India Office And Services.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament

6 March 1934 · House of Commons debate (Committee of Supply, India Office and Services Vote) · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on March 6, 1934, in a debate on the India Office and Services vote, attacking the Government's proposed £1,500,000 annual grant to India for Army costs and announcing he would vote against it.
Main themes
£1,500,000 annual grant-in-aid to India, cost of the Indian Army to the British taxpayer, report of the Garran committee on Army charges, India as a training ground for troops, readiness of Indian Army in an emergency, burden of garrisoning India on British soldiers, short-service versus long-service army, sea transport subsidy of £130,000, White Paper constitution and federal home rule for India, government economy versus generosity to India
Duration
~31 min
84th percentile
Words
3,778
84th percentile
Sentences
136
77th percentile
Readability
54
75th percentile
Grade
12.7
53rd percentile
Syntax
3.24
77th percentile
Vocabulary
2.00
10th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
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Other
  • Institutional 43%40%
  • Economic 23%22%
  • Geopolitical 22%21%
  • Ceremonial 9%8%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

136 sentences in 37 paragraphs

Nothing could be more misleading than to increase the nominal total of the Army Estimates by this £1,500,000 a year. The Government are justified in being candid with the public, but it is perfectly clear, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman admits, that it in no way involves an increase of armaments of any kind. I am very glad to see my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for India in his place. I trust that he has not unduly strained the permission of his medical adviser by coming here. I very much regret if, in the course of my remarks, I should be involved in controversy with him, and he should not be in the very best of health. My right hon. Friend sometime ago accused me of hitting the Government and hitting its Members. I can assure him that that is a complete delusion, especially in his case. It is not the sinner that I hit but the sin. That rule is general in his case, on this as upon other matters.

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The right hon. Gentleman had no right to try to claim me as a supporter of his policy in this matter. I notice that His Majesty's Government are inclined to claim my protection from time to time. Even the Prime Minister seemed to go out of his way to drag me in when I was sitting most inoffensively in this corner. I cannot accord to my right hon. Friend the protection that he desires in this matter. We have been associated for many years, and he must know perfectly well—though I am not entitled to make any relevation in regard to those days any more than he is to refer to my opinions of those days—that he has heard me on many occasions and in different places express consistently, over many years, the view that the balance of charge between India and the War Office was unfairly adjusted against this country. That has been the view that I have consistently held for a great many years. To suggest that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or any Chancellor of the Exchequer in the last 25 years, would have been responsible for putting down a vote of £1,500,000 for a new grant-in-aid for India in perpetuity—and to do so in these hard times of crushing taxation and grinding economy—is altogether at variance with the known facts and with the ordinary processes of human reason. The right hon. Gentleman must stand on his own feet in this matter.

I make no complaint of the particular form of the tribunal, though I am certainly not saying that it was a wise thing to set up this tribunal. We are not concerned with the tribunal—or only very indirectly. It is not an award as the right hon. Gentleman says; it is a report. It is not an award of a judicial tribunal by which we are bound; it is a report of a body of gentlemen, a committee of very able gentlemen, to the Government, and on their report the Government have decided to take £1,500,000 per year out of the pockets of the taxpayer and to present it to the Government of India. I am certain that that would never have been allowed and would never have been agreed to by any of the Governments which have held office in the last 25 or 30 pears. We had discussions following upon the Welby Commission and the Romer Commission. There were long discussions between Lord Haldane and Lord Morley, which I perfectly remember, in which the matter was threshed out in

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great detail by men whose Liberalism and whose desire to deal equitably with India were undoubted. They arrived at what they considered to be a fair working arrangement.

During the recent Conservative Administration the late Sir Laming Worthington Evans, who was then Secretary of State for War, felt very acutely the injustice to which the British taxpayer was subjected by the cost of maintaining the service of the Indian Army, and he pressed very strongly upon the Government of that day that there should be an inquiry into one specific point, the question of sea transport charges. That was agreed to, the matter being raised on the initiative of the War Office. That fact shows that the Government of the day felt, as I know that they did, that there was a prima facie case for the diminution of the burden on the British taxpayer in respect of Indian Army costs. So far from the right hon. Gentleman quoting that as a means of trying to bring me to his rescue, and to cast my aegis over his manoeuvres, if it proves anything, it proves the reverse of what he set out to show.

