- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 7, 1938, in the annual Defence debate, arguing that Britain had fallen behind German air power and calling for an independent inquiry and a Supply Department.
- Main themes
- German air power compared with British, abandonment of first-line air strength as a yardstick, unfulfilled 124-squadron air expansion programme, defence expenditure of Britain and Germany, Royal Navy strength relative to Germany, 1934 parity pledge, General Weygand's air strength figures, call for an inquiry into military aviation, case for a Ministry of Supply, munitions supply and war potential
- Duration
- ~24 min
- Words
- 2,902
- Sentences
- 100
- Readability
- 54
- Grade
- 12.6
- Syntax
- 3.43
- Vocabulary
- 2.12
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other100 sentences in 32 paragraphs
The hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) is, I am sure, entitled to the compliments of the House for his maiden speech. Not only did we sympathise with him in those internal tremors which are so often the prelude to excellent preformance both in this House and in the field, but the House, I think on all sides, will have felt that we may look forward in the future to contributions from him to our Debates of a sensible, solid and practical character. I shall not attempt to follow the hon. Gentleman into the topics which he specially selected, though I think he was quite well-advised to speak to us for the first time on subjects which he had studied particularly and of which he had had special experience. I do not wish to be drawn into details on this occasion, neither do I feel very much inclined to discuss those rather fearsome Amendments
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by which it is sought to overlay this Debate.
This is not the occasion for parties setting their caps at one another. It is almost one of the only occasions we have in the year when we are supposed to be able to survey in a general fashion the great problems of Defence, picking out the salient points, but keeping ourselves above either a tangle of technicalities or ordinary controversial party policy. The question which lies before us to-night above all others is, What are the best steps we should take to deter an aggressor from breaking the peace, and for our survival, if we should be the victims of an assault? Owing to the excellent relations which have grown up with the United States of America, and the fact that the United States Navy is not being allowed to fall behind British naval expansion in any way, we are, I think, entitled to measure our naval power against the naval power of European countries. We are, therefore, in a far stronger position on sea relatively to any navy in Europe, or to any likely combination of navies in Europe than we were with the much larger fleets we had in 1914. In those days I was forced to work upon the basis of 16 ships to 10, and two to one in cruisers, but now we have a ratio with the Germans of three to one operative for the whole Fleet, except only submarines.
In the Army we are, of course, weaker in every respect, relatively and actually, than we were in 1914, but the Army is not at the present time a prime factor in our safety, so, therefore, I come at once to the more decisive and crucial element in our defences. About £280,000,000 has been spent on Defence Services in the last financial year, and we are now asking for £350,000,000 in 1938. These figures are rightly judged enormous, but they acquire their significance only in relation to what is being spent elsewhere. £350,000,000 for 1938 compares with at least £900,000,000 in Germany, and it must be remembered that for the last three years in succession German defence expenditure has been running at about that level. On the other hand, the prime charge on German defence expenditure is the gigantic army, which they are now so rapidly forming and enlarging corps by corps. We have no similar liability. No figures are published as to how German expenditure is divided between the different Services. One can only speculate
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upon that subject, but I hazard the suggestion that, upon the German army, navy, air service and air defence, which is included in that service and upon their munitions supply, including roads and fortifications and other ancilliaries, it would not be unreasonable to assume three-quarters of the total German military budget was consumed, that is to say, £625,000,000.
Therefore, on this assumption there would be £275,000,000 left over for the comparable German Air Force and the German Navy, as compared with the British expenditure of £250,000,000.
As the German expenditure upon the Navy is presumably only about one-third of ours, we should deduct from this £275,000,000 about £35,000,000, leaving £240,000,000 available for the possible German expenditure in 1938 upon the air force. Our comparable British figures are somewhat over £100,000,000. It would therefore not surprise me at all if Germany were going to spend in 1938 more than twice as much upon their air force as we, and it must be remembered, as I have already indicated, that this expenditure follows upon several years of even much larger preponderance of German expenditure upon the air compared with British air expenditure. Therefore, one may apprehend that German air power was at least double that of ours, and is being expanded at least at double our rate, allowing for expanding upkeep. I freely admit that these conclusions are highly speculative. The truth may be better, or it may be worse. One looks for cross-checks.
