- Context
- Churchill, a backbench MP, spoke in the House of Commons in London on March 17, 1938, in the Navy Estimates debate, criticising destroyer and cruiser provision and urging a faster building programme.
- Main themes
- Navy Estimates 1938, continuity of Admiralty leadership under Lord Chatfield, shortage of destroyers, inferior Southampton-class cruisers, German 8-inch cruisers as commerce raiders, 16-inch guns for new battleships, foreshortening of the construction programme, anti-aircraft armament for merchant ships, Italian fortification of the Mediterranean, Pantelleria and Malta, naval treaty limits and Japanese construction, air and submarine threats to the Fleet
- Duration
- ~27 min
- Words
- 3,292
- Sentences
- 114
- Readability
- 52
- Grade
- 13.5
- Syntax
- 3.19
- Vocabulary
- 2.13
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other114 sentences in 32 paragraphs
I am sure that every one will sympathise with the disappointment which the First Lord must be feeling at being confined to a bed of sickness when he would have so greatly desired to present to the House his first Admiralty statement, but the task has been well and adequately discharged by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, whose statement covered the whole field and who had many interesting announcements to make to us about the interior economy of the Navy and the conditions of its ranks and ratings. I must say that I was astonished to see the state of the House during the Debate this afternoon. My mind goes back to the days before the War when the Navy Estimates were debated in a House which was crowded to the utmost capacity. I have been looking up the Debate of 1913. I see that owing to a political quarrel we did not begin the discussion until 7.30 and the House sat right on through dinner up to eleven o'clock. It may be that hon. Members feel more reassured in their minds about the position of the Navy than they did in those days, or it may possibly be that the fibre of post-war Parliamentary representatives is not up to what it was in the days of old, though perhaps it is discourteous to present such a suggestion otherwise than in the form of an alternative.
I should like to say how very glad I am that the Government have decided to prolong the tenure of office of the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Chat-field, and also not to allow the ordinary movements of the profession to interfere in any way with the continuity of the work of the Admiralty. In this officer you have, as the Parliamentary Secretary has told us, a man who commands the complete confidence of the
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Naval Service and a man of the very highest ability, and it is extremely important, especially when the First Lord has several times been changed, that the continuity should prevail and that the study of these great measures of naval defence and their execution should not be interrupted frequently by new changes of view. I am very glad indeed that those decisions have been taken, and I hope that in the present critical conditions the importance of continuity in naval policy will be steadily borne in mind by the Prime Minister and the authorities.
I have one or two criticisms to make and questions to ask, and I will put my points as clearly as I can. They do not imply any want of confidence in the naval administration or in the Board of Admiralty, which I believe to be of the very highest quality and certainly unsurpassed at any period during our naval records. We notice in the programmes that we have nothing but a nominal statement of the new production; that is no doubt because we are waiting to see what Japan says about the character of the ships she has built. It may be all right to wait for a little while, but I think we should require an assurance that our essential security will not in any way be impaired through the delay, that unless we have the information in a very short time we shall go forward on whatever assumption we regard as most prudent and proper, and that we shall not delay in any way the preliminary preparation of those vessels. There is an immense amount of work to be done before a hammer is swung or a plate laid.
I hope that the promise which was made, I think as a result of a question which I asked last year, has been carried out and that 16-inch guns have all been made and tested and that all the plant is ready to construct them, should it be necessary to move to that calibre. Otherwise a whole year may be lost. I do not feel contented that the five battleships that are now being built, and that together are to cost us £40,000,000, will be armed with guns which are certainly smaller than those which are now being put into the contemporary vessels of all the great naval Powers throughout the world, so far as I am aware. It is not very satisfactory. I have no doubt that it will not be many weeks before we have a much fuller statement with regard to
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the new programme, and that a Supplementary Estimate will be put before us.
I agree with the late First Lord of the Admiralty who spoke from the Front Opposition Bench, in drawing attention to the question of destroyers. When I read the White Paper I rubbed my eyes and thought there must be a misprint, because there was no mention of destroyers. I thought that it was, of course, a printer's error, not to include flotilla destroyers in the annual programme. However, it appears from the account we have received from the representative of the Admiralty that they are satisfied that they have enough destroyers. That is news to me. I have never heard of such a thing before. I thought destroyers were a commodity of which you never could have enough if war began. When we consider that we may find Germany or Italy in possession of submarines numbered I believe by the hundred, the number of destroyers that we possess is far below the demands that will be made upon us for security of convoy, for the service of the Fleet and for all the processes of reconnaissance. The fact that 40 destroyers are being built is not a satisfactory answer. I should be very glad to see the number doubled.
