- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 16, 1950, during the defence debate, urging more light carriers and aircraft against Soviet U-boats and criticising the sale of jet fighters to Argentina.
- Main themes
- Soviet snorkel U-boat threat, light fleet aircraft carriers, long-range naval air patrol, Soviet air force numerical strength, sale of jet fighters to Argentina, American bomber base in East Anglia, German reconciliation and neo-Nazism, Royal Fleet Reserve, atomic bomb as shield, Auxiliary Air Force re-armament, Defence Estimates
- Duration
- ~27 min
- Words
- 3,282
- Sentences
- 152
- Readability
- 59
- Grade
- 10.6
- Syntax
- 3.06
- Vocabulary
- 2.18
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other152 sentences in 48 paragraphs
The Minister of Defence did not attempt to deal with this issue, although it and others are the foundation of the responsibilities confided in him; but I hope that the Prime Minister will be able to speak to us about them tonight. The decision, of course, does not rest with this country alone, but we must have a policy, and the House ought
1290
to know what is our policy. To remain as we are now for a long period of time is certainly not the best way of preventing the measureless horrors of a third world war.
It is painful to witness the present indecision, and also the petty annoyances, by which the reconciliation of France and Great Britain with the German people is hindered, by the belated dismantlement of a few remaining German factories and the still more belated trials of aged German generals. All this plays into the hands of the Communist fifth column in Western Germany and the reviving Naziism, or neo-Naziism, which is only another variant of the same evil. All this squanders the precious years that still remain in which war can be averted and peace established on a lasting foundation. I felt it my duty to raise this subject today, and I think it would be altogether wrong that these Debates should proceed upon a basis of guarded platitudes and the avoidance of any real statement of the issues upon which our lives and fortunes depend.
Now I come to the Navy. Estimates of £193 million are put forward for the Navy, and a reduction is proposed in the manpower under Vote A from 144,000 at 1st April, 1949, to 127,000 in April, 1951. I do not quarrel with this. I have urged in successive years the combing of the tail and the numbers employed ashore in non-combatant jobs and in clerical duties at the Admiralty. I am glad to see that the Minister of Defence is a convert to this process. I am glad to see it has been going forward, albeit slowly and tardily.
I was sorry, however, to read in the Admiralty paper that for reasons of economy there will he no increase in the strength of the Royal Fleet Reserve during 1950 to 1951.
The maintenance of the Royal Fleet Reserve is not expensive in proportion to the security which it gives and the service that it renders. I have also studied the tables given in the Admiralty paper of the strength of the Fleet, both active and reserve, and such information as is vouchsafed us about new construction, modernisation and conversion. I do not propose to make any comments in detail upon this, but rather to deal generally with the great change that has come
1291
over the naval position, and to try to focus for the House, so far as is possible, the new Admiralty problem.
This is not like the period before the First World War when all was thought to culminate in a decisive engagement between the battle fleets at sea; and we maintained the ratio of 16 to 10 over the German capital ships. There is no surface fleet potentially hostile to us in the world today. The only other surface fleet of consequence is that of the United States, nearly all of which—or a great part of which—has, with much wisdom, been placed in material reserve, protected from decay by costly but well worth while systems of preservation. In the Navy the war in the air and the war on the sea have become so closely interwoven as to be indistinguishable and inseparable.
It is obvious and imperative that the Navy should manage its own air service. Nevertheless, in the sea war of the future it is the air which will decide the fate and fortunes of ships of war. Therefore, the aircraft carrier with proper naval protection must increasingly replace the battleships of former times. But what kind of aircraft carrier, and how many of the large or small types? To decide this you must look at the actual problem which lies before us. The combat of gunfire between lines of battle is utterly extinct.
What we have to face in the next few years is the Germanised Soviet U-boat. The nation does not seem to know much about this, and the right hon. Gentleman did not mention it in his statement, but the salient facts are public property and govern the thoughts of all the staffs in many countries. I am not going to attempt to compute the Soviet U-boat force. According to Brassey's "Naval Annual," the strength given out by Soviet propaganda is 250, and Brassey's "Naval Annual" regards this as a reliable figure. Between 75 and 100 of these, according to this authority, are of war-time or postwar construction.
It may not be wise to publish what we ourselves have in anti-U-boat craft and forces, but there really cannot be any reason for the Government not stating broadly what we might have to (ace. At the end of the war the Soviets
1292
became possessors of a great part of Germany and of several of its Eastern Baltic ports. They engaged, by persuasion or pressure, a large number of German scientific personnel. They have made a great U-boat fleet, in the designing and building and even handling of which a considerable proportion of Germans are involved, by seduction or duress.
Certainly an immense advance has been made in the character and quality of the U-boat menace to the ocean life lines without whose maintenance we cannot live. An entirely new type of U-boat has been developed. Instead of a ship going eight or nine knots under the water and having to come up to breathe at comparatively short intervals, we have a type of U-boat which can manoeuvre below the surface at upwards of 20 knots or thereabouts. By the use of the breathing tube or Snorkel—or "snort" as we call it—it can make passages of thousands of miles without appearing on the surface where it might be detected.
