Defence

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

27 July 1950 · House of Commons debate on defence · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on July 27, 1950, during a defence debate, warning of Soviet superiority in Europe, urging German rearmament and pressing ministers to disclose Western force levels.
Main themes
Soviet and satellite military strength in Europe, rearmament of Western Germany, weakness of Western Union forces, rocket-propelled and guided missile threat to Britain, Soviet air power and Western air defence, request for disclosure of force figures, US atomic bomber base in East Anglia, Korean War context, criticism of Attlee government's defence policy
Duration
~12 min
40th percentile
Words
1,380
40th percentile
Sentences
54
35th percentile
Readability
57
81st percentile
Grade
11.7
41st percentile
Syntax
3.31
83rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.07
21st percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 77%74%
  • Institutional 13%13%
  • Ceremonial 10%9%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

54 sentences in 20 paragraphs

I hope the Minister of Defence, when he replies, will tell us. There is really no reason why we should not know what the Soviets and all the General Staffs of Europe know, and what the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence must themselves have known for a long time. In a Secret Session, there would I think, have been no difficulty in giving the broad facts.

When, in March, in the Debate on the White Paper, I said in the House that it would be necessary and right to enable the Germans of Western Germany to take part in the defence of their hearths and homes from the hideous menace under

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which they lie, the Prime Minister dismissed my advice as irresponsible. However, it is the advice which I understand the military commanders of the United States, at any rate, would give. At present, we have followed the principle that the only Germans who may be re-armed are the Communist Germans in the Eastern zone, who have been formed by the Soviets into a highly effective police army with powerful weapons and numbering 45,000 or 50,000 men—it may be more—and with considerable offshoots in the Communist cells and caches of arms known to exist in Western Germany.

I do not wonder that something like panic prevails along the Eastern frontiers of Western Germany. Every true German friend of reconciliation with the Western democratic world, and the redemption of their past by faithful service, knows that the lurking Communist in the neighbourhood has marked him down for early liquidation. How can there be any foundation for a helpful German policy under such conditions?

In all that I have said so far, I have only spoken of the Soviet forces with which we are confronted—eight or nine to one against us in infantry and artillery, and probably much more than that in tank formations. I have not mentioned the satellite Powers. Poland, under strict Russian control, with a Russian marshal at the head of her forces, has a powerful party army. Czechoslovakia has another army, though less trustworthy, and the arsenals of Skoda, possibly the largest arms plant now in Europe, are steadily pouring out their weapons. If the facts that I have stated cannot be contradicted by His Majesty's Government, the preparations of the Western Union to defend itself certainly stand on a far lower level than those of the South Koreans. I notice that the right hon. Gentleman said yesterday with candour:

I will not conceal from the House that the Forces at present available, or in sight, fall a long way short of requirements estimated even on the most conservative basis. There is nothing to be gained by failing to recognise this fact."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th July, 1950; Vol. 478, c. 474.]

It is always, I think, true to say that one of the main foundations of the British sense of humour is under-statement, and this appears to be a very excellent example of that fact.

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We may, no doubt, throw much of the blame on France and the Benelux countries, weakened by the disasters of the war, but do not let us imagine that we are not in danger ourselves. If, as M. Reynaud says, and I have no reason to dispute him, the Soviet armies, with their armoured columns, could be at Calais and reach the Channel—or the Atlantic, that is to say—before any substantial reinforcements from the United States could arrive upon the scene—if that is true, then we ourselves, although protected from an immediate incursion by the anti-tank obstacle of the Channel, with its waves, tides and storms, will be subjected to a bombardment by rocket-propelled and guided missiles—I am not speaking of atomic bombs—incomparably more severe than anything we have endured or imagined.

The Soviet Government picked up and developed all the Germans knew about this form of war. Peenemunde fell into their hands, and all the German secrets of this new phase of warfare, on which Hitler had set his final hopes, but the development of which was cut short by our advance—all this new phase of warfare has been developed in five years of intensive study and production.

The Russians do not need to come to the coast to plant their batteries. Very long ranges are within the compass of these weapons, and they can pick and choose their places. If we were alone, I might give some indication of the inconvenience which might be caused thereby. All this is true, and may be near—how near no one knows for certain, except the dictator oligarchy in the Kremlin, who accept no moral principles as known to us, but who are able to pursue, year after year, their calculated plans for world conquest without being concerned with public opinion or elections or any of the scruples which rule the Western and the Christian world.

Here I leave the first part of my subject—the relative strength of the armies and of the tanks upon the Western Front. Let us now look to the air. Immense figures have been published in America and in this country about the Soviet air forces—25,000 military aircraft produced yearly was one figure. The Minister of Defence said yesterday that the Russian forces—he was speaking of their total

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military forces—are backed by 19,000 military aircraft, including jet aircraft of the latest design, both bombers and fighters.

But, on the Western front, which is the matter which I have most in point at the moment, in fighter and bomber aircraft, how many have they got in full commission? Would 4,000 or 5,000 or 6,000 be too large an estimate? I should be greatly relieved if the Government were able to answer this question in a reassuring manner. But, considering all we have been told of the Russian strength, I can see no reason why, even under the conditions of a public Session, it should not be answered. But, even if we take it as only 4,000, how many have we got? We and the Americans and the Western Allies, how many have we got on the Continent—I am not speaking of home forces—to sustain our Armies of perhaps 12 divisions, as stated by M. Reynaud, against 80 or 90? Here, again, even if we were in Secret Session, I would not ask the Government to state the exact figure, but could they say, for instance, that we have a half, a third, a fourth, a fifth, a sixth, or a seventh of what we know we have to face? I do not press them for a reply unless they wish to give one.

Upon the question of quality, no doubt we may hope to have superiority in machines and pilots, but this is by no means certain. The right hon. Gentleman has told us that a large proportion of the Russian aircraft are of the highest quality. They have certainly made great improvements on the jet aeroplanes in regard to which we so lightheartedly furnished them with our specimen engines a few years ago.

There are other aspects of the Russian air menace not concerned with the mainland of Europe with which I must now deal. If the Russian Armies reached or approached the coast of France and held the airfields there from which we were attacked by the Germans 10 years ago, they could, I fear, outnumber us in the air by a far larger number of machines than Hitler ever had. Anything that the Government choose to say upon the fighter forces available for the defence of London and our vital feeding seaports which would reassure the House would give the deepest satisfaction to us all.

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But there is another aspect of the air defence of Britain which is even more grave and intense. Two years ago, the Government agreed that the Americans should establish a bombing base in East Anglia from which they could use the atom bomb upon the Russian cities and keypoints. The Americans have other bases, but this is one of the most important. We on this side of the House do not criticise the Government for taking this very serious step for which, in any case, they had the large Socialist majority of the last Parliament at their disposal.