Viktor Orbán's speech at the anniversary celebration of the weekly magazine "Weltwoche"

Hungary Viktor Orbán · Prime Minister of Hungary

22 November 2023 · Anniversary celebration of the weekly magazine Weltwoche

Context
Orbán addressed guests at the anniversary celebration of Swiss conservative weekly Weltwoche in Switzerland on November 22, 2023.
Main themes
Conservative politics in Europe, Swiss-Hungarian friendship, Weltwoche anniversary, progressive-liberal hegemony, freedom of speech, European intellectual trends, historical connections between Hungary and Switzerland, 1956 Hungarian revolution, Hungarian Nobel Prize winners, conservative media, cultural and historical ties
Duration
~49 min
94th percentile
Words
5,836
94th percentile
Sentences
312
95th percentile
Readability
51
65th percentile
Grade
10.7
29th percentile
Syntax
2.97
43rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.07
21st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 38%35%
  • Ceremonial 20%19%
  • Institutional 19%17%
  • Social 13%12%
  • Economic 10%9%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 8%

312 sentences in 42 paragraphs

Americans like to say, “If my father had heard all this, he would have been proud of me, and my mother would have believed everything.” But we have not come together today, ladies and gentlemen, to talk about me, but about the Weltwoche. It is a great honor!

I also welcome those guests who have already been mentioned by name. For me, it is a special honor, Mr. Editor-in-Chief, that President Václav Klaus can also be present at this meeting. In Switzerland, perhaps not everyone knows this, but in European conservative politics, he represents the intellectual standard. We would all like to reach the level at which he represents this politics. And there is another person here among you whom we, Hungarians, are very proud of. Here is Dr. Ferenc Krausz, who received the Nobel Prize in Physics two weeks ago. It was a great week for Hungary because in the course of a single week, two Hungarians also received the Nobel Prize: one for biology and one for physics. From this, you can also see that I did not come from the end of the world.

First of all, I wish a happy birthday! I thank the Editor-in-Chief, Roger, and the editorial team of the Weltwoche. I do not know who was more surprised that this meeting came about, the Weltwoche or I. After all, there is something strange about the Prime Minister of a distant, ten million-inhabitant Central European country giving a speech on the birthday of one of the largest conservative publications in the German-speaking world. The truth is that an Adenauer or a Helmut Kohl should be standing here now, but you must be satisfied with me today.

Let us clarify how I came to be here. There can be several reasons for this. The first is that I hold your publication in high regard. I belong to those who believe that European politics would be poorer without the Weltwoche. Today, in Europe, today in European politics, the general intellectual tendency is the progressive liberal direction. It is reassuring that there is a German-speaking publication that represents conservative values. For me, it has the character of therapy that I can be here now. It is certainly good news that there is still a place in Europe where one can speak freely. And Switzerland is undoubtedly such a place. In other countries in Europe, there is a progressive-liberal hegemony, and conservative speech and the conservative program are immediately stigmatized.

The other reason why I may be here can be expressed by the Latin saying: similis simili gaudet, like attracts like. The Weltwoche is not like a mainstream medium, and I am not like a mainstream politician. I hope the interest is mutual. I am also interested in what you think here several hundred kilometers west of my homeland, and perhaps the readers of the Weltwoche are also interested in what is thought several hundred kilometers east about Europe.

The third reason is that there is a Swiss-Hungarian friendship. Neither of the two peoples is overly sentimental; we do not usually talk about this, but it exists. 1956 is something I do not need to explain here. 1956 meant great suffering in Hungary. We thank you for the Swiss who took in our refugees, and we thank our refugees for earning appreciation and respect here, and therefore Hungary has a good reputation because of the ’56 refugees. We thank you for that! But also Neumann, the father of the computer, attended the University of Zurich. Ábrahám Ganz was the greatest Hungarian industrial magnate; he was a Swiss who created modern Hungarian industry in Hungary.

