- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons debate on defence in London on July 27, 1950, warning of Western weakness against Soviet forces and relying on the American atomic deterrent.
- Main themes
- American atomic bomber base in East Anglia, sale of British jet engines to Argentina and Egypt, Auxiliary Air Force re-equipment, Soviet U-boat fleet and the Atlantic life-line, Coastal Command strength, Western Union forces compared with Soviet forces, American atomic deterrent, Soviet atomic bomb capability, civil defence booklet and atomic bomb effects, refusal of a Private Session, government accountability for defence
- Duration
- ~26 min
- Words
- 3,143
- Sentences
- 135
- Readability
- 55
- Grade
- 11.6
- Syntax
- 3.17
- Vocabulary
- 2.05
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other135 sentences in 48 paragraphs
Not at this point. All this has been in the newspapers for a long time. I would not have asked the Government, even in Secret Session, for the exact numbers of the American offensive forces for using the atomic bomb on Soviet Russia which are located here in this island. However, the Prime Minister stated them on Monday as 10,000 men and 180 planes in three bomber groups. To this, the Minister of Defence added last night that there were fighter squadrons also, so we may be sure that the Russians know the main facts pretty well. It is on this foundation that the Communists base their oft-repeated charge that Britain is an aircraft carrier moored to attack the Soviet Union. It is also, this base in East Anglia, our major defence against the consequences which would follow or accompany a Russian onslaught in Europe, and it is a vital part of the atomic bomb deterrent, which is what we are living on now.
More than two years have passed since this base was established and became public. It was obvious, whatever else was done or not done, that from that moment the utmost endeavours should have been used to make the base secure by every form of anti-aircraft artillers and by the most perfect and elaborate development of radar, and, above all, by the largest number of the latest fighter aircraft which we could produce ourselves or get from the United States. I hope this has been done. I naturally do not ask for a detailed reply, but one fact makes me anxious—it has been mentioned before, and I must refer to it now for it may be typical of much else
707
in our present administrative policy. I simply cannot comprehend a policy which while, on the one hand, taking this extraordinary risk of establishing this base, can disperse or distribute so large a proportion of the jet aircraft in the production of which British genius has held the lead.
We wonder how many jet aeroplane engines we have distributed to our friends or sold to foreign countries. I do not ask for a reply in detail; I will content myself with reminding the House, as my right hon. Friend did yesterday, of what has been published in the newspapers and admitted by Ministers, namely, that 100 of these jets were sold to the Argentine, which lays its claims to the Falkland Islands and is at this moment in wrongful occupation of British territory in the Antarctic. It has also been stated, and not denied when raised in the House, that 110 were sold, traded, or given to Egypt—written off against sterling balances, or the like—to Egypt of all countries at the present time, which was actually blocking the Canal in violation of the treaty, and no doubt given to them in order to enable them to face the new State of Israel. Here at any rate are 210 machines, only, of course, a proportion of what have been dispersed or disposed of, out of the total of these invaluable jets, and of these 210 we have been deprived by an act of improvidence beyond description or compare.
We have the Auxiliary Air Force, which is an important element in our home defence—about 20 squadrons—and is manned by very high quality volunteers really worthy of the finest weapons which our factories can make. This Auxiliary Air Force could all have been re-armed by now with the jets we have distributed to these foreign countries. I simply cannot understand it. In the 50 years since I entered this House, I have never seen anything quite like it. I made my protests and appeals to the Prime Minister more than a year ago. Perhaps he or the Minister of Defence will tell us tonight that at least the sale of our jets to neutrals has now been stopped.
But this particular illustration of the manner in which the policy of the Government has been incoherent or uncoordinated, ugly though it be, must not draw our minds from the general picture
708
which I am presenting to the House. I have dealt with the relative strengths of the armies and the armoured forces on both sides in Europe. I have spoken of the Air Force, though I have not attempted to go into actual or relative strengths, except to state that we are, I believe, outnumbered as we have never been before.
Now I come, thirdly, to the naval sphere and the Soviet U-boats. Reliable naval reference books estimate the present Russian U-boat fleet at 360 divided, no doubt, between the Pacific and the West, of which between 100 and 200 are ocean-going and capable of high speeds. These seem to me very large figures, and I am not at all accepting them as final figures, but what is the truth about them? I do not see why the Minister of Defence should not give us his best estimate, considering the information which has been given about other portions of the Russian forces.
Many of these boats, we are told, are of 20 knots. A modern 20-knot submerged U-boat would, it is calculated, be able to search five times the area of water that was covered by the last war U-boats with their maximum submerged speed of nine knots. What is the truth of this? There can be no harm in giving this information to the public. All German technical discoveries and, no doubt, some German technical aid have been at the command of the Soviets since the war. Considering that we and the world have been told the deadly details of the American atomic force in East Anglia, surely the facts about the Russian U-boat construction can be given on the best estimate that is available.
