Speech by Viktor Orbán on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs.

Hungary Viktor Orbán · Prime Minister of Hungary

4 December 2023 · 50th anniversary of the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs

Context
Orbán addressed the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs conference on December 4, 2023, marking the institute's 50th anniversary and its new direct subordination to the Prime Minister's Office.
Main themes
Hungarian foreign policy, Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs 50th anniversary, Prime Minister's foreign policy leadership, Hungarian national interest, foreign policy tradition and sovereignty, decision-making support structures, diplomatic protocol, Hungarian historical statesmanship
Duration
~28 min
80th percentile
Words
3,335
80th percentile
Sentences
149
80th percentile
Readability
47
54th percentile
Grade
12.3
48th percentile
Syntax
3.13
64th percentile
Vocabulary
2.10
27th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 51%48%
  • Social 17%16%
  • Institutional 15%14%
  • Ceremonial 14%13%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

149 sentences in 19 paragraphs

Good day, ladies and gentlemen! Esteemed directors! Excellencies, distinguished guests! Honorable Professor András Balogh!

It is a pleasure to see you again. It brings back memories of the good old days.

It is not easy to deliver the closing remarks at a conference one has not attended. Perhaps the best thing to do is to congratulate you all on your birthday right away! But I can ascertain in just two short minutes that work is also being done here as a celebration. That may be right, but it is certainly necessary.

Perhaps I should start by answering the question that, according to a popular Hungarian saying, goes: What is the boot doing on the table? What am I doing here at the conference marking the 50th anniversary of the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs? If I want to answer this question simply, in the American style of your president, briefly and clearly, I would say that I am here because you all will now work directly for the Prime Minister. Because the Institute of Foreign Affairs will in the future support my work through the Office of the Prime Minister and the Political Director, a position that until now no one has been able to define precisely what it is. The work of the Political Director is as nebulous as the world of foreign affairs is nebulous, so they fit well together, and from this elusive area, I hope that we will be able to draw on a background that will be beneficial for the government's decisions. I do not believe that the current change in classification will alter the tasks, but it will certainly mean that the same tasks will have to be carried out differently.

In reality, the situation that the Institute of Foreign Affairs works directly for the Office of the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister is not a new situation, but rather a restoration of the old world. When Hungary has been able at times in its long history to conduct a sovereign and independent foreign policy, it has always been a foreign policy oriented towards the Prime Minister. The guidelines of foreign policy strategy were formulated by the Prime Minister and his staff and implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If we look back at the greatest among them – Tisza, Bethlen, Teleki – and examine how they worked, we will find that the current situation is a return to the previous tradition. The return to tradition is generally a reasonable reflex, as traditions, especially in a country with such a long history as Hungary, are not gathered by the wind, but the knowledge of several generations is accumulated there. In other words: traditions do not arise by chance. There are countries – and I think Hungary is one of them – that have been condemned by history to set more ambitious goals than would follow from their size or economic power. We are not the only country of this kind, but there are not so many of them. These countries cannot afford to forgo the energy, dynamism, and initiative that lie in foreign policy, in external affairs. In other words: the reins of foreign policy must be firmly held in such countries, which in our constitutional system means that it is good for the Prime Minister to hold them. This corresponds to the Hungarian political view. However, this works well only if the Prime Minister is supported by a decision-preparing team, preferably a large, broad, and high-quality team that assists in thinking. In this area, the principle that I chose as a battle cry for my work as Prime Minister at the age of 35 applies in particular, albeit in a much more poetic way than today, which goes something like this, and this is the compass I have followed since then: Alone, you can never be wise enough. And this is perhaps most evident in foreign policy. It is therefore a natural necessity for the Institute of Foreign Affairs to support the Prime Minister in his work.

There may not be much more to say about this, but there are one or two points that need to be clarified, and I could formulate it in such a way that the Hungarian position that I believe exists, the Hungarian interest, is worth a few words. This needs clarification, as the worst thing I have learned from my experience is that during the course of work, it turns out that colleagues are not on the same basis. To avoid this, it is worth reviewing the seemingly fundamental, sometimes clichéd, but still crucial basic theses together.

Ladies and gentlemen!

Of course, I am no novice in the field of foreign policy, and I am well aware that foreign relations are the most demanding area of politics, the one that is the most refined, placing the greatest value on appearances and formalities. This is also correct, as it is often a delicate matter, and diplomatic protocol was not invented by chance. However, this does not mean that anyone who has sensitive questions or astonishing statements, insights, or novel proposals is per se a violation of the norm. And this holds true even if one may have to deviate from the path, the trail of diplomatic protocol. I would suggest that we should not yield to such siren songs that want to teach us a lesson in well-mannered foreign policy behavior. There are countries that can afford to be generous due to their size and power, that seek only recognition, personal recognition, that can afford to be an "easygoing" partner in all matters and accumulate a kind of fame through constant agreement. These countries that can afford it are usually countries with great power status. They have a natural deterrent due to their size. If one has the necessary military and economic power, one can earn respect without having to warn one's partners extra.