And in my opinion, there is no other European country where one would know about actors of that history beyond William Tell. But we in Hungary know who Hermann Gessler is; we know who Rudolf Harras is. We know who Kuoni the shepherd, Walter Fürst, and Itell Reding are. Not to mention Stüssi the field guard. Do you know how we know this? From the cards of the so-called Hungarian cards, for they are depicted on the most popular Hungarian card game. When I learned this game – it is worth playing for small sums – I learned from my father that the reason Swiss heroes of freedom or participants in the freedom struggle are depicted is that when these cards were printed after the suppression of the 1848 freedom struggle, it was forbidden to depict Hungarian freedom fighters. Therefore, instead of Lajos Kossuth, you find William Tell on the Hungarian cards, etc. That is why we know about the Swiss freedom struggle; we know who its actors were, and from here we know that the Swiss people are a freedom-loving and fighting people. And, ladies and gentlemen, we also know the Swiss legends; there is some romance in them as well. We also know about the Hunnic tribe that supposedly got lost here during the retreat of the Huns and has since lived in a valley here. We know that the state of Switzerland is – similar to Hungary – bound by a blood covenant, only that there were not four of them with us, but seven. Seven tribes that concluded the blood covenant and thus created the Hungarian nation.

Currently, but importantly: 900 Swiss companies are operating in Hungary. More than 30,000 families earn their bread with Swiss companies. Our trade is continuously increasing. Perhaps this was the fourth reason why you invited a Hungarian to this occasion.

Ladies and gentlemen!

The main reason, however, may be that I – contrary to appearances – am the doyen of European prime ministers, the longest-serving prime minister in Europe. I am in my seventeenth year as prime minister. This means that I have seen a lot. I started in politics in the 1980s, in the anti-communist, youth, and university resistance. Then I became a member of parliament in the first elections in 1990. That is 33 years! I spent 16 years in opposition and seventeen years in government. So, ladies and gentlemen, I have my own view of Europe. Perhaps that is why I am allowed to stand here now. I accepted this invitation because I view European politics from a different perspective than the tactical dimension of current events. When I started my profession, my colleagues were still Chirac, Kohl, Blair, Aznar. That also existed.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, what I would like to talk about is our common problem, the common problem of Switzerland and Hungary, and it is called the European Union. You are not a member of the European Union. You are not a member of the EU, yet you are still Europeans, and in Brussels, it is also about you; the decisions made there also have an impact on you, as I was able to learn in detail during my discussions with your Federal President yesterday. And in 2024, during the elections to the European Parliament, in which you will not participate because you are not a member, it is also about you, because the power relations that will emerge then will also influence your participation in the single common market.

Ladies and gentlemen!

Conservatives today agree in Europe that Europe is no longer its own master. Its share of the world GDP is declining; by 2030, according to forecasts, there will be only one European country among the ten largest economies: Germany in tenth place. The others are all falling out of the top ten. With the enlargement, we are obviously not making progress, and with the regional conflicts – be it the Balkans or Ukraine – Europe is unable to cope. So today I will speak about the problems of Europe, frankly. The topic is difficult, and it is compounded by the fact that the language I speak, Hungarian, is a robust language, full of strong verbs and expressive images. I do not want to provoke, but on a morning like this, perhaps that is still possible. And if someone has missed their breakfast coffee, I guarantee that what they will hear will wake them up; they have not come in vain.

Ladies and gentlemen!

Right at the beginning, I would like to state my thesis, to present the conclusion of my lecture in advance. My thesis is: Europe has lost its ability to self-determination. This means it is unable to determine what its goals are, and it cannot recognize which instruments it must use to achieve its goals, i.e., it is incapable of independent and sovereign action. I say this with bitterness; for a Hungarian person, this is a painful feeling because we are indeed talking about the cradle of Western civilization. And it is true that Western civilization has also taken root on other continents, but its marrow, its core is indeed here in Europe. It hurts to see what we see today. Let us go back in time! How did this situation arise?

Before World War II, Europe had the ability to determine its own fate. Unfortunately, it could not utilize this. Between the two world wars, the peoples of Europe used their forces to attack one another, and in doing so, they weakened each other, perhaps permanently weakened, resulting in a civil war within European or Christian civilization. It is not indifferent who won and who lost, but overall, on a European horizon, we all lost. Because the end result was that extra-European forces became stronger. I am speaking of the United States and the Soviet Union, which now exists only as a bad memory. The western half of Europe fell under American occupation and American influence, and the eastern half fell under Soviet occupation. There we lost the ability for self-determination for the first time.