I want to make it clear that Parliament is free to decide in this matter. The Committee have an absolutely free hand. We are not dealing with a judicial award, but with a proposal put forward by a Minister of the Crown, on the responsibility of our own Government at home, to add to the public burden. This is a matter in which the Committee ought to take some interest. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is distributing his surplus very early this year. I hope that it is a very large and ample surplus, but it is quite remarkable when we consider the conditions under which this Government were appointed, and the tremendous insistence upon ruthless economy at the time, that there should be so much money about, and that £1,500,000 can be pulled out and brought forward on an afternoon like this, not as an amount only for the year, but as a continuing service for all time. The figure may not be quite accurate, but I think that the capital value of that sum will represent pretty nearly £40,000,000. That is what we are asked to do, and we ought certainly to look into it very carefully. I am very glad that the hon. and gallant Gentleman

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opposite has taken interest in it. Public money ought not to be splashed about in this manner without very grave, just and searching examination by this Committee of the House of Commons.

I have read the able report of this able committee—or tribunal if you like to call it, but it is no more a tribunal than any other committee similarly appointed to make recommendations—to the Government about this question. It seems to me that the committee were very hard put to it, to find any reason for an increased contribution from Great Britain with respect to the British Army in India. On pages 8 and 9 of the report they give an account of their search for some reason, and apparently they looked at a great many promising resting places for their argument, but, upon consideration, they found that one after another would not bear the weight of any conclusion. It is not until we get to page 15 that they have at last found a foothold for this new imposition upon the British taxpayer. I hope that the Committee will look at page 15. When tribunals give decisions and do not give reasons, it is very difficult for anyone to form an opinion. But, when a tribunal or committee gives its reasons, even ordinary laymen can form their own views on them. Just let us look at the two reasons which are given on page 15. My right hon. Friend read them, but they are very important, and, if the Committee will bear with me, I will read them again. They are:

"(1) That the Army in India is a force, ready in emergency to take the field at once, which does not exist elsewhere in the Empire, which is specially available for immediate use in the East, and which has on occasion been so used.

(2) That India is a training ground for active service which does not exist elsewhere in the Empire."

I do not say that there is nothing in these two statements, but there is not very much, and to a large extent they are not true. Take the first—that the Army in India is a force ready in an emergency to take the field at once, which does not exist elsewhere in the Empire. That is only true in the sense that the British troops in India are up to full war strength, whereas in this country it is necessary to call out the reserves in order to mobilise our battalions and other units. Apart from that, it is not true to say that the troops in India are more readily

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available or are ready in an emergency to take the field at once, because, if you consider the time it takes to prepare transport, the probably much quicker location of masses of shipping in this country, and the need for furnishing special equipment in India for the various contingencies that might arise, you would not find in many cases that they would be ready any sooner, or even, possibly, so soon. Certainly they were not ready so soon in the great instance that we had in the Great War, when our Expeditionary Force had been fighting for, I think, two months before these excellent troops from India could be brought on to the scene. This first of the two reasons, therefore, on which £1,500,000 of British money is to be expended, is really capable of considerable canvassing and modification in regard to its validity.

As regards the second reason—that India is a training ground for active service which does not exist elsewhere in the Empire—again I do not wish to underrate the manly and gallant life of our troops on these vast plains of India, but I doubt whether you can say that experience in frontier wars is any special guide in, shall I say, the great struggles of the Continent of Europe. I remember often hearing the late Sir Charles Dilke argue to the contrary, and point out how, in the war of 1870, it was considered that the French suffered by having such a large proportion of Colonial generals who had been advanced from small fightings in their Colonial possessions to high positions in the Army, instead of having men at the summit who had based their views on broad scientific study of the greatest operations of war. And the Germans, let me point out, had no India, they had none of this advantage of training their troops on a great training ground such as India. Their Army was entirely a home-trained army, trained in Europe; and I have yet to learn that they did not give a very good account of themselves in the Great War. Certainly, judged by the most awful and unanswerable test, they killed between two and three men for every one of themselves who was killed, and that without any of the advantages detailed in the second reason for which we are invited to spend £1,500,000 a year for all time.

