Demobilisation

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

22 October 1945 · House of Commons debate on demobilisation · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill, as Leader of the Opposition, addressed the House of Commons in London on October 22, 1945, in a debate on demobilisation, urging faster releases and proposing a Royal Navy ceiling of 150,000 men.
Main themes
Slow pace of demobilisation, return of servicemen to productive work, revival of industry, controls and scarcity of consumer goods, housing and use of billeting, military commitments, strength of the Royal Navy, Navy Vote A of 150,000, reduction of shore establishments, permanent scale of the armed forces
Duration
~11 min
38th percentile
Words
1,298
38th percentile
Sentences
66
43rd percentile
Readability
62
90th percentile
Grade
9.8
18th percentile
Syntax
3.04
52nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.08
24th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 28%21%
  • Institutional 26%20%
  • Geopolitical 18%14%
  • Social 16%12%
  • Ceremonial 12%9%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 24%

66 sentences in 13 paragraphs

(Woodford)

We have asked for this Debate upon demobilisation, because demobilisation is the foundation upon which, at this moment, everything else stands, and also, because tardy, inadequate demobilisation is the fountain-head of all our domestic difficulties. Whatever view may be taken of Socialism or free enterprise, surely it is common ground between us all, that we should get all the great wheels and the little wheels of life and industry in this country turning as soon as possible. For this we need the men. Without the men, and also the women, now held in the Services, there can be no speedy revival. The woeful shortage of consumer goods will continue. The Government will be afraid to allow people to spend their savings, for fear of undue rise in prices. Scarcity will be used as justification for controls, and controls will become the fatal means of prolonging scarcity. Get all the great wheels turning, and all the little cog wheels too. Let them rotate and revolve, spin and hum, and we shall have taken a long step forward towards our deliverance. In order to get them turning, we must bring the men home, and set the men free.

I am disquieted at the slow rate of demobilisation. I would have been ashamed to be responsible for the earliest declarations of His Majesty's Government on this subject. Even now that these have been markedly improved, I have no hesitation in saying that they fall far below what is both possible and necessary. His Majesty's Ministers have had an enormous windfall in the sudden end of the Japanese war, and of the cessation of fighting and slaughter throughout the world. There are no more enemies to conquer; no more fronts to hold. [Hon. Members: "Oh."] I mean of course in a military sphere. All our foreign foes

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have been beaten down into unconditional surrender. Now is the time to bring home the men who have conquered, and bring them back to their families and productive work. There is, we are assured, no lack of productive work. There is, at this time, no fear of large-scale unemployment. Every industry is clamouring for men. Everywhere are useful and fruitful tasks to be performed. I am sure that the restrictions and controls which would prevent men from getting work, and which would hobble and fetter the life energies of the nation, will be swept away once the men are back, and the whole great series of wheels will begin to turn. Do not let us be deterred by the fear of shortage of houses. Use billeting wherever necessary to the full; take the land for houses, if you need it—I say if you need it—as readily as you would have taken it for a gun site in 1940–41. Do whatever is needful and humanly possible to bring the men home and get things started again.

I would not go so far in urging the Government to these extreme efforts—I know their difficulties—if I were not prepared myself to run the risk of trying to make a positive contribution to our problems. There is some risk in a Member of the Opposition making a positive proposal, or set of proposals. I have no longer the power to "press the button" and obtain the exact information on any point. Still I have a general knowledge of our national life problem as a whole, particularly on its military side. For what it is worth, however, I am prepared, in good will and in good faith, to offer some definite suggestions to His Majesty's Government. We are told that the return of the troops and the members of the other Services is delayed or regulated by three conditions—first, our commitments—such is the term that is used—that is the military necessities; second, transportation; and third, the execution of the Bevin Coalition Government demobilisation plan.

I will deal with these three. First of all, commitments. This is a most dangerous ground for anyone not possessed of the latest information to venture upon. Nevertheless, I shall try my best, and, if the estimates which I make are shown to be erroneous, I shall be very ready to be convinced by the responsible statements of Ministers. I am going to submit

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to the House what I think should be the strength of the United Kingdom Armed Forces, which we should aim to reach with all possible speed. A year later these strengths could be reconsidered in closer relation to our long-term plan. I take the Navy first. On existing plans, allowing for intake, on 31st December of this year, the strength of the Navy would be 665,000, of whom 55,000 are women, so that the Navy would even retain 448,000 at the end of June, 1946. I am astounded that such figures should be accepted by His Majesty's Government. I know no reason why Vote A of the Navy should exceed the figure at which it stood in the Estimates of 1939,namely, 133,000. We had a fine Navy at the outbreak of war. I was sent to the Admiralty, at a few hours' notice on 3rd September, 1939, and that is what I found, relatively, to the Forces of other countries against whom we were at that time matched, or likely to be matched. I have yet to hear any argument which justifies our planning to maintain, or maintaining, at the present time—unlessit be in connection with the Fleet Air Arm—a larger naval force in personnel than we had at the beginning of the late war.

I remember that at the height of the Nelson period, in the war against Napoleon, we reached a Vote A of 148,000, and that, oddly enough, was the figure that I was responsible for reaching in August, 1914. Let us take, as a working figure,150,000. If there is some entirely new case to be unfolded because of new commitments, which I have not heard of, the Government should lay that case before the House. On the whole, although I think we should not be too precipitate in judging these matters, it would seem that new conditions might, at any rate in respect of very large vessels, tell the other way. But, failing some entirely new situation, of which only the Government can be aware, definite orders should be given to discharge all men surplus to the 150,000, and to make sure that the enormously swollen shore establishments are reduced equally with those afloat. I hazard the guess that at this time, there are nearly as many men of the Navy ashore as afloat. I should have thought that no great length of time would be needed for this operation, provided orders were given now, and enforced with real authority. At the same

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time, while this operation is going on, every opportunity should be given to men, entitled to release, to stay on if they volunteer. If there were so many volunteers that the number was exceeded, I think we should face that.

Here I will make a digression. It seems most urgent, and, indeed, vital, that the Government should put forward their proposals, in outline at any rate, for the permanent scale at which all three of our Armed Services are to be maintained, let us say, in the next 10 years. Men and women in all the three Forces ought to know, now, the conditions under which they can continue in the Services, or can transfer from "hostilities only" to longer or full-time engagements. I am inclined to agree with a remark which I saw attributed to the Minister of Labour and National Service the other day, to the effect that there is not the same universal general desire to leave the Services now, which was encountered after the first great war.