- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 21, 1934, in a debate on Imperial Defence, urging the Government to declare a Ministry of Defence as its goal and to coordinate the three Services in the interim.
- Main themes
- Proposed Ministry of Defence, coordination of the three fighting services, science and invention in defence, pooling of research and intelligence, unified supply and war contracts, Weir Committee recommendations, Imperial Defence College and staff training, Chiefs of Staff as Privy Councillors, divergent service threat assessments, German Waffenamt and rearmament
- Duration
- ~36 min
- Words
- 4,366
- Sentences
- 158
- Readability
- 50
- Grade
- 13.5
- Syntax
- 3.16
- Vocabulary
- 2.03
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other158 sentences in 41 paragraphs
This is not a controversial occasion, and, speaking for myself, I shall certainly not endeavour to make it so. I agree very largely I think with the gracious speech which was delivered by the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition, and I should not be prepared to challenge in detail a great many
1242
of the statements made by the Prime Minister. As far as I am able to understand the general tone of the position he has explained this afternoon, he is, leaving out the matters to which he referred in his closing passages, very generally satisfied with the present system. He likes its elasticity. He spoke of it being flexible from day to day. I agree that there is a good deal of flexibility in our system which is very valuable from day to day, but we have to be careful, not only in the military sphere, but also in the political, to prevent this flexibility and elasticity degenerating into a kind of opportunism. What we require is to have aim and theme and structure and design more prominent in the immediate forefront of our discussions and of our policy. The right hon. Gentleman stated a great many of the methods by which business in the sphere of defence is at present transacted, and stated them very fully and agreeably, but it would be a great mistake to assume that all is perfect and everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, that there is nothing to be done to improve it at the present time, that no new structural change, no new surge of impulse is required in the reorganisation and development of our defences.
I shall try to make a very few practical comments this afternoon, which I hope will be accepted in the spirit in which they are made, which is one of helpful—may I use one little word that is very popular to-day—of helpful co-operation. It seems to me that there is a very general agreement in the House that a Ministry of Defence should be our ultimate aim. In no other way can the best arrangement be made for economy and efficiency. There are particularisms and what my hon. Friend the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition described as the vested interests—the innocent and respectable vested interests—of the various Services, and they cause much confusion. It would be a great mistake to suppose that this is not causing much waste and confusion. Your history books are full of the discussions between the Army and Navy which have led to the loss of so many fine opportunities in the past. We are assured by the Prime Minister that everything is brought into complete harmony from a central point of view at
1243
every moment, but when you come to look below the surface of this assurance one sees many things which do not square with this hopeful and desirable assumption.
At the present time each of the three Services is preparing itself—I will not say to face a different enemy, because we must not use that wicked word, and of course there can be no potential enemies after the various conferences in which my right hon. Friend has been engaged, but there are what are called potential aggressors. I believe I shall be quite correct in using that term and not shock any of my friends, even among those who sit around me here. But the curious fact is that each of the three Services to-day is preparing itself to defend the British Empire against a different aggressor. The Navy is naturally preoccupied, apart from the paramount duty of bringing in our food, with the Pacific Ocean, and the need to maintain some contact with Australia and New Zealand, who came to our aid in the Great War and to whom we are bound by sacred ties. It must be always concerned about some great naval Power, excluding the United States of America, which possesses a powerful cruiser fleet available in the Pacific Ocean.
Then the Army has a different objective. The Army, of course, no longer exists as any appreciable factor in European war until after the lapse of two or three years of national effort. It is no more than a glorified police force at the present time and discharges its job of home defence and security. But so far as the Army has any objective it must necessarily and naturally be the defence of the North-West frontier of India against some of the barbarous tribes which I believe lie beyond the Himalayan mountains. Then there is the Air Force, which is now the vital matter in most people's minds and the matter causing most concern. It feels it must measure itself against the nearest and most probable antagonist.
I think I have been successful in describing these potential aggressors without introducing any names, which I am sure everybody would deprecate, and of course all these Services are bound to consider these matters, not with any idea, that we shall be involved in a war or
1244
any intention of being involved in a war, but because it is the common practice in every country to consider eventualities, and the duty of the technical advisers to make the study. The point I am venturing to make is that all these three Services are in effect basing their claims upon the Exchequer very largely upon potentially different dangers which may arise.