These are fairly flimsy pretexts, found after such a very long search by this

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very able Committee, considering the burden which is to be placed upon us. At any rate, whatever you may think of these reasons, there is nothing new in them; there is nothing in these two proposals which has not been perfectly obvious and well known and recognised as common ground for the last 30 years in all the endless discussions between the India Office, calling itself India—"she"—and the War Office; in all those endless discussions these facts have been perfectly well known. Why should they now be given such extraordinary prominence at the present time? That is the question that we have to investigate. Before I attempt to do so, I would like to say that against these two reasons which are given on page 15 there are other considerations which might well be studied if you are going to survey the whole relationship of the British Army in India to the Exchequer and the English taxpayer. If you are going to do that, there are other considerations which far outweigh the two set forth here. I will mention two of them to the Committee now, neither of which is referred to at all in the report. I am astonished that the representatives of the War Office did not bring them to the notice of the Committee, if in fact they did not.

To begin with, the first great consideration which must be set forth is the enormous effort and sacrifice imposed upon the British nation in maintaining an army of 60,000 men permanently under the conditions of life and service in India for generation after generation. That is holding out the dumb-bell at arm's length; it is a tremendous strain. A seven years' slice is taken out of the lives of these young men. You call it short service, but by every standard in Europe it is a very long service. Seven years are taken out of their lives, some five of which are passed under all the fierceness of the Asiatic sun, they are exposed to the trying effects of the Indian climate, and they are exposed to the temptations which naturally follow to young soldiers in that country. As we well know, the statistics of venereal disease and the general effects upon our young men sent out to serve in the Army in India are by no means negligible. I do not wish to put it too high; I make great acknowledgment of the efforts

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which have been made to improve the hygiene and conditions of the troops; but to suppose that you are not subjecting a body of 60,000 of your men, the flower of your youthful working-class manhood, to a long strain, and taking from them five or six years of the time during which they might be fitting themselves into the industrial field, to suppose that you are not taking from these men's lives something which is extremely important and which they may never get back again, is altogether to underrate the character of the effort which Britain makes to maintain an army in India.

It is our duty to make this effort, because, if we did not do so, if we did not maintain this Army in India, India would fall immediately into anarchy and civil war, and, after a brief period of turbulence and disorder, the probabilities are that history would see another conqueror, either from across the seas or through the mountains. I will not pursue the topic further, except to submit to the Committee that this great strain and effort made by Great Britain for so many generations to preserve the peace, order and security of India should count at least as an equal, and I consider as an overriding, consideration to match against this second item that India is a training ground and that they get good practice at manoeuvres out there.

Let us look at the next consideration. We could, of course, have a very much cheaper military arrangement if we had only ourselves to consider. I remember often hearing Sir Charles Dilke explain the great advantages that would accrue to our military system if we divided the Army, making India pay the whole cost of a long-service Army for India, while we ourselves had a short-service Army here, with, we will say, two years with the Colours and 10 in the Reserve. Such an Army would rapidly build up a very large, flexible, homogeneous force at no greater, and probably at a less, cost than we are now put to by having to adopt the system of seven years with the Army and five with the Reserve. It is a great mistake to suppose that our Army arrangements are not gravely complicated and burdened, as anyone who has studied the matter knows them to be, by the need of rendering this great service

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to India; and I think that this second counter-consideration ought to have been placed against, and might well be placed against, the reason of the Committee that we have some troops there ready in an emergency. I say that there is not much validity in either of these reasons, that there is nothing new in either, and that undoubtedly far stronger points can be raised on the other side.

