International Situation.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

19 May 1939 · House of Commons debate on the international situation · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill, a backbench MP, spoke in the House of Commons in London on May 19, 1939, urging the Government to accept the Soviet proposal for a triple alliance with Britain and France against aggression.
Main themes
Proposed triple alliance of Britain, France and Soviet Russia, deadlock in Anglo-Soviet negotiations, Anglo-Turkish agreement, guarantees to Poland and Rumania, security of the Baltic States, need for an Eastern front, Soviet munitions aid to Poland, Italy, Spain and Portugal and the alliance, lessons of the Russian front in 1917, criticism of the Chamberlain government's foresight
Duration
~27 min
79th percentile
Words
3,297
79th percentile
Sentences
158
82nd percentile
Readability
59
86th percentile
Grade
10.2
23rd percentile
Syntax
2.93
38th percentile
Vocabulary
2.13
33rd percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 86%79%
  • Institutional 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 8%

158 sentences in 35 paragraphs

The cool and deft Parliamentary reply which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has just delivered has not, I think, carried the Committee very much further. Nor has it, I venture to

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say, reassured those who feel deep misgivings about the present situation. One could hardly have expected to hear that after many weeks of negotiation, at a most vital moment, there was a complete deadlock, for the moment, between the Russian Soviet Government and His Majesty's Government. One has not received, I think, any very clear account of the differences which exist, nor of the reason or substance which lie in those differences. We have been told that the negotiations are still proceeding and that the situation is extremely delicate. That may be quite true, but they have beep proceeding all these weeks, and the time may be very short. I have been quite unable to understand what is the objection to making the agreement with Russia which the Prime Minister professes himself desirous of doing, and making it in the broad and simple form proposed by the Russian Soviet Government. I have learned nothing to-day from the right hon. Gentleman which throws the least light on that.

Undoubtedly, the proposals put forward by the Russian Government, which have been given very considerable publicity, contemplate a triple alliance between England, France and Russia, which alliance may extend its benefits to other countries if and when those benefits are desired, against aggression. The alliance is solely for the purpose of resisting further acts of aggression and of protecting the victims of aggression. I cannot see what is wrong with that, and I am going, if the House will bear with me, to examine some aspects of the difficulty. What is wrong with this simple proposal? It is said: "Can you trust the Russian Soviet Government?" I suppose in Moscow they say "Can we trust Chamberlain?" I hope that we may say that the answer to both questions is in the affirmative. I earnestly hope so.

There was more than one phrase in the necessarily guarded closing remarks of my right hon. Friend which inspired me with the hope that the differences between His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government, and the differences between the right hon. Gentleman and other Members of the House, may not be so large as we have been, unhappily, led to suppose. When you come to examine the first question, the interest and the loyalty of the Russian Government in this matter, you must not

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be guided by sentiment. You must be guided by a study of the interests involved. The vital major interests of Russia are deeply engaged in co-operation with Great Britain and France to prevent further acts of aggression. We have heard of the Turkish Agreement, on which everybody congratulates and compliments His Majesty's Government. I think it is particularly satisfactory in the Turkish Agreement that there were foresight and design and that a £10,000,000 loan was proposed by the Prime Minister more than a year ago. It is this evidence of foresight and design which is specially welcomed and specially beneficial at this time. If one may quote a famous phrase, they are "rare and refreshing fruit," the more refreshing because perhaps, unhappily, they are somewhat rare.

This Turkish proposal, which is universally accepted, is a great consolidating and stabilising force throughout the whole of the Black Sea area and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey, with whom we have made this agreement, is in the closest harmony with Russia. She is also in the closest harmony with Rumania. These Powers together are mutually protecting vital interests. If an advance down the Danube of Nazi influence were to lead to the setting in motion of submarines in the Black Sea, that would be a menace to all the vital interests of Russia and Turkey. Therefore, you have been working on a community of interests. A community of interests prevails throughout this great area affected by the very wise and sagacious Agreement between Turkey and Great Britain, which I hope will in a few days be supplemented by a similar undertaking between France and Turkey.

There is a great identity of interests between Great Britain and the associated Powers in the South. Is there not a similar identity of interests in the North? Take the countries of the Baltic, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which were once the occasion of the wars of Peter the Great. It is a vital major interest of Russia that these Powers should not fall into the hands of Nazi Germany. That is a vital interest in the North. I need not elaborate the arguments about the Ukraine which means an invasion of Russian territory. All along the whole of this eastern front you can see that the major interests of Russia are definitely engaged, and, therefore, it seems that you could

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fairly judge that they would pool their interests with other countries similarly affected.