We can easily see what difficulties there will be in evolving any coherent scheme against what we will call the least improbable and the more urgent of our dangers. When there are these divergent outlooks, naturally divergent outlooks, there must be a great many cross purposes and a great deal of irrelevant matter. Our dangers change from time to time and one would like to feel sure that under the guidance of the Foreign Office and the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Prime Minister the three Services were focussed more immediately and thoroughly upon whatever danger seemed to be emphasised in the period or the decade—because I am not talking of day-to-day movements—through which we are passing. No doubt, as the Prime Minister has assured us, a great deal is being done, and I make no unfair criticism of our existing system, but undoubtedly a great deal more could be done if the three Services were fused more closely together with a stronger superior direction controlling their daily work and purpose.
One cannot help feeling that in the distribution of public money each Service naturally fights for its own hand. There is nothing like leather, said the cordwainer, and each Service naturally presses its own claims. In my experience, which is, I suppose, as long as anyone's, the Minister with most information and address and backed by the Department with the largest hold upon tradition and public good will gets the largest share, and a larger share I may say than would be secured if the case for the three Services were presented to the Cabinet as a whole, and not only as a whole but in relation to what is judged to be the chief danger of the times through which we are passing. That seems to me to be the first argument which can be adduced for a Ministry of Defence, that it would put us in a much better position for dealing with the changed conditions of high strategy and Imperial policy.
1245
But there is a second, and that is rather a novel one, new and increasing. All the three Services in modern times have a new common factor which they never had in anything like the same degree until the present century and indeed until after the recent Great War. I mean science and invention. Science and invention are sweeping all before them. As the Lord President of the Council said the other day—I speak from memory, and I do not wish to misquote him—we wake up every morning in dread of some new horrible possibility which science will open upon us, and make us the victims of. The same science applies to all three Services alike, and its application must play a large part in all your plans and outlook. Nothing like this was known in the nineteenth century, and in those days the segregation of the Services seemed comparatively simple. The Navy, to quote Lord Fisher, was a dismal mystery surrounded by sea-sickness and had nothing in common, except good conduct, with the barrack square and the red-coated Army of those days. The Air Force did not exist.
The new science has come along permeating all these Services—a solvent which disperses their differences. Science cares nothing for the professional particularisms or the established customs or the cherished traditions of any one of the Services. In the fires of science, burning with increasing heat every year, all the most dearly-loved conventions are being melted down; and this is a process which is going continually to increase. Therefore, it seems to me, and I submit it to the judgment of the House, that a new argument of measureless importance has come into the relations of the three Services in this compulsive influence of the ever-expanding knowledge of applied science. In view of the inventions and discoveries which are being made for us, one might almost say every month, a unified direction of the war efforts of the three Services would be highly beneficial. We should have a much greater chance of applying the gifts of science broadly to the whole texture of our defensive arrangements if there were a reception of all these new facts from a common elevated point of view, removed from the prejudice or the bias of the particular uniformed professions upon which we depend at the present time. That is a second argument for a Ministry of Defence.
1246
There is a third argument, which arises out of the other two, but which also affects the very important question of public economy—the expense, the burden upon this House and the taxpayer. There are many functions which are common to all three Services, but which are now managed as separate branches. There are separate medical services to succour the three separate Services of the Army, the Air and the Navy. There are separate Departments of chaplains to minister to the spiritual needs of the airman, the soldier or the sailor. Research—an enormous, vital field—has not been pooled; there must, surely, be great overlapping there. Above all, Intelligence has not been pooled, and this, I may point out, was recommended to a very considerable extent by the Weir Committee, appointed in his first premiership by my right hon. Friend the Lord President, who reported in his second premiership, and whose recommendations were accepted by the Cabinet of that day. They strongly urged a movement towards the pooling of the various, almost numerous, Intelligence branches which, are at work at the present time in the body of our State. But nothing has been done about it. The Committee was appointed in 1923; it reported in 1926; we are now here in 1934, and nothing has been done about it. It was a very good Committee, a very moderate Committee. You could not have two more capable minds applied to these topics than those of the late Lord Melchett and Lord Weir. They were very moderate. They pressed this, but nothing has been done about it in the interval.
Lastly, there is the great field of contracts. I apologise to the House for dealing with these matters, but really I think we have to try to come to some grips with these points. There is the great field of contracts, and here something has been done. I would go further, and admit that much has been done. The Contracts Committee, which the Prime Minister mentioned, is at work, and even before that committee was set up I have never felt that it was true that the different Departments of the State have been against each other to any large extent in time of peace in the common market so as to put prices up against one another. The Treasury took care of that. And our arrangements, as the Prime Minister has indicated, are often
1247
very much better in practice than they are in theory. But in the field of contracts there is a great deal that could be done, even in time of peace, and if ever we should be involved in a great war again, which God forfend, it would be most important that the entire business of the purchase and manufacture of munitions and supplies of all kinds, possibly with certain highly technical exceptions, should be taken over by a central administration and unified.