It is important that we do not believe that both occupations had the same balance. There is not much to say about the balance of the Soviet occupation; it was a clear dictatorship, inhumanity, atrocities, economic backwardness, intellectual hopelessness, and impoverishment. That is the negative side. On the positive side, there is almost nothing. However, the western part of the continent has long benefited from American dominance. Initially, there was the Marshall Plan, which helped rebuild war-torn Western Europe, and that is undoubtedly the merit of the Americans. At the same time, during this period, a very significant intellectual challenge arose before the leading European politicians: they had to determine Europe’s position in this new world when the two halves of Europe were occupied from both sides. The intellectual challenge was how Europe could remain Europe, how it could preserve its own quality while adapting to the power relations that had emerged. Was that possible? I personally hold the leading European politicians of that time in high regard because they solved this intellectual task. Adenauer, Schuman, de Gaulle figured out how to maintain European quality in Western Europe in a world dominated by Anglo-Saxon customs and norms. Because it was clear that the United States expected there to be democracies in Western Europe and that the economy should adopt the capitalist mode of operation and structure. The leaders of that time understood that simple copying, the straightforward adoption of American models in Europe, would lead to catastrophe, as the Anglo-Saxon political and economic models were not native, not entrenched in Europe. So, somehow, democracy and capitalism had to be given a European face, a peculiar quality, so that this new structure could succeed in Western Europe. This solution became Christian democracy.

If you consider it, then Christian democracy provided an answer to the question of how to sneak the concept of the common good into the purely competition-based democracy. The contract-based approach to democracy, which is characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon world, was supplemented by the idea of the common good, resulting in a peculiar European political quality. We can safely say that what is referred to in the Anglo-Saxon world as liberal democracy was called Christian democracy in Europe. And this also happened with capitalism, as the cowboy-type capitalism of the United States is indeed foreign to Europe. There we have the greater responsibility, the solidarity, the responsibility felt for neighbors; thus, this very deep Christian tradition is embedded in our economy. And Christian democracy has also accomplished this well. That has succeeded.

In a spiritual sense, Western Europe, which at that time was Europe, could remain an independent factor. This means that the leaders of Europe at that time knew exactly – if you read their speeches, you will see this – what the difference was between them and the Americans. And they were able, they were capable of formulating this difference, representing European interests even within an American hegemony. Therefore, the history of Eastern and Western Europe diverged. In the East, there was a violent takeover, the Soviets, the Russians forced their own Soviet model upon us. However, American power was expanded through different channels than the Soviet system. They rather built positions in Europe. They established themselves in decision-making centers, background institutions, lobby groups, and in the cultural sphere. What is now called soft power was, in contrast to the brutal Soviet hard power.

From here on, everyone can personally remember what happened. In 1990, the West won the Cold War against the East, the Soviet Union, we became free, and the Soviet power structures simply disappeared from Europe, including from the eastern half of Europe. The exciting question is – and this leads us to today – what has happened to the American structures in the past 33 years. This leads us to the provocative question of whether it is bad that the Americans have stayed here after 1990.

Let us examine this question! There is logic in it, because it is after all the strongest state of Western civilization, and it is logical that this alliance should be led by the strongest member, which is the United States. Therefore, it was acceptable, indeed useful for Western Europe, that such a configuration emerged: Christian Western Europe, Christian Western United States. In 1990, that was still the case. This configuration has changed until today. That is the big difference between 1990 and 2023. The last period in which Christian Western Europe and Christian Western United States cooperated was during Ronald Reagan's time, who spoke of his homeland as: "One nation under God, city on the hill." And at that time, there was still a Christian Democratic leadership in Europe. Thus, the entire American presence caused no problems, no problems that could not be dealt with. However, the situation has changed, because in the meantime, the progressive liberal forces in the United States have replaced the Christian political forces with significant weight and power. Conservatives have switched too late, both in Western Europe and in America, and if you look around, you will see: Progressive liberals have reached all important positions. This means that American positions today in Europe essentially represent progressive-liberal principles and have taken over the leadership of the continent. And the Americans are spreading these progressive-liberal principles everywhere, including in Europe, with full force today. The big question is whether it is possible for Europe, under such conditions, to create its own quality again and still maintain its independence within the large Western alliance system. This is politely called "strategic sovereignty" nowadays. The French say it, which is why it sounds so elegant: strategic autonomy, but it means what I am talking about. Only they are not allowed to express it in this way, so openly.

