- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons debate on the Defence White Paper in London on March 16, 1950, criticising the Government's army and National Service policy and arguing Western Germany must contribute to European defence.
- Main themes
- Structure of the Regular Army, universality of National Service and selective ballot, 18-month service term, lack of deployable brigade groups, fall in Regular Army recruiting, dispersal of wartime stocks, defence of Western Europe against Soviet Russia, German contribution to European defence, Anglo-French unity, Brussels Treaty and Atlantic Pact, German refugees from the East
- Duration
- ~12 min
- Words
- 1,420
- Sentences
- 57
- Readability
- 52
- Grade
- 12.4
- Syntax
- 3.16
- Vocabulary
- 2.15
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other57 sentences in 20 paragraphs
I am now coming to the question of the structure of the Regular Army. Here I must say that I do not agree with the Government's view, expressed in the last sentence of the White Paper on Defence, which reads:
The idea that the present principle of universality of national service should be abandoned in favour of a scheme under which a smaller number of men, selected by ballot or otherwise, would be required to serve for a period of eighteen months or more is, in the Government's view, impracticable.
Nearly 300,000 men come within the scope of National Service every year. Of these the intake for 1950–51 is to be 168,000. I am quoting from the Paper. I do not suggest that this number should be increased. On the contrary, I think that by wise administration it might well be somewhat diminished. But I believe that the method of choosing those who are required could be greatly improved, and I do not exclude the principle of selective service by ballot from a proper application of our National Service law. I think it is a matter which should not be too lightly brushed aside.
I believe that if, by various inducements of a voluntary or optional character, men called up could be persuaded to serve for a somewhat longer period, important economies, easements and improvements would be possible in our whole military system. I am satisfied that conscription could be applied with less burden and with less expense, combined with greater efficiency, having regard especially to our peculiar needs; and I do not think the Minister of Defence disagrees with that. I do not propose, however, to go into details, but I renew the assurance, which I gave during the election, that the Conservative Party do not intend to use compulsory powers to lengthen the terms of National Service above the 18 months which now prevail—not compulsory powers.
One aspect of the evils of the present application of the compulsory Service Acts is shown in our lamentable inability to produce, even with the present severe measures of compulsion, any adequate reinforcement or expeditionary force even for the minor contingencies which arise in the world, and that for a nation
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whose responsibilities, as the Minister of Defence reminded us, are still so widely spread as ours. We have, of course, the German garrisons to maintain and more troops are needed in the Far East; but to set against this there is the relief of what used to he our prime burden of maintaining a great long-service Army in India.
Even with all the compulsory powers which the Government have taken, with 380,000 men in uniform, I do not believe there are a couple of well-formed brigade groups which could be sent abroad at short notice—I should be quite ready and very glad to be contradicted on that point—not a couple of well-formed brigade groups. That would compare with the six divisions produced under the Haldane scheme, without compulsion, before the First World War, or with the four or five divisions which stood ready at the outbreak of the Second World War.
Of course, things are cot exactly on all fours, I quite agree. There have been many changes, but such great contrasts should not be ignored and, with facts like these staring us in the face, it is hard to believe that we are presented with a successful solution of the military problem by those who have had unprecedented control for the last 4½ years. We have an enormous mass of men in uniform, and here we are reduced to this pitiful shortage of the means to send small reinforcements, modest reinforcements, abroad at short notice. It is not a thing to laugh at; it is a thing to puzzle at, and to try to find a way to do it. We shall not get through our difficulties by this attempt at geniality when under examination.
Time does not permit me this afternoon to recur to the extraordinary disappearance and dispersal of immense masses of war materials which were at our disposal when the present Government came into office. The right hon. Gentleman said something about it, and of course some weapons become obsolete in a few years but others, properly taken care of, especially artillery and rifles, of which we had enormous masses, can be kept in good order for a whole generation.
Now I return to the recruiting for the Regular Army and for the Territorial Forces. How seriously this has fallen off
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is shown by the figures on page six of the White Paper. There has been a fall in the Regular Army recruiting from 33,900 in 1948 to 23,800 in 1949—that is to say, a drop of nearly one-third. Yet it is on this Regular Army, so heavily burdened by the need of training the National Service recruits, and losing them as soon as they begin to be most useful, that there falls the task of providing not only our garrisons overseas, with units of real fighting quality, but also the supply of effective reinforcements available at short notice, which all admit are needed
I come to the wider aspects of our military affairs. The decision to form a front in Europe against a possible further invasion by Soviet Russia and its satellite States was at once grave for us and also imperative. There was a school of thought in the United States which held that Western Europe was indefensible and that the only lines where a Soviet-satellite advance could be held were the Channel and the Pyrenees. I am very glad that this view has been decisively rejected by the United States, by ourselves and by all the Powers concerned in the Brussels Treaty and the Atlantic Pact.
I find it necessary to say, however. speaking personally, giving my own opinion, that this long front cannot be successfully defended without the active aid of Western Germany. For more than 40 years—and what years!—I have worked with France. Britain and France must stand together primarily united in Europe. United they will be strong enough to extend their hands to Germany. Germany is at present disarmed and forbidden to keep any military force. Just beyond her eastern frontier lies the enormous military array of the Soviet and its satellite States, far exceeding in troops, in armour and in air power all that the other Allies have got. We are unable to offer any assurance to the Germans that they may not be overrun by a Soviet and satellite invasion.
Seven or eight millions of refugees from the East have already been received and succoured in Western Germany. In all the circumstances this is a marvellous feat. Another quarter of a million are now being or about to be driven across the Polish and Czech frontiers. The mighty mass of the Russian armies and their satellites lies, like a fearful cloud, upon the German people. The Allies
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cannot give them any direct protection. Their homes, their villages, their cities might be overrun by an Eastern deluge and, no doubt, all Germans who have peen prominent in resisting Communism or are working for reconciliation with the Western democracies would pay the final forfeit.
We have no guarantee to give except to engage in a general war which, after wrecking what is left of European civilisation, would no doubt end ultimately in the defeat of the Soviets, but which might begin by the Communist enslavement of Western Germany, and not only of Western Germany. If the Germans are neither to have a guarantee of defence nor to be allowed to make a contribution to the general framework of defence they must console themselves, as they are doing, by the fact that they have no military expense to bear—nothing like the £800 million we are now voting or the contributions of the French and other treaty Powers, or the far greater sums provided by the United States. They are free from all that.
The Germans may also comfort themselves with the important advantages which this relief from taxation gives to German commercial competition in all the markets of the world, growing and spreading with every month that passes. I cannot feel that this is a good way to do things, or that we should let them drift on their course. I say without hesitation that the effective defence of the European frontiers cannot be achieved if the German contribution is excluded from the thoughts of those who are responsible.