When the Great War broke out, our Navy was by far the largest in the world, and its great supply departments of all kinds lay behind it in the same proportion. The Army had to be multiplied twenty or thirty-fold, but this took some time, and it was many months before the War pressure led the Navy and the Army even to impinge upon the real resources of British industry. But by the middle of 1915 we began everywhere to feel the frontiers of the possibilities of supplies of every kind; the bones began to appear through the skin; and thereafter, from that time onwards, there were lamentable collision and dispute and friction between the Admiralty and the other two Services represented by the Ministry of Munitions. In the end, the Ministry of Munitions made everything for the Air Ministry and for the Army, but they had to fight with the Admiralty, who remained a separate enclave, almost a foreign Power, as it seemed, in the heart and centre of our State. I hope that arrangements will be made in the future to ensure that nothing like that occurs again, for I have no doubt, from the experience which I have had—and I had opportunities of seeing a good deal—that the public did not get the best service or the best use of the available material during the opening years of the War, owing largely to the particularistic clash which took place between the Admiralty and the other two Departments.
In this matter of organising industry, not only actually but prospectively, surely we might learn something from our German friends, who are building up an entirely new army and other fighting services, and who have the advantage of building them up from what is called a clean-swept table—what I believe the learned people would describe as tabula rasa—starting fair in this respect, unhampered by past conventions, un-
1248
hampered by customs or prejudices of any kind. That is a great advantage indeed. I have been told that they have created what is called a "weapon office," or—and here again I must quote a foreign term—Waffenamt, which makes for all the three arms of the services which they are so busily developing. It seems to me that this expression "weapon office" is pregnant, and that it might well enter into and be incorporated in our thought at the present time. Not only in the current supplies of the three Services in time of peace, but still more in the organisation of national industry in case war should come, it seems to me imperative that there should be one view and one control in this country.
I have outlined to the House three large spheres of organisation—strategic, scientific and supply—in which it seems that our arrangements would be markedly improved by the creation of a Ministry of Defence, and the House may think it odd that I do not proceed to urge that a Ministry of Defence should be set up at this moment, or even in the next few years. But I do not do so. I do not quarrel with His Majesty's Government for not coming down to us this afternoon with proposals of that character. The reasons which lead me to agree with them are these: A Ministry of Defence must be grown rather than built; and something that fell from the Prime Minister, if I interpreted it rightly, gave me the feeling that that was very much in his mind also. Suddenly to come forward at this juncture with a drastic and fundamental remodelling of the whole organisation of the three Fighting Services would be attended with so much friction at the present time, with men's minds shared between the different Services as they are at the present time, that it might well mean losing more than we should gain in actual preparedness against war danger or in the symmetry of our plans; and I should regret—I say so quite frankly—when the defences of all the three Services, however you look at them, are so much in arrear of our needs, to see a single Minister having to bear the whole burden of the struggle with the Treasury and with the Cabinet for the requirements of the country, while he had behind him three Services not yet fused or co-ordinated. I did think I was going to get through without using that
1249
word, but there it is. It is a most hard-worked word. When we think of all the unemployed members of our vocabulary, surely we might give that poor word a little ease. I apologise.
Imagine the position of this Minister, having to come forward and demand the entire costs of national defence, with three Services each filled with a bitter resentment against the many changes which would be imposed upon them in their methods of thought and their established practice and routine. Therefore, I advocate an evolutionary process. But let us proclaim the goal; that is what I ask of the Government. My right hon. Friend behind me seems to take exception to that word. I will say, let us proclaim the objective towards which our policy should move. There ought to be a purpose animating all the plans which are being made and all the administrative measures which are taken. The process of evolution should be consciously directed, and the aim should be to achieve eventually what will be needed by every condition of science and by every condition of the world—a unified Defence Service.
I have no doubt that a great deal is being done in that direction, but what is needed now is a clear declaration by the Government that that is the aim. And, besides such a declaration, we want a much stronger impulse to the fusion of the different branches. There is a great deal that can be done without delay. There is the unification of all those functions and branches which I have mentioned, but especially research, intelligence, and supply, and the mapping out and preparing of war industries. All that can be set on foot, and a great deal of it could be done now at the present time; there is not the slightest need to wait for any large Department. But what is going to take time, and what cannot be hurried, because you are dealing with the human factor, is the building up of a body of officers in the medium and higher ranks of the three Services, who will be weaned early from their particularisms, and taught to think of the problems of defence in their integrity and as a whole. Here we have made a definite start. After the War the Imperial Defence College, to which the Prime Minister referred, was set up at which officers of middle rank from the three Services, in touch with high
1250
officials of the Civil Service, studied combined problems together for as much as two years at a time.