The most spectacular expression of this phenomenon is that Europe has lost its large-format politicians who would remind us of the former greats. It is not by chance that we felt the great contrast when I listed the old leading politicians earlier and we all recalled the current ones. This is no wonder, because political acumen and the ability to act are like all other human abilities. It is the same in our profession; if you do not practice something, it atrophies. Just like the muscles of astronauts in a state of weightlessness. And since 1990, after the great generation, Chirac and Kohl, stepped down, and a dominant, liberal, American progressive-liberal dominance came to the fore, we have practically unlearned to use those of our abilities without which there are no large-format European leading politicians. What I am saying is not a criticism of individuals; it is directed against no one, I am providing a structural description, because from such a structure, it is difficult to expect, or perhaps one cannot expect at all, that there should be leading politicians who remind us of the old greats. If we look at it from here, then it is already a problem that the Americans have such a strong position in Europe. Today, the situation is such that, even if it sounds brutal, the fate of Europe is chained to America. This means that if they lose ground, we also suffer the disadvantages of that. And this is today’s main trend in world politics: American loss of ground, and as a consequence, loss of positions on the European side as well.

Ladies and gentlemen!

The Americans are strong in their ability to present what is actually American interest as universal, as a universal value. This seems like a small trick, but it has serious consequences in an intellectual sense, because if you base foreign policy on a values basis and hide your interests behind those values, then there is no longer the possibility for meaningful dialogue. Because you are not trying to reconcile interests, but you must accept those high values formulated by the other as postulates, which you know are actually American interests, but you cannot defend yourself against them, because then you turn against the values. This game runs day and night. The Europeans have also adopted this. When they talk about European values, behind them generally lie the interests of some large European country. The essence is the same in both cases. We cannot meaningfully discuss significant foreign policy issues because no one dares to admit that they want to represent their interests. Interests can be reconciled, values cannot. The nature of value debates is entirely different from that of interest debates.

Ladies and gentlemen!

The United States has not only begun a Westernization in Europe after 1990 but has also tried to export progressive-liberal principles across the globe. We all know this; we have experienced it, anyone could glean it from the daily press over the past thirty years, and it is known that the plan has backfired. On the one hand, it caused a great number of wars at various points around the world. On the other hand, the non-Western part of the world began to view the United States with hostility. Additionally, we brought China into the free trade system, which strengthened much faster than anyone could have imagined, and today the situation is that China has become the representative of the countries that reject the West, let us call them the discontented countries. What has happened is what Huntington wrote about at the beginning of the nineties, reflecting on the future of the world, in a fantastic book. He wrote that if the United States continues with the Westernization of the world, they will achieve that the entire non-Western world will turn against them. And this sentiment can be strongly represented in international politics through China – as the United States is being pushed out of more and more places in the world, and we Europeans have tied ourselves to them, we are also constantly losing our positions. This will have serious consequences. You can see it too; it only takes a conflict somewhere in the world where the United States has vital interests, the Middle East – currently – the Pacific region – that is also the case – and for the United States, other parts of the world suddenly become more important than Europe.

This raises serious questions. And in Brussels, there are not only no answers to this question, but they do not even understand the question. To illustrate just one problem, to make it more concrete, I am talking about the Russian-Ukrainian war. Let us ask the question: What will happen if there is a political shift in the United States, say, if the more skeptical Republicans regarding the Ukraine issue come to power? Then America will regroup its forces, perhaps even turn its back on the issue. And we, Europeans, will be left with a huge geopolitical conflict. For us, this is important; our eastern neighbor is Ukraine, and we will then have to find a political solution to an almost impossible matter, and we will have to bear the entire financial burden of restoring order. From Switzerland, this may sound hard to believe, but Europe is in a process of impoverishment; it has no money for such a large adventure and undertaking. I do not want to answer this question; I just wanted to outline the consequences of what already has effects when Europe ties itself to the United States instead of representing its own interests, and what consequences this may have in the future, considering that a reordering is taking place all over the world.

Ladies and gentlemen!

Perhaps I still have a few minutes; this problem leads us to the issue of leadership, to the problem of political leadership, that is, in the European Union. The European Union is indeed a peculiar creation, a sui generis. Such a creature does not exist according to the lexicons, yet in reality, it does exist. The leadership, the political leadership of this entity, this conglomerate, should be provided by a body called the European Council, which includes the top people, the prime ministers and presidents of the 27 member states. The reality I see is that instead of the Council and the national leading politicians, the Brussels institutions are making more and more decisions. Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with the institutions, because without institutions, there is no civilized life, but it is already a big problem if the institutions do not perform the work that is their task. The institutions are always bureaucratic. They are there to execute the decisions of politicians, not to make decisions in place of politicians. Instead of analyzing the European structures at length, I will just say, if you think of your daily press briefings, how often does it seem in public that the leadership of Europe is being provided by the European Commission and its president? We think of her and read her statements as if a leader of Europe were speaking, while she is our employee, our paid employee, whose job it is to execute what we have decided.

