. We have already laid down that each battalion of the Red Army shall have four companies, with seventy-five rifles to a company; adding the special task company, the machine-gun company, the trench-mortar company, regimental headquarters and the three battalion headquarters, each regiment shall have 1,075 rifles. Rifles captured in battle are used as far as possible to arm the local forces. The commanders of the Red Guards are men sent by the counties for training in the training corps run by the Red Army, who then take up command. Sending men from distant places in the Red Army to serve as commanders of local units must be gradually reduced. Zhu Peide and Wu Shang are also arming the peace preservation corps and the house-to-house militia, and the numbers and fighting capacity of the landlord-gentry's armed forces in the border counties are quite considerable. The expansion of our Red local armed forces brooks not a moment's delay.

The principle for the Red Army is concentration, and that for the Red Guards is dispersion. In the present period of temporary stability of the reactionary regime, the enemy can concentrate large forces to attack the Red Army, and dispersion is disadvantageous for the Red Army. In our experience, dividing our forces has almost always led to defeat, whereas concentrating our forces to strike at an enemy force smaller than, equal to, or slightly larger than ours has often led to victory. The area which the Central Committee has instructed us to develop for guerrilla warfare extends several thousand li in length and breadth, which is far too large; this is probably due to an overestimate of our strength. For the Red Guards, dispersion is advantageous, and at present the Red Guards in all the counties are adopting the method of dispersed operations.

The most effective method of propaganda directed at the enemy forces is to release captured soldiers and give medical treatment to the enemy's wounded. When soldiers or battalion, company or platoon commanders of the enemy are captured by us, we immediately conduct propaganda among them; they are divided into those who wish to stay and those who wish to leave, and those who wish to leave are given travelling expenses and set free. This immediately exposes the enemy's lie that "the Communist bandits kill everyone they see". Yang Chisheng's Ninth Division Ten-Day Bulletin exclaimed of this method of ours, "How vicious!" The Red Army soldiers are extremely warm in comforting and seeing off the prisoners they have taken, and at every "farewell party for new brothers" the captured soldiers in their speeches repay us with warm gratitude. Giving medical treatment to the enemy's wounded is also very effective. Clever enemies like Li Wenbin have lately been imitating our method, not killing prisoners and giving medical treatment to captured wounded. Nevertheless, when fighting takes place again, some of our men still come back to us bringing their rifles; this has happened twice already. In addition, we are doing as much written propaganda as possible, such as writing slogans. Wherever we go, the walls are covered with slogans. But we are short of people skilled in drawing, and ask the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees to send us a few.

Military bases: The first base is the Jinggang Mountains, which lie where the four counties of Ninggang, Lingxian, Suichuan and Yongxin meet. At the northern foot is Maoping in Ninggang, and at the southern foot is Huang'ao in Suichuan; the distance between the two is ninety li. At the eastern foot is Nashan in Yongxin, and at the western foot is Shuikou in Lingxian; the distance between the two is 180 li. The circuit, starting from Nashan and passing through Longyuankou (the above in Yongxin), Xincheng, Maoping, Dalong (the above in Ninggang), Shidu, Shuikou, Xiacun (the above in Lingxian), Yingpanxu, Daijiapu, Dafen, Duiziqian, Huang'ao, Wudoujiang, Che'ao (the above in Suichuan) back to Nashan, totals 550 li. On the mountains there are paddy fields and villages at Dajing, Xiaojing, Shangjing, Zhongjing, Xiajing, Ciping, Xiazhuang, Xingzhou, Caoping, Baiyinhu and Luofu, which have always been the lairs of bandits and deserters and have now become our base. But the population is less than two thousand and the yield of grain less than ten thousand dan, so that the army's grain must all be brought in from the three counties of Ninggang, Yongxin and Suichuan. Fortifications have been built at all the strategic passes on the mountains. Our hospitals, bedding and clothing workshop, ordnance department and the rear offices of the regiments are all here. At present grain is being carried up the mountains from Ninggang. Given sufficient supplies, the enemy can never break in. The second base is Jiulongshan, at the junction of the four counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua and Chaling; it is not as important as the Jinggang Mountains, but serves as the last base for the local armed forces of the four counties, and fortifications have been built there too. For a Red independent regime surrounded by White political power, it is necessary to make use of mountain strongholds.

