Foreign Affairs (Middle East)

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

30 July 1951 · House of Commons debate on Foreign Affairs · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons in London on July 30, 1951, criticised the Government's Middle East policy and its handling of Egyptian sterling balances, urging joint action with the United States.
Main themes
Decline of British influence in the Middle East, Anglo-American cooperation, Persian oil dispute, Egypt and war-time sterling balances, Palestine policy failures, Korea compared with Persia and Egypt, Turkey and the Atlantic Pact flank, Soviet expansion and Communism, rearmament costs, transfer of H.M.S. Cottesmore to Egypt
Duration
~18 min
61st percentile
Words
2,157
61st percentile
Sentences
77
50th percentile
Readability
48
56th percentile
Grade
13.7
64th percentile
Syntax
3.26
78th percentile
Vocabulary
2.23
56th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 47%45%
  • Economic 31%30%
  • Ceremonial 12%12%
  • Institutional 8%8%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

77 sentences in 33 paragraphs

(Woodford)

When the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary asked me to forgo the opportunity of opening this debate, I was encouraged to hope that he would have something to tell us. I thought that he would be able to cast a light on some of these anxious and serious problems which in more than one quarter press upon our minds this afternoon. Instead, he has treated us to an able and agreeable parade of bland truisms and platitudes which I fear must, in these busy times, have caused him many long hours of toil and study. I, also, shall indulge in a somewhat general survey, though I shall not go back so far as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which, after all, took place at the end of the First and not of the Second World War.

The decline of our influence and power throughout the Middle East is due to several causes. First, the loss of our Oriental Empire and of the well-placed and formidable resources of the Imperial armies in India. Second, it is due to the impression which has become widespread throughout the Middle East that Great Britain has only to be pressed sufficiently by one method or another to abandon her rights and interests in that, or indeed any other, part of the world. A third cause is the mistakes and miscalculations in policy which led to the winding-up of our affairs in Palestine in such a way as to earn almost in equal

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degree the hatred of the Arabs and the Jews.

I was struck by the fact that the right hon. Gentleman should have confessed mistakes which have been made in this matter. One failure, he said, we admit. It has long been evident how disastrous was the course we followed there, and all these put together, the loss of our power in the world, and in that part of the world, the diminution of our resources, the mistakes which we have made, and the feeling that we are incapable of putting up an effective resistance—most unjust assumptions I would certainly say—all these have brought us to the melancholy and anxious position in which we stand this afternoon.

The position is not necessarily irretrievable in its long-term aspects, but we certainly cannot restore it by ourselves alone. It can only be retrieved at a lower level in any case than before the Second World War, and it can only be retrieved, in my opinion, by the joint co-operative action of Britain and the United States, and, in the Mediterranean sphere, of France. And Turkey, I entirely agree with that.

It is for this reason that I have been most anxious to encourage the United States Navy to take a leading part in the Mediterranean and that I welcome so strongly the support which they have given both to Greece and Turkey, and the keen attention they are at length—I might almost say at last—giving to Persian and Iraqi affairs.

The oil supplies from this part of the world have a value far above their commercial or financial importance, great though this be. The strategic aspect of the destination of the oil supplies and the immediate future of the Middle East countries is of immense importance, not only to Britain, but to the United States. It plays a part in their whole plan of creating ever-increasing deterrents, direct or indirect, to the spread of Communism, and thus to preserving the peace of the world by reaching conditions on which a lasting and friendly settlement may be made with Soviet Russia on the basis not of weakness and divided policy, but of strength, unity and well-conceived measures.

We may, indeed, truly say that the events which are taking place in Egypt and Persia play an integral and, possibly,

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vital part in the whole purpose of the vast alliance, under the supreme authority of the United Nations organisation, to which we have all bound ourselves. The consequences of this alliance present themselves now to us in this country in a manner which dominates our domestic life, with our immense expenditure on re-armament and the reactions which that entails on the standards of life of all classes throughout Great Britain. The issues at stake in the Middle East are of capital importance to us at home and abroad and to all our Allies.

Since the war stopped, I have always been anxious that the United States should become more interested in what is taking place in Persia and in Egypt. We admire and support the sacrifice and exertions they have made to resist aggression in Korea. Mortal injury would have fallen upon us all, upon the free democratic world, if we had been unable to serve, or unwilling to serve, the United Nations organisation in resisting armed aggression at any point.

But in a material and geographical sense, Korea, after all, is a promontory jutting out into salt water, ruled by American sea-power under an air canopy controlled by, in the main, American air forces. It is not a place from which things can spread in a physical way against the main interests of the United Nations. The moral and strategic importance of Persia and Egypt, on the other hand, and the relation of those countries to the Atlantic Pact system profoundly affect American interests and the success of their world policy in which Great Britain and the Dominions of the Commonwealth are all joined.

If, for instance, the Persian situation arising out of the oil dispute and the wrongful treatment meted out to us by Persia, with the consequent prolonged paralysis of the Persian oilfields, were to lead to the regions from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf being included in the satellite countries which are Kremlin-controlled today, the consequences would be far more deadly, not only to us, but to the United States than anything that could have arisen in Korea.

