Anglo-American Financial And Economic Discussions
Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom
- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on December 13, 1945, in the debate on the Anglo-American financial agreement, criticising its terms and the haste of its presentation while advising Conservatives not to vote in different lobbies.
- Main themes
- Anglo-American loan agreement, 1.62 percent interest charge on the loan, linkage of loan to Bretton Woods and Commercial Policy Declaration, sterling convertibility within 15 months, Bretton Woods Agreement, Imperial preference, import restrictions in the Commercial Policy Declaration, indecent haste of parliamentary consideration, 31 December ratification deadline, Conservative Party voting policy
- Duration
- ~12 min
- Words
- 1,390
- Sentences
- 55
- Readability
- 56
- Grade
- 11.7
- Syntax
- 3.19
- Vocabulary
- 2.11
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other55 sentences in 15 paragraphs
(Woodford)
Everyone is aware of the many objections to the Agreement which is now before us. The Government have in no way concealed their disappointment. They tell us that they have not been able to procure easier terms, and I think I may say that we wholeheartedly share their disappointment. Not only is there disappointment, there is deep misgiving as to what the consequences will be and also of our ability, however hard we try, to discharge successfully the obligations now to be imposed upon us.
I shall not attempt to repeat in detail the complicated technical arguments with which those who are particularly versed in this matter have enriched the Debate. 1 will only repeat the salient objections which we all feel. The first affects the loan. I was astonished that the United States should think it worth while to exact the equivalent of 1.62 percent. interest from their debtor in the special circumstances in which we find ourselves. This interest charge can play a very small part in the economy of the United States. In so far as it operates at all, it must be a deterrent upon their exporting power. They will be taking British imports direct, or roundabout, in payment of the interest on the debt, instead of repayment for United States exports, which they desire and which it is in their interest to have continually increased. We are told that this is a commercial transaction and that the loan can only be viewed as a commercial transaction. I rather agree with what the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) said. It is a great pity that a commercial transaction should be mixed up with other non-commercial transactions, such as the agreement at Bretton Woods, upon which we have to pass a Bill, or the Commercial Policy Declaration on which there is to be agreement between the two countries to approach together along concerted lines. All the arguments for treating the loan as a commercial transaction tell against linking with it acceptance of other extraneous, and altogether separate, agreements. It is a pity that we should have allowed a commercial loan agreement to be mixed up and linked up with other transactions. I do not like the mixture.
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If we have misgivings in respect of the gold standard about Bretton Woods, or in respect of Imperial preference about the Commercial Policy Declaration, we are told, "You are getting the loan." When it comes to discussing the loan, we are told, "This is a commercial matter and cannot be presented to Congress on any other basis." If the United States had seen fit to say, "We will give a grant-in-aid," or even "a loan without interest equal to these disbursements in America paid by the British before Lend-Lease was in action," then it would have been to their interest to associate with so benevolent an act, agreements and understandings on other matters. As it is, we seem to have the worst of it both ways.
Everyone has drawn attention to the proposal to make sterling convertible into dollars within so short a time as 15 months, whereas at Bretton Woods, it was contemplated there should be a delay of as much as five years before we accept convertibility as a definite legal obligation, however much we might try, in the meanwhile, to accelerate the process in fact. From what I have heard stated in this Debate without challenge on either side of the House, and especially by my right hon. Friend the Member for Alder-shot (Mr. Lyttelton), this convertibility proposal within 15 months appears to be a proposition so doubtful and perilous that the best hope is that in practice it will defeat itself, and that it is in fact too bad to be true. There is a lot in this. The trees do not grow up to the sky, indeed, I have not found that to be so in a long life. That is the second obvious and salient point.
Thirdly, there are most objectionable provisions of the Commercial Policy Declaration which, for instance, require us, if we are incapable of finding dollars to pay for American imports of tobacco, cotton, or other commodities, to reduce also, in equal proportions, our imports from any alternative source. This is really a proposal upon which I earnestly trust the steady gaze of the just-minded people of the United States will be attentively fixed.
Finally, I resent, with every other hon. Member, the indecent haste with which these most serious complex matters are thrust before us, and have to be settled. There have been months of secret negotiation—each day there have been rumours
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about them, which have been contradicted by the rumours of the day after. Now, suddenly, we are confronted with this set of complicated, grave, far-reaching White Papers, and we are told that we must accept them within a few days—indeed, within a limited number of Parliamentary hours. I make it a cause of complaint against the Government that they have let themselves be browbeaten in this matter of time. The date of 31st December for the ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreement has no special sanctity. It has no more sanctity than 31st March for the ending of our financial year. I well remember being brought up to believe that 31st March was a day of particular sanctity and that the world would come to an end unless things were done by 31st March. One year it happened that we could do nothing by 31st March, but the world went on quite happily. I say that the date of 31st December was fixed for convenience, and it could be altered for good reasons.
The United States have a strong attachment to the Bretton Woods Agreement, and even if Congress had to amend their Act or pass it again—I am not aware of what the procedure would be—just for the sake of altering the date for a month or two, it would not be asking very much in respect of an international instrument of such great consequence where 65 other nations are concerned. But whatever weight there may be in this difficulty, it is nothing comparable beside the question why the whole matter should not have been disclosed both to the American and British peoples now, and be given a couple of months in which to make up our minds and allow public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic to form itself on this subject. It might well be that some of the crude objections which exist, and which are obvious in these White Papers, might, by good will and mutual concession, have been smoothed away in the face of the public, and, at any rate, mature judgment could be formed by what are, after all, the representatives of the nation assembled here in the House of Commons.
I have never heard any valid or solid reason why the Bretton Woods date could not have been revised or extended, or why we should not have said, ",These matters must be laid before Parliament, and Parliament will require, at any rate,
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a considerable time in which to consider them in the light of maturing public opinion." Such a request from a cherished friend and faithful ally could never, for any reason, have been used or made the ground for breaking off negotiations on this matter so indispensable to the two countries. Some risk would have been run in saying "No when the proper moment comes, in regard to time at any rate.
For these reasons, upon which it would be easy to expatiate, we on this side of the House refuse altogether to accept any responsibility for this set of transactions. We recognise that it is the duty of the Government to decide. In international matters it is always our desire to associate ourselves, so far as possible, with them. I very much regret that we cannot do so on this occasion. The task falls to me, as Leader of the Conservative Party, to give advice to my hon. Friends as to what our conduct should be in this present bleak and difficult situation. It would be a great pity and would weaken us for our future tasks, which are heavy, if we all voted in different Lobbies on a question of this kind.