The Land Question

The land situation on the border: Broadly speaking, more than 60 per cent of the land was in the hands of the landlords and less than 40 per cent in the hands of the peasants. On the Jiangxi side, land was most concentrated in Suichuan, where about 80 per cent belonged to the landlords. Yongxin came next, with about 70 per cent belonging to the landlords. In Wan'an, Ninggang and Lianhua there were more owner-peasants, but the landlords still owned the comparatively greater part of the land, about 60 per cent, the peasants only 40 per cent. On the Hunan side, in both Chaling and Lingxian about 70 per cent of the land was in the hands of the landlords.

The question of the intermediate class: Given the land situation described above, the confiscation and redistribution of all land can win the support of the majority. But the rural population is roughly divided into three classes: the class of big and middle landlords, the intermediate class of small landlords and rich peasants, and the class of middle and poor peasants. The rich peasants' interests are often bound up with those of the small landlords. The land of the rich peasants makes up only a small portion of the total, but taken together with that of the small landlords it amounts to quite a lot. This is probably much the same throughout the country. On the border the policy adopted towards land is complete confiscation and thorough distribution; hence in the Red area both the landlord-gentry class and the intermediate class were hit. That was the policy, but in its actual execution it met with great obstruction from the intermediate class. In the early days of the revolution, the intermediate class ostensibly capitulated to the poor-peasant class, but in reality they made use of their former social position and of clan ties to intimidate the poor peasants and delay the distribution of land. When no further delay was possible, they concealed the true amount of their land, or kept the good land for themselves and gave up the poor land. During this period the poor peasants, having long been trampled upon and feeling that the victory of the revolution was not secure, often accepted the views of the intermediate class and did not dare to take vigorous action. Only when the revolution reaches a high tide, when, for instance, political power has been won in a whole county or even several counties, the reactionary troops have been defeated several times, and the might of the Red Army has been shown several times, is vigorous action taken in the countryside against the intermediate class. For example, the southern section of Yongxin, where the intermediate class is most numerous, was where the delaying of land distribution and the concealment of land were worst. Only after the Red Army's great victory at Longyuankou on June 23, and after the district government had dealt with several people who delayed the distribution, was the land actually distributed. But in every county the feudal clan organization is extremely widespread, often one clan to a village or one clan to several villages; and it will take a rather long time before class differentiation can be completed within the villages and clan sentiment overcome.

The defection of the intermediate class under the White terror: Having been hit during the revolutionary high tide, the intermediate class went over to the enemy as soon as the White terror came. It was the small landlords and rich peasants of the two counties who led the reactionary troops in burning down on a large scale the houses of the revolutionary peasants in Yongxin and Ninggang. Following the instructions of the reactionaries, they burned houses and arrested people, with great boldness. When the Red Army returned to the area around Xincheng, Gucheng and Longshi in Ninggang, several thousand peasants, believing the reactionaries' propaganda that the Communists would kill them, followed the reactionaries and fled to Yongxin. Only after our propaganda, "We will not kill the peasants who went over to the enemy" and "Welcome to the peasants who went over to the enemy to come back and reap their crops", did some of these peasants gradually come back.

When the revolution throughout the country is at a low ebb, the most difficult problem in the independent area is that we cannot hold the intermediate class. The chief reason for the intermediate class turning against us is that it has been hit too hard by the revolution. But when there is a revolutionary upsurge throughout the country, the poor-peasant class has something to rely on and becomes more courageous, while the intermediate class has something to fear and dares not get out of hand. When the war between Li Zongren and Tang Shengzhi spread to Hunan, the small landlords in Chaling sued for peace with the peasants, and some even sent the peasants pork for the New Year (by then the Red Army had already left Chaling for Suichuan). When the Li-Tang war ended, such things were no longer seen. Now, when there is a counter-revolutionary high tide throughout the country, the intermediate class, having been hit, has in the White areas almost entirely attached itself to the landlord-gentry class, and the poor-peasant class has been left isolated. This problem is very serious indeed.