I noticed a few months ago that General Weygand, who had just before given up a post on the Supreme Council of Defence in France, gave some figures of the relative strength of the air power of the different countries. He put Germany at 3,000, Great Britain at 1,500, Italy at 1,200, and France at 1,000. I was impressed by these figures, because I know that this distinguished officer would not have mentioned them except as the result of deep knowledge, and also because I am sure that he would not have made that statement, placing the French figure at only 1,000, unless those circles concerned with the safety of the French Republic had thought it desirable that such a statement should be made. But to what basis do these figures refer? I look upon
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them as symbolic figures, and I agree that they may be variously interpreted, but they were called by the General, "first-line aircraft," or in our expression, "first-line air-strength."
The Prime Minister to-day has told us that first-line air strength is not a good method of measuring the relative power of countries, but it is the criterion which His Majesty's Government themselves selected some years ago. When four years ago I made the statement that the German air force was already equal to ours, we were told later on that you must consider first-line air strength, and it is on that basis that these discussions have always proceeded. By first-line air strength I mean always the number of machines which the air force of any country can put into action on a given date, and can keep in action, in respet of both personnel and material, month after month for quite a long time in spite of the enormous monthly wastage. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister now abandons this criterion, and I must say that I was disquieted by the vague and reserved passage in his speech with which he dealt with this extremely important feature. Does anyone suppose that if a thoroughly satisfactory answer could have been made on first-line air strength it would not have been made? Can anyone suppose that we should have been invited to adopt a new standard if the position of the Government could be thoroughly vindicated upon the old?
My right hon. Friend now alters the yardstick. He adopts a different measure altogether, and he brings in a great number of matters which certainly are not capable at any time, as the hon. and gallant Member for Thanet (Captain Balfour) has said, of being analysed or reduced to terms of precision; but even in those which my right hon. Friend has mentioned, I doubt whether a more satisfactory showing would be obtained than on the first-line air strength which has been abandoned. Take the question of reserves; take the question of stores of bombs—using the items to which my right hon. Friend referred—take the war potential, the full blast, when the factories are let out so that they can assure, month after month, aeroplanes in time of war; take the anti-aircraft defence which my right hon. Friend mentioned: is it really suggested that if we have fallen behind
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on the somewhat narrow criterion of first-line air strength, we shall make up for it by our great lead over another Power in respect of these other items which my right hon. Friend mentioned?
No, Sir; I am bound to say that I feel a very great deal of disquiet, although I feel that the Prime Minister has placed us in his debt by making a statement, carefully guarded, but which nevertheless reveals that the former position of the Government in regard to parity is now no longer maintained or argued. However one judges the figures which I have ventured to give, it may well be that German air power is above double that of Great Britain. What has become, in that case, of the pledge of the right hon. Gentleman the late Prime Minister on 8th March, 1934? It was a very serious pledge, it was a pledge of a most solemn character; and I do not feel that if, after all these years, that pledge cannot be held to be maintained in any effective manner, it should be passed over by us as a mere casual incident of debate.
I pass to the next section of my argument. At what rate are we fulfilling the programme of air expansion which we have set ourselves? Let me give the brief time table. When late in the summer of 1935, after the miscalculations and mistakes had been fully admitted, it was at last decided to make a great expansion of the Air Force, we were promised that 124 squadrons would be ready by 31st March, 1937. It was made plain, and it was generally understood, that those squadrons were to be complete for war purposes in all respects. Great play was made of the fact that as we had started late, all our squadrons would be equipped with the best and latest patterns. In fact, my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence excited the amusement of the House by his ingenious argument that we had really stolen a march on our rivals by not starting sooner.
In addition, we were assured that British reserves of aircraft on a much higher scale than abroad would be in existence, and of course the magnitude of those reserves must be kept secret. Therefore, we were promised 124 squadrons, fully equipped with guns, instruments, and reserves, in a really efficient state by 31st March, 1937. As time passed, it became evident that that programme was
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not going to be achieved by the date mentioned; and on 27th January, 1937, a Debate was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Duddeston (Mr. Simmonds) in the course of which the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence made a very important statement. He admitted that the programme was in arrears, but he said that 100 squadrons, 22 of which would be on a one-flight basis—if you are making squadrons on a one-flight basis it does not show a very large plethora of reserves—would be completed by 31st March, 1937. My right hon. Friend spoke with the greatest frankness and candour, as he always does, when-even he can, to the House. He said:
I am going to take the risk, which may be brought home to me in six months' time, of saying that, if our expectations are fulfilled, the remaining 24 squardons, or at any rate, 20 of them, will be completed by July next."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th January, 1937; col. 1001, Vol, 319.]