I was there when this change occurred. Earlier, during the time of Barroso, during the time of President Barroso, the Commission was an executor, a bureaucracy. The change occurred with President Juncker, who announced the program that he would transform the Commission into a political body. But that is a different field. The Commission understands nothing of that; we understand something of it. Therefore, the situation has arisen that bureaucrats can manage things when the sun is shining. It does not even become apparent that Europe lacks political leadership; everything proceeds peacefully, tried-and-true routines, familiar procedures. But when problems arise, a crisis comes, well, then leaders are needed. Politicians are necessary. The most characteristic trait of a politician is that he is able to rewrite the rules. The true politician does not stand out by keeping things within the given framework, but by recognizing that new frameworks must be set. To put it simply, a politician is one who is able to say, "Until now, we have done things this way, but that is no longer good; starting tomorrow, we will do them differently." We cannot expect this from any bureaucratic institution.

The situation is this, my dear ladies and gentlemen, esteemed participants of the birthday gathering, that today in Europe the politicians are missing and the bureaucrats are everywhere. And if that were not enough, we also have the evil that the administrative institutions in a spiritual sense have been occupied by the progressive-liberal hegemony imported from the United States. We are dealing with a very peculiar mix. Instead of politicians, officials occupy leading positions. However, these officials are not ideologically neutral, as the bureaucracy otherwise should be and as the profession would require, but they are committed supporters of that progressive liberalism that started overseas and occupied all of Europe. I did not come here to seek pity, but after this, I truly deserve some sympathy from you. This is due to the fact that there are no strong national leaders, and the term "strong leader" itself is a negatively connoted expression in Brussels. So if someone dares to say in Brussels that a strong leader is needed, they receive the most negative assessment imaginable. One cannot even utter that strong leading politicians are necessary.

My dear ladies and gentlemen!

Therefore, the last question that I should perhaps answer is what Central Europe can do in such a situation and what Hungary can do in such a situation? Because of what I have said, I have always thought that Hungary has some peculiar responsibility in this situation. First, because we do not have a liberal hegemony either. We broke that in 2010. There is pluralism, no hegemony. There are no coalition squabbles, as we have a very strong legitimacy from the voters. There are no riots in the streets, there is no migration, the number of migrants in Hungary is zero, zero, there is not a single one! Hungary therefore has time to think about the future of Europe, and that gives a kind of responsibility. We have tried to meet this responsibility by developing a different model. What I have spoken about so far, we call the Brussels European model. What is happening in Hungary – now aside from the liberal insults, which we should discount, and that is not easy, as they form a broad layer, so let us discount those, but if we disregard these political squabbles and look at the essence, examine the nature of the structures – then we will see that a different model is functioning in Hungary – which we call the Hungarian European model. Of course, we know where our place is. A country with ten million inhabitants. I usually say: We can say interesting things, but not important ones. So now we will say something interesting, because we have developed a different kind of social, political, and economic model than that of Brussels. I will only briefly mention a few pillars or elements.

The first is that we do not accept the economic conception of the "welfare state." The "welfare state" in Western Europe is something that the state must guarantee its citizens prosperity at some level. We do not agree with that. In our case, there is the "workfare state," meaning one must work first, and if someone has worked, then the result of that will be prosperity. Not the other way around! So of course we also want prosperity for Hungarians, but the state cannot guarantee that. One must earn it, one must produce it, and for that, one must work. Here, performance is necessary. This means, of course, a social system of a completely different type, which means a much harder and harsher, colder system in Hungary than what is customary in Western Europe. The migrants do not come to Hungary not only because we stop them at the border with the help of a huge fence. Just this year, our border guards thwarted 270 thousand illegal border crossing attempts. 270 thousand! That is one reason. But they also do not come because if they want to be somewhere, it is not Hungary, because according to Hungarian laws, a migrant coming to Hungary can only receive social benefits equivalent to what a Hungarian citizen receives. And since everything is linked to work in our country, our attractiveness in this regard can be described as rather limited.