The pressure of daily life and its influence on the defection of the intermediate class: The Red and the White areas confront each other like two hostile countries. Owing to two causes, the enemy's tight blockade and our mishandling of the petty bourgeoisie, trade between the two areas has almost entirely ceased; daily necessities such as salt, cloth and medicines are scarce and dear, and agricultural products such as timber and tea-oil cannot be sent out, so that the peasants' cash income is cut off and the people as a whole are affected. The poor-peasant class is comparatively better able to bear such hardships, but when the middle class can bear them no longer, it capitulates to the landlord-gentry class. If the splits and wars among the landlord-gentry and warlords of China were not continuing, and if the revolutionary situation throughout the country were not developing, the small Red independent areas would come under great economic pressure, and their long-term existence would be in doubt. For not only would the middle class be unable to bear such economic pressure, but the workers, the poor peasants and the Red Army might also find it unbearable at some point. In the two counties of Yongxin and Ninggang there was no salt to eat, and the supply of cloth and medicines was completely cut off, not to mention other things. Now salt can be bought again, but it is very dear. Cloth and medicines are still unobtainable. Timber and tea-oil, which are produced in large quantities in Ninggang, western Yongxin and northern Suichuan (all of which are within the present independent area), still cannot be sent out.

The criterion for land distribution: The township is taken as the unit for distributing land. In places with many hills and few fields, such as the Xiaojiang district of Yongxin, there have been cases of taking three or four townships as a unit for distribution, but these are very few. All the inhabitants of the villages, men and women, old and young, receive equal shares. Now, in accordance with the Central Committee's method, the criterion has been changed to labour power, so that those able to work receive twice as much as those unable to work.

The question of concessions to the owner-peasants: This has not yet been discussed in detail. The rich peasants among the owner-peasants have put forward the demand that productive capacity be taken as the criterion, that is, that those with more manpower and capital (farm implements and so on) should receive more land. The rich peasants feel that both equal distribution and distribution according to labour power are unfavourable to them. Their view is that, as regards manpower, they are willing to work harder, and, with the addition of their capital, they can reap larger harvests. If they are given the same share as everybody else, their special efforts and surplus capital will be disregarded (left idle), and they are not willing to accept this. Here we are still carrying out the Central Committee's method. But this question should still be discussed, and we will report when we have reached a conclusion.

The land tax: In Ninggang the tax collected is 20 per cent, 5 per cent more than under the Central Committee's method; as collection is already under way, it cannot be changed now, but it will be reduced next year. Besides, the parts of Suichuan, Lingxian and Yongxin within the independent area are all hilly country, and the peasants are so poor that it is not right to tax them. The expenses of the government and the Red Guards are met by expropriating local tyrants in the White areas. As for supplies for the Red Army, rice can for the time being be obtained from the land tax in Ninggang, while money, too, comes entirely from expropriating the local tyrants. During our guerrilla operations in Suichuan in October we raised more than ten thousand dollars, which will last us for a while, and we shall see what can be done when it is spent.

The Question of Political Power

People's political power has been organized everywhere at the county, district and township levels, but more in name than in reality. In many places there are no councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies to speak of. The executive committees of the township, district and even county governments have been elected at some kind of mass meeting. Mass meetings hastily called together cannot discuss questions, cannot give the masses political training, and, moreover, are most easily manipulated by intellectuals or opportunists. Some places do have councils of deputies, but they are regarded merely as temporary bodies for electing the executive committees; once the election is over, authority is monopolized by the committee and the council is never heard of again. Councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies worthy of the name are not non-existent, but they are very few. The reason for this is the lack of propaganda and education about this new political system of councils of deputies. The evil feudal habit of arbitrary dictation is so deeply rooted in the minds of the masses and even of ordinary Party members that it cannot be swept away at once; when anything comes up, they choose the easy way and have no liking for the bothersome democratic system. The system of democratic centralism can be widely and genuinely applied in mass organizations only when its effectiveness has been demonstrated in revolutionary struggle and the masses have come to understand that it is the best means of mobilizing their strength and is of the greatest help in their struggle. We are drawing up detailed organic laws for the councils of deputies at all levels (based on the outline of the Central Committee), so as gradually to correct the errors of the past. In the Red Army, conferences of soldiers' deputies at all levels are now being set up on a regular basis, to correct the past error of having only soldiers' committees and no soldiers' councils.

