Bread (Rationing) Order

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

18 July 1946 · House of Commons debate on the Bread (Rationing) Order · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons in London on July 18, 1946, moved to annul the Bread (Rationing) Order, arguing the Government had not shown that rationing was necessary from July 21.
Main themes
Annulment of the Bread (Rationing) Order, bread rationing from 21 July, wheat pipeline of eight weeks' supply, 800,000 ton danger point for distribution, 1946 home harvest, wheat imports of 150,000 tons in September, small saving of 40,000 tons, fear of later deeper ration cuts, Minister of Food's 'shorten sail' remark, timing during summer holidays, exporting countries' harvest estimates
Duration
~12 min
41st percentile
Words
1,386
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Sentences
62
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Readability
68
97th percentile
Grade
9.0
11th percentile
Syntax
2.89
32nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.09
24th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

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Other
  • Economic 67%61%
  • Institutional 22%20%
  • Ceremonial 9%8%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 10%

62 sentences in 19 paragraphs

(Woodford)

I beg to move.

That the Bread (Rationing) Order, 5946, dated 11th July, 1946 (S.R, & O., 1946, No.1100), a copy of which was presented on 15th July, be annulled.

We have given the most careful consideration to, and we have had long discussions among ourselves upon, all the statements and figures which have been given to us on this subject by His Majesty's Government, and as the result we cannot feel convinced that the imposition of bread rationing is necessary on 21st July. Unless some new fact is disclosed which we do not now know, we shall be bound to vote against the imposition of this heavy, awkward, galling burden at this time. I will now proceed to examine seriatim the reasons which have so far been vouchsafed to us. The Minister of Food— I am glad to see him safely out of the oven. The Minister's case has rested upon the state of the pipeline of 31st August, 1946. The "pipeline" is his own expression, a very good expression, and it is on the state of that chain of moving supplies on 31st August that he rests his case. We are told that the pipeline will contain only eight weeks' supply, and that we use 100,000 tons a week—actually, I think we use a little more, 112,000 tons—whereas we have worked in the war to ten and a half weeks' supply, and made that a necessary precautionary essential. We are told that less than eight weeks' supply in the pipeline will endanger distribution, at any rate in particular localities.

Somewhere below the figure of 800,000 tons—these are the words of the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Food—there would come a point where the distribution system of the country, first of the wheat, and then of the flour after it had been milled, would begin to creak and groan, and finally break down. We cannot, he argues, run that risk. But by

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31st August we reap the new home harvest. At least between 200,000 and 300,000 tons of this harvest will be garnered in September—and perhaps more may be accelerated by special measures—and the rest, amounting in the end to over 1,700,000 tons, can be garnered and delivered to the millers, as may be needed from October onwards, by arrangements which can easily be made now. We have not been told what other supplies will reach us from abroad in August and September. In September, the Minister is counting on 250,000 tons from our own harvest. So we need import only about 150,000 tons to maintain the pipeline above the danger point.

Why should this be so difficult? In September, 1944, a bad year, with the war going on, we imported 292,000 tons of wheat across the U-boat blockade. In September last year, we imported 318,000 tons of wheat. Why should we not be able to import 150,000 tons of wheat in September? Have we left it too late? If so, tell us so. In matters of this kind it is much better to tell the truth. This country is not afraid of facing ugly facts. We would not be here now if we had shrunk from that. I must say that, so far as I am aware—I have endeavoured to get all the information possible from those who know about the state of this trade—there is no difficulty in importing 150,000 tons, and indeed, far more than that, in September. After September we have the whole of the home harvest within our reach to draw on as we think fit, and although the problem of our bread supply may remain, its urgency will have vanished, Spring may bring other troubles, but the urgency will have vanished. The latest published harvest estimates of the four great exporting countries—Canada, the United States of America, the Argentine and Australia—are now declared to be 10,000,000 tons in excess of the statistics given in the April White Paper. Therefore, on the facts now before us—I emphasise "now before us" because it is the crux on which I rest my argument—it is clear that any imminent danger wilt have passed by 31st August. Why, then, is there this need of bread rationing on 31st July? That is the point we have to settle tonight.

There could hardly have been selected a more inconvenient date for the introduction of bread rationing, because so

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many people are away from their homes, or about to go away, on their annual and hard-won holidays. I will speak of the difficulties and confusion of this scheme, so hurriedly conceived, in a few minutes. But I return to the point which I am making—What is the reason for bringing this scheme into operation on 21st July? It cannot, certainly, be on account of the valuable savings which are to be made in bread consumption by the declared scale of rationing during the five weeks involved. What are those savings? They are estimated by the Government now as a maximum—I am taking the best figure for them—of seven per cent. of consumption in a whole year. In the five weeks concerned, the saving amounts only to about 40,000 tons, or one-fifth of the 200,000 tons that the Lord President of the Council agreed to forgo when he visited the United States of America. The Lord President agreed to forgo two weeks' supply—the critical two weeks' supply. Now, to save less than three days' supply, we are to take upon ourselves all the inconveniences and friction of the present scheme of bread rationing beginning on Sunday next. I cannot believe that this petty saving is the true reason of the Government's serious decision.

Let us, then, continue our search for that reason. The next explanation which presents itself for the Government's anxiety to start rationing is that they anticipate a serious long-term shortage of wheat, and desire to prepare for it. The proposed ration scale, yielding a saving of only seven per cent. per annum, would certainly be no remedy for a serious long-term shortage of world wheat. It was for that reason that, when nearly one month ago the Minister of Food announced his intention to ration bread, I immediately formed the impression that cuts far more formidable than would be enforced at the beginning would be imposed upon us later on, once the rationing scheme was in working order.

I do not think that the Minister of Food was entitled to be vexed with are or surprised that I came to that conclusion, because I remember that the Lord President had said on 31st May that, of course, if it should become necessary for him—that is, the Minister of Food—to economise in consumption then dais machinery would be there ready for the purpose. I thought that meant that it

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would be put up on a certain scale and, if serious economies were necessary, it would be turned on, as it would have to be turned on. I have been given a quotation, which I did not hear with my own ears, but which I have verified, in which he said on the same day:

The purpose is, as my right hon. Friend "—

the Lord President of the Council—

has said already, above all, to give us control of the situation… we are sailing… into a storm area… but we are determined to go into that storm area with the capacity and the ability to shorten sail "— in this connection "shorten sail" means to cut the ration— at the shortest notice if that proves necessary.''— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st May, 1946; Vol. 423, C. 1575.]

The right hon. Gentleman, who has had so many burdens come upon him at the beginning of his career as a Minister of Cabinet rank, resented what I said, and since then he has given repeated assurances that the scales contained in the Order now before us—which we are praying this House now to annul—are the worst we have to expect. I have certainly understood, and I think there are repeated quotations to confirm, that he has said that they are the worst we have to expect, but if I am wrong by all means let us be told. Ought we to reach this point in this long discussion and not know a thing like that?