When I went to the Admiralty at the beginning of the last war the Germans had 30 ocean-going U-boats with a maximum underwater speed of nine knots. Only 30 And now the figure of 300 is mentioned; but it may be much less and yet be most grave. I am not committing myself to any precise figure, but they only had 30 then. I hope it may be possible to reassure us on the present position.
I do not know, nor do I ask, what resources we have in up-to-date anti-U-boat craft, but I doubt very much whether they are in number equal actually, or still less proportionately, to what those who are called the "guilty men"
709
of the last war had prepared. I believe it is probably true to say that the Russian-Soviet U-boat menace to our trans-ocean Atlantic life-line and world communications, which also comprise all American reinforcements for Europe, would be far more severe than was the German U-boat force in their attacks of 1939 and 1940; and this seemed quite enough then.
We have, however, the Air Force Coastal Command, and in this and in multiplication of aircraft carriers and antisubmarine vessels lies our hope, and, I trust, our policy. But it was said yesterday that the Coastal Command is below its approved strength, both in aircraft and in their personnel. I hope this may be contradicted, and if it cannot be contradicted I trust it will be made good. I do not feel I should be exaggerating if I said that the Soviet attack by modernised German U-boats in Russian hands upon our ocean life-line would, for a year at least, perhaps for more, be far more severe than was the Hitler attack in 1939 and 1940. I ask specifically if the Minister of Defence will deal with this in his speech, because it is fundamental and vital.
Summing up the scene, it looks as if there is at present no effective defence in Western Europe beyond the Channel, and that the Russian advance to the Channel or towards it will bring us under air bombardment, apart from the atomic bomb, far worse than we have ever endured. Secondly, it would be very bad for us if the Russians were to gain the command of the air over the Channel and over this island by an overpowering use of numbers. On the sea we are also at a serious disadvantage, as I have just described, compared with the last war. It is, perhaps, worth while for the House and the country to weigh these facts attentively. If they can be substantially corrected, no one will be more fervently thankful than I.
If the comparison of British and Western Union forces ended at this point, with a survey of land, sea and air, our position might well be judged forlorn. We might feel the need of the striking phrase used the other night by my hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) when he said, "While there is death there is hope." Fortunately, there is a fourth vast sphere of defence in which the United States have enormous and measureless
710
superiority. Two years ago I said in the country, at Llandudno:
If it were not for the stocks of atomic bombs now in the trusteeship of the United States, there would be no means of stopping the subjugation of Western Europe by Communist machinations backed by Russian armies and enforced by political police.
Again, I said on the same occasion:
Nothing stands between Europe today and complete subjugation to Communist tyranny but the atomic bomb in American possession.
It is to this aspect that I must now recur. I understand that we have no atom bombs of our own. Considering how far we were forward in this matter during the war—we could not ourselves undertake it because we were under fire, that was the only reason why we did not—and that we earnestly pressed the Americans into it, as my conversations with President Roosevelt in 1942, which are on record, will show, it is remarkable, considering all this, how quickly we were denied the confidence of the United States after the war was over, and how we have never been able in five years with all our own gathered knowledge to make the atom bomb ourselves.
I also said in 1948:
What will happen when the Russians get the atomic bomb themselves and have accumulated a large store? You can judge for yourselves what will happen then by what is happening now. If these things are done in the green wood, what will be done in the dry? If they can continue month after month disturbing and tormenting the world, trusting to our Christian and altruistic inhibitions against using this strange new power against them, what will they do when they themselves have large quantities of atomic bombs?
And further:
The Western nations will be far more likely to reach a lasting settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate their just demands while they have the atomic power and before the Russian Communists have got it too.
No attention was paid to this. I fully realise the difficulties and the dangers of such a policy and it did not rest entirely with us.
But now things have definitely worsened. It is painful in every respect to be told, as we were officially told some months ago, that the Russians have been able to gain the secret of the atom bomb through Communist traitors in the American and also notably in the British service. But between having the secret and making any large number of
711
bombs, there is undoubtedly a considerable interval.
It is this interval which we must not waste. We must endeavour to make up the melancholy leeway in military preparations which oppresses us today, and we must never abandon the hope that a peaceful settlement may be reached with the Soviet Government if a resolute effort is made on the basis not of our present weakness but of American atomic strength. This is the policy which gives the best chance of preventing a fearful war and of securing our survival should it break upon us.
