- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London in a debate on demobilisation, dated October 22, 1945, criticising the Bevin scheme's rigidity and urging that surplus troops be released and delayed men compensated.
- Main themes
- Bevin demobilisation plan, release of surplus troops at home, 400,000 excess men in the former 21st Army Group, return of Canadian naval personnel from the Pacific, shipping and rolling stock arrangements, request for official depot figures, lessons from the Addison scheme of 1919, compensation for men kept beyond their priority, double pay for delayed release, economic and industrial recovery
- Duration
- ~11 min
- Words
- 1,266
- Sentences
- 55
- Readability
- 65
- Grade
- 10.1
- Syntax
- 3.05
- Vocabulary
- 1.95
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other55 sentences in 13 paragraphs
That shows that we are not in dispute in the matter, but we have not heard about it. The right hon. Gentleman may indeed "do good by
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stealth," but he must not be vexed when he "blushes to find it fame." Are these men now being transported across Canada by the same rolling stock which is being used to take in the opposite direction the Canadian troops who have arrived in Halifax from Europe? These Navy men from the Pacific could then embark for home in ships which carry home to Canada, Canadian troops. Has that been arranged? These 6,000 naval ratings per month could then be brought home earlier than under the plan, even under the present rules. This would entail the release of a much larger corresponding number of the same age and service groups who are kept waiting for their release, and an appreciable acceleration would be brought about. These are points which I give only as instances. No doubt there are many others which should be studied with attention by His Majesty's Government. If they are already approved, it would give us great pleasure to hear that fact and credit the administration with it in the later stages of the Debate. We should be glad also of further information of the mass movement by air from remote areas, which seems to be of the greatest value and importance-.
But, after all, the great bulk of the troops and air ground personnel are over here at home, or only across the Channel in Europe. Sea transport does not enter into their return to any great extent. Ships of all kinds—well we know it—can carry troops either way across the Channel. No ships at all are needed for those who are now in this country. In the Debate on the Address I asked for the numbers of men in the various depots. They have not been given. There is no reason why they should not be given. They ought to be given. We request that they should now be given. Until we have the official figures I cannot, of course, speak with up-to-date accuracy, but I do not expect the assumption on which I am basing my argument will be very far astray.
I believe there are at least 400,000 more men than are needed for any useful purpose in what used to be called the 21st Army Group in Germany and in the Low Countries. That is not including the British Army in Italy or Austria, with which I am not dealing at this moment. Is it not true that there are here at home over a million men, the great majority of whom are absolutely redundant? Is it
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not true that there are something like, or over, a million men here at home? We expect to know. All these men, so much needed in civil life, are being kept out of the national economic and industrial recovery, not because of any military commitments, nor for any want of transportation, but simply because their turn comes later than that of a far smaller number of men who cannot for a considerable time be brought home from the East and the Far East. This raises grave problems of which I am well aware, but we must ask: Is it sensible, is it necessary, and can it on that basis be defended?
This brings me to the third and last part of this argument. It is a part with which I am deeply familiar, namely, the Bevin demobilisation plan. No one, I think, except its author, has more right to speak about it than I, for I was Secretary of State for War and Air during the whole demobilisation period after the last war, and well I know the perils and difficulties which beset that process. I have left on record in my book "The After-math" the complexities and shocking misfortunes in which we were involved in those days by the Addison scheme of demobilisation, which was felt by the fighting troops and those who had been out longest to be most unfair, and which was sprung upon them in a manner which gave it the least chance of favourable acceptance. I have, therefore, always been a strong supporter of the Bevin scheme. One must always try to carry the confidence and sense of loyalty and fair play of the troops. It must, however, be stated and remembered that this scheme was based on the assumption that the Japanese war would continue on a great scale for at least 18 months after a German surrender, and perhaps longer, and that large new armies would have to be sent to the Far East, going away from home at the end of this long struggle in Europe, while the process of turning over to peace conditions was in full swing through the country and through a very large part of the Armed Forces.
That problem we have, thank God, been saved. It is not the situation with which we are now confronted. We have a different scene, and a different problem. We must do justice to the case as it stands and to the facts as they are. I am sure it was right to frame this Bevin
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scheme and to make it our foundation and the first floor of our demobilisation. Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that Army opinion as a whole, convinced of the fairness of the intentions of the late and present Governments towards them, will be prepared to accept further considerable modifications in that scheme. Tidiness is a virtue, symmetry is often a constituent of beauty, but it would be a mistake to insist pedantically upon a rigid application of the Bevin scheme in the changed circumstances of to-day.
Let us take an extreme example. If, for instance, 100 men have to be kept idle in England, because 10 men higher up on the list cannot yet be brought home from Hong Kong, or Rangoon, or Calcutta, and cannot yet be placed in a category which entitles them to be brought home from these places, everyone would admit that that would be pushing a good principle to absurdity I would rather address myself to the 10 men and, by substantial additions to their pay or bonus or leave on release, and by special care for their future employment or otherwise, make up to them any disappointments which they may feel, not because they are not returning as soon as possible but because others lower down on the list have got out before them.
I am sure—and I do not speak without thought or some knowledge—that if the whole position were explained to the Army, and if substantial compensation were forthcoming to those kept longer than their time, with a proper proportion of compassionate cases, the men would understand and would accept the position. After all, does a Briton say to himself, "I am unfortunate; I cannot get home but I can bear it, because I know that 10 or 20 other men are being made unfortunate too, on my account"? That seems to me a sour and morose form of comfort. Might not a man prefer substantial compensation for himself instead of misfortunes needlessly inflicted upon others which can do him no possible good? Supposing every man was given double pay for every day that he was kept beyond his proper priority, that would be a small cost to the State compared with the enormous waste of keeping hundreds and hundreds of thousands of men out of productive work.
