- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London in the Egypt treaty negotiations debate on May 24, 1946, warning against evacuating Egypt and seeking alternative bases, and urging the Government to keep the 1936 Treaty.
- Main themes
- 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, evacuation of Egypt, defence of the Suez Canal, Palestine as alternative base, Cyrenaica trusteeship and air bases, risk of Russian demands for Mediterranean bases, Egyptian refusal of re-entry in an emergency, flawed diplomatic procedure, lack of consultation with the Dominions, Wafd opposition and the Sudan question, role of the United Nations organisation
- Duration
- ~22 min
- Words
- 2,668
- Sentences
- 122
- Readability
- 56
- Grade
- 11.0
- Syntax
- 3.20
- Vocabulary
- 2.14
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other122 sentences in 34 paragraphs
I am not criticising the hon. and gallant Gentleman in any way. I only referred to him out of courtesy. I have not had the pleasure of hearing him speak previously. I am not saddling him with any responsibility for the Palestine
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question. I will give him complete acquittal on that. He may leave the dock without a stain upon his character. This alternative of Palestine, which the Government may be cherishing, in order to protect the Canal, is disastrous to us and unduly complicating to all the other policies they were hopefully pursuing.
I turn Westward. It is also said, and here again I rely upon nothing but what I read in the different public prints, that we may obtain the trusteeship of Cyrenaica, where powerful air bases can be established, so that another jumping-off ground may be established there. This also seems to me a dangerous and unwise alternative. First, we throw away our grand position of seeking nothing for ourselves except honour, nothing out of the late war, after all our prodigious exertions, except to see that our duty is done as best we can, and is thoroughly and consistently maintained. We become immediately an interested party, seeking new bases in lands which were not ours, and in which we had no treaty rights before the war began, and we shall be immediately represented—and I do not need to indicate some of the quarters from which we shall be immediately represented—as a greedy, grasping nation, playing at power politics and demanding territories formerly owned by others for the sake of our own designs upon Egypt. We may be quite sure that, if we seek to build a new strategic position in Cyrenaica, in relation to the Suez Canal and Isthmus, Russia will renew or reinforce her demand for bases in the Eastern Mediterranean. Upon this argument, we should enter under every disadvantage, and I do not believe that we should succeed in gaining our desires without paying an inordinate price. Therefore, I say that, both to the East and to the West of the Canal, these alternatives for jumping off grounds would involve us in endless difficulty and vexation, that we shall come down from our high position as a Power not seeking any advantage from the war, that we shall encourage or condone all the appetites of other countries, and pay very dearly for any accommodation that we might obtain.
I go further and submit to the Committee, in extension of this argument, that, whether we establish our jumping-off grounds in Palestine or Cyrenaica, or both, and whatever price we pay for them, they will not be of any effective
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use in time of emergency for the purpose of defending the Canal or the Isthmus of Suez and keeping them open. Let us try to foresee what will happen if tension grows at any time in future and an emergency arises. My right hon. Friend very fittingly referred to this matter this morning. We shall then be in dispute with some other Great Power. That makes the emergency, and the moment will come when the military advisers will say, " We ought to reoccupy the military installations, camps and airfields in the Canal zone. We ought immediately to move in from our bases to the East or to the West of Egypt." What might be the behaviour of the Egyptian Government at such a juncture? We all know of the great sympathy there is when a small country is in so terrible a situation as that. No doubt we shall be told that there would be a treaty of alliance, but I cannot feel that, under such dire pressures, it would be of any avail. The Great Power with whom we shall be in dispute would, of course, say to the Egyptian Government: " We should regard any movement into the Canal zone of British Forces as an unfriendly act." Can anyone suppose that the Egyptian Government, confronted with this situation and not desiring anyhow to have British troops or Air Forces in the Canal zone, will not refuse permission for us to re-enter? And what then? They will say, " We do not agree that a state of emergency has arisen. We do not agree that a state of international emergency "—to quote the words of the Treaty of Alliance—" has arisen, and we deny your right to decide upon the fact contrary to us."