I remember asking three years ago that we should begin our construction of destroyers. If we had undertaken that construction at that time we could have looked ahead and seen that the gun plants were adapted to the full execution of that programme. I hope that we shall have some explanation of this position other than merely the argument that we have enough destroyers. If matters were left at that point they would recall the celebrated telegram which the War Office sent to Australia before the World War: "Unmounted men preferred." I hope that the Admiralty will be very careful not to lay themselves open to any reproach of that character in future. I trust that we shall have an assurance to-night that the flotilla of this year's destroyers will be undertaken at the earliest moment and conveniently fitted in with the general programme. Certainly, this class of vessel is not only indispensable in large numbers but happens to be a class that you can get in the shortest possible time. I do not think that we can look out on the affairs of the world on the basis that the tension is to last for
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seven or eight years. It is clearly not possible for the world to stand such a strain. Either we must come to a climax or there must be a settlement and a happy release of disarmament. So much for the destroyers.
I am far from contented with the types of cruiser we are building. Much may be said for the Dido class, because they relieve larger vessels for more far-range work, but the type of cruiser that we are building now, of which we laid down two or three last year and are laying down three this year, the Southampton type, which is a 9,000-ton cruiser armed with 6-inch guns, is hopelessly inferior to the 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-inch guns which are now being constructed in considerable numbers by Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States. I object strongly to the taxpayers' money being taken for a vessel which is not capable of facing its contemporary opposite number in single-ship action. True, we have been drawn into this position by treaty entanglements, but clauses are provided by which escape may be had from them; and by negotiation with other friendly Powers who are concerned in this attempt to limit naval armament it would be possible to get relief.
In Germany particularly—I am glad to have the chance of pointing this out—there are five 10,000-ton 8-inch gun cruisers which are being built, and none of our 8-inch gun 10,000-ton cruisers is within 10 years modernity of those ships, which are therefore superior to any of the similar ships which we have; nor are we building any ships capable of encountering them in single-ship action. If trouble should come, which may God avert, those German ships would be super-Emdens on the trade routes of the world, and we should have the very greatest difficulty in coping with them unless we had similar vessels. The Emden and her sisters that were loose on the ocean when the War broke out gave us the trouble of 120 cruisers to bring them to book, as they were eventually brought to book, and they did no end of damage. They were comparatively small ships that could easily be mastered by the more powerful vessels that we had.
I should like to draw the attention of the House to the fact that the small
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aircraft carrier and the cruiser squadron, searching in the wide waters, have an enormous range of search never open to them before. Consequently, you ought to be able to have either greater efficiency of cruiser work or possibly a saving in cruiser numbers; but when you have found the raiding cruiser and you have not a ship in your squadron which may face her in a single-ship action, the vessels all being spread out 100 miles or more apart, all your search is vain, and all that happens is that the raider, when eventually located, breaks through the line, probably inflicting very serious damage upon one or other of your vessels in the course of it. Each cruiser works separately, with its searchlight searching for its quarry, and when the quarry is found you must be able to send a vessel capable of destroying it. Your vessels need not all be capable of doing so, but there must be an adequate proportion of vessels which could not only catch but kill the raider when it is found. My comment upon the present situation is that we are not building any vessels equal to contemporary vessels now on the stocks in this most important class of large cruiser.
Here let me say that there is one particular danger upon which the Admiralty is, I am sure, keeping its eye. Owing to the treaty arrangements which we have made and which have imposed such very artificial conditions upon our naval architecture—I am not making this comment in a controversial sense at all—there is a gap between the 10,000-ton limit, and I think the 25,000-ton, between the 10,000-ton limit of large cruisers and the 25,000-ton where the battleship or battle-cruiser begins. It is in this limit that the danger from Japan is most likely to cause inconvenience, because by the construction of 15,000-ton vessels with 12-inch guns a whole series of British and American cruisers would be rendered comparatively obsolete, and no remedy would be open to those Powers, those fleets and navies, except to despatch battle cruisers for the purpose of meeting with those new vessels. If it should be found that such vessels are under construction, an immediate reply would have to be made, and vessels capable of finding them and of catching them and killing them, would have to be set down. That is more important
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even that the construction of a very large number of great vessels.
I have another point which I venture to submit to the House and to the Admiralty. The times in which we live are certainly critical enough to warrant what I may call a foreshortening of our programme. By that I mean that the exceptional priorities and the continuous shift or double shift method of construction should be applied to all vessels which can be brought into the water in six months, 12 months or 18 months, even at the cost of some slight retardation of vessels which cannot be finished until a later period. What we require is an increase of strength as soon as possible. That would increase our margin and increase the deterrents against attack, and would enable the execution of the rest of our programme to take place behind the cover of an ample margin of security. I hope that such a foreshortening of the programme may be considered. It would apply particularly to the reconstructed battleships, the "Warspite" and so on, which I understand are being reconstructed at great cost and with enormous advantage, making them far better than they were when they were new, when I proposed them to the House a quarter of a century ago. They will be admirable ships, I am told, certainly equal to any construction at present in the water. These vessels should certainly be brought forward, rather than consuming too much of our strength and energy upon the last programme of battleships, which cannot be available until five or six years hence. They, too, must go on in their turn, but the great thing is to be in possession of ample and adequate naval power in the near future.
