Foreign Affairs (Middle East)

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

30 July 1951 · House of Commons debate on foreign affairs · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill, as Leader of the Opposition, addressed the House of Commons in London on July 30, 1951, in a foreign affairs debate, attacking the Government's handling of the Persian oil dispute and defining the Opposition's role on military action.
Main themes
Persian oil dispute, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 1949 Supplemental Agreement, fall of British prestige in the Middle East, Anglo-American coordination on Persia, role of the Opposition in military matters, criticism of the new Foreign Secretary, illness of Ernest Bevin and Foreign Office disarray, 50-50 profit sharing in Saudi Arabia, private consultations between Government and Opposition
Duration
~11 min
39th percentile
Words
1,342
39th percentile
Sentences
62
41st percentile
Readability
59
85th percentile
Grade
10.3
23rd percentile
Syntax
3.05
54th percentile
Vocabulary
2.08
22nd percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 48%45%
  • Institutional 21%19%
  • Ceremonial 17%16%
  • Economic 14%13%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

62 sentences in 25 paragraphs

I expect the Foreign Secretary can look after himself, but will, no doubt, express his thanks to the hon. Member for his chivalry in coming to his rescue.

If you had seen and heard the semi-hysteria of hack bench Tory M. Ps. in the last fortnight, if you have read the more excitable of the Conservative newspapers, then you will find it difficult not to come to the conclusion that, if they had had their way, we should have been involved in two wars in the last 10 days.

I say that was a falsehood, all the more shameful because all the facts were known to the right hon. Gentleman. I could read more, but I have taken up enough time. I have been forced to take up the time of the House with it.

Let me press this point. Here is the new Foreign Secretary, who shows to all the world that his main thought in life is to be a caucus boss and a bitter party electioneer. It is tragic indeed that at this time his distorted, twisted and malevolent mind should be the one to which our foreign affairs are confided.

Now I turn to Persia. The right hon. Gentleman told us nothing new about Persia. The newspapers seem well informed, and I base myself on them. It is necessary for those on either side of the House to make their position clear. Judged by every standard, the conduct of

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the Persian Government has been outrageous, but this must not lead us to ignore what is fair and equitable in the Persian case. In February, 1948, Sir Stafford Cripps appealed for dividend restraint—we seem to go round that circle still—the Anglo-Iranian oil company was earning about 150 per cent. and paying 30 per cent. As payments by the company to Persia were in part proportional to the distributed profits, this had the effect of keeping down the amount received by the Persian Government, not on commercial merits but because of the domestic policy or the British Government. All this was put before the House in June by my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden). I must repeat what he said then:

As they"—

the Persian Government—

saw it, the company was earning 150 per cent. or thereabouts but they were still paying 30 per cent. His Majesty's Government were getting a good rake-off, not as a shareholder but from taxation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st June, 1951; c. 758, Vol. 489.]

It was quite clear from the moment this situation developed, and indeed before it, that new proposals must be made to the Persian Government. In 1949, negotiations between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian Government ended in a Supplemental Agreement, which was signed in 1949. Meanwhile, an agreement had been made in Saudi Arabia on a 50–50 basis by the American company which has been tactfully renamed "Iramco." Just watch that a little. It is as if we had changed the name of our company to "Persanglo." There is nothing like studying the customer.

The Supplemental Agreement of 1949—to quote the Foreign Secretary a few days ago—offered a more advantageous return for a ton of oil than was now enjoyed by any Middle Eastern Government.

Nevertheless the agreement was not ratified by the Persian Government for 18 months, and General Razmara, the Persian Prime Minister, who favoured it, was murdered on 17th March. The fall of British prestige in the Near and Middle East, particularly as a result of Anglo-Egyptian relations, must be considered as the main reason why this beneficial measure was not accepted, as it deserved to be. It is also a reflection on the British Government that they were not more

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active or more effective in pressing this matter from here., during the long interval of 18 months in 1950 and even before the end of 1949.

Then was the time to send a British Minister of the Crown to the spot. Then was the time to try to form with the United States a properly-conceived joint or harmoniously-co-ordinated policy; but the Foreign Office had fallen into the disarray to which I have referred, and which I believe was caused by the illness of Mr. Bevin. It had not the acumen, at any rate, or the ability to enable the Department to benefit from the accumulated experience of the old Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, whose personnel they had absorbed.

As usual, no foresight was shown and nothing constructive or effective was done. It may be said, "How easy to be wise after the event," but surely it is the business of the British Government to be wise before the event. In this case, the facts were obvious. The loss of India as a factor in these regions had effects plainly visible, not only on our prestige but on our power, which could only, and can only, be compensated by a closer association of British policy in Persia with that of the United States.

The issue was of such great importance as to be well worth a visit by the Prime Minister to the United States at a time when the two countries were acting so closely together in matters like the Atlantic Pact and its development. This matter might well have been incidental to the important topics discussed; but, as we know, an interval of five years passed between his visit after taking office in 1945 and the hastily-resolved mission on which he went eight months ago.

The truth is that the Government are so unequal to the enormous and complicated task, and so oppressed by their own political preoccupations, that they only live from hand to mouth and week to week, and seem to derive no benefit from the invaluable resources of special information and the opportunities of guiding and shaping events which, as an Executive, they enjoy.

I have before pointed out to the House the different characters of the responsibility borne by the Executive Government and the Parliamentary Opposition. This presents itself in the sharpest form where

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military operations are in question. It is not the duty of the Opposition to suggest or demand specific military operations. They do not know what are the forces available, nor what course of action the Government are pursuing. It has well been said—I think, by Lord Lansdowne, although I have not been able to verify this—that an Opposition may properly urge restraint upon a Government where military action is concerned, but ought to be very chary in demanding military action. That is the course which I have followed.

I say that if military action were to be taken, it would usually be unwise for the Executive Government themselves to describe it or to discuss it beforehand. For that reason, I and my colleagues thought that some private interchanges would be useful, and might help the Government and the general policy of the country, by avoiding undue Parliamentary interrogation and debate which otherwise was inevitable on a matter about which we would feel very strongly and which rouses so much justifiable anxiety.

I may say here that there has been no question of any agreement between the representatives of the Opposition and those of His Majesty's Government at these private discussions. We have expressed our opinion. We have offered some suggestions. We have endeavoured to make the Government feel that a policy of firmness, exercised with prudence, would in this matter, as in other matters, be treated in a non-party spirit. On the other hand, there is one point, which I shall come to later, which we have made absolutely clear.

Our general attitude on this side of the House is not the same as that of the Prime Minister when he led his party into the Lobby against National Service less than four months before the late war. Then he was only asked to give the support of his party to measures which no one knew better than he were necessary and, indeed, overdue.