What the people generally know as the "workers', peasants' and soldiers' government" means the committees, because they do not yet recognize the power of the councils of deputies and think that the committees are the real organs of power. Executive committees without the backing of a congress of deputies often act without regard to the views of the masses; hesitation and compromise over the confiscation and distribution of land, the squandering and embezzlement of funds, and the avoidance of the White forces or irresolute struggle against them are found everywhere. Moreover, the committees seldom hold plenary sessions, and matters are decided by the standing committees. In the district and township governments even the standing committees seldom meet, and matters are dealt with and decided individually by the chairman, the secretary, the treasurer or the commander of the Red Guards (or of the insurrection detachment), these four being permanently on duty at the government offices. Thus democratic centralism has not become customary in the work of the government either.

In the early days, the small landlords and rich peasants scrambled to get on to the government committees, especially at the township level. Wearing red ribbons and feigning enthusiasm, they wormed their way into the government committees by trickery and seized control of everything, so that the poor-peasant members were left with only minor roles. They can be got rid of only when their masks are torn off in the course of struggle and the poor-peasant class rises up. Although this phenomenon is not universal, it has been found in a great many places.

The Party enjoys immense prestige and authority among the masses, the government much less. The reason is that, for the sake of convenience, the Party has done many things directly itself, pushing the organs of political power aside. This happens a great deal. In some places there are no Party groups in the organs of political power, and in others where they exist they are not functioning properly. From now on the Party must carry out its task of giving leadership to the government; with the exception of propaganda, the Party's policies and measures must be carried out through the government organizations. The wrong practice of the Kuomintang of issuing orders directly to the government is to be avoided.

Questions of Party Organization

The course of the struggle against opportunism: Around the time of the Horse Day Incident, the Party in the border counties may be said to have been controlled by opportunism. When the counter-revolution came, there was very little resolute struggle. In October of last year, when the Red Army (the First Regiment of the First Division of the First Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army) arrived in the border counties, only a few Party members remained who had fled into hiding, and the Party organizations had been completely destroyed by the enemy. The period from November to April of this year was one of rebuilding the Party, and the period after May one of great expansion. Over the past year, manifestations of opportunism have still been found everywhere in the Party: some Party members, lacking the will to fight, hide in the depths of the mountains when the enemy comes, which they call "lying in ambush"; other Party members, though full of activity, slide into blind insurrectionism. Both are expressions of petty-bourgeois ideology. After a long period of tempering in struggle and of education within the Party, such things have gradually diminished. At the same time, this petty-bourgeois ideology also exists in the Red Army. When the enemy comes, some advocate a desperate fight, or else running away. Both ideas often come from the same person in the course of a discussion on military operations. Only after a long period of inner-Party struggle and the lessons of objective facts, for example, suffering losses in a desperate fight or suffering defeat in running away, have they gradually been changed.

Localism: The economy of the border area is agricultural, and some places are still at the stage of the pestle and mortar (in the hill areas rice is mostly husked with pestle and mortar, while in the flat country there are many stone mortars). The prevailing social organization everywhere is the clan, with each clan of one surname as a unit. As regards Party organization in the villages, because of the way people live, many branches are made up of Party members of a single surname, so that a branch meeting is practically a clan meeting at the same time. Under such circumstances it is truly very hard to build "a militant Bolshevik Party". They barely understand when told that the Communists recognize no national or provincial boundaries, and they barely understand that they should recognize no county, district or township boundaries either. Localism is very strong between the counties, and there is deep localism even between the districts, and even the townships, within a county. Reasoning can at best bring about some slight change in this localism; for the most part it depends on the non-local oppression of the White forces. For instance, only when the counter-revolutionary "joint suppression" campaigns of the two provinces gave the people common interests in the struggle could their localism gradually be broken down. After many such lessons, localism has decreased.

