- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons debate in London on May 24, 1946, criticising the Government's handling of Egypt, arguing for keeping British forces in the Canal zone and warning that using Palestine as a base would harm American cooperation.
- Main themes
- 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, withdrawal of British troops from Cairo and Alexandria, defence of the Suez Canal, Egyptian gratitude versus suspicion, Isthmus of Suez and transhipment, advice of the Chiefs of Staff, Irish ports precedent of 1938, Palestine as a base for re-entering Egypt, Anglo-American cooperation on Palestine, Jewish national home and immigration, Foreign Secretary's absence and Parliamentary tactics
- Duration
- ~21 min
- Words
- 2,558
- Sentences
- 112
- Readability
- 53
- Grade
- 11.7
- Syntax
- 3.10
- Vocabulary
- 2.19
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other112 sentences in 26 paragraphs
(Woodford)
Although we have not yet had the privilege of hearing his voice, I am sure I express the general sense of the House when I say that we are very glad to see the Foreign Secretary back in his place. I earnestly hope that his health has not been affected by the very hard work he has had to do and the amount of worry inseparable from the discharge of all his functions. I quite sympathise with his preoccupation. He was at Paris, and I regret very much that he was not able to give his full mind to the subject we are discussing today. He was announced as the head of the delegation, but it was understood that he could not go himself, and Lord Stansgate went. We have to be very careful not in any
767
way to trespass on the conventions of the Chamber that nothing must be said disrespectful to a Member of the other House, but I think I may go as far as to say that the substitution of Lord Stansgate for the Foreign Secretary involves the employment of an altogether lighter weight.
The only point where I would make a personal comment to the right hon. Gentleman is about his Parliamentary tactics. I really do not understand why he should not have made a short statement and told us where we were, and he could have had, in Supply, full opportunity of a rejoinder if he was not satisfied with the way he was treated by any of the speakers who followed. Apparently he cannot either trust any colleagues to discharge a portion of his functions for him in the course of the Debate—he must keep it entirely in his own hands—or, alternatively, he has undue apprehension about leaving his tail uncovered. I hope I may not deduce from that that he has the intention of indulging in violent and personal attack and then escaping from the Chamber under the blether and blare of majority cheering. He has no need to adopt those tactics, and should have more confidence in this House, and even perhaps more confidence in himself.
I come to the timetable of the recent Egyptian story. We must get the timetable right. Chronology is the secret of the matter. In 1936 a Treaty was made by which the British were to withdraw from Cairo and Alexandria to the Canal. The Egyptian Government were to build a barracks and installations in the Canal zone, and when they were built the British were to leave Cairo and Alexandria and repair to them. We should certainly have carried out that undertaking as and when it fell due, but later, long before the barracks were built or our time for removal to the Canal zone arrived, war burst on the world, and Egypt was soon threatened by an Italian invasion for which an army of nearly a quarter of a million troops had been moved steadily forward on the North African coast towards the Egyptian frontier. As we now know, it was to be included in Mussolini's African Empire. Naturally, it was not possible for the Egyptian Government to build the barracks and installations during the war, nor could anybody expect that the British troops would vol-
768
untarily withdraw to the Canal zone in the years of war. If they had done so, Cairo would have been sacked by the Germans, and the Italians, and the Delta would have been subjugated.
No one can suggest for a moment that we have not kept our word. No one can reproach the Egyptian Government with not having built the barracks. There is no ground whatever for what the Prime Minister the other night, I am sorry to say, called suspicion on the part of the Egyptians. The only sentiment that the Egyptians should permit themselves upon this war interlude is not suspicion but gratitude—gratitude, I might say, such as two nations have ever owed to another. However, the war has ended. Nearly all the Italians and Germans who ventured into Africa were destroyed or captured at a medium stage in the struggle. Egypt remained intact, enriched, securely defended. None of our troops were involved except in keeping internal order and for anti-aircraft defence. She was saved by the Armies of the British Empire from all the horrors which have racked the whole of Europe and large parts of Asia. And at the end we are assured that a large money debt is due from this country to Egypt for the supplies we purchased locally to feed the Armies which were successfully defending the soil of the Delta. No, I repeat, gratitude, not suspicion, is the only sentiment becoming to the Government of Egypt.