Meanwhile, the days will be slipping very quickly by. If such an attitude were adopted and there were no British personnel in the Canal zone, the Egyptians, or any ill-disposed persons, would be able to put out of action all the installations, radar equipment, airfields and so on, long before we could get there and the mere threat that they would do so, and had perhaps prepared the necessary measures to do so, would render our attempt to enter futile even before it was made. Can one imagine the British Government in such a situation, when the dread issue of peace or war in a renewed world struggle may be hanging in the balance, forcing the issue,, whether Egypt agreed or not? My right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick
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and Leamington reminded us of the difficulties of staff conversations. I have seen two great wars break out, and I know what a difficulty it was in the first, even to obtain the mobilisation of the British Fleet, which, in fact, I had to order in 1914 without the consent of the Cabinet, and only upon the personal assent of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. This is not a question of the mobilisation of our own forces; it is a positive act, an act which will be widely regarded and denounced as an act of aggression, as an act destroying the last hopes of peace. There are always hopes of peace which it is a terrible thing to trample on. and extinguish. Therefore, I say, we shall purchase our jumping off grounds, either in Palestine or Cyrenaica, or both, only at the greatest detriment to our political position and policy among the nations. And when we have lavished our money upon them, they will prove useless in the hour of need.
The United Nations organisation might well be called upon to prohibit the incursion of the British into Egypt. This would certainly be the case if the Egyptian Government stated that, in their view, the emergency did not warrant the action. Therefore, both alternatives, costly as they will be, will be utterly futile. Now it appears that the Egyptian Government already say:
There must be no return until Egypt declares war.
That is what I read only yesterday in the newspapers from Cairo. We have yet to learn what answer His Majesty's Government will make to this. The other night the Prime Minister said:
We can only carry out our obligations if we have been put in a position by the Egyptian Government to bring our Forces into action in the area without loss of time in an emergency
I intervened to say: "Before fighting begins."
The Prime Minister answered: "Yes, certainly."That is a very solid, serious, resolute statement and the Prime Minister further said:
If the whole matter breaks down, there is still, of course, the 1936 Treaty." [OFFICIAL REPORT, Tuesday, 7th May, 1946; Vol. 422, cc. 859, 860.]
The more I think of these alternative devices, the more I feel that the surest resting place at this time would be the 1936
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Treaty and that we should rest there for the next five or six years in the hope that U.N.O., meanwhile, will grow up, and gather a great world army which will put so many of these strategic dangers, nightmares and calculations back into the limbo of the vanished past. So much for the military aspect; I hope it may be carefully considered by the Committee.
I now come to the diplomatic procedure. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary has been working night and day in Paris. The position which has been adopted by the Government is that, first, they will evacuate Egypt, and, secondly, they will defend the Canal. This is a complete and total contradiction in terms. Then we are told that, in order to start on the negotiations in good will, we had, "reluctantly,"To say—that was the Lord President's remark—we will evacuate Egypt and that the second stage will be to examine how the Canal and Isthmus can be defended without British troops, and if it is clearly proved that anyone can see that anything of this kind is possible, the negotiations will break down and we shall revert to the Treaty of 1936.
I cannot imagine a more lamentable and, indeed, disingenuous procedure. We promise something as a prelude to the negotiations in order to give them a good start, but, in fact, we concede the whole point at issue, subject to conditions which cannot be obtained and, then, a little later on as the discussions proceed, we shall either have to accept some pure sham, or the negotiations will break down. Then, indeed, we shall be reproached with having excited hopes which could never be realised and with having endeavoured to procure Egypt's good will at the onset, when all along we knew we could not possibly give them what we had promised. That is not the way to deal with any people, least of all is it the way to deal with an Oriental people. I do not believe in tantalising diplomacy, holding out hopes which fall because of the inherent difficulties in the path of the negotiators.
The course which the Government have been pursuing seems to me to be marked with the utmost unwisdom. A perfectly sensible and straightforward course was open. The Government of Egypt had the right to raise the question of the revision of the Treaty at the 10th year.
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They have done so. His Majesty's Government could then have replied, " We will certainly discuss the matter with you, but you should first of all tell us exactly what it is that you propose and how the essential matters of the defence of the Canal and Isthmus of Suez are to be provided for."The Egyptian Government would next, in due course, have put forward their plan. We could then have said, " We will discuss this plan with the Dominions, and especially with those Dominions who have in two wars exerted themselves in your defence, and the graves of whose soldiers in scores of thousands lie in the desert." We ought to have approached this grave issue as-a united Commonwealth and Empire.