The question of the native and the Hakka inhabitants: There is another peculiar feature in the border counties, namely the division between the natives and the Hakkas. There exists a deep rift between the native inhabitants and the Hakkas, who migrated from the North several hundred years ago; the historical feud between them is very deep, and sometimes it breaks out in fierce struggles. The Hakkas, numbering perhaps several million, live in an area stretching from the borders of Fujian and Guangdong along the border of Hunan and Jiangxi as far as southern Hubei. The Hakkas occupy the hill country and are oppressed by the natives, who occupy the plains, and they have never had any political rights. They welcomed the national revolution of the year before last and of last year, thinking that their day had come. Unexpectedly, the revolution was defeated and the Hakkas continued to be oppressed by the natives. Within our area there is a native-Hakka problem in Ninggang, Suichuan, Lingxian and Chaling, and it is most serious in Ninggang. From the year before last to last year, the native revolutionaries of Ninggang, joining with the Hakkas under the leadership of the Communist Party, overthrew the political power of the native landlord-gentry and took control of the whole county. In June of last year the Jiangxi government of Zhu Peide turned against the revolution, and in September the landlord-gentry led Zhu Peide's troops to "suppress" Ninggang, stirring up afresh the struggle between the native and the Hakka people. In principle, this division between natives and Hakkas ought not to extend into the exploited classes of workers and peasants, still less into the Communist Party. But in fact, because of habits handed down over many years, the division still persists. For example, after the August defeat on the border, the native landlord-gentry led the reactionary troops back to Ninggang, spreading the propaganda that the Hakkas were about to kill the natives; most of the native peasants went over to the enemy, put on white ribbons, and led the White army in burning houses and searching the hills. When the Red Army defeated the White army in October and November, the native peasants fled with the reactionaries, and the Hakka peasants in turn confiscated the property of the native peasants. This situation is reflected in the Party, and senseless struggles often occur. Our method is, on the one hand, to spread the propaganda "We will not kill the peasants who went over to the enemy" and "Peasants who went over to the enemy will get land just the same when they come back", so as to get them away from the influence of the landlord-gentry and return home with their minds at ease; and, on the other hand, to have the county government order the Hakka peasants to return the confiscated property to its owners, and issue notices that the native peasants will be protected. Within the Party, education is being intensified to ensure unity between the two sections of Party members.

The defection of the opportunists: During the revolutionary high tide (in June), many opportunists took advantage of the open recruitment of Party members to sneak into the Party, and Party membership in the border area rose at once to more than ten thousand. Since most of the leaders of the branches and the district committees were new members, good inner-Party education was impossible. As soon as the White terror struck, the opportunists went over to the enemy and led the reactionaries in seizing our comrades, and most of the Party organizations in the White areas collapsed. From September onward the Party was rigorously purged, and strict restrictions were placed on the qualifications for membership. The Party organizations of the two counties of Yongxin and Ninggang were entirely dissolved and re-registration was carried out. Party membership was greatly reduced, but its fighting capacity increased. Formerly the Party organizations were entirely open; since September, secret organizations have been built so as to be able to carry on activities even when the reactionaries come. At the same time we have pushed into the White areas in many ways and are operating inside the enemy camp. But in the nearby towns we still have no Party foundation. The reasons are, first, that the enemy is stronger in the towns, and, second, that when our army occupied these towns it damaged the interests of the bourgeoisie too much, making it difficult for Party members to gain a footing there. We are now correcting these mistakes and trying hard to build up our organizations in the towns, but so far without much success.

