- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on July 21, 1949, in a foreign affairs debate, answering the Foreign Secretary on German dismantling, the Morgenthau Agreement and 'unconditional surrender'.
- Main themes
- Dismantling of German industry, 'unconditional surrender' phrase, Morgenthau Agreement, Berlin airlift, Anglo-American relations and the Atlantic Pact, German trials of generals, Germany's place among Western democracies, Foreign Secretary's criticism of Churchill, European Assembly at Strasbourg
- Duration
- ~10 min
- Words
- 1,211
- Sentences
- 46
- Readability
- 64
- Grade
- 10.7
- Syntax
- 3.02
- Vocabulary
- 1.91
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other46 sentences in 16 paragraphs
I do not wish to give way, if the hon. Gentleman will permit me to continue. I have been rather seriously criticised by the Foreign Secretary trying, as it were, to throw all the discredit for "unconditional surrender" upon me. If he did not mean that, he did not mean anything. He is doing that because he is vexed with what my right hon Friend, said, though I thought my right hon. Friend's statement was very mildly expressed. It cannot be said that the decisions to which the Foreign Secretary has come about the prolongation of dismantling are connected in any way with the use of the phrase "unconditional surrender" by President Roosevelt, so why bring it in and extend the Debate into other circles, and into matters of really very great gravity?
Another matter to which the Foreign Secretary referred, about which I do not by any means feel so confident in my conscience as to the judgment of my actions, is the Morgenthau Agreement at the second conference—the document published by Mr. Morgenthau of the conference. There is an agreement; it was initialed by President Roosevelt and by me, and it undoubtedly proposed treatment of Germany which was a harsh treatment, in respect of largely limiting her to being an agricultural country. But that was not a decision taken over the heads of the Cabinet. It was not one that ever reached the Cabinet. It never reached the Cabinet because it was only ad referendum; it was disapproved by the State Department on the one hand and by my right hon. Friend and the Foreign Office Committee on the other, and it just dropped on one side. I must say that it never required a Cabinet negative; it never had any validity of any sort or kind.
Nevertheless, I must say that I do not agree with this paper, for which I none the less bear a responsibility. I do not agree with it, but I can only say that when fighting for life in a fierce struggle with an enemy I feel quite differently towards him than when that enemy is
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beaten to the ground and is suing for mercy. Anyhow, if the document is ever brought up to me I shall certainly say, "I do not agree with that, and I am sorry that I put my initials to it." I cannot do more than that. Of course, many things happen with great rapidity, but to say it was done over the heads of the Cabinet, or anything like that, is quite untrue, and the Cabinet never agreed to it for a moment.
These two matters of great importance were brought in, in order to justify the right hon. Gentleman in pursuing the policy of dismantling, and some incidents connected with the trial of the German generals. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman need have brought such artillery back from the past to fire at me on such matters. I do not put the case with hostility against him. I consider that in the airlift and the treatment of the Berlin difficulty the Government and the Foreign Office—no one more than he—showed the very greatest determination, skill, good judgment, and tenacity, and their exertions over a long period were crowned by unmistakable success which has been of the greatest advantage to Europe, and very likely played a part in the closer drawing together of Britain and the United States, which has found its manifestation in the Atlantic Pact.
I was very much struck at the way in which all Germany watched the airlift, and how all Germany saw the British and American planes flying to carry food to 2½ million Germans whom the Soviet Government were trying to starve. I thought that was worth all the speeches that could have been made by all the peace leaders of Europe to turn the eyes of Germany to where her true destiny lies: namely, in peaceful and honourable association with the Western democracies and with the future into which they hope to lead the world under the auspices of the United Nations organisation. I indeed thought that was a very great advantage.
I must say that I personally was instinctively disappointed and chilled when I saw the dismantling policy, which has draggled and straggled on for four years, being a cause of upsetting this strong drift and tide of German sentiment which may be of very great value in the future. I could not help feeling that it was untoward. Of course, these things must in some cases be done. They should
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have been done, or could have been done, two years ago. That would have been all right.
But now, four years after, when Europe is in the midst of all this feeling of hardship and pressure, and of hopes of coming out of it again, to go on tearing down these buildings and solemnly proceeding with methodical routine on some agreement which now no longer has any validity or application to current affairs was, I thought, an error: not an error of major criminality, but a bad touch. I should have hoped that it would have been possible to have let that go. I should have thought it should have been brought to an end. I have said so several times in the last months, and I do not think it is a wrong thing for us to put that view.
Nor do I think that because I was present and supported President Roosevelt when he used the phrase "unconditional surrender" I am debarred from saying that at any time there should be a little give and take, and a different touch and handling in a sensitive manner of our relations with the German people. I am sure that the munitions which could be made by these factories which still remain to be dismantled would never do half the harm to the cause of peace, or to any future victory of the Allies against aggression, that is done by the great setting back and discouragement, out of all proportion, of the German movement towards Western civilisation and Western ideas. I will not put it at more than that.
As for the generals and so on, that, I think, should have been settled within a year or two of the end of the fighting; but to go on dragging these things out is simply feeding all the forces against peaceful solution and against passing the sponge across the past, with opportunities for making up and bad feeling. I do not make this a serious case of indictment against the right hon. Gentleman. In the main, we approve of his policy, but he really must not get so very upset and angry when certain notes are struck, even though when they are struck from this side, they awaken a very immediate echo on the benches behind him.
I have only one other thing to say, which I should not have referred to at
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all had I not felt it right to refer to the important topics which the right hon. Gentleman raised, and that is this question of our future meetings at Strasbourg. There will be a European Assembly at Strasbourg representing 10 nations.