There is however one practical step which should have been taken by us. It was mentioned today by my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden). The withdrawal of the troops from Cairo and Alexandria ought to have been completed many months ago. It would have been a wise act of policy, and of efficient administration. It would have been entirely in the spirit, and going far beyond the letter, of the Treaty of 1936, to withdraw the British troops and to withdraw the enormous swollen staff from Cairo and from Alexandria even though the barracks in the Canal zone had not been erected by the Egyptian Government. Camps could have been put up, new telegraph communications could have been arranged, or rearranged, and the necessary forces could have been moved as a gesture of good will away from the Egyptian capital. That this was not done, is the responsibility
769
of His Majesty's Government. I have no doubt that there were many difficulties, but that it was not done is their responsibility. The fault certainly does not lie on the 1936 Treaty, or anything in connection with the carrying out of that Treaty. The fault lies on the Treasury Bench. It may not be a very grievous fault; it may be one for which there are many explanations, but when we are told that the Egyptians have suspicions of our attitude at a time when an altogether different sentiment would be natural, then I think I am bound to point out that this is one way in which confidence in our desire not to interfere with their independence or sovereignty could have been sustained or stimulated would have been by a very considerable exodus—I think that is a very good local word— from Cairo and Alexandria of the enormous masses of staff officers and motor cars and so forth, which have been a prevailing feature of the streets of these cities during these years of war.
As I say, the fault, if any, does not lie with the Treaty or with any execution of it on either side. An opportunity was lost. But even graver issues are now before us. I would first examine the military aspect on which many speakers have delivered themselves. His Majesty's Government have made it clear, after considering any military advice they have received, that they regard it as vitally important that the Suez Canal should be defended. I think that is so—that His Majesty's Government have made it clear that it is vitally important that the Suez Canal should be defended. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary was in Paris at the time when the Prime Minister used these words, but I am only putting him in touch with what was said in order to make sure that there is no misunderstanding.
When we talk about defending the Suez Canal, I presume the Government mean that it should be kept open. What reason could there be for a naval Power like Britain to fear it being kept open? If the warships or transports of another nation with a weaker navy obtained passage through the Suez Canal in time of war we should encounter them in the Indian Ocean basing ourselves either on Aden or the East African harbours. We do not suffer if the Canal is kept open. We can only suffer if it is closed. I assert that it is impossible to keep it open, unless British personnel
770
are permanently stationed in the Canal zone. There may be doubts about our ability to keep it open in the air age, even if we have garrisons and fighter aircraft in that zone. But at any rate without that personnel there is no chance of keeping it open whatever. I do not believe that any military advice by the responsible Chiefs of Staff would challenge this assertion. If I am to be told that the Chiefs of Staff say that the Canal can be left open without any permanent garrison and air forces in the Canal zone, I treat their opinions with the utmost respect, but put on record that I am utterly unconvinced. But we do not know what questions were put to the Chiefs of Staff or on what political data they were called upon to report.
In the case of the Irish ports, in the spring of 1938, absolutely wrong political data, in my opinion, were put before the Chiefs of Staff—another set of Chiefs of Staff—and they gave advice which nearly brought us to our ruin. I have heard all this mocking laughter before in the time of a former Government. I remember being once alone in the House, protesting against the cession of the Southern Irish ports. I remember the looks of incredulity, the mockery, derision and laughter I had to encounter on every side, when I said that Mr. de Valera might declare Ireland neutral. We are seeing exactly the same sort of thing happening today, although I am not so much alone as I used to be. I would hardly have believed it possible that such things could happen twice in a lifetime.