The leading bodies of the Party: The branch executive has been renamed the branch committee. Above the branch is the district committee, and above the district committee the county committee. Where special circumstances require, a special district committee is formed between the district and county committees, as with the Northern Section Special District and the South-eastern Special District in Yongxin. There are five county committees in the border area, Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, Suichuan and Lingxian. There was a county committee in Chaling, but since our work could not take hold there, most of the many organizations built last winter and this spring were smashed by the White forces, and for the past six months we have been able to work only in the hill areas near Ninggang and Yongxin; so the county committee has been changed into a special district committee. To reach Youxian and Anren one must pass through Chaling; we sent people there, but they returned without accomplishing anything. In January the Wan'an County Committee held a joint meeting with us in Suichuan, but for the greater part of the year we were cut off from it by the White forces; only in September, when the Red Army made a guerrilla foray into Wan'an, did we make contact again. Eighty revolutionary peasants followed us to the Jinggang Mountains and were organized into the Wan'an Red Guards. There is no Party organization in Anfu. Ji'an borders on Yongxin, but the Ji'an County Committee has made contact with us only twice and has given us no help whatsoever, which is very strange. In the Shatian area of Guidong, land was distributed twice, in March and in August, and Party organizations were built; these come under the Southern Hunan Special Committee, centred on the twelve caves of Longxi. Above the county committees is the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee. On May 20 the First Congress of the Party in the border area was held at Maoping in Ninggang and elected twenty-three members of the first Special Committee, with Mao Zedong as secretary. In July the Hunan Provincial Committee sent Yang Kaiming, and Yang became acting secretary. In September Yang fell ill, and Tan Zhenlin became acting secretary. In August, when the main force of the Red Army went to southern Hunan and the White forces were bearing down heavily on the border area, we held an emergency meeting in Yongxin. In October, after the Red Army had returned to Ninggang, the Second Congress of the Party in the border area was convened at Maoping. It met for three days beginning on October 4, adopted resolutions including "The Political Problems and the Tasks of the Border Area Party Organization", and elected the following nineteen persons as members of the second Special Committee: Tan Zhenlin, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Long Chaoqing, Zhu Changxie, Liu Tiangan, Pan Yuanzhu, Tan Sicong, Tan Bing, Li Quefei, Zhu Yiyue, Yuan Wencai, Wang Zuonong, Chen Zhengren, Mao Zedong, Wan Xixian, Wang Zuo, Yang Kaiming and He Tingying. Five were made members of the standing committee, with Tan Zhenlin (a worker) as secretary and Chen Zhengren (an intellectual) as deputy secretary. On November 14 the Sixth Congress of the Red Army elected twenty-three persons to form the Army Committee, five of them as members of the standing committee, with Zhu De as secretary. The Special Committee and the Army Committee are both subordinate to the Front Committee. The Front Committee was reconstituted on November 6, as designated by the Central Committee, and consists of five persons, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, the secretary of the local Party organization (Tan Zhenlin), a worker comrade (Song Qiaosheng) and a peasant comrade (Mao Kewen), with Mao Zedong as secretary. For the time being the Front Committee has set up a secretariat, a propaganda section, an organization section, a labour movement commission and a military commission. The Front Committee directs the local Party. It is still necessary to keep the Special Committee, because the Front Committee sometimes has to move with the army. We feel that the question of proletarian ideological leadership is a very important one. The Party organizations in the border counties are composed almost entirely of peasants, and unless they are given proletarian ideological leadership, they will tend to go astray. Besides paying active attention to the labour movement in the county towns and larger market towns, we should increase the representation of workers in the organs of political power. The proportion of workers and poor peasants should also be increased in the leading bodies of the Party at all levels.

The Question of the Character of the Revolution

We fully agree with the resolution of the Communist International on China. There is no doubt that China is still at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The programme for a thoroughgoing democratic revolution in China comprises, externally, the overthrow of imperialism so as to achieve complete national liberation, and, internally, the elimination of the power of the comprador class in the cities, the completion of the agrarian revolution and the abolition of feudal relations in the countryside, and the overthrow of the warlord government. Only by passing through such a democratic revolution can a real basis be laid for the transition to socialism. In the past year we have fought in many places and are keenly aware that the revolutionary tide in the country as a whole is ebbing. On the one hand, Red political power has been established in a few small areas; on the other, the people of the country as a whole still lack ordinary democratic rights; the workers, the peasants and even the democratic sections of the bourgeoisie have no freedom of speech or assembly, and joining the Communist Party is the greatest of crimes. Wherever the Red Army goes, the masses are cold and aloof, and only after our propaganda do they slowly bestir themselves. Whatever enemy unit we face, we have to fight it out hard; there are hardly any mutinies or uprisings within the enemy forces. Even the Sixth Army, which recruited the most "rioters" after the Horse Day Incident, is no exception. We are keenly aware of our loneliness, and we are constantly hoping for the end of this lonely life. To pass into a seething, nationwide revolutionary upsurge, it is necessary to launch a political and economic struggle for democracy, embracing also the urban petty bourgeoisie; this is the road that must be travelled.