I do not expect that any of the Allies know how many atomic bombs the Soviet Government have yet been able to make, but—here I am only stating my personal opinion—I do not think that they have made many yet, or that their rate of production is at present rapid. As I say, I only candidly state my own personal view to the House. It would be very wrong that the House should attach any undue importance to it, but it is one of the stepping stones upon which my thought advances.
I see, however, that I said to the House earlier in this Session, two months ago, that if the Americans had a stock-pile of, say, 1,000, and the Russians had only 50, and we got those 50, it would not be pleasant. I was surprised that this crude remark did not affect opinion. But then, only two months ago there was a different atmosphere. All these matters, quite wrongly, seemed outside the range of ordinary politics and daily life. Now they dominate the minds of all thinking and patriotic men, and will increasingly do so as the months pass by.
It was stated officially at some Lobby conference with, I think, the Home Office, according to the "Daily Telegraph" of Tuesday, that each bomb costs as much as a battleship. This, of course, is ludicrous nonsense. It might be that the first two or three would cost that amount or more if they were saddled with the whole expense of research and production up to date, but once they were in production the cost would certainly be less than one-twentieth or even one-fiftieth of a modern battleship. Nevertheless I still adhere to my feeling—I am quite ready to be instructed by those who have the advantages of official information—that so far,
712
very few have been produced, and the extraordinary efforts which the Soviet Government are making to obtain even small quantities of uranium seem—I only say "seem"—to justify a hopeful view.
If this should happily be true, there can be no doubt that the United States possesses at this moment a superiority so vast that a major act of Russian aggression is still subject to an effective and even perhaps decisive deterrent. It is for this reason I have ventured on several occasions to express the opinion that a third world war is not imminent, and I cherish the hope that it may still be averted.
I noticed in the Debate on Civil Defence on Monday, at which I regret I was not present, that there was a considerable tendency, not confined to any one part of the House, to minimise the effects of the atomic bomb, and the Government have issued a carefully thought out booklet on this subject. No doubt, it is right nearly always to take a robust and cheerful view, but I expect this booklet, from what I have been able to learn of it, looking through it—I have not had time to read it with the attention it deserves—will be more cheering to the Russians than to us, because the atomic bomb is the only weapon on land, sea and air in which the Americans—that is to say the Allies—can possibly have overwhelming superiority during the next two or three years.
I should have thought, therefore, that it was a mistake in propaganda to weaken or discount the deterrents upon those who are already so much stronger in every other sphere except this. We shall need the whole weight of these deterrents to gain us the time which remains while this great advantage of ours endures. We are, of course, dependent upon the United States both for the supply of the bomb and largely for the means of using it. Without it, we are more defenceless than we have ever been. I find this a terrible thought. In 1940 I had good hopes that we should win the battle in the air even at heavy odds and that if we won, the Navy could stave off and repel invasion until eventually vast air power was developed here which would bring us out of our troubles, even if left alone. But now I cannot feel the same sense of concrete assurance.
713
We must never despair. We must never give in. We have over 5 million men and women who had service in the Armed Forces in the last war. We have three-quarters of a million who have been trained since, and there are nearly 700,000 now in the Armed Forces, and many thousands in our Volunteer and Auxiliary Forces. Our industrial capacity and that of the free world is gigantic. Our scientific and technical ability is unsurpassed. We may well have time to reorganise and develop the mighty latent strength of Britain surrounded by her Commonwealth.
But I warn the House that we have as great dangers to face in 1950 and 1951 as we had 10 years ago. Here we are with deep and continuing differences between us in our whole domestic sphere, and faced with dangers and problems which all our united strength can scarcely overcome. It was this that led me to hope that in Private Session the sense of the corporate life of the House of Commons might have asserted itself. But that has been forbidden by the Prime Minister. It has been forbidden by the Prime Minister, and at his request the House has prevented our meeting together and talking things over among ourselves in secret.
It is with deep grief that I have to say these things to the House, and to reflect that it is only five years ago almost to a month when we were victorious, respected and safe. The whole burden does not rest upon this country, nor upon the Government of this country. They have done several important things, like establishing compulsory National Service and the East Anglian American base. They have fostered the closest relations with the United States and our European friends, and they have maintained active resistance to Communism in its various forms.
Nevertheless, I say they bear a fearful accountability. The Prime Minister and his party have had power, men, and money never enjoyed before by any Government in time of peace. If they had asked for more, Parliament would have granted it to them and we would have given it our full support. It was with a sense of relief that I felt entitled to say in March that we could accept no responsibility for the present state of our defences. That does not mean that we will not strive to help the Government, in spite of
714
their total lack of consideration for our wishes and point of view, in every measure, however unpopular, which they may propose and which we recognise is aimed solely at securing national survival.