I took a great interest in this organisation at its inception and now, after the lapse of 15 years, it should certainly be bearing fruit in the supply of the very ablest officers, to the heads of their professions who are well acquainted with the three Fighting Services as a whole and with common problems of defence. I think it should be made plain, not only by precept but by example, that one of the best paths to the highest positions in the three fighting professions in future will be through this college for officers who have gained this general knowledge of the three branches. Thus the ablest officers in all the three professions will for a long period of time be attracted to go through this very important course of training. There is not the slightest doubt that, if you wish to establish the staff system, you must give preference to officers who have been through that staff system. That the staff system has succeeded in the Army is because that has been done. That it has not succeeded fully in the Navy is because it has to a large extent not been done. If you wish to have as advisers for the Cabinets of the future officers who are acquainted with the three branches of the Service in common terms and can deal with them all more or less, who do not pretend to be ignorant of any one of them, you should continually make it clear that, apart from brilliant war service, the path to the highest ranks in these Departments is through this College of Imperial Defence. In fact, we have to do in the military field what the Government are always inculcating upon us in the political sphere. We have to find officers who are, so to speak, nationally minded, who have dropped their original party particularisms and can form broad views over the whole general field of our affairs. I trust that the comparatively modest success which has attended the Prime Minister's experiment in the political field will not in any way discourage him from carrying out this principle in a very vgorous manner in the wholly different military sphere.
But there is one more practical and more immediate step which should certainly be taken. In 1913, General Seely, now disguised as Lord Mottistone, and myself were in charge of the two Service Departments. We arranged what we then
1251
called the "high level bridge" between the Admiralty and the War Office and there, were frequent meetings between the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, attended by such officers as those professional chiefs chose to bring. I am sure great advantage was reaped from it. It can be proved that the smoothness of our arrangements at the unexpected opening of the Great War largely resulted from this extremely harmonious interchange of views between the two Departments. The practice, I am aware, still continues, and, of course, the Committee of Imperial Defence brings together not only the heads of the professional services but such other experts and well-informed persons as the Prime Minister may choose to invite.
But something more definite and more regular is required in my view at present, both to meet current requirements and current needs and to survey the future, than fortuitous meetings of the professional heads of the three Services. Perhaps the Lord President will refer to this point. I know that much is done in this respect. It is not novel. It is more to emphasise the application of the organisation than its invention that I am dwelling upon it. I wish the Government would consider clothing the meeting of these three professional chiefs with more authority, formality and permanence. These three high officers sitting together should be the centre of our defence system, of course under the Cabinet, which is the responsible authority representing the Sovereign. But I should like to see them sitting together and coming together not merely as representatives of the Army, the Navy and the Air Service.
They cannot, of course, entirely divest themselves of that character, but I think they should be invited, nay, requested, to assume a much wider outlook—a general outlook—and for this purpose they should be severally charged by Order-in-Council with the responsibility for advising the Government over the whole field of national defence and, moreover, they should be charged in their commissions with a responsibility not limited to the technical boundaries of their own Services to the summit of which they may have risen, and, to emphasise the broadening of their responsibility, I would suggest that they
1252
should be sworn members of the Privy Council. Nothing would more effectively impress upon officers called to this position the fact that their duties were general, and that no responsibility to any one particular Service should stand in the way of their contribution being for the safety and defence of the country as a whole. I cannot claim any originality for this suggestion, because it first appeared in a once celebrated memorandum which Lord Randolph Churchill wrote to the Harrington Commission in 1890. I have some experience myself of the three Services and of the Ministry of Munitions, and I am convinced that this grouping of the three professional Chiefs, with wider responsibilities formally assigned to them, would be a great step forward both in economy and the efficiency of our defensive arrangements, and would give for the first time to professional opinion that ordered weight, that controlled weight, which it deserves in relation to the other forces in public life.
To sum up, I urge, first of all, that the Government should affirm publicly and definitely the principle of a Ministry of Defence; secondly, that they should take forthwith every interim step towards the merging and the fusion which would render, after the passage of a number of years, such unification possible, and that this should be a steady policy pursued year after year. By doing this I believe we should increasingly fit ourselves for dealing with immediate practical problems. We should improve the value which we get for the taxpayers' money or, alternatively, we should get the same security for less money, according to whether the skies were dark or clear, and we should be moving steadily towards that sound, true organisation of our resources upon which the safety of this Island and of this Empire depends.