Up to February of this year, we carried out our policy towards the petty bourgeoisie comparatively well. In March, representatives of the Southern Hunan Special Committee came to Ninggang and criticized us for being too far to the Right, for not burning and killing enough, and for not carrying out the so-called policy of "turning the petty bourgeois into proletarians and then forcing them into the revolution"; whereupon the leadership of the former Front Committee was changed and the policy changed. After the whole army came to the border area in April, there was still not much burning and killing, but the confiscation of the property of middle merchants in the towns and the levies imposed on the small landlords and rich peasants in the countryside were carried out very severely. The slogan put forward by the Southern Hunan Special Committee, "All factories to the workers", was also widely propagated. This ultra-Left policy of attacking the petty bourgeoisie drove most of them to the side of the landlord-gentry, so that they put on white ribbons and opposed us. Lately this policy has been gradually changed and the situation has been gradually improving. Particularly good results have been obtained in Suichuan, where the merchants in the county town and the market towns no longer shun us, and quite a few speak well of the Red Army. The fair at Caolinxu (held at midday, once every three days) is attended by twenty thousand people, which has never happened before. This shows that our policy is now correct. The landlord-gentry imposed very heavy taxes and levies on the people; the Suichuan Pacification Corps levied five tolls along the seventy-li road from Huang'ao to Caolin, and no farm produce was exempt. We smashed the Pacification Corps and abolished these tolls, winning the support of all the peasants and of the small and middle merchants.

The Central Committee wants us to issue a political programme that takes into account the interests of the petty bourgeoisie; we, for our part, propose that the Central Committee draw up a programme for the democratic revolution as a whole, embracing the interests of the workers, the agrarian revolution and national liberation, so that every locality has something to follow.

One characteristic of the revolution in China, where the economy is predominantly agricultural, is the use of military action to develop insurrection. We recommend that the Central Committee devote great efforts to military work.

The Question of the Location of Our Independent Regime

The area from the northern part of Guangdong along the Hunan-Jiangxi border to southern Hubei lies wholly within the Luoxiao mountain range. We have traversed the entire range, and by comparison of its different parts, the middle section, with Ninggang as its centre, is the most suitable for our armed independent regime. The terrain of the northern section is not as good as that of the middle section for either advance or defence, and it is too close to the major political centres; unless there is a plan to take Changsha or Wuhan swiftly, it is very dangerous to station the bulk of our forces in the area of Liuyang, Liling, Pingxiang and Tonggu. The terrain of the southern section is better than that of the northern, but our mass base there is not as good as in the middle section, and its political influence on the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi is also smaller; it is not like the middle section, where every action can influence the lower reaches of the rivers in the two provinces. The advantages of the middle section are: (1) a mass base that we have been building up for more than a year; (2) a fairly good foundation for the Party organizations; (3) local armed forces, rich in experience of struggle, which have been built up over more than a year, a thing very hard to come by; these local armed forces, together with the Fourth Red Army, cannot be destroyed by any enemy force whatsoever; (4) an excellent military base, the Jinggang Mountains, and bases for the local armed forces in every county; (5) its influence on the two provinces, and on the lower reaches of the rivers in the two provinces, which gives it a political significance altogether different from that of southern Hunan or southern Jiangxi, whose influence extends to only one province, and to the upper reaches and remote areas of that province. The disadvantage of the middle section is that, as it has been under the independent regime for a long time and faces large "encirclement and suppression" forces, its economic problems, especially the shortage of cash, are extremely difficult.