I should have thought that this plan of a triple alliance is a preliminary step, and an invitation to other countries in danger on this front to come under its protection, was the most straightforward and practical manner of approaching the subject. I do not know whether I can commend it to my right hon. Friend by adopting a simile selected as a special compliment to him. It is like setting up an armoured umbrella, under which other countries will be invited to take shelter as and when they seek to do so. But we cannot exclude from our minds the fact that we are in a deadlock at the moment. What are the differences? We have already given guarantees to Poland and Rumania, and the Government tell us that they would be glad if Russia would give similar guarantees. Consequently, if Poland and Rumania are attacked we shall be in the war, and so will Russia. It is almost axiomatic that those who are allies of the same Power are allies of one another. It is almost axiomatic.

If you are ready to be an ally of Russia in time of war, which is the supreme test, the great occasion of all, if you are ready to join hands with Russia in the defence of Poland, which you have guaranteed, and of Rumania, why should you shrink from becoming the ally of Russia now, when you may by that very fact prevent the breaking out of war? I cannot understand all these refinements of diplomacy and delay. If the worst comes to the worst you are in the midst of it with them, and you have to make the best of it with them. If the difficulties do not arise, well, you will have had the security in the preliminary stages.

Now I must deal with some of the objections. The right hon. Gentleman, very prudently, did not wish to discuss the position of some of the other countries. We know, however, that the names of some of those countries are being used in discussion, and it is absolutely necessary that we should look a little at the position of those different countries. Take, in the first place, Poland. It is not true to say that Poland is an obstacle to the formation of this triple alliance. The Government will contradict me if they feel it necessary

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to do so, but I cannot believe that the Polish Government will consider it any part of their duty to place a barrier between arrangements which might be made between France, England and Russia for their own mutual security. Poland would naturally not wish that her affairs should be decided over her head, and I notice with great satisfaction that when M. Potemkin visited Warsaw we were led to believe from all that transpired—to use that much abused word in its proper sense—that the conversations on all the matters involved were highly satisfactory. Therefore, I will not have it said and put into currency that Poland is the obstacle to agreement between Britain, France and Russia.

Nor is the introduction of the Baltic States an obstacle either to Poland or to Russia. On the contrary, these Baltic States, united together by the closest military agreement, are also in the closest touch with Poland. There is harmony there. The vital interests of Poland would be affected by the subjugation to the Nazi Power of the three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The same is true of Russia. There is an identity of interests in respect of these States. Are we to be told that we shall increase our responsibilities by guaranteeing these Baltic States as well? You will not extend your responsibilites, or your burdens, by extending your guarantees to cover all these countries, at the point at which you have now got, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. You are in it up to the neck already, and the question is how to make your system effective, and effective in time. I should have though that at the point at which we have now reached, there is safety in numbers, and there may be even peace in numbers, provided that every State that is admitted makes its fair contribution and shows itself earnestly resolved to take all measures to maintain its independence. Therefore, it seems to me that there is no reasonable objection on the ground of the attitude of Poland, and no reasonable objection on the ground of our having to give a guarantee or being involved in the fate of the Baltic States. These are not valid reasons in themselves for not going forward with this alliance with the Soviet.

But there are other countries of which we have heard. Take the case of Italy. It has been said: Do not irritate Signor

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Mussolini by making an alliance in time of peace with the Russian Soviet Government, just as he may be coming round, when he may be going to show some expectation of a change of policy. If the Prime Minister desires to influence Signor Mussolini, let me assure him that there is one way, and one way only, in which you can do it, and that is to be strong: nothing else will have any effect. If we are able to convince Signor Mussolini that Great Britain is strong, is arming herself, is united with the French Republic and bound together with other countries and has the whole power of Russia at her disposal, you will have the best chance of Signor Mussolini bracing himself for the great effort which may be required of him to liberate his own country from foreign thraldom.

There is the question of General Franco—that General Franco, also, may be coming round, and that we must not put him off. All we ask of General Franco is that he shall be neutral and rebuild the ruins of his country, and make a profit, as Spain did in the last War, from both sides. That is the only source from which they are likely to gain at the present. Can anyone doubt that that is the Spanish interest and the desire of General Franco? Yet if there is a different policy pursued in Spain, it is not because General Franco desires it but because there are forces and intrigues on the part of the Nazi and Fascist Powers. The way to counteract these forces of intrigue is to be strong, and the united strength of all peace-seeking nations would, as the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) has said, be overwhelming and would have a deterrent effect.

There is one other country, and that is Portugal, our ancient ally, with whom we have the oldest alliance in the world, the famous Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. Will they, it is said, not be rendered uneasy if they see their British ally also an ally of the Soviet Republic? I think it should be easy to remove such anxieties, because obviously if we are allies of the Russian Soviet Government they will not molest our allies by any intrigues or Communist propaganda. It will be quite easy to insist upon that as an element in the co-operation of our alliance. What is taking place in France to-day? Some time ago I was at Metz and the general there informed me that

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there were no more loyal and serviceable soldiers under his command than the Communists. Why is that? It is not because they care about France, but because they care about resistance to Nazi domination. What does it matter what the motive is as long as the action is effective and trustworthy? Motive is a matter for the individual himself. Therefore, it seems to me that it would be a great assurance to the Portuguese Government and people that they would not be disturbed by internal intrigues from the Comintern. An alliance with Russia would be an actual guarantee in the interests of Portugal rather than the contrary. At any rate, you will do far better if you have an opportunity of speaking to Russia as an ally than if you have the conditions of distrust and mutual suspicion which prevail at the present time.