My right hon. Friend was careful not to guarantee that they would be up to full strength by that time. That statement was made about 13 months ago; but what is the position as described in the White Paper?—
Rearming will be substantially completed during the coming financial year.
That is to say, the completion and first equipment of these 124 squadrons with modern types will not be even substantially completed until 31st March, 1939, two years later than the date promised. That is a fact which is openly and plainly admitted by the White Paper. I may add that if all the 124 squadrons had been completed in all respects as proposed by 31st March, 1937, our Air Force would still have been considerably smaller than the German Air Force. The House can judge for itself what the proportions are likely to be when a delay of two years has occurred. It must be realised that everything is relative, that everything is moving simultaneously. This boast that because we had started late, we had scored by getting new types of machines—where is that, when rearmament with these new machines will not be achieved until 31st March, 1939? Does the House really suppose that in this long interval the Germans have not bent new types on to their vast mass-production plants and that we shall not be confronted—I use the word "confronted" purely for purposes of comparison, for we are not now
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talking about the possibilities of war, but on questions of Defence, as far as this country is concerned, in a detached and impersonal manner; we are not discussing the political or diplomatic side in any way, and when I say "confronted," I speak only in the sense of a comparison. I see no reason for merriment; it seems to me to be one of the most correct remarks I have ever had the fortune to make in the House. We know that they have, in fact, made these new types on a great scale, and that by the time our new patterns of specimen aeroplanes, now made by hand, are multiplied sufficiently to equip all the squadrons and provide the necessary reserves, we shall once again be behind in quality and modernity, irrespective of our undoubted inferiority in numbers.
It would be unfair to throw the blame on any one Minister, or upon Lord Swinton, for our deficiency. Anyone who was put in his place in July, 1935, would have made a great many mistakes, and would certainly not have been able to discharge the programmes which were proclaimed within the limits assigned; but he certainly does represent—and I say this with a great feeling of sympathy for him in his task—an extremely able and wholehearted effort to do the best he possibly could to expand our air power, and the results which he has achieved would be bright if they were not darkened by the time table, and if they were not outshone by other relative facts occurring elsewhere. Every country admires what it is doing itself, but what is not always seen is what is being done by others. I say that the hard responsibility for the failure to fulfil the promises made to us rests upon those who have governed and guided this Island for the last five years, that is to say, from the date when——well, somebody must say these things—German rearmament in real earnest became apparent and known.
But while I do not attempt to throw the blame on any single Minister, for, after all, not only the Cabinet but Parliament is responsible for any neglect or tardiness in making proper preparations, I hold strongly that the House of Commons should satisfy itself more thoroughly than it can do in these Debates about the exact condition of our Air Force and expansion programme. We have had an inquiry, much resisted, but soon to be published, into civil aviation. The least we
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can do at the present time is to have a similar inquiry into the state of our military aviation. It might well be that the results of that inquiry would not be a fit subject for publication to foreign Powers; in that case, the Prime Minister could do as his predecessors have done in such matters, he could summon to the Committee of Imperial Defence the representatives of other parties, and there should be an agreement, such as one would expect under a National system of Government, both upon what should be said and upon what should be done. When the Air Force Estimates are considered, I shall certainly press this request—whether by Select Committee, or by a committee like the Cadman Committee, or by the Cadman Committee itself, I care not. There should be some tribunal, independent of the Executive, before which statements of detail could be made. They certainly cannot be made in this House, where we cannot converse about our vital affairs without having it all read abroad.
I come to the question of munitions supplies. In this field, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, like hope, told us a flattering tale. Three years ago, two years ago at the very latest, a Supply Department should have been created and the whole industry of the country brought into simultaneous review. This does not mean, of course, that the whole of civil industry would have been stopped. I thought my right hon. Friend, who is always so extremely fair-minded in his arguments, slipped a degree or two behind his usual exceptionally high standard when he represented this request for a Ministry of Munitions or a Ministry of Supply as being the idea that the whole industry of the country was to be devoted to making munitions. That would be impossible, and nobody ever suggested it.