Therefore I have done, speaking as an individual, whatever was in my power —such as it is—to impress upon leading

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American statesmen and citizens whom I have met and with whom I am in contact that their main interests are engaged in the Middle East at least as much as they are in any other part of the world outside their own country.

General Eisenhower's sphere of responsibility is also deeply affected by what happens in Persia and Iraq. Turkey is the right flank of any front that can be formed in the Europe against Soviet aggression—should that occur, which I do not pre-judge—and the position of Turkey would be greatly endangered if the Soviet control covered all the regions immediately south of the Caspian Sea. The European situation is, therefore, directly involved in what takes place in Persia and Iraq.

In surveying the general scene in the Middle East our relations with Egypt, to which the right hon. Gentleman devoted some of the closing passages in his speech, are of the first importance. During the war we preserved Egypt from the injury and pillage of Nazi-Fascist subjugation. I shall not speak of our loss of life, for that cannot be computed in material terms, but we spent vast sums of money in Egypt maintaining a local war-time prosperity there beyond that which any other country was enjoying in the whole world. Unhappily, that prosperity was shared almost exclusively by the rich and well-to-do classes while the peasantry seemed to remain in very much the condition in which I saw them when I first went to Egypt as a young officer, towards the end of the last century.

This point of view was confirmed and, indeed, emphasised by the Foreign Secretary in his speech. These rich, well-to-do, classes who got so much control in Egypt are the very ones who are trying to keep a popularity with the masses of the people by ungratefully assailing us today. It was calculated at the end of the war that we owed more than £400 million to Egypt. Most of it was for the local services and supplies we had purchased to maintain the armies which protected them.

These are the notorious war-time sterling balances—I said war-time sterling balances, because more complicated forms of sterling balances have come into existence at later dates, but I am speaking of the war-time sterling balances—in

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other words, presented to us as British debts. The War Cabinet of the National Government had always reserved the right to present counter-claims against these debts for the services we rendered in saving Egypt from the horrors of war and conquest.

When, some weeks ago, I was referring to our immense volume of unrequited exports under the heading of sterling balances, the Chancellor of the Exchequer used extravagant language condemning anyone who could so violate, or talk of violating, contractual obligations as to refuse to pay or put in a counter-claim against these war-time debts. But his predecessor, the Minister of Local Government and Planning, used very different language, which I shall venture to quote to the House. This is what he said—it is a lengthy quotation, but I think hon. Members ought to have it in their minds as it was spoken by so high an authority at the beginning of the Socialist reign:

That vast accumulation of debt represents an unreal, unjust and unsupportable burden. If Lend-Lease and mutual aid had been applied among all the members of the Grand Alliance as they were applied between the United States and the British Commonwealth, by far the greater part of these debts would never have been charged up against us. Sooner or later—and it would he better sooner than later—this mass must be very substantially scaled down. Britain is strong, but one side of her strength must he refusal to take on fantastic commitments, which are beyond her strength and beyond all limits of good sense and fair play. Nor could I, as the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, support financial arrangements which would mean that for years and generations to come this little island, which led the fight for freedom, would, through this peculiar war-time accountancy, carry a crushing load which even the defeated enemies of freedom—Germans, Japanese and the rest —would escape.

Pretty good stuff, that. The Chancellor is not here—no doubt he has some other preoccupations—but I trust that this quotation may be brought to his attention by some of his colleagues on the Front Bench. It is of special importance because the Prime Minister—who, I understand, is to wind up the debate tonight—was asked on 12th May, 1947, whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech represented the views of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman replied, with his usual laconic precision, "Yes, Sir." Surely the Chancellor of the Exchequer should moderate

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his denunciations of a policy which his predecessor declared in such illuminating terms and which his chief endorsed without a qualification of any kind.

I hold that we should have presented counter-claims and such a policy would have been supported by the United States. At the same time as we were being so strict, pedantic, meticulous, and punctilious in paying Egypt, we were borrowing or accepting from the United States far larger sums of money which I doubt if we shall ever be able to pay back. It must be an odd state of mind in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer can go on begging and borrowing from one country in order to pride himself and preen himself and plume himself in cutting such a fine example of financial probity, dignity and decorum with another.

It is said that one should be just before one is generous. In this case we ask the Americans to be generous in order that we might be just to the Egyptians and indeed, as I hold, unjust to our own people. I say that because it was known at the time that the United States' object in lending to us, giving us these very large sums, by which the Government have maintained themselves so remarkably—which, as I think the right hon. Gentleman said, have prevented unemployment rising to levels of millions in this country—the United States' motive in doing this was in order that the British people should be able to rebuild their own strength and stand securely on their own feet.

However, the payments of sterling balances continue on a large scale, and only the other day—I believe it was the day when the "Empire Roach" was attacked; but that was a mere coincidence, a pure accident, I am not making any serious point out of it—almost on that day another agreement for heavy payments was announced to the House.

What form do these payments take? There is a destroyer of the Hunt class. H.M.S. "Cottesmore" was her name. She, I understand, has been traded to the Egyptian Government, and her name has now been changed to the Ibrahim el Awal.