Let me make it perfectly clear that our position is that His Majesty's Government have no right to claim the approval of the Chiefs of the Staff for any policy without informing the House of the precise questions upon which their advice was obtained. I am astonished that people should talk continuously about the Suez Canal and say nothing about the Isthmus of Suez. Until my right hon. Friend mentioned the matter this morning, and reminded us that this extraordinary region is the junction between three Continents, I have not heard the Isthmus mentioned, or read of it in any of the newspapers. Even if the Canal were blocked by aerial bombardment, as it might be if our fighter air force were overcome, or if a lucky shot or several lucky shots fell home, there is always the means of transhipment across the Isthmus of Suez. With our fleet and air power properly disposed, this
771
can be assured. Under proper air protection in the Suez Canal zone, and with naval command of the Eastern Mediterranean, our troops could be disembarked at Suez and could re-embark at Red Sea ports. But if the overland route across the Isthmus is to be available, with the necessary installations and air bases, it is necessary to have British, and we hope, of course, Egyptian air and ground forces in effective control of the Canal zone. Without that, failure is inevitable.
Let me now examine the other alternatives which are suggested. I have, of course, no official information on these matters. I rely upon the public organs and the general discussion that goes on in this country, and upon my own knowledge which I have acquired of these subjects in the not too distant past. It is widely said that we should establish ourselves in Palestine, and the hon. and gallant Member for Buckingham (Flight-Lieutenant Crawley) touched upon that this morning. The British troops who will in time of war defend the Canal, and the Isthmus of Suez, will be maintained, on this hypothesis, in camps or barracks in Southern Palestine. From there they will be able to fly in or will move in by motorised transport as soon as a state of emergency is reached. Here I have to speak of Palestine as a place of arms outside Egyptian territory, for British Forces which have to re-enter Egypt, at or before the moment of crisis. It is even said that our troops are already moving off in this direction, or that plans have been made to move them as fast as possible.
The consequence on the Palestine position of such a decision must not be overlooked. I am in entire agreement with the policy of the Government in trying to enlist American aid and cooperation in solving, or at any rate in dealing with, the Jewish-Arab quarrel in Palestine. My views on this question are well known. I am for a Jewish national home in Palestine, with immigration up to the full absorptive capacity. I am also convinced that we cannot carry this out unless we have the help and active collaboration of the United States. Only by the action of our two Powers together can the objects to which we are pledged, and which the President of the United States evidently desires, be attained. I admire the Report of the Anglo-American Commission; but I think it is too much to
772
put on Britain alone, single-handed, weakened as she is by her efforts in the war. It is too much for her alone to have to carry out this policy to which we are pledged and which the United States desire. I was most hopeful that the Report of the Anglo-American Commission, and the manifest interest of the United States, and the declaration of President Truman about the acceptance of 100,000 Jews immediately in Palestine, would lead to cooperation between the two countries.
I have no difference with His Majesty's Government on that. I agree with them entirely. I congratulate them on the progress they have made. But from the moment when Britain is going to use Palestine as a jumping off ground to reenter Egypt, and defend the Canal and the Isthmus, it seems to me that quite a different question is raised, and I fear that the hope of gaining the aid of the United States on the Palestine question, the Arab-Jew question in Palestine, will be seriously prejudiced. If they refuse, far and away the best hope of a solution being reached by the two great English-speaking Powers on the Palestine difficulty, in a manner which would be respected both by Jews and Arabs, all that vanishes and we shall find ourselves left alone in Palestine, from which we derive no advantage of any kind other than that of keeping our pledged word, and we shall have to carry on alone a wearing dispute either with the Jews or with the Arabs, or possibly with both. In any case we shall incur the increasing hostility and criticism of both these powerful forces, and, of course, of all the sideline spectators in all the various countries.
It seems that by using Palestine as a jumping-off ground for the reoccupation of the Canal zone in time of an emergency we will impair the prospects of American aid, and will leave ourselves with the most thankless, profitless and unfortunate task that can be imagined. That is my first conclusion.