The flotillas and anti-U-boat vessels which, in enormous numbers, broke the U-boat peril and saved our lives in the last war are now largely obsolete for this purpose. In those days we used to employ 12-knot or 14-knot ships to hunt the U-boats, and it was comparatively easy to multiply those; but now, with U-boats capable of moving, for a short time at any rate, at 20 knots submerged, all this great anti-U-boat fleet which we created would be useless. We should have to have much faster vessels going at 30 knots or more merely to do the same hunting as we did in the last war.
Here also is a sphere in which numbers are imperative, but to create vessels of 30 knots in the numbers required involves impossible expense. We have to have many scores of them and each one costs four or five times as much as the old kind and takes two or three times as long to build or adapt. The problem of mastering the new German-designed and Soviet-owned U-boat cannot be solved along the lines of multiplying flotillas of larger and faster vessels. If the story stopped here, I should feel gloomy about it. Happily, however, as is often forgotten, all things are on the move together, and here the naval air and longer-range land-based aircraft come to the aid of the Navy.
1293
The light type of aircraft carrier, if provided in sufficient numbers, can search immense areas of sea. There are also, no doubt, improvements in the methods of destroying U-boats. We have to find them, however, before we can destroy them, and only the air can do this. I submit to the House that the main emphasis of our naval effort at the present time should be to create the largest numbers of light fleet aircraft carriers and auxiliary carriers capable of carrying the necessary modern types of aircraft.
This is a time to concentrate upon essentials. It does not at all follow that this means a vast augmentation of expenditure. It is necessary to concentrate upon essentials and beware, of all things, of frittering strength away on remedies against dangers which have passed away in time. An intense effort should be made to improve the methods of detecting submerged U-boats from the air. Great advances have already been made. I heard no reference to this by the right hon. Gentleman, but I have already seen a precise demand made upon science by the military which has not been met. Perhaps the solution has already been found. At any rate, it may be possessed by others.
On 23rd February—a date when some of us were pre-occupied with other matters—the United States authorities published an official statement on new measures designed to combat the snorkel submarine. They said:
The Navy has accepted delivery of a new model of the long-range Neptune, which will be the first aircraft specifically designed to meet the threat of snorkel type enemy submarines. This plane holds the world's non-refuelling distance record of 11,236 miles. Built by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the twin-engined Neptune carries the latest electronic and ordnance equipment. Its sensitive search radar permits detection of smaller targets, such as a snorkel tube, over a much greater distance than heretofore possible with long-range patrol planes.
That shows that the information that other countries find it possible to give has all been made public; instead of the limits to which the House of Commons is confined.
To locate submerged submarines accurately, the P2V will utilise magnetic detection gear and sonobuoys. These small radio buoys are dropped in a specific pattern over the area where a submarine is suspected. Floating on the surface the buoy lowers a small hydrophone to the proper depth, where the noise of the
1294
submarine's propellers is detected by the hydro-phone and transmitted. Receivers in the aircraft permit the operators to plot the submarine's position by interpreting the relative noise level transmitted by the sonobuoys.
I have not read anything so encouraging or hopeful for many a long day. I am bound to say I am astonished that more information should not have been volunteered by the Minister of Defence in the statement which he has made. If this should come true, the menace of modern U-boats may be finally overcome under the attack of modern aircraft launched from a sufficient number of small aircraft carriers. I think that the House ought to know and reflect upon these important facts in a debate of this character, and that they should play a real part in our consideration of these questions of defence policy.
Now I come to the general air problem —not the one connected with the Navy, but the general air problem. Here again, I shall only mention to the House what is already well-known to those who study such matters. In the forefront stands the enormous numerical strength of the Soviet air force. There never has been an air force of the size that the Soviet have built and are building in time of peace. In the air, quantity is best defeated by quality. That is how we got through in 1940 when all hung in the balance. But now we have a far greater disproportion of numbers to face, though happily of a lower relative quality.
Still no one can say that a sufficient quantity cannot overwhelm superior quality. If we wish to have that strength which will deter war, or if the worst comes to the worst, to enable us to win through, we require far larger numbers of the highest class aircraft than we now possess. Every sacrifice should be made on other branches of defence to make sure that that is not neglected. The highest priority should be accorded to it. Fortunately and providentially there is the American air force, far stronger than ours and of equal quality. We have allowed them to establish in East Anglia a base for their bombing aircraft, the significance of which cannot be lost on the Soviets.
We on this side supported His Majesty's Government in the steps they have taken. If any other party had taken such steps I do not know whether the
1295
Socialists in Opposition would have sustained them. Certainly they have not been put to that test. It was certainly a step which in any other period but this strange time in which we live might have led to war. What has distressed and disquieted me is that those who took it should appear not to be fully conscious of its importance. Our defensive forces in fighter aircraft should be raised and our radar precautions should be raised by our utmost exertions to the highest possible level.
