Palestine

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

1 August 1946 · House of Commons debate on Palestine · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on August 1, 1946, during a debate on Palestine, urging the Government to return the Mandate to the United Nations unless the United States shared the burden.
Main themes
British Mandate for Palestine, Zionist policy, Anglo-American cooperation, return of the Mandate to the United Nations, Jewish Agency violence against British forces, Chaim Weizmann, abandonment of Egyptian treaty rights, Suez Canal zone, withdrawal from India, Arab-Jewish federation, criticism of the Labour Government
Duration
~17 min
58th percentile
Words
2,043
58th percentile
Sentences
69
45th percentile
Readability
50
62nd percentile
Grade
14.0
67th percentile
Syntax
3.47
93rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.16
41st percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 73%70%
  • Ceremonial 14%13%
  • Institutional 8%7%
  • Social 5%4%
  • Economic 2%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

69 sentences in 19 paragraphs

I am against preventing Jews from doing anything which other people are allowed to do. I am against that, and I have the strongest abhorrence

1253

of the idea of anti-Semitic lines of prejudice. Secondly, I have for some years past—this is really the crux of the argument I am venturing to submit to the House—felt that an unfair burden was being thrown upon Great Britain by our having to bear the whole weight of the Zionist policy, while Arabs and Moslems —or Muslims, as they are called by a certain school of political thought—then so important to our Empire, were alarmed and estranged, and while the United States, for the Government and people of which I have the greatest regard and friendship, and other countries, sat on the sidelines and criticised our shortcomings with all the freedom of perfect detachment and irresponsibility. Therefore, I had always intended to put it to our friends in America, from the very beginning of the postwar discussions, that either they should come in and help us in this Zionist problem, about which they feel so strongly, and as I think rightly, on even terms, share and share alike, or that we should resign our Mandate, as we have, of course, a perfect right to do.

Indeed, I am convinced that from the moment when we feel ourselves unable to carry out properly and honestly the Zionist policy as we have all these years defined it and accepted it, and which is the condition on which we received the Mandate for Palestine, it is our duty at any rate to offer to lay down the Mandate. We should, therefore, as soon as the war stopped, have made it clear to the United States that, unless they came in and bore their share, we would lay the whole care and burden at the feet of the United Nations organisation; and we should have fixed a date by which all our troops and forces would be withdrawn from the country. At that time we had no interest in Palestine. We have never sought or got anything out of Palestine. We have discharged a thankless, painful, costly, laborious, inconvenient task for more than a quarter of a century with a very great measure of success. Many people have made fine speeches about the Zionist question. Many have subscribed generously in money, but it is Great Britain, and Great Britain alone, which has steadfastly carried that cause forward across a whole generation to its present actual position, and the Jews all over the world ought not to be in a hurry to forget that. If in the Jewish movement or in

1254

the Jewish Agency there are elements of murder and outrage which they cannot control, and if these strike not only at their best but at their only effective friends, they and the Zionist cause must inevitably suffer from the grave and lasting reproach of the atrocious crimes which have been committed. It is perfectly clear that Jewish warfare directed against the British in Palestine will, if protracted, automatically release us from all obligations to persevere, as well as destroy the inclination to make further efforts in British hearts. Indeed, there are many people who are very near that now. We must not be in a hurry to turn aside from large causes which we have carried far.

There is the figure of Dr. Weizmann, that dynamic Jew ,whom I have known so long, the ablest and wisest leader of the cause of Zionism, his whole life devoted to the cause, his son killed in the battle for our common freedom. I ardently hope his authority will be respected by Zionists in this dark hour, and that the Government will keep in touch with him, and make every one of his compatriots feel how much he is respected here. It is perfectly clear that in that case we shall have the best opportunities of carrying this matter further forward.

I am sorry to weary the House with these reminiscences and "might have beens" but it was my intention when the war was over to place this position before our American friends in the plainest words—the plainest words, which, spoken in good will and good faith, are the words to which Americans are most likely to respond. I am in full accord with every effort the Government have made to obtain American support in sharing the burden of the Zionist policy. The Anglo-American Committee was a step in the right direction, the negotiations which have taken place since are another favourable step, as was this scheme which has been read out as agreed to by the expert bodies joined in this Committee. It is far more important that there should be agreement than that there should be this or that variant of the scheme. I fully agree that the Government were right to labour with the United States; I will not try to examine the various schemes of partition or cantonisation which have been put forward, nor would I dwell on that idea, which I

1255

always championed, of a wider union— an Arab-Jew federal system of four or live States in the Middle East, which would have been one of the great Powers, with Jew and Arab combined together to share the glory and mutually protect and help each other. As I say, almost any solution in which the United States will join us could be made to work.