Then there is the reservation on the last page, by Lord Dunedin and Lord Tomlin, on the question of sea transport. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that this is a matter well worthy of our attention. Here are these two great legal authorities, dealing, not with any of those imponderabilia which played such a large part in every sphere in which the committee worked; they are dealing with a question on which they are absolutely competent to express an opinion, namely, whether there is a case in equity and in contract for the continuance of the £130,000 subsidy in aid of sea transport. They both come to this conclusion:

We, therefore, though reluctantly.… are driven to the conclusion that there is no ground for the subsidy….

But that does not affect the Government at all. In this mood of generosity which has swept across them, and for which usually we search in vain, they have not hesitated to act against the opinion of these two eminent legal authorities dealing with a matter on which they are perfectly competent to pronounce. In order to bring matters to an issue, therefore, I propose, if it can be fitted in with any other Motion—I am not sure whether there is a Motion from the other side to reduce the Vote—to move to reduce the Vote by £130,000, in order to point out that the policy of the Government in this respect at any rate should be brought into line with the definite rulings of these two eminent Law Lords, who are themselves so friendly to the aspirations of India in other respects. If I get an opportunity, I shall also vote against the grant of £1,500,000 as a whole.

To return to the question that I mentioned a moment ago, why His Majesty's Government decided to convey this new grant-in-aid to India, or rather to the British Government in India, at this particular time, no doubt we shall be told that it has nothing to do with the White Paper Constitution and nothing to do With the grave financial expense and con-

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fusion in which the attempt to extend the pleasures of democratic electioneering to the Indian masses is likely to involve the Indian Government. Those who wish to deceive themselves will believe that it has nothing to do with it. I am told that the right hon. Gentleman even referred to the possibility of money from this source in one of his answers before the Committee, but I have not the reference, and, if that is not so, I will stand corrected. We shall be told it had nothing to do with it, just as we were told that the retrocession of the Bangalore Cantonment had nothing to do with the desire to make Mysore into a federal system, or that the new arrangements made about the Nizam's sovereignity over the Berars had nothing to do with any desire to include that great Indian State in Federation. It seems to me, and I believe it to be true—I regret to say it—that this extra payment of £1,500,000 which is being engineered and might slip through the House without the public attention being drawn to it is part of that elaborate crochet work which my right hon. Friend, I am sorry to say, has too often mistaken for statesmanship. Let the Committee contrast this strange liberality with the attitude of the Government and the Treasury when the question is discussed of the difference between two and three shillings in the children's allowance. Then a very different mood prevails. Then the Government are adamant. Then the Chancellor of the Exchequer is the emblem of financial austerity.

Something has happened in regard to the Indian matter which puts it in a different category, and I will tell the Committee what in my opinion has happened. When a Cabinet Minister gets into a difficulty with a policy on which the Cabinet is bent and to which it is largely committed and they do not see their way clearly through it, the money has to be found and the Chancellor of the Exchequer has to face the burden.

Not once or twice in our rough island story the line of least resistance has been found through the pocket of the taxpayer. Do not let the Committee delude itself with the idea that this sop—for it is no more—is or will be accepted as a settlement. India, that national entity which you are endeavouring to call into being and the nucleus of the British

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bureaucracy will not accept it. You have only to see the proposals which the India Office put forward. Our Secretary of State hopefully put forward five or six proposals which would have added enormously to our charges. He put them forward as matters which should be considered so that, when it came to splitting the difference, there would be a very good chance of their getting a large slice of the money of the British taxpayer. Of course, what you are doink now will be brought forward by the Indian Home Rule Government as soon as it is constituted. They will say: "You have admitted the injustice. What about the arrears of all these years?" They will press not only for the different concessions which the Secretary of State and the India Office have put before the Committee. They will take these as a starting point and will press forward much larger demands, and that will be the first phase of the new Government when it is created. This is only the first heavy drop of the thunder shower. It is only the first of the deprivations and repudiations to which we are to be subjected if the policy to which my right hon. Friend is committed is carried out. If you have so much money as all this, if you are in such a giving mood, if you are resolved to persist in the policy of giving federal home rule to India, you should have kept this £1,500,000 a year carefully as a means of guaranteeing the pensions of the British officials who have so faithfully served you and served their country and whose anxiety you might so easily thereby have allayed.