We have the jet fighter. This is the product of British genius. There is nothing to surpass it in the world and it is continually improving. I was glad to read in the White Paper, page 5, paragraph 15, the plan for doubling the jet fighter strength of Fighter Command would be completed. I hope that means really "doubling" and not merely filling up existing squadrons and bringing them up to strength. I was glad to read it for what it was worth. But I cannot understand why a British Government which has established an American base in East Anglia should have allowed anything to diminish the supply of jet fighter aircraft upon which our deterrent against war and our survival should it come might alike depend.
Here again I base myself only upon what has been made public in the newspapers and is common property. The right hon. Gentleman made a reference to jet fighters. British jet fighters have hitherto been for many good but insufficient reasons—and a good reason if insufficient in a matter like this is a bad reason—dispersed and distributed in various quarters. I am content to deal only with those which have been sold to the Argentine, or written-off against what are called "sterling balances" to Egypt. I do not know how many have been sent or given—for that is what it comes to—to Egypt; but it is already public knowledge that 100 jet fighter aircraft have been sold to the Argentine for little more than £2 million.
There is a sense of disproportion about an act like this which passes the frontiers of reason. The Air Force lays before us Estimates for £223 million, and yet to gain perhaps little more than £2 million of foreign exchange—which the Liverpool Cotton Exchange could have earned for
1296
us in a year; a trifle compared to the vast scale of our expenditure—100 of these vital instruments have been sent away.
Even upon the basis of the facts known to the public I am prepared to argue this matter in a little further detail. A wise use of our jet aircraft would have enabled the whole of our Auxiliary Air Force squadrons to be at this moment effectively re-armed. I do not think that those who conduct the Government of the country, although animated I am sure by a sincere purpose, have comprehended this aspect of their problem. As far as I could understand him this afternoon, the Minister of Defence gave a most extraordinary reason. He said that the Air Force could not afford to buy them; and when I asked why they could not afford to, it was because apparently they had overrun the Estimate agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But all this is in the same sphere of ministerial responsibility, and money should be saved elsewhere rather than that a vital need of this kind should be denied to the Air Force.
I will try to put this problem in the simplest terms for the benefit of the right hon. Gentleman. Here we have an Air Force at an overall cost of £223 million, and to get £2 million of dollar exchange we deprive ourselves of this part of an element vital to our security. Let me take a really simple example derived from the days which some of us have lived in, in the early years of the century, of old-fashioned war. Suppose we had a regiment of Lancers 500 strong. It might have cost £100,000 a year. There were the overheads; there were the fine uniforms, there were the horses, the barracks, the band, and all that. What would have been thought of an Administration which cut off the steel spear points of 100 of the lances and sold them to the local ironmonger at half-a-crown apiece to reduce expense? I have put it simply to the right hon. Gentleman, and I hope he has managed to take that in anyhow. But that is exactly what this particular transaction of selling 100 jet fighter aircraft to the Argentine, published in all the newspapers and common knowledge all over the world, has amounted to.
We shall hear all sorts of excuses about the time it takes to lengthen runways on
1297
the airfields, the collection of skilled mechanics, the importance of building up, as the right hon. Gentleman told us, a future clientele of customers abroad, and the like. We have only to think of the total cost of the Air Estimates of £223 million to see what such arguments are worth. We have only to think of the time that has passed since we allowed the Americans to establish their bombing base in East Anglia to see how vain are these excuses for not having taken all the concomitant measures at the same time. If we had strictly safeguarded our jet fighter aircraft of the waste of which I have given only one example—and that because it is public—the whole of our Auxiliary Air Force could have been re-armed by now, and even further aircraft might have been made.
In putting this point before the House I must repeat that I am citing no fact which is not known to the world, or was not known to me apart from any information I have derived from discussions with the Government. I do not know how much of this sort of thing has been vitiating our enormous expenditure upon armaments, but I am sure that far greater value for the money we voted could have been achieved, and that far better use could now be made of our British resources. If we wish to prevent the fearful tensions which exist in the modern world we must not only be cool and patient, but also firm and strong. Here is one of the reasons why I could not possibly accept the word "approve" when errors of this kind have been committed in the open light of day.
Do not, I beg the House, nurse foolish delusions that we have any other effective overall shield at the present time from mortal danger than the atomic bomb in the possession, thank God, of the United States. But for that there would be no hope that Europe could preserve its freedom, or that our island could escape an ordeal incomparably more severe than those we have already endured. Our whole position in this atomic sphere has been worsened since the war by the fact that the Russians, unexpectedly as the Minister admitted, have acquired the secrets of the atomic bomb, and are said to have begun its manufacture.
Let us therefore labour for peace, not only by gathering our defensive strength, but also by making sure that no door is
1298
closed upon any hope of reaching a settlement which will end this tragic period when two worlds face one another in increasing strain and anxiety.