There is another important point which the late Foreign Secretary has mentioned. We ought to have made sure that the Egyptian Government speak for the other great parties in Egypt besides the Court party which is now in power. There are the Wafd who lately had a considerable majority. What has happened now? The Egyptian Government make their proposals, and if they were all accepted that would not settle our relations with Egypt. The Wafd opposition would simply go one better. As it is, they are already denouncing this offer of the evacuation of Egypt as wholly insufficient because the question of the Sudan has not been settled in a similar manner. We ought to have approached this matter with much fuller knowledge of what the Egyptians of the. leading parties would agree as a settlement, and we ought to have met in council beforehand with our Dominions and presented a united delegation to take part in the discussions. That would have been a reasonable and sensible procedure.
Let me, however, say this. Great departures of this character ought not to be influenced by threats of mob violence and by threats of attacks on British troops and installations. There have always been such threats. It is the responsibility of the Egyptian Government to keep the Treaty which we have signed with them, until another one is signed, and meanwhile to maintain order in their country. I have not the slightest doubt that they have full capacity to do so. The Government have taken an entirely wrong course while there was a perfectly right and proper course open to them, and further, if this wrong course is persisted in it will
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ruin our interests in the Middle East, destroy our communications with our possessions and fellow Dominions in the-Indian and Pacific Oceans, and will, in: the Foreign Secretary's own expressive-phrase, " Sever the lifeline "—" lifeline " was his word—"of the British Empire."
I am going to 'divide the time with the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary as agreed. I have a few minutes more. I have a word to say about the Dominions. In our brief Debates on the Adjournment Motion a fortnight ago, I said that the Dominions had not been consulted. I said they had been told. I asked the Prime Minister this question pointedly, and, when I shook my head at his reply, he rejoined, amid a roar of cheers, that I was not there. It appears, however, that I was right. The Prime Minister has withdrawn from the position which he took up. He has not only withdrawn but he has apologised—a manly and. I may also add, the only thing to do. We now know that instead of an agreement with the Dominions upon this policy of Egypt, and abandoning the defence of the Suez Canal, as I have declared, all that the Governments of the Dominions have agreed, is that we should shoulder the responsibility alone. Is it our responsibility alone? Have we any moral right to assume the entire burden of dealing with the fate of our communications through the Mediterranean, and of the defence of the Canal and the Isthmus of Suez?
It seems to me that this is a very dangerous right for us to claim, and a very onerous responsibility to assume. After all, in the 1914–1918 war and in this last war—especially and overwhelmingly in the last war—the defence of these large interests has been very largely entrusted to the Australians, New Zealanders and South Africans. Without their aid we could not have succeeded in protecting Egypt. It is a strange thing to call upon brave soldiers to travel thousands of miles across the ocean to fight for great strategic objectives, all well-defined and fully declared, and then to turn round immediately afterwards, and discredit altogether those strategic objectives—or apparently do so—for which so many-men, at our request and under our leadership, have come so far to give their lives. Apart from the interests of Britain, apart from the danger to Imperial communica-
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tions in the Eastern Mediterranean, I say a shock has been given to the British self-governing Commonwealth, and their confidence in the guidance 'and leadership of the Mother Country has been painfully and injuriously affected by the apparent casting away of those interests which we have hitherto declared to them were vital.
It always looks so easy to solve problems by taking the line of least resistance. Again and again in my life I have seen this course lead to the most unexpected result, and what looks like being the easy road turns out to be the hardest and most cruel. No nation is so remarkable as ours for the different moods through which it passes, moments of great abjection, moments of sublime triumph, heroism, fortitude and then exhaustion. What has been gained with enormous effort and sacrifice, prodigious and superb acts of valour, slips away almost unnoticed when the struggle is over. I earnestly hope that the Government—with whom I do not attempt to pick a quarrel, but to whom I am giving a serious warning on this matter at this moment—will realise that there is only one safe resting place for this country, and that is the firm maintenance of the Treaty of 1936.