But we, Hungary, are not a great power, and yet we claim our right to an independent foreign policy, and we expect others who are larger than us to accept this claim. This is a relatively difficult task, as I think if one were to express it in your language, one would say: Our relative dominance is low; it is so low that it is in the negative range. Consequently, a country with this ambition, this size, and this power has no choice but to rely on its stance. On the striking and bold stance, on the instinct not to run away in difficult situations, not to adopt camouflage, not to trick oneself in, but to confront the conflict. One can also create a relative dominance from this, and we do so. Our most successful political product in international waters is precisely the fact that Hungary, although it is a country with only ten million inhabitants, has a gross domestic product as it has, and has the number of soldiers it has, nevertheless conducts or can conduct an independent foreign policy. Although you are the experts and can certainly grasp the essentials in theory better than I will, it may be useful from the basis of practice if I lay out what I consider to be the cornerstones of an independent and proactive foreign policy. I have one, two, or three theses.

My first thesis is this: If a country that has no relative advantages wants to conduct an independent foreign policy, it must take a radical position. This means that this country must have a grand vision, a vision that is long-term, but also ambitious and concrete. It must have a plan and a strategy to become a strong country that is respected by others and whose demand for an independent foreign policy is accepted by others. Arguments can be made against this. Typical arguments are that those who are not strong enough should not want much. This seems to be a fairly simple argument. If resources are limited, then one should set small goals, as they are still achievable. The government before us expressed this in a witty way: "We should dare to be small." If we get along well with everyone, then thanks to the generosity of the great, we get a small crumb from the table, and so on and so forth. If we act as there have been such periods in modern Hungarian foreign policy, then we do indeed have a little something, but we must accept that others will decide for us on the issues that are truly important and significant to us. Furthermore, we must also face the fact that if we have accustomed our partners to the idea that we are always the good ones, and if the situation arises that we must oppose the will of the great, then what we have received out of goodwill until then will also be taken from us. Therefore, it may be best to pretend that Hungary does not want to be the best student of another power, but its own master. This cannot be done with a policy of "We should dare to be small," but requires a radical stance, a radical stance that is necessary for success. From a tactical perspective, for the reason that if we are not radical enough, there is nothing in the debate that we can concede. In other words: Radicality always enlarges the scope. That is the tactical side of the matter. But there is also a strategic side. Because radical means in the Hungarian language, in our cultural context, perhaps something different than in most Western languages. Radical means rooted. Radical means taking a position that captures the core, the essence of a matter.

This is, by the way, also a cultural-anthropological characteristic of Hungarians. This English traveler, John Paget, published a shockingly thick book in which he describes his travels in Hungary in the early 19th century, in which he describes his folk experience of how the Hungarians were back then. For those who have not yet worked through it, I recommend doing so. At one point, this good English traveler writes that Hungarians speak honestly and, as he says, even when they know they are surrounded by spies, they are by no means artificial. The Hungarians do not care a bit about them. In modern terms of the 20th century, we would call this a café society. The former traveler hit a crucial point, for indeed: Hungarians take pleasure in naming things as they are. And they also take joy when they manage to grasp the problem by the horns, when they have succeeded in pressing as much context as possible about the subject under investigation into a single sentence. In English, it may be easier to say: "You can’t say anything without saying everything." In other words: It is clear that the straightforward, clear, all-encompassing way of speaking gets to the root, and that Hungarian radicalism, which tries to tackle the problem at its root, is essentially an intellectual phenomenon. It is not about rudeness, not about physical violence, but about a phenomenon of an intellectual nature.

To get out of this abstract explanation, I will give you a concrete example that may illustrate that I am not talking about a theoretical question. You have surely also noticed that we Hungarians do not argue about the mechanism – we have not participated in any of these debates – by which migrants should be distributed and integrated after distribution. For us, the question of how they should be distributed and how they should be integrated is not a substantive, I would say irrelevant, technical, and inherently uninteresting question. The essential question for a Hungarian is whether migration in general and at all is a good thing or not. As long as we have not dissected that, as long as we have not clarified that, it makes no sense to talk about how to distribute them and how to integrate them. The debates in the West never go so far as to ask: Is migration itself good or bad? But now, for years, it has only been about discussing the principles of distribution, the details of successful or unsuccessful integration. I call that radicalism.