All these processes of inquiry, negotiation and discussion have been the occasion, so frequently referred to in this Debate, of prolonged and very dangerous delays and if at the end of all these delays success is not attained, namely, Anglo-American cooperation on equal terms to carry out a Zionist policy within the limits defined or as we may agree— if that is not attained then we are confronted with a deplorable failure in the conduct of our affairs in Palestine since the end of the second great war. It was with very great regret that I read this morning of the non-agreement of the United States, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down, quite bluntly and bleakly told us that there was no agreement at the present time. I hope it is not the final word. This agreement was the one great goal to which we were invited to aspire; here was the one excuse the Government could put forward for the long delays and indecisions which have involved us in so much cost and serious bloodshed. If this Anglo-American cooperation fails, as it seems so far to have failed, then I must say that the record of the Administration during this year—and a Government must be judged by results—in the handling of Palestinian affairs will stand forth as a monument of incapacity.

It may be that they have had difficul-1ies but Governments are judged by results. I turned up with a number of defeats during the war and I was very much criticised about it. I had several times to come down with reports of defeats, but when afterwards there were successes we were entitled to be praised. Up to this particular minute, this has been a complete failure; it has gone from bad to worse, and one does not feel that there is any grip of the matter which is going to succeed. The one rightful, reasonable, simple, and compulsive lever which we held and, if you will, still hold, was and is a sincere readiness to resign the

1256

mission, to lay our Mandate at the feet of the United Nations organisation and thereafter to evacuate the country with which we have no connection or tradition and where we have no sovereignty as in India and no treaty as in Egypt. Such was the position we could have adopted until a few months ago, and I am sure it would have procured a good result. The cogency of such a statement once it was believed would, I am sure, make the solution much more possible, and if no solution was obtained, then our responsibilities would have been honourably discharged. Once make it clear that the British have no interests in remaining in Palestine and no wish to do so, and that they decline to carry forward single-handed this harsh, invidious burden, then you will get attention paid to what you say and what you ask and all kinds of good solutions for the Jew and Arab alike, based on the cooperation and resources of the English-speaking world, will immediately come into the field of possibility.

However, His Majesty's Government by their precipitate abandonment of their treaty rights in Egypt, and, in particular, the Suez Canal zone, are now forced to look for a strong place of arms, for a jumping-off ground in Palestine in order to protect the Canal from outside Egypt. By this unwisdom they have vitiated disinterestedness and we can now be accused of having a national strategic motive for retaining our hold on Palestine. I must regard this as a very grave disaster and an immense weakening of our position. What the Government have done in Egypt—though no doubt from very good motives—has greatly weakened our moral position in Palestine by stripping us of our disinterestedness in that country. I pointed out in the Debate on Egyptian policy a few weeks ago, that the moment we were dependent upon Palestine for a base from which to defend the Suez Canal, we should greatly hamper all possibility of obtaining American cooperation. Well, look at the position to which we have now been brought.

Take stock round the world at the present moment; after all, we are entitled to survey the whole field. We declare ourselves ready to abandon the mighty Empire and Continent of India with all the work we have done in the last 200 years, territory over which we possess unimpeachable sovereignty. The Govern-

1257

ment are, apparently, ready to leave the 400 million Indians to fall into all the horrors of sanguinary civil war—civil war compared to which anything that could happen in Palestine would be microscopic; wars of elephants compared with wars of mice. Indeed we place the independence of India in hostile and feeble hands, heedless of the dark carnage and confusion which will follow. We scuttle from Egypt which we twice successfully defended from foreign massacre and pillage. We scuttle from it, we abandon the Canal zone about which our treaty rights were and still are indefeasible, but now, apparently, the one place where we are at all costs and at all inconveniences to hold on and fight it out to the death is Palestine, and we are to be at war with the Jews of Palestine, and, if necessary, with the Arabs of Palestine. For what reason? Not, all the world will say, for the faithful discharge of our long mission, but because we have need, having been driven out of Egypt, to secure a satisfactory strategic base from which to pursue our Imperial aims.

I thank the House for listening. I have trespassed on their time at some length, but I wish to look forward before I conclude and not to look back. I will not go so far in criticising and in censuring without proposing positive action, with all the responsibility and the exposure to counterattack which one incurs when one proposes definite and serious action. Here is the action—action this day. I think the Government should say that if the United States will not come and share the burden of the Zionist cause, as defined or as agreed, we should now give notice that we will return our Mandate to U.N.O. and that we will evacuate Palestine within a specified period. At the same time, we should inform Egypt that we stand by our treaty rights and will, by all means, maintain our position in the Canal zone. Those are the two positive proposals which I submit, most respectfully, to the House. In so far as the Government may have hampered themselves in any way from adopting these simple policies, they are culpable in the last degree, and the whole Empire and the Commonwealth will be the sufferers from their mismanagement.