Sterling Exchange Rate

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

28 September 1949 · House of Commons debate on the devaluation of sterling · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on September 28, 1949, in the sterling exchange rate debate, attacking the Chancellor of the Exchequer's handling and timing of devaluation and defending his own 1925 Gold Standard record.
Main themes
Devaluation of the pound sterling, criticism of the Chancellor's lack of foresight, timing of the exchange rate change, Chancellor's reversal of earlier pledges, reduction in public expenditure, tax relief and production incentives, relaxation of controls on private enterprise, return to the Gold Standard in 1925, accusations of promoting unemployment, secrecy of currency changes and France
Duration
~10 min
37th percentile
Words
1,255
37th percentile
Sentences
61
40th percentile
Readability
54
75th percentile
Grade
10.8
29th percentile
Syntax
2.85
28th percentile
Vocabulary
2.26
63rd percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 50%49%
  • Institutional 30%30%
  • Ceremonial 15%15%
  • Social 5%5%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

61 sentences in 26 paragraphs

—a substantial relief in taxation——The Chancellor of the Exchequer does not say there should never be any reduction in expenditure. Hon. Members should ask him on what. He has the power to answer the question, and the duty to answer the question——I am as good a judge of my duty as the hon. Member is of his.

I say that a reduction in expenditure, a substantial relief in taxation applied to increase incentives to production and earnings, especially among the wage-earners liable to direct taxation, widespread relaxation of needless and vexatious controls and interferences with the flexibility of private enterprise, the definite lifting of the shadow of further nationalisation from our most active and prosperous industries and, above all, the return to power of a Government commanding national and international confidence—all these would have created and may still create conditions in which the liberation of the pound sterling would have a good chance of opening wide doors of prosperity into the future.

But by one means or another devaluation or liberation, if this step were inevitable, should have been taken as part of a general scheme of financial reform

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instead of being plunged into as an isolated act forced upon us at the last moment. Again and again the Chancellor was warned from this side of the House and by financial authorities outside that he was living in a fool's paradise. But all these warnings were in vain. I think he made some remark about "Dismal Desmonds." Was that his phrase or did one of his colleagues achieve this alliterative gem?

Therefore, whatever may be thought of the relative advantages or disadvantages of devaluing or liberating the pound sterling, the timing of the step was obviously wrong. A drastic alteration in the exchange rate, if proved necessary, should not have been left till the crisis broke upon us but should have been taken in anticipation of it. It is not easy to palliate the right hon. and learned Gentleman's blunder. We all know the abilities of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In his position he had more and better information on the subject at his disposal than anyone else in the world. He ought, surely, to have exercised foresight and decision in good time before our remaining gold reserves had been drained away and he was forced higgledy-piggledy into action which we know he loathed, under the worst possible circumstances.

I am sorry not to see the Lord President of the Council in his place because I wish to quote with great approval some remarks which he has made on this subject:

The real problem of statesmanship …

said the Lord President of the Council in June, 1946—

in the field of industry and economics is to see trouble coming and to prevent ourselves getting into the smash. We are determined that we are not going to be caught unawares by blind economic forces under this Administration.

But that is exactly what has happened to his colleague the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He could not possibly have described it in more precise or harmonious language. In fact, it has almost a prophetic aspect about it.

I come to another point. The question is much discussed in the country of the Chancellor's political honesty. Ordinary people find it difficult to understand how a Minister, with all his knowledge and

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reputation for integrity, should have felt it right to turn completely round, like a squirrel in its cage, abandon his former convictions and do what he repeatedly said he would never do, and moreover, enforce upon his party and his most faithful followers the humiliating tergiversation which we have witnessed.

I am surprised, I must say, that the Chancellor's own self-respect did not make him feel that, however honest and necessary was his change of view, his was not the hand that should carry forward the opposite policy. Certainly he stands woefully weakened in reputation, first by his lack of foresight, and secondly, by having had completely to reverse the reasoned convictions with which he made us familiar. Of course, we know that changes in currency cannot be announced beforehand. The secret had to be kept. It was certainly very well kept, perhaps too well kept considering the position of some of our friendly countries like France. But we congratulate the Chancellor—and he will agree with this—and the Foreign Secretary on the high art which they displayed in the necessary process of deception. The histrionic quality of their performance was indeed remarkable.

But I am not speaking of the last month but of the position three and four months ago. I have been shown nine quotations from the Chancellor's speeches declaring himself the inveterate opponent of devaluation. It is very important that our Chancellor of the Exchequer should have foresight. It is also desirable that he should have consistency, as far as possible. It is important that Parliament and the country should believe that when he speaks at that Box opposite he means what he says. Otherwise, how can people attach the weight to his declarations and pledges without which a Chancellor of the Exchequer is grievously crippled? How he of all men could adopt the policy, "What I tell you nine times is untrue," is most astonishing.

Although his personal honour and private character are in no wise to be impugned, it will be impossible in the future for anyone to believe or accept with confidence any statements which he may make as Chancellor of the Exchequer from that Box. He stands convicted of lamentable lack of foresight. His usefulness, for all his abilities in the great office

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he holds, has been definitely impaired, and I find it most difficult to believe that he would have been content to stay in office if he had thought the ordeal was likely to be a long one.

It is odd that the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his present weak and vulnerable position should feel entitled to judge his predecessors with so much severity and to impute wrong and unworthy motives to them. The right hon. and learned Gentleman referred yesterday to my action in returning to the Gold Standard a quarter of a century ago. He said that his policy today was a substitution for the alternative policy of severe deflation.

That policy"—

I quote his words from HANSARD—

was pursued at one time under the aegis of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and depended for its efficacy upon a massive extension of unemployment, with the accompanying lowering of wage rates and so the impoverishment of the employed and unemployed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th September, 1949; Vol. 468, c. 25.]

There were loud cheers from hon. Gentlemen opposite.

This was a very aggressive and I may even say offensive reference to past history. To suggest that people would like to see other people unemployed is I think deserving— I will pick my epithets with care, and I have a large collection of them—is I think deserving of the word "offensive." I think that the whole passage in which he referred to me is singularly out of keeping with the governess and sermon-like passages of some other parts of his discourse. I must say that I am obliged to him for making his accusations here, where they can be answered, instead of circulating them, as is no doubt being done far and wide at this present moment by his party propaganda machine.

The House must pardon me if I make a short digression—