My second thesis is that Hungary's foreign policy practice, which focuses on addressing questions at their core, contrary to all opposing rumors, does not harm Hungary's reputation and esteem, but rather enhances it. For the fact that others do not speak in this way, that they do not express their knowledge within this linguistic framework, does not mean that these questions do not concern them. I do not believe that an Italian, a Frenchman, or a German does not, from time to time, when alone at home, ask himself—carried away by his emotions—whether there might not be a way to turn everything back, and talk about how we could, instead of integrating migrants, return to the time when we arrived at the point where we are now in a way that no one can comprehend, from a situation that might pull us back. And if we had the choice, we would choose the state of thirty or forty years ago and not the state of today. What I want to convey to you is that the fact that others do not choose this radical way of speaking, analyzing the situation, and expressing themselves does not mean that they are not interested in the same or similar substantive questions. And that is why they enjoy listening to us. They may not want to join in. They do not want to get involved in the debate that follows the presentation of a Hungarian viewpoint, but they are very eager to listen to us because they too, somewhere deep inside, are interested in these fundamental questions. And the fact that we are able to present our viewpoint not only substantively but also to try to defend it both intellectually and politically, and even to fight for it. This is slowly becoming a kind of trademark; this is actually Hungarian soft power. This will then help us form coalitions with those who cannot say the same as we do, whose goals align with what we are discussing. And there are more and more of these difficult situations where, precisely because we speak openly and directly—of course not in public, but at the negotiating table—more and more combinations and coalitions are opening up for us. If someone is interested in what this looks like concretely, I would like to draw your attention to the diplomatic events of the next two or three weeks.

Ladies and gentlemen!

In this context, we must also address the widespread belief that the radical capture of the essential leads not to prestige but to isolation. This notion does not align with my experiences. I do not wish to engage with this on a theoretical level, but I can only say from practice that Hungarian foreign policy has never been as active and extensive in a century as it has been in recent years. Just recently: Beijing, the Chancellery in Berlin, the President of the Italian Parliament, Switzerland, a UN event in Azerbaijan, the President of the European Council in Budapest, then from here to Argentina, Brussels, and who knows what other mysterious travels. Intensive contacts with the West, a resonant opening to the East and South. Speed, agility, trade, investment, and connectivity. This brings with it what I have spoken about so far, and not isolation.

Ladies and gentlemen!

So far, I have spoken about the formulation of our position and the manner in which it is represented. I have said a few things about what improves and strengthens our position in the world. Now we just need to talk about what the standpoint is, what the guiding principle is, on the basis of which we will approach and articulate the substantive questions. This is my third thesis that I have prepared for today. This simple sentence is that Hungarian foreign policy is based on national interest. Obviously, you think you know this thought to the point of exhaustion. Nevertheless, I suggest that we talk a little about it. Because foreign policy is traditionally classified as either idealistic or realistic. If someone is idealistic, they try to advocate for a principle that they consider important in the world. We call this a values-based foreign policy. If one is a realist, they believe in strength and, above all, in the balance of power and also try to assert their interests with the help of greater power. This is an interest-based foreign policy. I think you know my negative stance on values-based foreign policy, but I would like to add that I am not particularly enthusiastic about interest-based foreign policy either. The reason for this is that what truly excites and inspires us Hungarians, and me personally, is a foreign policy based on national interests, because I believe it combines the best elements of idealism and realism. The naming also helps us understand this. The word "national" here is not a simple adjective; the word national is, in this context, an essential, substantive word; it refers to the idealistic element, because the nation is primarily an idea. And the interest that we associate with the word national, the national interest, is itself realism, the general designation for what is necessary, useful, and practical. And this, in turn, requires a special mindset that is rarely discussed in academic circles; it requires that a foreign policy based on national interest can never be dogmatic. Yes, if we understand what that means, it cannot become dogmatic. Because the most important task of a foreign policy oriented towards national interest is to constantly recognize, define, and capture what the national interest is in every situation—and, as you know, in foreign policy, every situation changes constantly—and to act on that basis. I am convinced that a foreign policy that is oriented towards national interest has intellectual substance, that it also contains principles and values, but that it forces those who hold this view to constantly and flexibly adapt. This means, for example, that we Hungarians pay attention to the balance of power, but we do not try to assert our interests through a mere preponderance of power. One could say that we make a virtue out of necessity; we are not a great power that can rely solely on its strength. We believe in a comprehensive network of relationships that are open in all directions, in an arsenal of soft power instruments that are used wisely. That is the true strength of Hungarian foreign policy.

Now, this is the intellectual task where I will count most on your help in the future, namely that of the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs. Helping decision-makers navigate the great questions of the world, recognizing the essence of national interest, and proposing and imposing this constant adaptation on decision-makers. To the extent that Hungary's foreign relations become increasingly diverse, to the extent that we are present in more and more regions of the world, to the extent that our attention is increasingly distributed across individual areas, there is a growing need for the most qualified experts of Hungarian foreign policy thinking to carry out this interpretative, national interest-defining, and decision-preparatory work. And the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Prime Minister can only implement this foreign policy if they have a qualitatively excellent intellectual background. If there is deep, analytical work behind the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and behind those who make foreign policy. If we have a special intellectual team at our disposal. And I see the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs as such a special unit of Hungarian foreign policy strategy. I congratulate you on your anniversary and count on your work. Hungary counts on you. We ask you to contribute your part to ensure that Hungary can continue to appear on the international stage far beyond its strength.

Happy anniversary and good work!