Foreign Affairs.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament

14 March 1934 · House of Commons debate on foreign affairs · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 14, 1934, in a foreign affairs debate, criticising the disarmament policy, urging British air parity and proposing League of Nations-based collective security.
Main themes
Failure of the Lord Privy Seal's mission to Berlin, Paris and Rome, French resistance to disarmament proposals, French air force reduction to 500 machines, rearmament of Germany, futility of the Disarmament Conference, British air parity, proposed Air Convention and delay, weakening of France and British obligations, collective security through the League of Nations
Duration
~27 min
78th percentile
Words
3,180
78th percentile
Sentences
130
75th percentile
Readability
57
81st percentile
Grade
11.4
37th percentile
Syntax
3.07
56th percentile
Vocabulary
2.12
30th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 82%75%
  • Institutional 8%8%
  • Ceremonial 8%7%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 9%

130 sentences in 33 paragraphs

It is no doubt unfortunate that this important Debate on

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foreign affairs should have taken place when the representatives of the Foreign Office are not in a position to make anything but an interim, an exceedingly guarded, and, if I may say so, an obscure statement upon the actual facts of the European situation. I was taken to task the other day for saying that my hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal in his mission to the three capitals in Europe had failed. I have listened to his very agreeably delivered speech, so excellent in its phrasing and so well meant in its sentiments, and I am bound to say that the furthest I can go in altering my statement that his mission had failed is to say that up to the present at any rate it has not succeeded. There is certainly no one in this House who would throw the blame on the hon. Gentleman. We are quite sure that if at Berlin, Paris and Rome, he did no good, he did no harm as far as we are concerned, for no one seems to have mastered more completely the art of discussing these grave topics of foreign affairs without at any point committing an indiscretion or using expressions which would be likely to hinder the growth of that harmony which is no doubt the desire of all.

As I said the other day, the hon. Gentleman was set an impossible task. Take one instance. He had to commend to France an elaborate scheme of disarmament which meant that the French would have to agree that their Army in Europe, long the most famous in the history of the world, should be no stronger than the Army of Poland, Germany or Italy. It seemed to me, even before my hon. Friend set out on his tour, extremely unlikely that France would agree to that at any time, least of all at a time like this. I ventured to say a year ago, when the Prime Minister's first scheme was put forward, prescribing in great detail to the countries in Europe exactly how large their armies, navies and air forces should be—and may I say that that proposal was in no way detrimental to Great Britain, on the contrary, it was advantageous—that there was no chance of it being accepted. And when this scheme had been received by the French with the greatest politeness, and with an ingenuity born of what is now a long and careful study of the Anglo-Saxon mentality and the character of public opinion in the United Kingdom and in the United States, when they accepted

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with great civility the scheme as a most valuable contribution to the progress of mankind and the consolidation of the peace of the human race, but mentioned that there were a few little reservations on this point and that which they might find it necessary to introduce, I ventured to predict what the fate of the scheme would be. The modifications in the scheme have not relieved the proposal from the fact that it is bound to encounter the greatest opposition and resistance, which will be put forward through diplomatic processes of which we are now only too painfully familiar.

The Lord Privy Seal has pointed out that the objections now are not the technical objections of experts as to the size of cannons, and so on; that is not what is holding up agreement. For a long time we were told that this was the difficulty, but as the experts have now adjusted their views we have got back to where we started. Nations are not prepared to accept a great diminution of their individual security at this juncture, and they begin, at their end, to raise new and fundamental opposition to the principles of the proposals put forward. Another proposal with which the Lord Privy Seal was charged was that France should reduce her air force to 500 machines. Actually at the moment she is proposing to spend, over a certain period, £40,000,000 to £50,000,000 in order to improve the character, quality and power of her air force, which already numbers three or four times that figure. Are they likely to agree? Will the French write back to us and say that they are entirely converted from their point of view and are ready to reduce their air force to 500 machines, while contemplating an improvment in the German air force at the same time?

We are awaiting the French answer. What answer does my hon. Friend expect? Is it realy worth while indulging in these illusions? Can we expect the French to write back to us agreeing with the proposal? What is their position? They have been feeling very anxious about our own weakness in the air. Public men have been making statements about their alarm as to our own position. They desire to fill the gap in our defensive system. Now we are told that we must expect them to write and say that in consequence of the threat that England will increase her Air Force

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they are willing to reduce theirs. It is the exact opposite. By not reducing their air force they will compel us to put ourselves in a position of reasonable security; that will certainly have its bearing on the answer which the French Government will give. We are deluding ourselves if we suppose that we are going to receive from this outstanding Government something which will meet the first MacDonald scheme or the second Mac-Donald scheme. It is a mistake to indulge too long in credulity. The word "credulity" reminds me of a famous quotation from Dr. Johnson, which might well be read and pondered over by my hon. Friend:

Ye who listen with credulity to the whispers of fancy, and pursue with eagerness the phantoms of hope, who expect that age will perform the promises of youth, and that the deficiencies of the present day will be supplied by the morrow; attend to the history of Rasselas, Prince of Abysinia.