The second pillar of this Hungarian model is that we want to handle demographic challenges through family policy instead of migration. I do not want to talk about this now; this would be the subject of a separate conference. In Hungary, we have achieved a family policy turnaround, but not a demographic turnaround. The big question for the future is whether we will succeed? Concentrating all our efforts on this, we spend the most money from our GDP on this in all of Europe. Will we succeed in maintaining our population by our own efforts or not? – That will be decided in the coming ten years and some. So one part, one pillar of our model is what is called "flat tax," the extremely low taxes, everyone pays a tax of 15 percent. Families with children do not even pay that much, as they can be exempted based on the number of children. There is no inheritance tax. The corporate tax is below 10 percent; it is the lowest in all of Europe. And foreign direct investments are flowing into the country, which we all support. Part of this strategy is that we support family values instead of gender values. A component of our strategy is – in this regard, Hungary is an old conservative country – that the constitution states completely banal things. For example, it says that a marriage requires a man and a woman. Or it states – this is also a completely banal thing, one is a bit ashamed to say it – it is written in the constitution that the father is a man, the mother is a woman. That sounds quite primitive, but I can offer this much in our defense: We are not so primitive, but the world is.

Now, another component of this Hungarian model is that we do not want a dividing wall to arise again between the East and the West in economic terms, but we have an economic strategy with which we want to help the eastern companies with the best technology and the technologically best western companies to rendezvous in Hungary. We have industrial parks where a huge German and Chinese investment are simultaneously, side by side, producing a common product. This is a different strategy than the decoupling and derisking that one otherwise hears so often about in Europe.

And as for political life, instead of the liberal hegemony, the progressive liberal hegemony, there is pluralism, and in the debates within the European Union, we represent a sovereignist standpoint.

This is what we call the Hungarian European model. The good news is that this model works. Although it has been written thousands of times and in thousands of places that this wasp cannot fly or that this creature does not exist. I always like to refer to my studies in biology, where there is also a description of the wasp, mathematicians have created it, according to which with such a large body and such a small wing, it is impossible to fly. Yet the wasp flies; therefore, we must not believe that this model does not work, because it does.

In 2022 and 2023, the world turned upside down. 2022 – remember: COVID, then war – although the world economy was turned upside down, there was a record of investments in Hungary, first in the European Union, there was a record of employment, and we also had an export record. And in 2023, we will again have an investment record, an employment record, and also an export record. Imagine Hungary as being ranked 96th in the world by population and 34th in terms of export volume. And in certain technologies, we rank second, third, or fourth. This has happened, my dear ladies and gentlemen, while we are simultaneously subjected to financial sanctions by the European Union! So the European Union unlawfully refuses to hand over those resources, those financial resources, that the country is entitled to. That amounts to 3-4 billion euros annually. So we are record holders in difficult years in such a way that we do not receive those 3-4 billion euros that we are otherwise entitled to, and yet this model is capable of achieving these results.

In summary, what should the European Union do? And I promise, Mr. Editor-in-Chief, that I will really come to an end now. In Hungary, there is a Calvinist joke that the child asks his father when the preacher will finally finish his sermon. "My son, he has already finished it, he just cannot stop." I try to avoid that. So what should Europe do in this situation? First of all, a script is needed, and we must prepare for the fact that the United States will partially or completely withdraw from Europe. And therefore, we must seriously engage in creating European defense industrial, security, and military guarantees. One must rehabilitate political leadership capabilities; one must forget such postmodern madness regarding leadership. These Frankenstein theories that have escaped from the sociology department must be forgotten, and we must return to the classical European political and leadership culture. And we must – this is the most important thing – we must raise a new generation of politicians who will enter politics. But politics is not attractive today. And the most talented young people do not enter politics. And that can lead to problems, especially on the conservative side. We must educate a new conservative political generation. We must not accept the excuse reminiscent of scholastic philosophers, according to which I will not go into the water until I have learned to swim. One must throw the young into the deep water so that they swim and learn it; otherwise, there will be no young conservative politician generation in Europe. In my conviction, we must take the position of connectivity in the debate about decoupling from or connectivity with other parts of the world. Europe must regain control over its own borders.

And I make one last cautious remark about Christianity and Christian culture, for I believe that Christian culture must be popularized, and it would not be a problem if this were paired with evangelization, but that is already completely outside my responsibilities as a politician. That is another world. But if we do not regain our faith in such a way that the pursuit of the path proposed by Christ results in the freest, most humane, and livable world, and we also find the answers to the ultimate questions of human life here, if we do not regain this faith, it will be very difficult to make Europe independent and successful again.

In summary, what I wanted to tell you, my dear ladies and gentlemen, besides wishing you a happy birthday, is that Hungary is not the black sheep, but the first swallow, and we are waiting for the others!