The Financial Secretary, in his description of the methods of convoy adopted under various conditions, mentioned that some merchant ships would be armed against aircraft. That is a most indispensable requirement. I believe that aircraft will not do too much harm to war ships; they are not particularly anxious to go near them; but a merchant ship without a gun to fire is an easy prey. The aircraft comes right down, follows the track of the vessel, and almost with certainty destroys it. Before the War I obtained the permission of the House to arm all our merchant ships, or a great proportion of them, with what was called
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self-defensive armament—a gun which fired astern, so that the ship could fire when running away, but no one could think it would be so wicked as to molest any other ship. That was found to be a very convenient and valuable defence against attacks, not, of course, by warships, but against attacks by enemy armed liners, of which there were a number. In regard to the air danger, it is indispensable that one or more anti-aircraft guns should be placed on all the important ships, and that the merchant crews should receive such training as is necessary to enable them to serve such guns. This will relieve to some extent the strain, which will be so great, on the Navy and the destroyers should we be engaged in a serious naval war.
I shall not follow the right hon. Gentleman into the political domain, which I will not say he trespassed upon, but which he skirted so very closely during the latter part of his speech; but I must say that I entirely agree with him as to the very serious strategic issues which are raised by the Italian fortification of the Mediterranean, which is proceeding ceaselessly at the present time. Not only are there the dangers, which have been spoken of, of fire from the land at Gibraltar; not only are there the dangers to which Malta may be subjected from mass air attack unless we have an overwhelming anti-aircraft defence; but we have to consider the very special measures which are being taken to fortify the island of Pantellaria, which have no other object than to enable the Mediterranean to be cut in half by an Italian fleet. They are not for any other purpose; it is certainly not for our benefit that that labour is being undertaken. Then there is the fortification of some other islands; which are being provided with very heavy armaments, much more than we think of putting in minor naval bases in the Red Sea. All of these constitute a process which, I submit to the House, requires the unceasing vigilance of the British Admiralty and of the British nation. I have a sort of feeling that we are being netted in in various direction.
I certainly do not consider that easy explanations are sufficient in the case of these very expensive and elaborate arrangements which are being steadily advanced and matured in the Medi-
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terranean. At the same time, I do not consider that the Navy should have any difficulty in discharging its duties in that Sea. The Navy Estimates of this year are, I think, £123,000,000. The Navy Estimates of Italy are £20,000,000. And, even in those years in which the locusts were so prevalent, our Navy Estimates were never maintained at a level of less than £50,000,000, or quadruple those of our colleague Power in the Mediterranean. If, with this enormous preponderance of expenditure of money, the British Admiralty are not able to assure us that our safety is maintained in that Sea, they must be less accomplished in their task than have been the Boards of generations gone by. I am pretty sure that they will be able to convince themselves, and, if necessary, other people, that, if we were forced to defend our interests in the Mediterranean, our forces would be ample for that purpose.
We have had several debates in recent weeks about defence, and I agree that, as has been already said, the gloomy feeling which was natural in many bosoms has not been particularly relieved by the course of those debates; but here to-night, on the Navy, at any rate, we have a right to feel a sense of good cheer and courage, because the Navy is far stronger relatively to Europe than it ever was in those days before the War, although then we had a far larger fleet. The Navy is not only far stronger than it was then, but I do not think that these new dangers which have menaced the Navy since the War and during the War—I mean the submarine and the air menace—have in any way weakened the power of the Fleet and of the Navy. I think the Admiralty have been proved right in this matter. They have assured us that the submarine menace, however serious it may be, is far less than it was at the close of the Great War, and, after all, we grappled with that menace in the Great War; so that, with ample supplies of destroyers and modern equipment, it should be possible to strangle the submarine and give full protection both to the Fleet and to the Mercantile Marine.
The air raises a different problem. I see my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hertford (Sir M. Sueter) in his place. When I last spoke on these
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topics he was rather vexed with me, because I said he indicated that all it was necessary for an aircraft to do was just to drop a bomb down the funnel of the ship, and how easy that would be. I ridiculed the idea, but I do not mind saying to the House that I was disconcerted when one morning I read a highly coloured account in the newspapers of the sinking of a Spanish battleship by a bomb being dropped exactly down the funnel. However, I did not lose courage entirely, and very soon I was reassured by the statement that inquiry by the Admiralty had shown that this outrage was wholly unfounded, and that the destruction of the vessel had taken place by means which, if they cannot be called more orthodox, were at any rate far less disquieting.