But I did not find very much of that in his most attractive and engaging speech. Neither did we find very much that was reassuring. On the contrary, in the most correct phraseology which could possibly fall from the lips of a Minister of the Crown he painted for us a more sombre picture of the deterioration which has been going steadily forward in the European position, than any we have yet heard from that Bench. I venture to suggest to my hon. Friend, in whose career really the whole House has a common interest, because we do like to see new figures emerge, to be very careful not to be too obliging in his departmental duties and not be too ready to do what is asked of him on all occasions, because he is very valuable, and we all hope that he will be associated with real successes in the domain of foreign affairs.

But, as the House knows, I have for the last four years and more been pointing out the difficulties into which we have got by this persistent harping upon disarmament. False ideas have been spread about the country that disarmament means peace. The Disarmament Conference has brought us steadily nearer, I will not say to war because I share the repulsion of using that word, but nearer to a pronounced state of ill-will than anything that could be imagined. I pointed out four years ago,

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when we were in opposition, that this pressing of Disarmament Conferences upon nations who had already signified in one way or another their desire not to be pressed further, was most dangerous diplomacy. First of all, you were met with a competition among the different countries to disarm the other fellow, to take away the peculiar weapons of this or that other country, while safeguarding their own special military or naval interests. Then, in the second place, at Disarmament Conferences which were persisted in again and again year after year in spite of every failure, the desire was to throw the blame of the inevitable breakdown on some one country or another. "It was not me but that other country which was responsible for the failure."

So, in the end, what have we got? We have not got disarmament. We have the rearmament of Germany. That is the monstrous child which has emanated from this immense labour—the rearmament of Germany. Why, it is only a little while ago that I heard Ministers say and read diplomatic documents which said that rearmament was unthinkable—"Whatever happens we cannot have that. Rearmament is unthinkable." Now all our hope is to regulate the unthinkable. Regulated unthinkability—that is what is the proposal now; and very soon it will be a question of making up our minds to unregulate unthinkability.

I think it is always an error in diplomatic policy to press a matter when it is quite clear that no further progress is to be made. It is also a great error if you ever give the impression abroad that you are using language which is more concerned with your domestic political state of things than with the actual fortunes and merits of the various great countries upon the Continent to whom you offer advice. Even suppose that the hon. Gentleman's mission shall be judged eventually to have failed, I am not be sure that we shall be so much worse off than if he had succeeded. Suppose France had taken the advice which we tendered, and have tendered during the last four or five years, and had yielded to the pressure of the two great English-speaking nations to set an example of disarmament. Suppose she had taken the advice of the Liberal news-

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papers. Only a short time ago, three or four years ago, we noted the derision with which they wrote about the French barrier of fortresses which had been put up, and so forth. Suppose the French had followed our example. Suppose they had made this gesture which is on everyone's lips to-day, and had reduced themselves to allowing their defences to fall into the kind of disarray to which we, out of the highest motives, for which we do not always get credit abroad, have reduced ours? What would be the position to-day? Where should we be?

I honour the French for their resolute determination to preserve the freedom and security of their country from invasion of any kind; I earnestly hope that we, in arranging our forces, will not fall below their example, so far as the freedom and independence of this country are concerned. The awful danger, nothing less, of our present foreign policy, is that we go on perpetually asking the French to weaken themselves. And what do we say is the inducement? We say, "Weaken yourselves," and we always hold out the hope that if they do it and get into trouble, we will then in some way or other go to their aid, although we have nothing with which to go to their aid. I cannot imagine a more dangerous policy. There is something to be said for isolation; there is something to be said for alliances. But there is nothing to be said for weakening the Power on the Continent with whom you would be in alliance, and then involving yourself more in Continental tangles in order to make it up to them. In that way you have neither one thing nor the other; you have the worse of both worlds.