There is only one more point I want to make, and I must make it if the House will bear with me. It is what I may call the technical military aspect of the defence of Poland. His Majesty's Government have given a guarantee to Poland. I was astounded when I heard them give this guarantee. I support it, but I was astounded by it, because nothing that had happened before led one to suppose that such a step would be taken. I want to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that the question posed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs ten days ago, and repeated to-day has not been answered. The question was whether the General Staff was consulted before this guarantee was given as to whether it was safe and practical to give it, and whether there were any means of implementing it. The whole country knows that the question has been asked, and it has not been answered. That is disconcerting and disquieting, because obviously if it could have been answered it would answered about giving £5,000,000 of Czech money back to Germany. I had hoped that it would be answered, but it was not, because it could not be answered in any satisfactory form.

If there had been a careful military examination of this problem, I think it would have been seen at the very outset that no great influx of Russian troops into Poland for the purposes of the defence of Poland is practically possible. The roads and the railroads, of which the

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gauges change at the Russo-Polish frontier, would not enable any large Russian army to come into action on the Western borders of Poland. Moreover, it is not necessary, for the Poles have a very large army; they do not lack brave men to defend their native land and their regained independence. What they need is not men: they need munitions. That is what I want to impress upon the Committee. That is what we shall all need should a war come—not only Poland and Great Britain, but all the countries engaged in it. In the last War, the fighting was very intense for two months or more, and then suddenly it stopped, not only because of the winter, but because both sides had fired their ammunition. There had to be a breathing-space. There will not be any breathing-space in the next war. Once the German bombardment is begun, it will continue for many months without the slightest slackening. This country and its allies must be equally able to maintain themselves, and that is where the aid of Russia to Poland is going to be absolutely vital, in aeroplanes, tanks, artillery, ammunition and equipment. This ought to be studied and thought out. It is not a question of bringing in great masses of Russian troops, but of giving aid in the form in which it it needed and in the form in which I have every reason to believe Russia would give it in practice, provided that, on these broad lines, a triple alliance were set up. That is why M. Potemkin's conversations were satisfactory.

Clearly, Russia is not going to enter into agreements unless she is treated as an equal, and not only treated as an equal, but has confidence that the methods employed by the allies—by the peace front—are such as would be likely to lead to success. No one wants to associate themselves with indeterminate leadership and uncertain policies. The Government must realise that none of these States in Eastern Europe can maintain themselves for, say, a year's war unless they have behind them the massive, solid backing of a friendly Russia, joined to the combination of the Western Powers. I do not agree altogether with the very dark colours with which my right hon. Friend invested his picture in order to bring out his points, but, in the main, I agree with him that if there k to be an effective Eastern front—an Eastern

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peace front, or a war front as it might become—it can be set up only with the effective support of a friendly Soviet Russia lying behind all those countries.

Unless there is an Eastern front set up, what is going to happen to the West? What is going to happen to those countries on the Western front to whom, if we had not given guarantees, it is admitted we are bound—countries like Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Switzerland? What is going to happen to those countries? How are they to be defended if there is no Eastern front in activity? Let us look back to the experiences we had in 1917. In 1917, the Russian front was broken and demoralised. Revolution and mutiny had sapped the courage of that great disciplined army, and the conditions at the front were indescribable; and yet, until the Treaty was made closing the front down, more than 1,500,000 Germans were held upon that front, even in its most ineffectual and unhappy condition. Once that front was closed down, 1,000,000 Germans and 5,000 cannon were brought to the West, and almost at the last moment turned the course of the War and forced upon us a disastrous peace.

It is a tremendous thing this question of the Eastern front. I am astonished that there is not more anxiety about it. Certainly, I do not ask favours of Soviet Russia. This is no time to ask favours of countries. But here is an offer, a fair offer, and a better offer, in my opinion, than the terms which the Government seek to get for themselves; a more simple, a more direct and a more effective offer. Let it not be put aside and come to nothing. I beg His Majesty's Government to get some of these brutal truths into their heads. Without any effective Eastern front, there can be no satisfactory defence of our interests in the West, and without Russia there can be no effective Eastern front. If His Majesty's Government, having neglected our defences for a long time, having thrown away Czecho-Slovakia with all that Czechoslovakia meant in military power, having committed us without examination of the technical aspects to the defence of Poland and Rumania, now reject and cast away the indispensable aid of Russia, and so lead us in the worst of all ways into the worst of all wars, they will have Hi-deserved the confidence and, I will add,

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the generosity with which they have been treated by their fellow-countrymen.