Within a few weeks in June and July, the Hunan Provincial Committee changed its proposals for our plan of action here three times. First Yuan Desheng came and approved the plan for political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao range. Then Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming came and urged that the Red Army should push towards southern Hunan without the slightest hesitation, leaving only two hundred rifles to defend the border area together with the Red Guards; this, they said, was the "absolutely correct" policy. The third time, Yuan Desheng came again, barely ten days later, with a letter which, besides giving us a long dressing-down, urged that the Red Army should go to eastern Hunan; this again was described as the "absolutely correct" policy, and again we were to go "without the slightest hesitation". Faced with such rigid instructions, we were in a real dilemma: not to comply would be close to insubordination, while to comply meant certain defeat. When the second letter arrived, the Army Committee, the Special Committee and the Yongxin County Committee held a joint meeting, considered it dangerous to go to southern Hunan, and decided not to carry out the Provincial Committee's views. A few days later, however, Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming, insisting on the Provincial Committee's views and exploiting the home-sickness of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, dragged the Red Army off to attack Chenzhou, causing the defeat of both the border area and the Red Army. The Red Army lost about half its strength; in the border area, countless houses were burned down and countless people killed; one county after another was lost, and to this day not all of them have been recovered. As for going to eastern Hunan, so long as the landlord-gentry regimes in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi have not split, the main force of the Red Army should on no account be sent there. Had there been no expedition to southern Hunan in July, not only could the August defeat in the border area have been avoided, but we could have taken advantage of the fighting between the Kuomintang Sixth Army and Wang Jun at Zhangshu in Jiangxi to smash the enemy forces in Yongxin, sweep through Ji'an and Anfu, and push our vanguard to Pingxiang, thus linking up with the Fifth Red Army in the northern section. Even at that time, Ninggang should have remained our general headquarters, and only guerrilla units should have been sent to eastern Hunan. Since war had not broken out among the landlord-gentry, and powerful enemy forces were still present in Lingxian, Chaling and Youxian on the Hunan border, had our main force moved north, the enemy would certainly have taken advantage of it. The Central Committee wants us to consider going to eastern Hunan or to southern Hunan; both would be very dangerous in practice. The proposal to go to eastern Hunan was not carried out, but the southern Hunan expedition has already proved it. This bitter experience is worth our remembering at all times.

At present the rule of the landlord-gentry class has not yet split, and the enemy forces surrounding the border area for the "suppression" campaign still number more than ten regiments. But if we can continue to find ways of solving the problem of cash (grain and clothing are no longer major problems), then, relying on the foundation we have in the border area, we can deal with these enemy forces, and even larger ones. For the sake of the border area, if the Red Army were to leave, ravages like those of August would immediately recur. Although the Red Guards would not be completely wiped out, the Party and our mass base would suffer a crushing blow; apart from the mountain strongholds, where some of the independent regime could be preserved, everything in the flat country would have to go underground, as in August and September. If the Red Army does not leave, then, with our present foundation, we can gradually expand in all directions, and the prospects are very bright. For the sake of the Red Army, if it wants to expand, the only way is to wage a prolonged struggle against the enemy around the Jinggang Mountains, where we have a mass base, that is, in the four counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lingxian and Suichuan, taking advantage of the conflicting interests of the Hunan and Jiangxi enemies, who must defend themselves on all sides and cannot concentrate their forces. By using correct tactics, fighting no battle unless we can win it and taking prisoners and booty in every battle we fight, we can gradually expand the Red Army. Given the preparations made by the masses in the border area between April and July, the Red Army would undoubtedly have expanded in August had its main force not made the expedition to southern Hunan. Although we made one mistake, the Red Army has come back to the border area, which enjoys favourable terrain and the support of the people, and the prospects are still not bad. Only in places like the border area can the Red Army, if it makes up its mind to struggle and has the courage to sustain it, increase its weapons and train good soldiers. The red flag has now been flying in the border area for a full year. Although, on the one hand, it has aroused the bitter hatred of the landlord-gentry class of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi and even of the whole country, on the other hand it has gradually aroused the hopes of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers in the neighbouring provinces. Take the soldiers: because the warlords regard the "bandit suppression" campaign against the border area as a major undertaking, with talk such as "a year's bandit suppression has cost a million dollars" (Lu Diping) and "they are said to number twenty thousand, with five thousand rifles" (Wang Jun), the attention of the enemy soldiers and of the lower-ranking officers who have no way out is gradually being drawn to us, and more and more of them will break away and come over to us; this is yet another source for the expansion of the Red Army. Moreover, the fact that the red flag in the border area has never been lowered shows not only the strength of the Communist Party but also the bankruptcy of the ruling classes, and this is of great significance in national politics. Therefore we have always held that the creation and expansion of political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao range is entirely necessary and entirely correct.