The Romans had a maxim, "Shorten your weapons and lengthen your frontier." But our maxim seems to be, "Diminish your weapons and increase your obligations." Aye, and diminish the weapons of your friends. It has been a most extraordinary policy in late years. Great hopes were put on the Disarmament Conference when it began, and after Locarno there were great hopes. I am not going to pretend or suggest that the insistence on disarmament, the nagging and harping on disarmament, have been the sole cause of the great degeneration of European affairs. That would be unfair. Hideous and new factors have rushed up at us from the gulf. Hideous new events have taken place which no

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one could have foreseen. I quite agree. Surely now we have reached a point where we ought to make an end of this effort to force disarmament upon countries which feel themselves in great danger, and to put ourselves in a reasonable position of security. That will be better for peace, much better for peace, much better for our own safety if peace should fail.

We now have an urgent duty, and I am very glad the Prime Minister is in his place, because we know that the Lord President of the Council has been called away on some urgent business. The Lord President made a very important and very welcome declaration in Debate last week upon air policy, that if these attempts to obtain a Disarmament Convention failed, we should then place ourselves in a position of air parity, or words to that effect. I accept a statement of that kind in the most absolute good faith, because I am certain that with his reputation and with his responsibility my right hon. Friend would not have made such a statement if he had intended merely to use it to get round a Parliamentary-corner on a particular occasion, or to stave off the fulfilment of his undertaking by dilatory processes. Therefore, I did not share the anxiety of some hon. Gentlemen at some passages in the right hon. Gentleman's speech.

But there is one point on which anxiety might have arisen. When my right hon. Friend was making his speech and saying that if all failed, then—we all expected him to say, "Then we shall immediately take steps to put ourselves in a satisfactory position"; but after the "then" came something different. He said that then there would be an Air Convention. That was rather disappointing to some of our hopes, rather anticlimax in a way. But it seems to me that if the Air Convention, that is to say if this main tableau of military and naval arrangements, cannot be accepted, as I am sure it will not be accepted, then I gather it is the intention of the Government to say, cannot we make a convention limiting the air forces? There would be no harm in that, and I do not see why it should take very long. But what would be very dangerous indeed would be if we had to begin again in regard to the Air Convention all those elaborate discussions with all the Powers, the tremendous procedure at Geneva, to go over the whole

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course again for one-third of the prize as it were, and at the same time remain ourselves in this extremely dangerous position, while all the time the situation, for all we know, might be altering from week to week by the development of the aerial armaments and facilities of Germany.

Therefore, one hopes that when the Minister who is to reply speaks he will say something to reassure us that this Air Convention which, if the main Convention fails, is to be entered upon, will not interpose a delay of more than a few weeks in the proper review and reconsideration of our domestic defence. I made a proposal myself that we should endeavour to have an agreement with different Powers near us to limit the use of the air weapon. That is quite a different matter. There need be no delay in consequence of that—to regulate air warfare as far as you can to the zones of the armies or military objectives. There need be no delay in that, because the essence of it is that we have parity, have an equal air force. Therefore, every step we make meanwhile to secure parity would help an agreement if it could be reached on the limitations which should be imposed by either side in the use of aircraft.

I hope that the Prime Minister will be able to promise us another day some time between Easter and Whitsuntide to discuss the general question of air defence. There ought to be some day found for it, and I am sure everyone would be quite willing and content to wait till then. But there are a very great number of Members who are very anxious about it, and the Government are very anxious, as we know and see by their utterances, and it would be only reasonable to have a day to discuss the Air, either on the existing Estimates, which seem wholly inadequate, or else upon new proposals which the Government will put before us.

I do not intend to detain the House any more. But there was one remark thrown out very tentatively and guardedly by the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. M. Jones), a remark which I am bound to say seemed to me to be pregnant and deserving of attention. He said, in effect, why, if other things fail, should not the nations who are actually in agreement about keeping the peace

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and so forth, reach out their hands to one another? I think that is an idea which should be pursued, but it should be pursued through the League of Nations. It is to the League of Nations that France or Belgium or any of those countries who are alarmed by the proceedings of their powerful neighbour, Germany, should have recourse. There it is that they should make their case and all consequential action should be taken under the authority of the League of Nations.

If it be true that those countries are deeply alarmed by proceedings across their frontiers and if no satisfaction is given to them and no explanation made of what is going on, then it seems to me that those nations who are alarmed and who agree together should associate themselves one with another, under the aegis of the League of Nations and within the circle of the League and under its express authority. Thus you would have a large number of countries who agreed and who had powerful forces and who could stand there, armed, as it were, to defend each other if necessary, but who would not be able to move in any way except by the sanction of the international body. You would thus have the strength of the individual armies plus the control and authority of a great world-wide international organisation. I do not believe you will ever succeed in building up an international force in a vague and general manner or that it can be created out of cold blood. But it might well be that an international force would come into being by an alliance of national forces for a particular emergency or for particular purposes, and, once having been started, it might give the security to the world which would avert the approaching curse of war.